Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities:
April 2000 - With technology-related goods and services, the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. To achieve efficiency gains through worldwide standardization and mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral trade agre...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | April 2000 - With technology-related goods and services, the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. To achieve efficiency gains through worldwide standardization and mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral trade agreements before regional blocs form. Network externalities exist when the benefit a consumer derives from a good or service depends on the number of other consumers using the same good or service (as happens, for example, with telecommunications, television broadcasting standards, and many other technology-related goods and services). National monopolies, regulated and endorsed by sovereign governments, tended to produce network externalities in the past: most countries had telephone monopolies, often state-owned, before deregulation. Whether to allow foreign competition in such industries becomes a pressing issue when national boundaries begin to blur as technology advances and as previously untraded goods and services become tradable. Despite obvious gains from trade in such newly tradable sectors, governments often keep trade-prohibiting measures. With analog high definition television (HDTV) transmission standards, for example, regulations and politics kept Europe and Japan from cooperating, so each invested heavily to develop its system in an attempt to have its own standard adopted by the rest of the world. Kubota analyzes how the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. In her model, governments decide whether or not to allow international trade. When trading is permitted, the superior standard drives out all others in the trading area. She shows that even when there are efficiency gains from worldwide standardization, global free trade may not prevail. The technology leader is generally eager to trade, but countries with less advanced technology often choose to form inefficient regional blocs or not to trade at all. Once such regional networks are established, global efficiency-enhancing free trade becomes even harder to achieve than it would have been in their absence. Transfer payments between countries reduce or eliminate such inefficiency and facilitate the achievement of efficient trade in products. To achieve mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral agreements before regional blocs form. This paper is a product of Trade, Development Research Group. The author may be contacted at kkubota@worldbank.org |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a April 2000 - With technology-related goods and services, the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. To achieve efficiency gains through worldwide standardization and mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral trade agreements before regional blocs form. Network externalities exist when the benefit a consumer derives from a good or service depends on the number of other consumers using the same good or service (as happens, for example, with telecommunications, television broadcasting standards, and many other technology-related goods and services). National monopolies, regulated and endorsed by sovereign governments, tended to produce network externalities in the past: most countries had telephone monopolies, often state-owned, before deregulation. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Whether to allow foreign competition in such industries becomes a pressing issue when national boundaries begin to blur as technology advances and as previously untraded goods and services become tradable. Despite obvious gains from trade in such newly tradable sectors, governments often keep trade-prohibiting measures. With analog high definition television (HDTV) transmission standards, for example, regulations and politics kept Europe and Japan from cooperating, so each invested heavily to develop its system in an attempt to have its own standard adopted by the rest of the world. Kubota analyzes how the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. In her model, governments decide whether or not to allow international trade. When trading is permitted, the superior standard drives out all others in the trading area. She shows that even when there are efficiency gains from worldwide standardization, global free trade may not prevail. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a The technology leader is generally eager to trade, but countries with less advanced technology often choose to form inefficient regional blocs or not to trade at all. Once such regional networks are established, global efficiency-enhancing free trade becomes even harder to achieve than it would have been in their absence. Transfer payments between countries reduce or eliminate such inefficiency and facilitate the achievement of efficient trade in products. To achieve mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral agreements before regional blocs form. This paper is a product of Trade, Development Research Group. The author may be contacted at kkubota@worldbank.org | |
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| spelling | Kubota, Keiko Verfasser aut Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities Kubota, Keiko Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier April 2000 - With technology-related goods and services, the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. To achieve efficiency gains through worldwide standardization and mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral trade agreements before regional blocs form. Network externalities exist when the benefit a consumer derives from a good or service depends on the number of other consumers using the same good or service (as happens, for example, with telecommunications, television broadcasting standards, and many other technology-related goods and services). National monopolies, regulated and endorsed by sovereign governments, tended to produce network externalities in the past: most countries had telephone monopolies, often state-owned, before deregulation. Whether to allow foreign competition in such industries becomes a pressing issue when national boundaries begin to blur as technology advances and as previously untraded goods and services become tradable. Despite obvious gains from trade in such newly tradable sectors, governments often keep trade-prohibiting measures. With analog high definition television (HDTV) transmission standards, for example, regulations and politics kept Europe and Japan from cooperating, so each invested heavily to develop its system in an attempt to have its own standard adopted by the rest of the world. Kubota analyzes how the presence of network externalities affects a country's willingness to trade. In her model, governments decide whether or not to allow international trade. When trading is permitted, the superior standard drives out all others in the trading area. She shows that even when there are efficiency gains from worldwide standardization, global free trade may not prevail. The technology leader is generally eager to trade, but countries with less advanced technology often choose to form inefficient regional blocs or not to trade at all. Once such regional networks are established, global efficiency-enhancing free trade becomes even harder to achieve than it would have been in their absence. Transfer payments between countries reduce or eliminate such inefficiency and facilitate the achievement of efficient trade in products. To achieve mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is important to arrive at multilateral agreements before regional blocs form. This paper is a product of Trade, Development Research Group. The author may be contacted at kkubota@worldbank.org Online-Ausg Consumers Costs Deregulation Economic Theory and Research Economies Of Scale Emerging Markets Foreign Competition Free Trade Goods Government Regulations International Economics & Trade International Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets Monopolies Monopoly Network Externalities Payments Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Telecommunications Trade Trade Law Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy WTO Welfare Kubota, Keiko Sonstige oth Kubota, Keiko Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2317 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kubota, Keiko Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities Consumers Costs Deregulation Economic Theory and Research Economies Of Scale Emerging Markets Foreign Competition Free Trade Goods Government Regulations International Economics & Trade International Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets Monopolies Monopoly Network Externalities Payments Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Telecommunications Trade Trade Law Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy WTO Welfare |
| title | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities |
| title_auth | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities |
| title_exact_search | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities |
| title_full | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities Kubota, Keiko |
| title_fullStr | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities Kubota, Keiko |
| title_full_unstemmed | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities Kubota, Keiko |
| title_short | Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities |
| title_sort | trade negotiations in the presence of network externalities |
| topic | Consumers Costs Deregulation Economic Theory and Research Economies Of Scale Emerging Markets Foreign Competition Free Trade Goods Government Regulations International Economics & Trade International Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets Monopolies Monopoly Network Externalities Payments Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Telecommunications Trade Trade Law Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy WTO Welfare |
| topic_facet | Consumers Costs Deregulation Economic Theory and Research Economies Of Scale Emerging Markets Foreign Competition Free Trade Goods Government Regulations International Economics & Trade International Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets Monopolies Monopoly Network Externalities Payments Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Telecommunications Trade Trade Law Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy WTO Welfare |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2317 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kubotakeiko tradenegotiationsinthepresenceofnetworkexternalities |