Decentralization and accountability: are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections?
Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopic...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economis
[2001]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2557 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election |
| Beschreibung: | "February 2001"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-17) Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 17, 2002 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:34Z |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Khemani, Stuti Verfasser aut Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? Stuti Khemani Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economis [2001] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 2557 "February 2001"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-17) Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 17, 2002 Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election Online-Ausg Also available in print Elections India Local elections India State governments India Elections Voting research India India / Politics and government World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics oth Khemani, Stuti Decentralization and accountability http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2557 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Khemani, Stuti Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? Elections India Local elections India State governments India Elections Voting research India |
| title | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? |
| title_auth | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? |
| title_exact_search | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? |
| title_full | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? Stuti Khemani |
| title_fullStr | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? Stuti Khemani |
| title_full_unstemmed | Decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? Stuti Khemani |
| title_short | Decentralization and accountability |
| title_sort | decentralization and accountability are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections |
| title_sub | are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? |
| topic | Elections India Local elections India State governments India Elections Voting research India |
| topic_facet | Elections India Local elections India State governments India Elections Voting research India |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2557 |
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