How Binding is Supervisory Guidance?: Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning
This paper investigates whether banks respond differently to supervisory guidance than to specific regulatory action. Using a sample of subsidiaries of European banks operating in developing countries, the study exploits the sequencing in the supervisory and regulatory implementation of a reform on...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2022
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper investigates whether banks respond differently to supervisory guidance than to specific regulatory action. Using a sample of subsidiaries of European banks operating in developing countries, the study exploits the sequencing in the supervisory and regulatory implementation of a reform on provisioning for credit losses for identification, generally referred to as European calendar provisioning. While the reform achieved the intended goal of reducing European banks' nonperforming loan ratios, its effects were greater during the initial implementation of the supervisory guidance than after its enactment as a binding regulation. This finding is consistent with the notion that the subsequent formalization of the supervisory initiative within a regulatory framework achieved limited results because it eliminated the flexibility the regulatory authority had concerning the stringency with which European calendar provisioning was enforced. Finally, the study offers evidence of a mechanism through which policies in advanced economies affect banking outcomes in developing countries to which their local financial authorities should be alert |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-10050 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049080277 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2022 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-10050 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)078960509 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392154282 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KEP078960509 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Fiordelisi, Franco |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? |b Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |c Franco Fiordelisi |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2022 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper investigates whether banks respond differently to supervisory guidance than to specific regulatory action. Using a sample of subsidiaries of European banks operating in developing countries, the study exploits the sequencing in the supervisory and regulatory implementation of a reform on provisioning for credit losses for identification, generally referred to as European calendar provisioning. While the reform achieved the intended goal of reducing European banks' nonperforming loan ratios, its effects were greater during the initial implementation of the supervisory guidance than after its enactment as a binding regulation. This finding is consistent with the notion that the subsequent formalization of the supervisory initiative within a regulatory framework achieved limited results because it eliminated the flexibility the regulatory authority had concerning the stringency with which European calendar provisioning was enforced. Finally, the study offers evidence of a mechanism through which policies in advanced economies affect banking outcomes in developing countries to which their local financial authorities should be alert | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Bank Capital Adequacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Banking Law | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Banking Regulation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Banking Supervision | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Basel Committee | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cross-Border Financial Institutions | |
| 650 | 4 | |a European Calendar Provisioning | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Financial Regulation and Supervision | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Financial Stability | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Law and Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Non-Performing Loans | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Supervisory Guidance | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Lattanzio, Gabriele |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mare, David S. |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Fiordelisi, Franco |t How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |d Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2022 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10050 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034342167 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1812671838966251520 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Fiordelisi, Franco |
| author_facet | Fiordelisi, Franco |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Fiordelisi, Franco |
| author_variant | f f ff |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049080277 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)078960509 (OCoLC)1392154282 (DE-599)KEP078960509 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-10050 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a22000001c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049080277</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2022 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-10050</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)078960509</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392154282</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)KEP078960509</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fiordelisi, Franco</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">How Binding is Supervisory Guidance?</subfield><subfield code="b">Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning</subfield><subfield code="c">Franco Fiordelisi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper investigates whether banks respond differently to supervisory guidance than to specific regulatory action. Using a sample of subsidiaries of European banks operating in developing countries, the study exploits the sequencing in the supervisory and regulatory implementation of a reform on provisioning for credit losses for identification, generally referred to as European calendar provisioning. While the reform achieved the intended goal of reducing European banks' nonperforming loan ratios, its effects were greater during the initial implementation of the supervisory guidance than after its enactment as a binding regulation. This finding is consistent with the notion that the subsequent formalization of the supervisory initiative within a regulatory framework achieved limited results because it eliminated the flexibility the regulatory authority had concerning the stringency with which European calendar provisioning was enforced. Finally, the study offers evidence of a mechanism through which policies in advanced economies affect banking outcomes in developing countries to which their local financial authorities should be alert</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bank Capital Adequacy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banking Law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banking Regulation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banking Supervision</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Basel Committee</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cross-Border Financial Institutions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">European Calendar Provisioning</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Financial Regulation and Supervision</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Financial Stability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law and Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Non-Performing Loans</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Supervisory Guidance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lattanzio, Gabriele</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mare, David S.</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Fiordelisi, Franco</subfield><subfield code="t">How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning</subfield><subfield code="d">Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10050</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034342167</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049080277 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:57Z |
| indexdate | 2024-10-12T04:02:56Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034342167 |
| oclc_num | 1392154282 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Fiordelisi, Franco How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning Bank Capital Adequacy Banking Law Banking Regulation Banking Supervision Basel Committee Cross-Border Financial Institutions European Calendar Provisioning Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Regulation and Supervision Financial Stability Law and Development Non-Performing Loans Supervisory Guidance |
| title | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |
| title_auth | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |
| title_exact_search | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |
| title_exact_search_txtP | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |
| title_full | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning Franco Fiordelisi |
| title_fullStr | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning Franco Fiordelisi |
| title_full_unstemmed | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning Franco Fiordelisi |
| title_short | How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? |
| title_sort | how binding is supervisory guidance evidence from the european calendar provisioning |
| title_sub | Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning |
| topic | Bank Capital Adequacy Banking Law Banking Regulation Banking Supervision Basel Committee Cross-Border Financial Institutions European Calendar Provisioning Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Regulation and Supervision Financial Stability Law and Development Non-Performing Loans Supervisory Guidance |
| topic_facet | Bank Capital Adequacy Banking Law Banking Regulation Banking Supervision Basel Committee Cross-Border Financial Institutions European Calendar Provisioning Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Regulation and Supervision Financial Stability Law and Development Non-Performing Loans Supervisory Guidance |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10050 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fiordelisifranco howbindingissupervisoryguidanceevidencefromtheeuropeancalendarprovisioning AT lattanziogabriele howbindingissupervisoryguidanceevidencefromtheeuropeancalendarprovisioning AT maredavids howbindingissupervisoryguidanceevidencefromtheeuropeancalendarprovisioning |