A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing: The Mexican Approach
July 2000 - To bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments, Mexico's federal government has established a two-pillar framework that explicitly renounces federal bail-outs and establishes a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational gover...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | July 2000 - To bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments, Mexico's federal government has established a two-pillar framework that explicitly renounces federal bail-outs and establishes a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower's credit rating. Whether the framework succeeds will depend partly on market assessments of the government's commitment to enforce bank capital rules and refrain from bailing out defaulting subnational governments. Faced with weak subnational finances that pose a risk to macroeconomic stability, Mexico's federal government in April 2000 established an innovative incentive framework to bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments. That framework is based on two pillars: an explicit renunciation of federal bail-outs and a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower's credit rating. In theory, this new regulatory arrangement should reduce moral hazard among banks and their state and municipal clients; differentiate interest rates on the basis of the borrowers' creditworthiness; and elicit a strong demand for institutional development at the subnational level. But its success will depend on three factors critical to implementation: · Whether markets find the federal commitment not to bail out defaulting subnational governments credible. · Whether subnational governments have access to financing other than bank loans. · How well bank capital rules are enforced. This paper - a product of the Mexico- Country Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to understand the subnational underpinnings of sustainable, national economic framework. The authors may be contacted at mgiugale@worldbank.org, akorobow@worldbank.org, or swebb@worldbank.org |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a July 2000 - To bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments, Mexico's federal government has established a two-pillar framework that explicitly renounces federal bail-outs and establishes a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower's credit rating. Whether the framework succeeds will depend partly on market assessments of the government's commitment to enforce bank capital rules and refrain from bailing out defaulting subnational governments. Faced with weak subnational finances that pose a risk to macroeconomic stability, Mexico's federal government in April 2000 established an innovative incentive framework to bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments. That framework is based on two pillars: an explicit renunciation of federal bail-outs and a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower's credit rating. In theory, this new regulatory arrangement should reduce moral hazard among banks and their state and municipal clients; differentiate interest rates on the basis of the borrowers' creditworthiness; and elicit a strong demand for institutional development at the subnational level. But its success will depend on three factors critical to implementation: · Whether markets find the federal commitment not to bail out defaulting subnational governments credible. · Whether subnational governments have access to financing other than bank loans. · How well bank capital rules are enforced. This paper - a product of the Mexico- Country Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to understand the subnational underpinnings of sustainable, national economic framework. The authors may be contacted at mgiugale@worldbank.org, akorobow@worldbank.org, or swebb@worldbank.org | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Giugale, Marcelo Verfasser aut A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach Giugale, Marcelo Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier July 2000 - To bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments, Mexico's federal government has established a two-pillar framework that explicitly renounces federal bail-outs and establishes a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower's credit rating. Whether the framework succeeds will depend partly on market assessments of the government's commitment to enforce bank capital rules and refrain from bailing out defaulting subnational governments. Faced with weak subnational finances that pose a risk to macroeconomic stability, Mexico's federal government in April 2000 established an innovative incentive framework to bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments. That framework is based on two pillars: an explicit renunciation of federal bail-outs and a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower's credit rating. In theory, this new regulatory arrangement should reduce moral hazard among banks and their state and municipal clients; differentiate interest rates on the basis of the borrowers' creditworthiness; and elicit a strong demand for institutional development at the subnational level. But its success will depend on three factors critical to implementation: · Whether markets find the federal commitment not to bail out defaulting subnational governments credible. · Whether subnational governments have access to financing other than bank loans. · How well bank capital rules are enforced. This paper - a product of the Mexico- Country Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to understand the subnational underpinnings of sustainable, national economic framework. The authors may be contacted at mgiugale@worldbank.org, akorobow@worldbank.org, or swebb@worldbank.org Online-Ausg Bank Banks Banks and Banking Reform Borrowing Capital Commercial Banks Cred Debt Debt Markets Decentralization Deposits Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Externalities Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Performance Governments Institutional Development Interest Interest Rates Lending Loans Macroeconomic Stability Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Moral Hazard Private Sector Development Risk Korobow, Adam Sonstige oth Giugale, Marcelo Sonstige oth Webb, Steven Sonstige oth Giugale, Marcelo A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2370 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Giugale, Marcelo A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach Bank Banks Banks and Banking Reform Borrowing Capital Commercial Banks Cred Debt Debt Markets Decentralization Deposits Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Externalities Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Performance Governments Institutional Development Interest Interest Rates Lending Loans Macroeconomic Stability Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Moral Hazard Private Sector Development Risk |
| title | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach |
| title_auth | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach |
| title_exact_search | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach |
| title_exact_search_txtP | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach |
| title_full | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach Giugale, Marcelo |
| title_fullStr | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach Giugale, Marcelo |
| title_full_unstemmed | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing The Mexican Approach Giugale, Marcelo |
| title_short | A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing |
| title_sort | a new model for market based regulation of subnational borrowing the mexican approach |
| title_sub | The Mexican Approach |
| topic | Bank Banks Banks and Banking Reform Borrowing Capital Commercial Banks Cred Debt Debt Markets Decentralization Deposits Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Externalities Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Performance Governments Institutional Development Interest Interest Rates Lending Loans Macroeconomic Stability Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Moral Hazard Private Sector Development Risk |
| topic_facet | Bank Banks Banks and Banking Reform Borrowing Capital Commercial Banks Cred Debt Debt Markets Decentralization Deposits Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Externalities Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Performance Governments Institutional Development Interest Interest Rates Lending Loans Macroeconomic Stability Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Moral Hazard Private Sector Development Risk |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2370 |
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