Right belief and true belief:
The most important questions in life are questions about what we should do and what we should believe. The first kind of question has received considerable attention by normative ethicists, who search for a complete systematic account of right action. This book is about the second kind of question....
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Oxford University Press
[2023]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | The most important questions in life are questions about what we should do and what we should believe. The first kind of question has received considerable attention by normative ethicists, who search for a complete systematic account of right action. This book is about the second kind of question. Right Belief and True Belief starts by defining a new field of inquiry named 'normative epistemology' that mirrors normative ethics in searching for a systematic account of right belief. The book then lays out and defends a deeply truth-centric account of right belief called 'truth-loving epistemic consequentialism.' Truth-loving epistemic consequentialists say that what we should believe (and what credences we should have) can be understood in terms of what conduces to us having the most accurate beliefs (credences). The view straight-forwardly vindicates the popular intuition that epistemic norms are about getting true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, and it coheres well with how scientists, engineers, and statisticians think about what we should believe. Many epistemologists have rejected similar views in response to several persuasive objections, most famously including trade-off and counting-blades-of-grass objections. Right Belief and True Belief shows how a simple truth-based consequentialist account of epistemic norms can avoid these objections and argues that truth-loving epistemic consequentialism can undergird a general truth-centric approach to many questions in epistemology |
| Beschreibung: | VII, 244 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780197660386 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Introduction 1 Normative Epistemology 1.1 What Should We Believe? 1.1.1 Traditional Epistemology and What We Should Believe 1.1.2 Getting Clearer About the Question 1.2 Normative Ethics 1.3 Normative Epistemology 1.3.1 Right Belief and Why It’s Not Correct Belief 1.3.2 What Is Normative Epistemology? 1.3.3 What Is Right Belief? (Take 2) 1.3.4 The Methodology of Normative Epistemology 1.4 Toward a Theory of Right Belief 2 Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialism and Trade-Offs 2.1 Believe Truth! Shun Error! 2.2 Intuitions in Favor of Epistemic Consequentialism 2.3 On Trade-Offs: Part 0 2.3.1 The Shape of Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs 2.3.2 Trade-Offs in Pedagogy 2.3.3 Trade-Offs in Changes of Worldview 2.3.4 Indirect First-Personal Trade-Offs 2.4 Permissible Trade-Offs Are Rare 2.5 Some Benefits of Accepting Some Trade-Offs 2.6 Moving Toward More Discussion of Trade-Offs 3 On Specific Trade-Off Objections More Trade-Off Objections The Target of Epistemic and Ethical Consequentialisms The Specific Trade-Off Objections Responding to Specific Trade-Off Objections, Round 1 3.4.1 The Analogy 3.4.2 Epistemic Consequentialism as a Theory of Deontic Notions 3.4.3 An Explanation of the Directionality of Epistemic Notions 3.5 Deontic Trade-Offs 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 1 10 10 11 16 18 23 25 29 31 34 37 39 39 41 52 55 56 58 61 65 67 69 71 71 72 75 77 77 83 86 87
