The Vicious Circles of Control: Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises
In Russia and other transition economies that have implemented voucher privatization programs, how can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? - How can one account for t...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2000
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | In Russia and other transition economies that have implemented voucher privatization programs, how can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? - How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? Desai and Goldberg suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms' taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, Desai and Goldberg propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, by example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises' value by transferring effective control to investors. The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives. This paper - a product of the Private and Financial Sectors Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to address growth, governance, and poverty in the former Soviet Union. The authors may be contacted at desair@gunet.georgetown.edu or igoldberg@worldbank.org |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten)) |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049076305 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2000 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093208731 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392136918 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005444888 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Desai, Raj |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Vicious Circles of Control |b Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises |c Desai, Raj |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2000 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten)) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a In Russia and other transition economies that have implemented voucher privatization programs, how can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? - How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? Desai and Goldberg suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms' taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, Desai and Goldberg propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, by example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises' value by transferring effective control to investors. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives. This paper - a product of the Private and Financial Sectors Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to address growth, governance, and poverty in the former Soviet Union. The authors may be contacted at desair@gunet.georgetown.edu or igoldberg@worldbank.org | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausg | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Banks and Banking Reform | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cash Flows | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competitive Auctions | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Conversion | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate Governance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Debt Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory and Research | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Emerging Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Equity | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Financial Literacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Governance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Illiquidity | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Investment | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Investment and Investment Climate | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Investors | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Market | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Microfinance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Municipal Financial Management | |
| 650 | 4 | |a National Governance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Outside Investors | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Private Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Prof Property | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Property Rights | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Revenue | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Revenues | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Safety Nets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tax | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tax Debt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Urban Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Voucher Privatization | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Goldberg, Itzhak |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Desai, Raj |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Desai, Raj |a The Vicious Circles of Control |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338196 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |l EUV01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |l HTW01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |l FHI01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |l IOS01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185397159264256 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Desai, Raj |
| author_facet | Desai, Raj |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Desai, Raj |
| author_variant | r d rd |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049076305 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093208731 (OCoLC)1392136918 (DE-599)GBVNLM005444888 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05456nmm a22008291c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049076305</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2000 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093208731</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392136918</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005444888</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Desai, Raj</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Vicious Circles of Control</subfield><subfield code="b">Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises</subfield><subfield code="c">Desai, Raj</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten))</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In Russia and other transition economies that have implemented voucher privatization programs, how can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? - How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? Desai and Goldberg suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms' taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, Desai and Goldberg propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, by example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises' value by transferring effective control to investors. </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives. This paper - a product of the Private and Financial Sectors Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to address growth, governance, and poverty in the former Soviet Union. The authors may be contacted at desair@gunet.georgetown.edu or igoldberg@worldbank.org</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banks and Banking Reform</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cash Flows</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Competitive Auctions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Conversion</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate Governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Debt Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic Theory and Research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Emerging Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Equity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Financial Literacy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Illiquidity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Investment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Investment and Investment Climate</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Investors</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Macroeconomics and Economic Growth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Market</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Microfinance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Municipal Financial Management</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">National Governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Outside Investors</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Private Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Prof Property</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Property Rights</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Revenue</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Revenues</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Safety Nets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tax</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tax Debt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Urban Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Voucher Privatization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Goldberg, Itzhak</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Desai, Raj</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Desai, Raj</subfield><subfield code="a">The Vicious Circles of Control</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338196</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287</subfield><subfield code="l">EUV01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287</subfield><subfield code="l">HTW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287</subfield><subfield code="l">FHI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287</subfield><subfield code="l">IOS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049076305 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338196 |
| oclc_num | 1392136918 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten)) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publishDateSearch | 2000 |
| publishDateSort | 2000 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Desai, Raj Verfasser aut The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises Desai, Raj Washington, D.C The World Bank 2000 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier In Russia and other transition economies that have implemented voucher privatization programs, how can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? - How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? Desai and Goldberg suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms' taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, Desai and Goldberg propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, by example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises' value by transferring effective control to investors. The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives. This paper - a product of the Private and Financial Sectors Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to address growth, governance, and poverty in the former Soviet Union. The authors may be contacted at desair@gunet.georgetown.edu or igoldberg@worldbank.org Online-Ausg Banks and Banking Reform Cash Flows Competitive Auctions Conversion Corporate Governance Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Equity Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy Governance Illiquidity Investment Investment and Investment Climate Investors Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Microfinance Municipal Financial Management National Governance Outside Investors Private Sector Development Prof Property Property Rights Revenue Revenues Safety Nets Tax Tax Debt Urban Development Voucher Privatization Goldberg, Itzhak Sonstige oth Desai, Raj Sonstige oth Desai, Raj The Vicious Circles of Control http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Desai, Raj The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises Banks and Banking Reform Cash Flows Competitive Auctions Conversion Corporate Governance Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Equity Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy Governance Illiquidity Investment Investment and Investment Climate Investors Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Microfinance Municipal Financial Management National Governance Outside Investors Private Sector Development Prof Property Property Rights Revenue Revenues Safety Nets Tax Tax Debt Urban Development Voucher Privatization |
| title | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises |
| title_auth | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises |
| title_exact_search | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises |
| title_full | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises Desai, Raj |
| title_fullStr | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises Desai, Raj |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Vicious Circles of Control Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises Desai, Raj |
| title_short | The Vicious Circles of Control |
| title_sort | the vicious circles of control regional governments and insiders in privatized russian enterprises |
| title_sub | Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises |
| topic | Banks and Banking Reform Cash Flows Competitive Auctions Conversion Corporate Governance Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Equity Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy Governance Illiquidity Investment Investment and Investment Climate Investors Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Microfinance Municipal Financial Management National Governance Outside Investors Private Sector Development Prof Property Property Rights Revenue Revenues Safety Nets Tax Tax Debt Urban Development Voucher Privatization |
| topic_facet | Banks and Banking Reform Cash Flows Competitive Auctions Conversion Corporate Governance Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Equity Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy Governance Illiquidity Investment Investment and Investment Climate Investors Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Microfinance Municipal Financial Management National Governance Outside Investors Private Sector Development Prof Property Property Rights Revenue Revenues Safety Nets Tax Tax Debt Urban Development Voucher Privatization |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2287 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT desairaj theviciouscirclesofcontrolregionalgovernmentsandinsidersinprivatizedrussianenterprises AT goldbergitzhak theviciouscirclesofcontrolregionalgovernmentsandinsidersinprivatizedrussianenterprises |