ROBOTROLLING 4/2019:
Gespeichert in:
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
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Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Riga [Latvia]
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
2019
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 |
Beschreibung: | In this edition of Robotrolling, we expose a coordinated network of bots on Facebook, Twitter, and VK connected to a militaristic YouTube channel. Through our analysis, we discovered that the group of automated accounts is used to spread anti-NATO videos in the pro-Donbass information space. Our findings demonstrate that the video-sharing platform is a ripe target for robotic exploitation. During this period, the level of Russian-language bot activity decreased on Twitter. Meanwhile, English-language bot activity remained unchanged. On VK, the volume of messaging increased by 8%. Nearly a quarter of unique users engaging with NATO-related topics were identified as bot accounts. Russian- and English-language conversations about the NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland peaked on 13 August on both Twitter and VK. On Twitter, English-language bot and anonymous accounts targeted Poland, while the Baltic States received the majority of Russian-language bot attention. Events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Second World War attracted significant levels of fake engagement throughout the monitoring period. We observed two recurring anti-NATO narratives circulating in this context: (1) NATO is occupying the Baltic States and Poland, and (2) NATO supports fascism. Finally, this instalment of Robotrolling provides a glimpse into the flourishing world of commercial social media manipulation or, put simply, bots for hire. In a forthcoming report, we measure the inability of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter to counter online manipulation |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (6 Seiten) |
Internformat
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T23:12:50Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T10:07:26Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
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physical | 1 Online-Ressource (6 Seiten) |
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publishDate | 2019 |
publishDateSearch | 2019 |
publishDateSort | 2019 |
publisher | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence |
record_format | marc |
spelling | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 Riga [Latvia] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 2019 Frankfurt M. CEEOL 2019 1 Online-Ressource (6 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier In this edition of Robotrolling, we expose a coordinated network of bots on Facebook, Twitter, and VK connected to a militaristic YouTube channel. Through our analysis, we discovered that the group of automated accounts is used to spread anti-NATO videos in the pro-Donbass information space. Our findings demonstrate that the video-sharing platform is a ripe target for robotic exploitation. During this period, the level of Russian-language bot activity decreased on Twitter. Meanwhile, English-language bot activity remained unchanged. On VK, the volume of messaging increased by 8%. Nearly a quarter of unique users engaging with NATO-related topics were identified as bot accounts. Russian- and English-language conversations about the NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland peaked on 13 August on both Twitter and VK. On Twitter, English-language bot and anonymous accounts targeted Poland, while the Baltic States received the majority of Russian-language bot attention. Events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Second World War attracted significant levels of fake engagement throughout the monitoring period. We observed two recurring anti-NATO narratives circulating in this context: (1) NATO is occupying the Baltic States and Poland, and (2) NATO supports fascism. Finally, this instalment of Robotrolling provides a glimpse into the flourishing world of commercial social media manipulation or, put simply, bots for hire. In a forthcoming report, we measure the inability of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter to counter online manipulation Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies Central and Eastern European Online Library Sonstige oth |
spellingShingle | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies |
title | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_auth | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_exact_search | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_exact_search_txtP | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_full | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_fullStr | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_full_unstemmed | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_short | ROBOTROLLING 4/2019 |
title_sort | robotrolling 4 2019 |
topic | Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies |
topic_facet | Politics and communication ICT Information and Communications Technologies |
work_keys_str_mv | AT centralandeasterneuropeanonlinelibrary robotrolling42019 |