Vi CONTENTS 3.6 Responding to the Deontic Trade-Offs 3.7 Accounts of Justification and Rationality 3.8 How Plausible Is the Sophisticated View? 4 On Veritism and Promoting the Epistemic Good 4.1 The Truth-Loving Theory of Value 4.2 On the Promotion of Phone Book Beliefs 4.3 Littlejohn’s Promotion-Based Objection 4.3.1 Is True Belief Good qua Belief? 4.3.2 Is True Belief Good for the Believer? 4.3.3 Is True Belief Just Plain Good? 4.3.4 Expanding the Roadmap to Understanding Goodness 4.4 Promoting Epistemic Consequentialism 5 Consequentialism and Epistemic Utility Theory 5.1 Aiming at Truth in Our Beliefs and Credences 5.1.1 Gibbard’s Argument Part 1: Epistemic Rationality and the Value of Truth 5.1.2 Gibbard’s Argument Part 2: Epistemic Rationality as Maximizing Guidance Value 5.2 Immodesty and Truth-Based Approaches to Epistemic Normativity 5.2.1 Explaining Immodesty Without the Practical 5.2.2 Why It’s OK to Be Epistemically Modest 5.3 Objections to Dominance and Expected Value Arguments 5.4 Dominance Avoidance and Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialism 5.5 Epistemic Value for Consequentialists and Epistemic Utility Theorists 5.6 Are Epistemic Utility Theory and Truth-Loving Consequentialism Opposed? 6 On Racist Beliefs and Moral Encroachment 6.1 The (Apparent?) Conflict Between Epistemic and Moral Norms 6.2 Irrational or Racist: The Puzzle 6.3 Dilemmism, Moral Encroachment, and Purism 6.4 Why Moral Encroachment Doesn’t Solve the Puzzle 6.5 How to Be a Dilemmist 7 Consequentialist Epistemology 7.1 On Epistemic Deontic and Responsibility Terms 7.1.1 On Constraining Views
of Epistemic Responsibility 7.1.2 On Instrumentalist Views of Epistemic Responsibility 89 94 97 101 101 106 113 114 115 117 119 121 123 125 125 128 131 131 136 142 146 149 152 155 155 158 163 168 179 189 191 192 197
CONTENTS 7.2 Going Global 7.2.1 What Global Epistemic Consequentialism Is 7.2.2 Why Global Rather Than Local Consequentialism 7.2.3 The Broader Global Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialist Picture 7.3 The Global Truth-Loving Framework for Inquiry 7.4 Global Truth-Loving Consequentialism and Naturalized Epistemology 7.5 Conclusion References Index vii 205 206 207 214 219 224 228 231 243
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| adam_txt |
Contents Introduction 1 Normative Epistemology 1.1 What Should We Believe? 1.1.1 Traditional Epistemology and What We Should Believe 1.1.2 Getting Clearer About the Question 1.2 Normative Ethics 1.3 Normative Epistemology 1.3.1 Right Belief and Why It’s Not Correct Belief 1.3.2 What Is Normative Epistemology? 1.3.3 What Is Right Belief? (Take 2) 1.3.4 The Methodology of Normative Epistemology 1.4 Toward a Theory of Right Belief 2 Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialism and Trade-Offs 2.1 Believe Truth! Shun Error! 2.2 Intuitions in Favor of Epistemic Consequentialism 2.3 On Trade-Offs: Part 0 2.3.1 The Shape of Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs 2.3.2 Trade-Offs in Pedagogy 2.3.3 Trade-Offs in Changes of Worldview 2.3.4 Indirect First-Personal Trade-Offs 2.4 Permissible Trade-Offs Are Rare 2.5 Some Benefits of Accepting Some Trade-Offs 2.6 Moving Toward More Discussion of Trade-Offs 3 On Specific Trade-Off Objections More Trade-Off Objections The Target of Epistemic and Ethical Consequentialisms The Specific Trade-Off Objections Responding to Specific Trade-Off Objections, Round 1 3.4.1 The Analogy 3.4.2 Epistemic Consequentialism as a Theory of Deontic Notions 3.4.3 An Explanation of the Directionality of Epistemic Notions 3.5 Deontic Trade-Offs 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 1 10 10 11 16 18 23 25 29 31 34 37 39 39 41 52 55 56 58 61 65 67 69 71 71 72 75 77 77 83 86 87
Vi CONTENTS 3.6 Responding to the Deontic Trade-Offs 3.7 Accounts of Justification and Rationality 3.8 How Plausible Is the Sophisticated View? 4 On Veritism and Promoting the Epistemic Good 4.1 The Truth-Loving Theory of Value 4.2 On the Promotion of Phone Book Beliefs 4.3 Littlejohn’s Promotion-Based Objection 4.3.1 Is True Belief Good qua Belief? 4.3.2 Is True Belief Good for the Believer? 4.3.3 Is True Belief Just Plain Good? 4.3.4 Expanding the Roadmap to Understanding Goodness 4.4 Promoting Epistemic Consequentialism 5 Consequentialism and Epistemic Utility Theory 5.1 Aiming at Truth in Our Beliefs and Credences 5.1.1 Gibbard’s Argument Part 1: Epistemic Rationality and the Value of Truth 5.1.2 Gibbard’s Argument Part 2: Epistemic Rationality as Maximizing Guidance Value 5.2 Immodesty and Truth-Based Approaches to Epistemic Normativity 5.2.1 Explaining Immodesty Without the Practical 5.2.2 Why It’s OK to Be Epistemically Modest 5.3 Objections to Dominance and Expected Value Arguments 5.4 Dominance Avoidance and Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialism 5.5 Epistemic Value for Consequentialists and Epistemic Utility Theorists 5.6 Are Epistemic Utility Theory and Truth-Loving Consequentialism Opposed? 6 On Racist Beliefs and Moral Encroachment 6.1 The (Apparent?) Conflict Between Epistemic and Moral Norms 6.2 Irrational or Racist: The Puzzle 6.3 Dilemmism, Moral Encroachment, and Purism 6.4 Why Moral Encroachment Doesn’t Solve the Puzzle 6.5 How to Be a Dilemmist 7 Consequentialist Epistemology 7.1 On Epistemic Deontic and Responsibility Terms 7.1.1 On Constraining Views
