Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior?: Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico
February 1999 - A study of the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s finds that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors - who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Bank fundame...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | February 1999 - A study of the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s finds that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors - who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting deposit behavior. Peria and Schmukler examine the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico to see if market discipline existed there in the 1980s and 1990s. Using a set of bank panel data, they test for the presence of market discipline by studying whether depositors punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. They find that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors-who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Standardized coefficients and variance decomposition of deposits indicate that bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting deposits. GMM estimates confirm that the results are robust to the potential endo-geneity of bank fundamentals. This paper-a joint product of Finance, Development Research Group and the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Carribean Region-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study banking issues affecting developing countries. The study was funded by the LAC Regional Studies Program and by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project Deposit Insurance Design and Use (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at mmartinezperia@worldbank.org or sschmukler@worldbank.org |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (57 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a February 1999 - A study of the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s finds that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors - who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting deposit behavior. Peria and Schmukler examine the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico to see if market discipline existed there in the 1980s and 1990s. Using a set of bank panel data, they test for the presence of market discipline by studying whether depositors punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. They find that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors-who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Standardized coefficients and variance decomposition of deposits indicate that bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting deposits. GMM estimates confirm that the results are robust to the potential endo-geneity of bank fundamentals. This paper-a joint product of Finance, Development Research Group and the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Carribean Region-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study banking issues affecting developing countries. The study was funded by the LAC Regional Studies Program and by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project Deposit Insurance Design and Use (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at mmartinezperia@worldbank.org or sschmukler@worldbank.org | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| spelling | Peria, Maria Verfasser aut Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico Peria, Maria Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999 1 Online-Ressource (57 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier February 1999 - A study of the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s finds that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors - who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting deposit behavior. Peria and Schmukler examine the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico to see if market discipline existed there in the 1980s and 1990s. Using a set of bank panel data, they test for the presence of market discipline by studying whether depositors punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. They find that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small insured depositors-who punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits. Standardized coefficients and variance decomposition of deposits indicate that bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting deposits. GMM estimates confirm that the results are robust to the potential endo-geneity of bank fundamentals. This paper-a joint product of Finance, Development Research Group and the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Carribean Region-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study banking issues affecting developing countries. The study was funded by the LAC Regional Studies Program and by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project Deposit Insurance Design and Use (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at mmartinezperia@worldbank.org or sschmukler@worldbank.org Online-Ausg Bank Bank Deposits Bank Risk Banking Banking Crises Banking Sector Banks Banks and Banking Reform Debt Markets Deposit Insurance Deposit Insurance Schemes Deposits Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Guarantees Industry Interest Interest Rates Loans Market Discipline Monetary Policies Moral Hazard Prudential Regulations Savings Peria, Maria Sonstige oth Peria, Maria Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2058 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Peria, Maria Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico Bank Bank Deposits Bank Risk Banking Banking Crises Banking Sector Banks Banks and Banking Reform Debt Markets Deposit Insurance Deposit Insurance Schemes Deposits Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Guarantees Industry Interest Interest Rates Loans Market Discipline Monetary Policies Moral Hazard Prudential Regulations Savings |
| title | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico |
| title_auth | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico |
| title_exact_search | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico |
| title_full | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico Peria, Maria |
| title_fullStr | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico Peria, Maria |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico Peria, Maria |
| title_short | Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? |
| title_sort | do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline in argentina chile and mexico |
| title_sub | Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico |
| topic | Bank Bank Deposits Bank Risk Banking Banking Crises Banking Sector Banks Banks and Banking Reform Debt Markets Deposit Insurance Deposit Insurance Schemes Deposits Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Guarantees Industry Interest Interest Rates Loans Market Discipline Monetary Policies Moral Hazard Prudential Regulations Savings |
| topic_facet | Bank Bank Deposits Bank Risk Banking Banking Crises Banking Sector Banks Banks and Banking Reform Debt Markets Deposit Insurance Deposit Insurance Schemes Deposits Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Guarantees Industry Interest Interest Rates Loans Market Discipline Monetary Policies Moral Hazard Prudential Regulations Savings |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2058 |
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