Corruption under moral hazard:
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, DC
World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
[1999]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2204 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits |
| Beschreibung: | "October 1999"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) ill 28 cm |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corruption under moral hazard |c Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
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| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Eskeland, Gunnar S |a Corruption under moral hazard |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338278 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) ill 28 cm |
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| publishDate | 1999 |
| publishDateSearch | 1999 |
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| publisher | World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics |
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| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spelling | Eskeland, Gunnar S. Verfasser aut Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics [1999] 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) ill 28 cm txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 2204 "October 1999"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits Online-Ausg Also available in print Civil service Salaries, etc Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models Thiele, Henrik Sonstige oth World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics oth Eskeland, Gunnar S Corruption under moral hazard http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2204 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Eskeland, Gunnar S. Corruption under moral hazard Civil service Salaries, etc Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models |
| title | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_auth | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_exact_search | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_full | Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| title_fullStr | Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| title_short | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_sort | corruption under moral hazard |
| topic | Civil service Salaries, etc Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Civil service Salaries, etc Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2204 |
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