Life without degrees of moral status: implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belie...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2023]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"-- |
| Beschreibung: | Includes index |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 232 pages Illustrationen, Diagramm 21 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780197675328 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Wendler, David Sheffer |d 1961- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)140971017 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Life without degrees of moral status |b implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us |c David S. Wendler |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Oxford University Press |c [2023] | |
| 300 | |a xi, 232 pages |b Illustrationen, Diagramm |c 21 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes index | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Introduction : why should we care? -- Our place in the universe and in the analysis -- The possibility of degrees of moral status -- Are some properties moral status enhancing? -- Is it really worse to kill humans than animals? -- Are pain and suffering really worse in humans than animals? -- Does respect really apply to humans but not animals? -- Should we believe in degrees of moral status anyway? -- Life without degrees of moral status -- Conclusion : a future without hierarchies | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"-- | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Human-animal relationships / Moral and ethical aspects | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Animal welfare / Moral and ethical aspects | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Relations homme-animal / Aspect moral | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Animaux / Protection / Aspect moral | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Animal welfare / Moral and ethical aspects | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Human-animal relationships / Moral and ethical aspects | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe, EPUB |a Wendler, David |t Life without degrees of moral status |z 978-0-19-767534-2 |d New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023] |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034603669 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
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| author | Wendler, David Sheffer 1961- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)140971017 |
| author_facet | Wendler, David Sheffer 1961- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Wendler, David Sheffer 1961- |
| author_variant | d s w ds dsw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049343156 |
| classification_rvk | CC 7200 CC 7266 |
| contents | Introduction : why should we care? -- Our place in the universe and in the analysis -- The possibility of degrees of moral status -- Are some properties moral status enhancing? -- Is it really worse to kill humans than animals? -- Are pain and suffering really worse in humans than animals? -- Does respect really apply to humans but not animals? -- Should we believe in degrees of moral status anyway? -- Life without degrees of moral status -- Conclusion : a future without hierarchies |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1409130605 (DE-599)BVBBV049343156 |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV049343156 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:47:35Z |
| indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:16:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780197675328 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034603669 |
| oclc_num | 1409130605 |
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| owner_facet | DE-11 |
| physical | xi, 232 pages Illustrationen, Diagramm 21 cm |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Wendler, David Sheffer 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)140971017 aut Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us David S. Wendler New York, NY Oxford University Press [2023] xi, 232 pages Illustrationen, Diagramm 21 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes index Introduction : why should we care? -- Our place in the universe and in the analysis -- The possibility of degrees of moral status -- Are some properties moral status enhancing? -- Is it really worse to kill humans than animals? -- Are pain and suffering really worse in humans than animals? -- Does respect really apply to humans but not animals? -- Should we believe in degrees of moral status anyway? -- Life without degrees of moral status -- Conclusion : a future without hierarchies "Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"-- Human-animal relationships / Moral and ethical aspects Animal welfare / Moral and ethical aspects Relations homme-animal / Aspect moral Animaux / Protection / Aspect moral Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB Wendler, David Life without degrees of moral status 978-0-19-767534-2 New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023] |
| spellingShingle | Wendler, David Sheffer 1961- Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us Introduction : why should we care? -- Our place in the universe and in the analysis -- The possibility of degrees of moral status -- Are some properties moral status enhancing? -- Is it really worse to kill humans than animals? -- Are pain and suffering really worse in humans than animals? -- Does respect really apply to humans but not animals? -- Should we believe in degrees of moral status anyway? -- Life without degrees of moral status -- Conclusion : a future without hierarchies |
| title | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us |
| title_auth | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us |
| title_exact_search | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us |
| title_full | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us David S. Wendler |
| title_fullStr | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us David S. Wendler |
| title_full_unstemmed | Life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us David S. Wendler |
| title_short | Life without degrees of moral status |
| title_sort | life without degrees of moral status implications for rabbits robots and the rest of us |
| title_sub | implications for rabbits, robots, and the rest of us |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wendlerdavidsheffer lifewithoutdegreesofmoralstatusimplicationsforrabbitsrobotsandtherestofus |