No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today):
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brussels [Belgium]
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies
2011
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 |
| Beschreibung: | Is a high level of public debt inherently more dangerous within a monetary union? During the1990s it was often argued that only by entering the EMU could Italy (or Spain) protect itself from the high interest rates it had to pay on its large public debt. The argument was that by joining the single currency, Italy could convince financial markets that it would not inflate away the value of its debt and hence benefit from lower risk premia |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (10 Seiten) |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T23:12:48Z |
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| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2011 |
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| spelling | Gros, Daniel Verfasser aut No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) Daniel Gros Brussels [Belgium] CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 2011 Frankfurt M. CEEOL 2011 1 Online-Ressource (10 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Is a high level of public debt inherently more dangerous within a monetary union? During the1990s it was often argued that only by entering the EMU could Italy (or Spain) protect itself from the high interest rates it had to pay on its large public debt. The argument was that by joining the single currency, Italy could convince financial markets that it would not inflate away the value of its debt and hence benefit from lower risk premia National Economy Economic policy Government/Political systems Political economy Financial Markets Public Finances Central and Eastern European Online Library Sonstige oth |
| spellingShingle | Gros, Daniel No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) National Economy Economic policy Government/Political systems Political economy Financial Markets Public Finances |
| title | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) |
| title_auth | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) |
| title_exact_search | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) |
| title_exact_search_txtP | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) |
| title_full | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) Daniel Gros |
| title_fullStr | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) Daniel Gros |
| title_full_unstemmed | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) Daniel Gros |
| title_short | No. 257. Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union, Default versus Inflation (what to do today) |
| title_sort | no 257 speculative attacks within or outside a monetary union default versus inflation what to do today |
| topic | National Economy Economic policy Government/Political systems Political economy Financial Markets Public Finances |
| topic_facet | National Economy Economic policy Government/Political systems Political economy Financial Markets Public Finances |
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