Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire:
May 2001 - Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Workers appear to have some bargaining power and, in Côte d'Ivoire, can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. Labor costs in...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2000
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | May 2001 - Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Workers appear to have some bargaining power and, in Côte d'Ivoire, can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? Azam and Ris empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Côte d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power and that in Côte d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. This paper-a product of Public Services for Human Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of labor market policies and institutions on economic performance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions on Economic Performance" (RPO 680-96). Jean-Paul Azam may be contacted at azam@univ-tlsel.fr |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)) |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049075993 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2000 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093211848 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392150266 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005447992 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Azam, Jean-Paul |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |c Azam, Jean-Paul |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2000 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a May 2001 - Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Workers appear to have some bargaining power and, in Côte d'Ivoire, can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? Azam and Ris empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Côte d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power and that in Côte d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. This paper-a product of Public Services for Human Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of labor market policies and institutions on economic performance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions on Economic Performance" (RPO 680-96). Jean-Paul Azam may be contacted at azam@univ-tlsel.fr | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausg | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Bargaining | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Bargaining Power | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competitive Model | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Contracts | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory and Research | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Effects | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Efficiency | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Financial Literacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a High Wages | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Human Capital | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Income | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Labor | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Labor Costs | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Labor Market | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Labor Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Labor Policies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Prices | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Social Protections and Labor | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ris, Catherine |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Azam, Jean-Paul |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Azam, Jean-Paul |a Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034337884 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |l EUV01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |l HTW01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |l FHI01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |l IOS01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185396221837312 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Azam, Jean-Paul |
| author_facet | Azam, Jean-Paul |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Azam, Jean-Paul |
| author_variant | j p a jpa |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049075993 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093211848 (OCoLC)1392150266 (DE-599)GBVNLM005447992 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04103nmm a22006491c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049075993</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2000 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093211848</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392150266</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005447992</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Azam, Jean-Paul</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire</subfield><subfield code="c">Azam, Jean-Paul</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten))</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">May 2001 - Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Workers appear to have some bargaining power and, in Côte d'Ivoire, can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? Azam and Ris empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Côte d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power and that in Côte d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. This paper-a product of Public Services for Human Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of labor market policies and institutions on economic performance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions on Economic Performance" (RPO 680-96). Jean-Paul Azam may be contacted at azam@univ-tlsel.fr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bargaining</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bargaining Power</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Competitive Model</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Contracts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic Theory and Research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Effects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Efficiency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Financial Literacy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">High Wages</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Human Capital</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Income</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Labor</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Labor Costs</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Labor Market</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Labor Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Labor Policies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Macroeconomics and Economic Growth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Prices</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Social Protections and Labor</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ris, Catherine</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Azam, Jean-Paul</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Azam, Jean-Paul</subfield><subfield code="a">Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034337884</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600</subfield><subfield code="l">EUV01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600</subfield><subfield code="l">HTW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600</subfield><subfield code="l">FHI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600</subfield><subfield code="l">IOS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049075993 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:49Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034337884 |
| oclc_num | 1392150266 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publishDateSearch | 2000 |
| publishDateSort | 2000 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Azam, Jean-Paul Verfasser aut Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire Azam, Jean-Paul Washington, D.C The World Bank 2000 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier May 2001 - Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Workers appear to have some bargaining power and, in Côte d'Ivoire, can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? Azam and Ris empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Côte d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power and that in Côte d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments. This paper-a product of Public Services for Human Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of labor market policies and institutions on economic performance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions on Economic Performance" (RPO 680-96). Jean-Paul Azam may be contacted at azam@univ-tlsel.fr Online-Ausg Bargaining Bargaining Power Competitive Model Contracts Economic Theory and Research Effects Efficiency Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy High Wages Human Capital Income Labor Labor Costs Labor Market Labor Markets Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Prices Social Protections and Labor Ris, Catherine Sonstige oth Azam, Jean-Paul Sonstige oth Azam, Jean-Paul Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Azam, Jean-Paul Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire Bargaining Bargaining Power Competitive Model Contracts Economic Theory and Research Effects Efficiency Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy High Wages Human Capital Income Labor Labor Costs Labor Market Labor Markets Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Prices Social Protections and Labor |
| title | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |
| title_auth | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |
| title_exact_search | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |
| title_full | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire Azam, Jean-Paul |
| title_fullStr | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire Azam, Jean-Paul |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire Azam, Jean-Paul |
| title_short | Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Côte d'Ivoire |
| title_sort | rent sharing hold up and manufacturing wages in cote d ivoire |
| topic | Bargaining Bargaining Power Competitive Model Contracts Economic Theory and Research Effects Efficiency Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy High Wages Human Capital Income Labor Labor Costs Labor Market Labor Markets Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Prices Social Protections and Labor |
| topic_facet | Bargaining Bargaining Power Competitive Model Contracts Economic Theory and Research Effects Efficiency Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Literacy High Wages Human Capital Income Labor Labor Costs Labor Market Labor Markets Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Prices Social Protections and Labor |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2600 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT azamjeanpaul rentsharingholdupandmanufacturingwagesincotedivoire AT riscatherine rentsharingholdupandmanufacturingwagesincotedivoire |