Why we doubt: a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations
"This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Oxford
Oxford University Press
[2023]
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying to uncover the hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations. He then gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of having and applying this rule. Based on these ideas, he shows how we can give a new response to the traditional problem of global skepticism. He also argues that philosophical skepticism is not just something that comes up during philosophical reflection, as David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce and other philosophers have urged. Instead, it is of great practical significance. The rule which produces skepticism may itself be operative in certain pathologies such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, in creative endeavors, and in conspiratorial thinking. The rule can also explain some of our reluctance to trust statistical evidence, especially in legal settings. More broadly, this volume aims to breathe new life into a classic problem in philosophy by tackling it from a new perspective and exploring new areas of application. The book will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists and anyone interested in the human capacity to doubt and to question our beliefs"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xii, 277 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198871965 |
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| adam_text | Contents xiii List of Figures Introduction and Book Summary Skeptical Doubt The Rational Tension Created by Our Skeptical Judgments The Importance of Knowledge The Traditional and Cognitive Projects The Skeptical Rule Hidden Rules and Reflective Thought Determining the Rule The Function of the Skeptical Rule Applications Outline of the Book 1 1 2 6 6 10 12 14 14 16 18 I. SKEPTICAL TENSION 1. The Need for an Explanation 1.0 Chapter Summary 1.1 Closure-Based Skeptical Paradoxes 1.2 Probabilistic Rational Tension without Closure 1.3 Knowledge or Justification 1.4 Getting Clear on “Skeptical Doubt” 1.5 Intuitions or Arguments? 1.6 Five Arguments for the Skeptical Premise 1.7 Summary of What Needs to Be Explained 1.8 The Human Attraction to Skepticism 1.9 Direct vs Indirect Doubt 1.10 Cognitive Explanations 23 23 23 28 28 30 30 32 36 37 42 47 II. THE POSITIVE ACCOUNT 2. The 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Skeptical Rule Chapter Summary The Guiding Idea The Focus on Error Sensitivity as the Core of the Skeptical Rule Principal Base Sensitivity as a Heuristic for Doubt Explaining Lottery, Local, and Statistical Cases 55 55 55 56 60 65 73
X CONTENTS 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 Explaining the Attraction to Global Skepticism The Under-Determination Argument for the Skeptical Premise and Sensitivity The Cartesian Argument for the Skeptical Premise and Sensitivity The “Prior Justification” Argument for the Skeptical Premise and Sensitivity 82 88 92 95 Broad Function (Part 1) 3.0 Chapter Summary 3.1 Guided by First-Person Cases 3.2 Meta-Cognitive Preliminaries 3.3 A Model for Meta-Cognition 3.4 Meta-Cognitive Experiences 3.5 The Role of Meta-Cognitive Experiences 3.6 The Skeptical Experience 3.7 Some Negative Epistemic Feelings Will Not Be Produced by Meta-Cognitive Processes 3.8 Some States of Uncertainty Do Not Involve Feelings 97 97 97 99 100 102 103 106 Broad Function (Part 2) 4.0 Chapter Summary 4.1 General Description of the Model 4.2 Philosophical Reflection and the Monitor-Control Dynamics 4.3 Summary of Evidence that Skeptical Inclinations Fit the Model 4.4 Black Box Status 4.5 Functional Role of Skeptical Judgments 4.6 Evidence from Our Intuitive Assessments of Reasoning 4.7 Knowledge-Action Norms 4.8 Experimental Work on Knowledge and Action 4.9 Knowledge and Practical Interests 4.10 Priority of First- vs Third-Person Judgments 110 110 110 113 114 115 117 119 119 123 124 126 Narrow Function 5.0 Chapter Summary 5.1 Taking Stock 5.2 Sosa and DeRose on Why We Deploy Sensitivity in Forming Skeptical Judgments 5.3 The Bottom-Up Approach 5.4 The Bayesian Function of Principal Base Sensitivity 5.5 Further Remarks on PBS and Norm 5.6 What Counts as Explanatory Success? 127 127 127 108 108 128 132 134 139 140
