Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?:
June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trad...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. Mattoo and Olarreaga show that the feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve trade policy in goods and services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or molarreaga@worldbank.org |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten)) |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049076219 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s1999 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093209592 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392144957 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005445744 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Mattoo, Aaditya |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |c Mattoo, Aaditya |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 1999 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten)) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. Mattoo and Olarreaga show that the feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve trade policy in goods and services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or molarreaga@worldbank.org | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausg | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Currencies and Exchange Rates | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Currency | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Debt Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Dispute Settlement | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory and Research | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Emerging Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Free Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Insurance and Risk Mitigation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International Economics & Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International Trade and Trade Rules | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Multilateral Liberalization | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Multilateral Negotiations | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Private Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Public Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Reciprocal Concessions | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tariff | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tariff Reductions | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tariff Schedule | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tariffs | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Terms Of Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Terms Of Trade Loss | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Trade Liberalization | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Trade Negotiations | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Trade Policy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Trade Policy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Unilateral Liberalization | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Unilateral Reduction | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Unilateral Tariff Reduction | |
| 650 | 4 | |a World Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a World Trade Organization | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mattoo, Aaditya |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Olarreaga, Marcelo |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Mattoo, Aaditya |a Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338110 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |l EUV01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |l HTW01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |l FHI01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |l IOS01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185397115224064 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Mattoo, Aaditya |
| author_facet | Mattoo, Aaditya |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Mattoo, Aaditya |
| author_variant | a m am |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049076219 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093209592 (OCoLC)1392144957 (DE-599)GBVNLM005445744 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04794nmm a22008051c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049076219</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s1999 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093209592</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392144957</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005445744</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mattoo, Aaditya</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?</subfield><subfield code="c">Mattoo, Aaditya</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten))</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. Mattoo and Olarreaga show that the feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve trade policy in goods and services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or molarreaga@worldbank.org</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Currencies and Exchange Rates</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Currency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Debt Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Dispute Settlement</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic Theory and Research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Emerging Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Free Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Insurance and Risk Mitigation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">International Economics & Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">International Trade and Trade Rules</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Macroeconomics and Economic Growth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Multilateral Liberalization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Multilateral Negotiations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Private Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Public Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reciprocal Concessions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tariff</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tariff Reductions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tariff Schedule</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tariffs</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Terms Of Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Terms Of Trade Loss</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Trade Liberalization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Trade Negotiations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Trade Policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Trade Policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Unilateral Liberalization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Unilateral Reduction</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Unilateral Tariff Reduction</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">World Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">World Trade Organization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mattoo, Aaditya</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Olarreaga, Marcelo</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Mattoo, Aaditya</subfield><subfield code="a">Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374</subfield><subfield code="l">EUV01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374</subfield><subfield code="l">HTW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374</subfield><subfield code="l">FHI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374</subfield><subfield code="l">IOS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049076219 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034338110 |
| oclc_num | 1392144957 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten)) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publishDateSearch | 1999 |
| publishDateSort | 1999 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Mattoo, Aaditya Verfasser aut Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? Mattoo, Aaditya Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. Mattoo and Olarreaga show that the feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve trade policy in goods and services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or molarreaga@worldbank.org Online-Ausg Currencies and Exchange Rates Currency Debt Markets Dispute Settlement Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development Free Trade Insurance and Risk Mitigation International Economics & Trade International Trade and Trade Rules Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Multilateral Liberalization Multilateral Negotiations Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Reciprocal Concessions Tariff Tariff Reductions Tariff Schedule Tariffs Terms Of Trade Terms Of Trade Loss Trade Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy Unilateral Liberalization Unilateral Reduction Unilateral Tariff Reduction World Trade World Trade Organization Mattoo, Aaditya Sonstige oth Olarreaga, Marcelo Sonstige oth Mattoo, Aaditya Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Mattoo, Aaditya Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? Currencies and Exchange Rates Currency Debt Markets Dispute Settlement Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development Free Trade Insurance and Risk Mitigation International Economics & Trade International Trade and Trade Rules Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Multilateral Liberalization Multilateral Negotiations Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Reciprocal Concessions Tariff Tariff Reductions Tariff Schedule Tariffs Terms Of Trade Terms Of Trade Loss Trade Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy Unilateral Liberalization Unilateral Reduction Unilateral Tariff Reduction World Trade World Trade Organization |
| title | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_auth | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_exact_search | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_full | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? Mattoo, Aaditya |
| title_fullStr | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? Mattoo, Aaditya |
| title_full_unstemmed | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? Mattoo, Aaditya |
| title_short | Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_sort | should credit be given for autonomous liberalization in multilateral trade negotiations |
| topic | Currencies and Exchange Rates Currency Debt Markets Dispute Settlement Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development Free Trade Insurance and Risk Mitigation International Economics & Trade International Trade and Trade Rules Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Multilateral Liberalization Multilateral Negotiations Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Reciprocal Concessions Tariff Tariff Reductions Tariff Schedule Tariffs Terms Of Trade Terms Of Trade Loss Trade Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy Unilateral Liberalization Unilateral Reduction Unilateral Tariff Reduction World Trade World Trade Organization |
| topic_facet | Currencies and Exchange Rates Currency Debt Markets Dispute Settlement Economic Theory and Research Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development Free Trade Insurance and Risk Mitigation International Economics & Trade International Trade and Trade Rules Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Multilateral Liberalization Multilateral Negotiations Private Sector Development Public Sector Development Reciprocal Concessions Tariff Tariff Reductions Tariff Schedule Tariffs Terms Of Trade Terms Of Trade Loss Trade Trade Liberalization Trade Negotiations Trade Policy Unilateral Liberalization Unilateral Reduction Unilateral Tariff Reduction World Trade World Trade Organization |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2374 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mattooaaditya shouldcreditbegivenforautonomousliberalizationinmultilateraltradenegotiations AT olarreagamarcelo shouldcreditbegivenforautonomousliberalizationinmultilateraltradenegotiations |