Family altruism and incentives:
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, DC
World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth
[2000]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2505 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding |
| Beschreibung: | "December 2000"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38) Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Gatti, Roberta Verfasser aut Family altruism and incentives Roberta Gatti Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth [2000] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 2505 "December 2000"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38) Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002 In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding Online-Ausg Also available in print Altruism Econometric models Inheritance and succession Econometric models World Bank Development Research Group Macroeconomic and Growth oth Gatti, Roberta Family altruism and incentives http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2505 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Gatti, Roberta Family altruism and incentives Altruism Econometric models Inheritance and succession Econometric models |
| title | Family altruism and incentives |
| title_auth | Family altruism and incentives |
| title_exact_search | Family altruism and incentives |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Family altruism and incentives |
| title_full | Family altruism and incentives Roberta Gatti |
| title_fullStr | Family altruism and incentives Roberta Gatti |
| title_full_unstemmed | Family altruism and incentives Roberta Gatti |
| title_short | Family altruism and incentives |
| title_sort | family altruism and incentives |
| topic | Altruism Econometric models Inheritance and succession Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Altruism Econometric models Inheritance and succession Econometric models |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2505 |
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