Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities:
Implicit government guarantees to bail out troubled banks can produce a sizable fiscal contingent liability. Drawing on a rich history of various forms of staggered bailouts, this paper studies the link between bank bailouts and fiscal contingent liabilities using bank-level data for Kazakhstan-an u...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2023
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Implicit government guarantees to bail out troubled banks can produce a sizable fiscal contingent liability. Drawing on a rich history of various forms of staggered bailouts, this paper studies the link between bank bailouts and fiscal contingent liabilities using bank-level data for Kazakhstan-an upper-middle-income country in Central Asia. The paper first estimates the probability that a bank in distress is bailed out, conditioning on bank characteristics and financial soundness. Second, it estimates the magnitude of bailout costs depending on the size of banks, their ownership type, financial soundness, and the type of bailout instrument used by the government. The latter aims to contrast the fiscal contingent liabilities when the government uses bailout instruments without recourse on bank future profits-such as government purchases of bad loans at 100 percent nominal value-versus instruments that do not allow bank owners to socialize losses and privatize gains-such as properly governed and priced senior debt or equity injections. Third, the paper illustrates how the estimations could be used for projecting the expected contingent liabilities from bank bailouts |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten) |
DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-10273 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV049079342 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 230731s2023 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-10273 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)090344731 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)1392150251 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)KEP090344731 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Mare, Davide S. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |c Davide S Mare |
264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2023 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten) | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | 3 | |a Implicit government guarantees to bail out troubled banks can produce a sizable fiscal contingent liability. Drawing on a rich history of various forms of staggered bailouts, this paper studies the link between bank bailouts and fiscal contingent liabilities using bank-level data for Kazakhstan-an upper-middle-income country in Central Asia. The paper first estimates the probability that a bank in distress is bailed out, conditioning on bank characteristics and financial soundness. Second, it estimates the magnitude of bailout costs depending on the size of banks, their ownership type, financial soundness, and the type of bailout instrument used by the government. The latter aims to contrast the fiscal contingent liabilities when the government uses bailout instruments without recourse on bank future profits-such as government purchases of bad loans at 100 percent nominal value-versus instruments that do not allow bank owners to socialize losses and privatize gains-such as properly governed and priced senior debt or equity injections. Third, the paper illustrates how the estimations could be used for projecting the expected contingent liabilities from bank bailouts | |
650 | 4 | |a Bank Bailout | |
650 | 4 | |a Bank Distress | |
650 | 4 | |a Banking Law | |
650 | 4 | |a Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | |
650 | 4 | |a Contingent Liabilities | |
650 | 4 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
650 | 4 | |a Fiscal Cost | |
650 | 4 | |a Law and Development | |
650 | 4 | |a Problem Bank Resolution | |
650 | 4 | |a Socialize Bank Loss | |
650 | 4 | |a Systemic Importance | |
700 | 1 | |a Melecky, Martin |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Murina, Hanna |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Mare, Davide S |t Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |d Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2023 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10273 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034341233 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1812671828339982336 |
---|---|
adam_text | |
adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
any_adam_object_boolean | |
author | Mare, Davide S. |
author_facet | Mare, Davide S. |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Mare, Davide S. |
author_variant | d s m ds dsm |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV049079342 |
collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)090344731 (OCoLC)1392150251 (DE-599)KEP090344731 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-10273 |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a22000001c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049079342</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2023 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-10273</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)090344731</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392150251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)KEP090344731</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mare, Davide S.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities</subfield><subfield code="c">Davide S Mare</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Implicit government guarantees to bail out troubled banks can produce a sizable fiscal contingent liability. Drawing on a rich history of various forms of staggered bailouts, this paper studies the link between bank bailouts and fiscal contingent liabilities using bank-level data for Kazakhstan-an upper-middle-income country in Central Asia. The paper first estimates the probability that a bank in distress is bailed out, conditioning on bank characteristics and financial soundness. Second, it estimates the magnitude of bailout costs depending on the size of banks, their ownership type, financial soundness, and the type of bailout instrument used by the government. The latter aims to contrast the fiscal contingent liabilities when the government uses bailout instruments without recourse on bank future profits-such as government purchases of bad loans at 100 percent nominal value-versus instruments that do not allow bank owners to socialize losses and privatize gains-such as properly governed and priced senior debt or equity injections. Third, the paper illustrates how the estimations could be used for projecting the expected contingent liabilities from bank bailouts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bank Bailout</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bank Distress</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banking Law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Contingent Liabilities</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Fiscal Cost</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law and Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Problem Bank Resolution</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Socialize Bank Loss</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Systemic Importance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Melecky, Martin</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Murina, Hanna</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Mare, Davide S</subfield><subfield code="t">Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities</subfield><subfield code="d">Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10273</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034341233</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV049079342 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:55Z |
indexdate | 2024-10-12T04:02:46Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034341233 |
oclc_num | 1392150251 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten) |
psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
publishDate | 2023 |
publishDateSearch | 2023 |
publishDateSort | 2023 |
publisher | The World Bank |
record_format | marc |
spellingShingle | Mare, Davide S. Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities Bank Bailout Bank Distress Banking Law Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress Contingent Liabilities Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Cost Law and Development Problem Bank Resolution Socialize Bank Loss Systemic Importance |
title | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |
title_auth | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |
title_exact_search | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |
title_exact_search_txtP | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |
title_full | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities Davide S Mare |
title_fullStr | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities Davide S Mare |
title_full_unstemmed | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities Davide S Mare |
title_short | Bank Bailouts and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities |
title_sort | bank bailouts and fiscal contingent liabilities |
topic | Bank Bailout Bank Distress Banking Law Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress Contingent Liabilities Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Cost Law and Development Problem Bank Resolution Socialize Bank Loss Systemic Importance |
topic_facet | Bank Bailout Bank Distress Banking Law Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress Contingent Liabilities Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Cost Law and Development Problem Bank Resolution Socialize Bank Loss Systemic Importance |
url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10273 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT maredavides bankbailoutsandfiscalcontingentliabilities AT meleckymartin bankbailoutsandfiscalcontingentliabilities AT murinahanna bankbailoutsandfiscalcontingentliabilities |