Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets.a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Perform...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, MA
Harvard University Press
[2009]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAB01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UPA01 UBG01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets.a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders.Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives.This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 06. Mrz 2024) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (304 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780674020634 |
| DOI: | 10.4159/9780674020634 |
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| 520 | |a The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets.a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders.Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives.This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| spelling | Bebchuk, Lucian Verfasser aut Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press [2009] © 2006 1 Online-Ressource (304 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 06. Mrz 2024) The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets.a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders.Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives.This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance In English BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Business Law bisacsh Corporate governance Executives Salaries, etc Fried, Jesse Sonstige oth https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674020634?locatt=mode:legacy Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bebchuk, Lucian Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Business Law bisacsh Corporate governance Executives Salaries, etc |
| title | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation |
| title_auth | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation |
| title_exact_search | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation |
| title_full | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried |
| title_fullStr | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried |
| title_short | Pay without Performance |
| title_sort | pay without performance the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation |
| title_sub | The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation |
| topic | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Business Law bisacsh Corporate governance Executives Salaries, etc |
| topic_facet | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Business Law Corporate governance Executives Salaries, etc |
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