of Epistemic Responsibility 7.1.2 On Instrumentalist Views of Epistemic Responsibility 89 94 97 101 101 106 113 114 115 117 119 121 123 125 125 128 131 131 136 142 146 149 152 155 155 158 163 168 179 189 191 192 197
CONTENTS 7.2 Going Global 7.2.1 What Global Epistemic Consequentialism Is 7.2.2 Why Global Rather Than Local Consequentialism 7.2.3 The Broader Global Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialist Picture 7.3 The Global Truth-Loving Framework for Inquiry 7.4 Global Truth-Loving Consequentialism and Naturalized Epistemology 7.5 Conclusion References Index vii 205 206 207 214 219 224 228 231 243 |
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| spelling | Singer, Daniel J. Verfasser (DE-588)1312407670 aut Right belief and true belief Daniel J. Singer New York Oxford University Press [2023] VII, 244 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The most important questions in life are questions about what we should do and what we should believe. The first kind of question has received considerable attention by normative ethicists, who search for a complete systematic account of right action. This book is about the second kind of question. Right Belief and True Belief starts by defining a new field of inquiry named 'normative epistemology' that mirrors normative ethics in searching for a systematic account of right belief. The book then lays out and defends a deeply truth-centric account of right belief called 'truth-loving epistemic consequentialism.' Truth-loving epistemic consequentialists say that what we should believe (and what credences we should have) can be understood in terms of what conduces to us having the most accurate beliefs (credences). The view straight-forwardly vindicates the popular intuition that epistemic norms are about getting true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, and it coheres well with how scientists, engineers, and statisticians think about what we should believe. Many epistemologists have rejected similar views in response to several persuasive objections, most famously including trade-off and counting-blades-of-grass objections. Right Belief and True Belief shows how a simple truth-based consequentialist account of epistemic norms can avoid these objections and argues that truth-loving epistemic consequentialism can undergird a general truth-centric approach to many questions in epistemology Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Konsequentialismus (DE-588)4327570-9 gnd rswk-swf Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd rswk-swf Belief and doubt Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 s Konsequentialismus (DE-588)4327570-9 s Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9780197660409 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034715133&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Singer, Daniel J. Right belief and true belief Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Konsequentialismus (DE-588)4327570-9 gnd Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd |
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| title_full | Right belief and true belief Daniel J. Singer |
| title_fullStr | Right belief and true belief Daniel J. Singer |
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| title_short | Right belief and true belief |
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| topic | Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Konsequentialismus (DE-588)4327570-9 gnd Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd |
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