CONTENTS XI III. APPLICATIONS 6. Solving the Skeptical Paradox 6.0 Chapter Summary 6.1 Three Grades of Solutions to Skepticism 6.2 Two Models of Justification from Heuristics 6.3 A Defeating Principle for Heuristic-Based Beliefs 6.4 Defeating Global Skepticism 6.5 Local, Lottery, and Statistical Cases 6.6 Are We Begging the Question? 145 145 145 146 148 150 154 156 7. Skepticism in Society 7.0 Chapter Summary 7.1 Creative Inquiry 7.2 Do Knowledge Norms Dampen Creativity? 7.3 Skepticism as an Antidote to Conservativism Bias 7.4 When Skepticism Hinders Inquiry 7.5 Conspiracy Theories 158 158 158 159 162 164 165 8. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 8.0 Chapter Summary 8.1 OCD and Skepticism 8.2 The Doubting Disease 8.3 The Skeptical Model of OCD Doubt (SMOD) 8.4 Support for SMOD: Seven Features of OCD That Can Be Explained by SMOD 8.5 Final Remarks 172 172 172 173 174 9. Varieties of Doubt 9.0 Chapter Summary 9.1 Characterizing Doubt 9.2 Sub-Personal States of Doubt 9.3 Can We Doubt Things We Never Believed? The Spinozan Model 9.4 Heuristic Doubt 9.5 Doubt without Denials of Knowledge 9.6 Principal Base Sensitivity without Meta-Cognition 9.7 Doubt in the Brain: Deficiencies of Doubt 189 189 189 190 191 193 194 196 197 176 187 IV. COMPETING VIEWS AND OBJECTIONS 10. Philosophically Accommodating Accounts 10.0 Chapter Summary 10.1 Language and Philosophy 10.2 External World Skepticism 10.3 Relevant Alternative Theory 10.4 Eliminating Alternatives 10.5 What Counts as a RelevantAlternative? 203 203 203 204 209 213 217
xii CONTENTS 11. Psychological Accounts 11.0 Chapter Summary 11.1 General Remarks about Extant Accounts 11.2 Availability Heuristic 11.3 Gerken’s Stereotypical Knowledge Ascriptions 11.4 Nagel’s Ego-Centric Approach 11.5 Hawthorne’s Sub-Cases 11.6 Turri’s Explanations 221 221 221 222 225 227 231 232 12. Objections to Sensitivity 12.0 Chapter Summary 12.1 Genuine Counter-Examples to PBS: The Closure Worry 12.2 Genuine Counter-Examples to PBS: Probative Yet Insensitive Evidence Which Puts You over the Knowledge Threshold; Preemption with Perfect Replacement? 12.3 Some Failed Counter-Examples 12.4 Grandparent 12.5 Williamson’s Under-Estimator 12.6 Ice Cubes and Garbage Chutes 12.7 Extreme Cases 12.8 Statistical Evidence 12.9 Small Changes in Statistical Evidence 12.10 Bold Prisoner 235 235 235 Works Cited Index 253 275 237 240 241 242 243 246 248 249 251
|
| adam_txt |
Contents xiii List of Figures Introduction and Book Summary Skeptical Doubt The Rational Tension Created by Our Skeptical Judgments The Importance of Knowledge The Traditional and Cognitive Projects The Skeptical Rule Hidden Rules and Reflective Thought Determining the Rule The Function of the Skeptical Rule Applications Outline of the Book 1 1 2 6 6 10 12 14 14 16 18 I. SKEPTICAL TENSION 1. The Need for an Explanation 1.0 Chapter Summary 1.1 Closure-Based Skeptical Paradoxes 1.2 Probabilistic Rational Tension without Closure 1.3 Knowledge or Justification 1.4 Getting Clear on “Skeptical Doubt” 1.5 Intuitions or Arguments? 1.6 Five Arguments for the Skeptical Premise 1.7 Summary of What Needs to Be Explained 1.8 The Human Attraction to Skepticism 1.9 Direct vs Indirect Doubt 1.10 Cognitive Explanations 23 23 23 28 28 30 30 32 36 37 42 47 II. THE POSITIVE ACCOUNT 2. The 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Skeptical Rule Chapter Summary The Guiding Idea The Focus on Error Sensitivity as the Core of the Skeptical Rule Principal Base Sensitivity as a Heuristic for Doubt Explaining Lottery, Local, and Statistical Cases 55 55 55 56 60 65 73
X CONTENTS 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 Explaining the Attraction to Global Skepticism The Under-Determination Argument for the Skeptical Premise and Sensitivity The Cartesian Argument for the Skeptical Premise and Sensitivity The “Prior Justification” Argument for the Skeptical Premise and Sensitivity 82 88 92 95 Broad Function (Part 1) 3.0 Chapter Summary 3.1 Guided by First-Person Cases 3.2 Meta-Cognitive Preliminaries 3.3 A Model for Meta-Cognition 3.4 Meta-Cognitive Experiences 3.5 The Role of Meta-Cognitive Experiences 3.6 The Skeptical Experience 3.7 Some Negative Epistemic Feelings Will Not Be Produced by Meta-Cognitive Processes 3.8 Some States of Uncertainty Do Not Involve Feelings 97 97 97 99 100 102 103 106 Broad Function (Part 2) 4.0 Chapter Summary 4.1 General Description of the Model 4.2 Philosophical Reflection and the Monitor-Control Dynamics 4.3 Summary of Evidence that Skeptical Inclinations Fit the Model 4.4 Black Box Status 4.5 Functional Role of Skeptical Judgments 4.6 Evidence from Our Intuitive Assessments of Reasoning 4.7 Knowledge-Action Norms 4.8 Experimental Work on Knowledge and Action 4.9 Knowledge and Practical Interests 4.10 Priority of First- vs Third-Person Judgments 110 110 110 113 114 115 117 119 119 123 124 126 Narrow Function 5.0 Chapter Summary 5.1 Taking Stock 5.2 Sosa and DeRose on Why We Deploy Sensitivity in Forming Skeptical Judgments 5.3 The Bottom-Up Approach 5.4 The Bayesian Function of Principal Base Sensitivity 5.5 Further Remarks on PBS and Norm 5.6 What Counts as Explanatory Success? 127 127 127 108 108 128 132 134 139 140
