ROBOTROLLING 1/2022:
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Riga [Latvia]
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
2022
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 |
| Beschreibung: | In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the "genocide" of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative's traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (6 Seiten) |
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| 500 | |a In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the "genocide" of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative's traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Geopolitics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Peace and Conflict Studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Russian Aggression against Ukraine | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Fredheim, Rolf |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Stolze, Martha |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
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The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. 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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T23:12:56Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T10:07:32Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (6 Seiten) |
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| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
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| publisher | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence |
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| spelling | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 Riga [Latvia] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 2022 Frankfurt M. CEEOL 2022 1 Online-Ressource (6 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the "genocide" of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative's traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets Media studies International relations/trade Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies Geopolitics Peace and Conflict Studies Russian Aggression against Ukraine Fredheim, Rolf Sonstige oth Stolze, Martha Sonstige oth Central and Eastern European Online Library Sonstige oth |
| spellingShingle | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 Media studies International relations/trade Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies Geopolitics Peace and Conflict Studies Russian Aggression against Ukraine |
| title | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_auth | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_exact_search | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_exact_search_txtP | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_full | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_fullStr | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_full_unstemmed | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_short | ROBOTROLLING 1/2022 |
| title_sort | robotrolling 1 2022 |
| topic | Media studies International relations/trade Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies Geopolitics Peace and Conflict Studies Russian Aggression against Ukraine |
| topic_facet | Media studies International relations/trade Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies Geopolitics Peace and Conflict Studies Russian Aggression against Ukraine |
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