Answering moral skepticism:
"This book examines a variety of arguments that might be thought to support skepticism about the existence of morality, and it explains how these arguments can be answered by those who believe in objective moral truths. The focus throughout is on discussing questions that frequently trouble tho...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY, United States of America
Oxford University Press
[2024]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book examines a variety of arguments that might be thought to support skepticism about the existence of morality, and it explains how these arguments can be answered by those who believe in objective moral truths. The focus throughout is on discussing questions that frequently trouble thoughtful and reflective individuals, including questions like the following: Does the prevalence of moral disagreement make it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all? Is morality simply relative to particular societies and times? What could objective moral facts possibly be like? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Shouldn't belief in the theory of evolution undermine our confidence that our moral intuitions reliably reveal moral truths? Would moral facts ever actually explain anything at all? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview? The book explores plausible answers to questions like these and it thus aims to show why the belief in objective morality remains an intellectually reasonable one"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xiv, 392 Seiten 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780197688984 9780197688977 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "This book examines a variety of arguments that might be thought to support skepticism about the existence of morality, and it explains how these arguments can be answered by those who believe in objective moral truths. The focus throughout is on discussing questions that frequently trouble thoughtful and reflective individuals, including questions like the following: Does the prevalence of moral disagreement make it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all? Is morality simply relative to particular societies and times? What could objective moral facts possibly be like? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Shouldn't belief in the theory of evolution undermine our confidence that our moral intuitions reliably reveal moral truths? Would moral facts ever actually explain anything at all? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview? The book explores plausible answers to questions like these and it thus aims to show why the belief in objective morality remains an intellectually reasonable one"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgments A Note to the Reader xi xiii Introduction 1 1. What Would Morality Need to Be? 8 1.1 Job Descriptions 1.2 Possible Elements 1.3 Satisfying the Job Description 8 16 39 2. Basic Positions in Metaethics 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Cognitivism versus Noncognitivism Nihilism versus Moral Realism Varieties of Moral Realism Moral Skepticism 3. Nihilism 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 The Nature of Nihilism The Case for Nihilism Disregarding the Arguments Normative Nihilism 4. Noncognitivism 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism 4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism 4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism 5. Disagreement 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 The Argument from Disagreement The Implications of Disagreement Explaining Moral Disagreement Nonconvergence 6. Relativism 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Moral Relativism Clarifying Relativism Arguing for Relativism Relativized Foundational Theories 42 42 46 52 61 65 65 68 71 77 79 79 87 96 104 104 108 114 125 129 129 133 141 151
viii contexts 7. Knowledge 7.1 The Analogy to Observation 7.2 Appearances 7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions 7.4 Reliability 7.5 Intuitionism 158 158 162 167 177 185 8. Evolution 8.1 The Argument from Evolution 8.2 A Second Try 8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics 8.4 Common Ground 8.5 The Continuity Problem 8.6 Path Dependence 191 191 196 202 209 214 220 9. Explanation 9.1 A Metaphysical Test 9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts 9.3 Reduction and Explanation 9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts 9.5 The Unrestricted Test 225 225 228 232 238 242 10. Motivation 10.1 Motive Internalism 10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism 10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism 10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation 10.5 The Direction of Fit 248 248 254 259 265 271 11. Reasons 11.1 Reasons Internalism 11.2 Reasons 11.3 Refining the Argument 11.4 Hypothetical Reasons 11.5 Rational Support 11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation 277 277 280 286 291 296 300 12. Reductionism 12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism 12.2 The Nature of Reduction 12.3 The Open Question Argument 12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind 12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction 12.6 Reducing Reasons 308 308 313 317 325 329 335
CONTENTS 13. Simple Realism 13.1 Simple Normative Realism 13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity 13.3 Nonnatural Properties 13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals ix 342 ■ 342 347 353 361 14. Moral Realism 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic 14.2 Systematic Moral Theory 364 Notes References Index 373 364 369 387 389 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T23:06:46Z |
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| isbn | 9780197688984 9780197688977 |
| language | English |
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| physical | xiv, 392 Seiten 25 cm |
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| spelling | Kagan, Shelly Verfasser (DE-588)1024182940 aut Answering moral skepticism Shelly Kagan New York, NY, United States of America Oxford University Press [2024] © 2023 xiv, 392 Seiten 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "This book examines a variety of arguments that might be thought to support skepticism about the existence of morality, and it explains how these arguments can be answered by those who believe in objective moral truths. The focus throughout is on discussing questions that frequently trouble thoughtful and reflective individuals, including questions like the following: Does the prevalence of moral disagreement make it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all? Is morality simply relative to particular societies and times? What could objective moral facts possibly be like? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Shouldn't belief in the theory of evolution undermine our confidence that our moral intuitions reliably reveal moral truths? Would moral facts ever actually explain anything at all? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview? The book explores plausible answers to questions like these and it thus aims to show why the belief in objective morality remains an intellectually reasonable one"-- Faktizität (DE-588)4153600-9 gnd rswk-swf Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd rswk-swf Objektivismus (DE-588)4172309-0 gnd rswk-swf Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Ethics Ethical relativism Skepticism Morale Relativisme moral Scepticisme ethics (philosophy) Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s Faktizität (DE-588)4153600-9 s Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 s Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 s Objektivismus (DE-588)4172309-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-768899-1 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034741050&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Kagan, Shelly Answering moral skepticism Faktizität (DE-588)4153600-9 gnd Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd Objektivismus (DE-588)4172309-0 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4153600-9 (DE-588)4177682-3 (DE-588)4172309-0 (DE-588)4055225-1 (DE-588)4015602-3 |
| title | Answering moral skepticism |
| title_auth | Answering moral skepticism |
| title_exact_search | Answering moral skepticism |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Answering moral skepticism |
| title_full | Answering moral skepticism Shelly Kagan |
| title_fullStr | Answering moral skepticism Shelly Kagan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Answering moral skepticism Shelly Kagan |
| title_short | Answering moral skepticism |
| title_sort | answering moral skepticism |
| topic | Faktizität (DE-588)4153600-9 gnd Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd Objektivismus (DE-588)4172309-0 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Faktizität Relativismus Objektivismus Skeptizismus Ethik |
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