Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation: Evidence from Chinese Cities
Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increases over the course of the first term of the top b...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2022
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increases over the course of the first term of the top bureaucrat, peaking in the last year of his or her term. Winning a tournament competition is behind this performance manipulation: political rivals reinforce each other in exaggerating performance, and political competition intensifies the tendency for manipulation. Performance exaggeration leads to higher chances of promotion, but the ratchet effect (that is, better performance today leading to a higher target tomorrow) and the potential to blame predecessors induce restraint. A good local institutional environment also restrains performance manipulation |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (61 Seiten) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-9938 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increases over the course of the first term of the top bureaucrat, peaking in the last year of his or her term. Winning a tournament competition is behind this performance manipulation: political rivals reinforce each other in exaggerating performance, and political competition intensifies the tendency for manipulation. Performance exaggeration leads to higher chances of promotion, but the ratchet effect (that is, better performance today leading to a higher target tomorrow) and the potential to blame predecessors induce restraint. A good local institutional environment also restrains performance manipulation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Amount Of Power | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Development | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Growth | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Growth Rate | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory and Research | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Energy | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Industrial Economics | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Xu, L. Colin |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:57Z |
| indexdate | 2025-02-20T07:20:23Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| spellingShingle | Xu, Gang Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities Amount Of Power Development Economic Development Economic Growth Economic Growth Rate Economic Theory and Research Energy Energy Policies and Economics Gender and Development High Population Density Industrial Economics Industry Labor Markets Local Economic Growth Local Government Local Government Budget Open Door Prior Work Experience Public Sector Job Quality Of Bureaucracy Real Economic Activity Real GDP Regional Economic Performance Social Protections and Labor |
| title | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_auth | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_exact_search | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_full | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities Gang Xu |
| title_fullStr | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities Gang Xu |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation Evidence from Chinese Cities Gang Xu |
| title_short | Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation |
| title_sort | bureaucrats tournament competition and performance manipulation evidence from chinese cities |
| title_sub | Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| topic | Amount Of Power Development Economic Development Economic Growth Economic Growth Rate Economic Theory and Research Energy Energy Policies and Economics Gender and Development High Population Density Industrial Economics Industry Labor Markets Local Economic Growth Local Government Local Government Budget Open Door Prior Work Experience Public Sector Job Quality Of Bureaucracy Real Economic Activity Real GDP Regional Economic Performance Social Protections and Labor |
| topic_facet | Amount Of Power Development Economic Development Economic Growth Economic Growth Rate Economic Theory and Research Energy Energy Policies and Economics Gender and Development High Population Density Industrial Economics Industry Labor Markets Local Economic Growth Local Government Local Government Budget Open Door Prior Work Experience Public Sector Job Quality Of Bureaucracy Real Economic Activity Real GDP Regional Economic Performance Social Protections and Labor |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-9938 |
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