CONTENTS XI III. APPLICATIONS 6. Solving the Skeptical Paradox 6.0 Chapter Summary 6.1 Three Grades of Solutions to Skepticism 6.2 Two Models of Justification from Heuristics 6.3 A Defeating Principle for Heuristic-Based Beliefs 6.4 Defeating Global Skepticism 6.5 Local, Lottery, and Statistical Cases 6.6 Are We Begging the Question? 145 145 145 146 148 150 154 156 7. Skepticism in Society 7.0 Chapter Summary 7.1 Creative Inquiry 7.2 Do Knowledge Norms Dampen Creativity? 7.3 Skepticism as an Antidote to Conservativism Bias 7.4 When Skepticism Hinders Inquiry 7.5 Conspiracy Theories 158 158 158 159 162 164 165 8. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 8.0 Chapter Summary 8.1 OCD and Skepticism 8.2 The Doubting Disease 8.3 The Skeptical Model of OCD Doubt (SMOD) 8.4 Support for SMOD: Seven Features of OCD That Can Be Explained by SMOD 8.5 Final Remarks 172 172 172 173 174 9. Varieties of Doubt 9.0 Chapter Summary 9.1 Characterizing Doubt 9.2 Sub-Personal States of Doubt 9.3 Can We Doubt Things We Never Believed? The Spinozan Model 9.4 Heuristic Doubt 9.5 Doubt without Denials of Knowledge 9.6 Principal Base Sensitivity without Meta-Cognition 9.7 Doubt in the Brain: Deficiencies of Doubt 189 189 189 190 191 193 194 196 197 176 187 IV. COMPETING VIEWS AND OBJECTIONS 10. Philosophically Accommodating Accounts 10.0 Chapter Summary 10.1 Language and Philosophy 10.2 External World Skepticism 10.3 Relevant Alternative Theory 10.4 Eliminating Alternatives 10.5 What Counts as a RelevantAlternative? 203 203 203 204 209 213 217
xii CONTENTS 11. Psychological Accounts 11.0 Chapter Summary 11.1 General Remarks about Extant Accounts 11.2 Availability Heuristic 11.3 Gerken’s Stereotypical Knowledge Ascriptions 11.4 Nagel’s Ego-Centric Approach 11.5 Hawthorne’s Sub-Cases 11.6 Turri’s Explanations 221 221 221 222 225 227 231 232 12. Objections to Sensitivity 12.0 Chapter Summary 12.1 Genuine Counter-Examples to PBS: The Closure Worry 12.2 Genuine Counter-Examples to PBS: Probative Yet Insensitive Evidence Which Puts You over the Knowledge Threshold; Preemption with Perfect Replacement? 12.3 Some Failed Counter-Examples 12.4 Grandparent 12.5 Williamson’s Under-Estimator 12.6 Ice Cubes and Garbage Chutes 12.7 Extreme Cases 12.8 Statistical Evidence 12.9 Small Changes in Statistical Evidence 12.10 Bold Prisoner 235 235 235 Works Cited Index 253 275 237 240 241 242 243 246 248 249 251 |
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| spelling | Pinillos, N. Ángel Verfasser aut Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations N. Ángel Pinillos Oxford Oxford University Press [2023] xii, 277 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm txt rdacontent sti rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying to uncover the hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations. He then gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of having and applying this rule. Based on these ideas, he shows how we can give a new response to the traditional problem of global skepticism. He also argues that philosophical skepticism is not just something that comes up during philosophical reflection, as David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce and other philosophers have urged. Instead, it is of great practical significance. The rule which produces skepticism may itself be operative in certain pathologies such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, in creative endeavors, and in conspiratorial thinking. The rule can also explain some of our reluctance to trust statistical evidence, especially in legal settings. More broadly, this volume aims to breathe new life into a classic problem in philosophy by tackling it from a new perspective and exploring new areas of application. The book will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists and anyone interested in the human capacity to doubt and to question our beliefs"-- Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd rswk-swf Skepticism Belief and doubt Cognition Scepticisme Croyance et doute cognition Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 s Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9780198871972 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9780198871989 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034821424&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Pinillos, N. Ángel Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
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| title | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations |
| title_auth | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations |
| title_exact_search | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations |
| title_full | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations N. Ángel Pinillos |
| title_fullStr | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations N. Ángel Pinillos |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations N. Ángel Pinillos |
| title_short | Why we doubt |
| title_sort | why we doubt a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations |
| title_sub | a cognitive account of our skeptical inclinations |
| topic | Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Erkenntnistheorie Zweifel Philosophy of Mind Skeptizismus |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034821424&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pinillosnangel whywedoubtacognitiveaccountofourskepticalinclinations |