The Regulation of Entry:
August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors pre...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| spelling | Porta, Rafael Verfasser aut The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses Online-Ausg Barriers To Entry Economic Theories Economic Theory and Research Economies Efficiency Environment Environmental Economics and Policies Equity Externalities Information Interest Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Markets Need Outcomes Policies Public Sector Economics and Finance Public Sector Regulation Regulatory Regimes Social Protections and Labor Shleifer, Andrei Sonstige oth Porta, Rafael Sonstige oth Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon Sonstige oth Porta, Rafael The Regulation of Entry http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2661 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Porta, Rafael The Regulation of Entry Barriers To Entry Economic Theories Economic Theory and Research Economies Efficiency Environment Environmental Economics and Policies Equity Externalities Information Interest Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Markets Need Outcomes Policies Public Sector Economics and Finance Public Sector Regulation Regulatory Regimes Social Protections and Labor |
| title | The Regulation of Entry |
| title_auth | The Regulation of Entry |
| title_exact_search | The Regulation of Entry |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Regulation of Entry |
| title_full | The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael |
| title_fullStr | The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael |
| title_short | The Regulation of Entry |
| title_sort | the regulation of entry |
| topic | Barriers To Entry Economic Theories Economic Theory and Research Economies Efficiency Environment Environmental Economics and Policies Equity Externalities Information Interest Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Markets Need Outcomes Policies Public Sector Economics and Finance Public Sector Regulation Regulatory Regimes Social Protections and Labor |
| topic_facet | Barriers To Entry Economic Theories Economic Theory and Research Economies Efficiency Environment Environmental Economics and Policies Equity Externalities Information Interest Labor Policies Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Markets Need Outcomes Policies Public Sector Economics and Finance Public Sector Regulation Regulatory Regimes Social Protections and Labor |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2661 |
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