State Ownership: A Residual Role?
Perotti reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the capture of the privatization...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2004
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Perotti reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the capture of the privatization process itself. In addition, the speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. In many countries institutional weakness limits regulatory capacity and reliability, yet the author's conclusion is that in such environments, maintaining state control undermines the very emergence of institutional capacity, and so the balance should tip toward progressively less direct state control. After all, what are "institutions" if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The author offers some suggestions about creating maximum accountability in regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a rotating board representative of users, producers, and civic organizations, to be elected by a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure. This paper-a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Investment Climate Unit-is part of a larger effort in the department to improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (25 Seiten)) |
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| spelling | Perotti, Enrico Verfasser aut State Ownership A Residual Role? Perotti, Enrico Washington, D.C The World Bank 2004 1 Online-Ressource (25 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Perotti reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the capture of the privatization process itself. In addition, the speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. In many countries institutional weakness limits regulatory capacity and reliability, yet the author's conclusion is that in such environments, maintaining state control undermines the very emergence of institutional capacity, and so the balance should tip toward progressively less direct state control. After all, what are "institutions" if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The author offers some suggestions about creating maximum accountability in regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a rotating board representative of users, producers, and civic organizations, to be elected by a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure. This paper-a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Investment Climate Unit-is part of a larger effort in the department to improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries Online-Ausg Accountability Constituencies Corporate Governance Degree of Autonomy Disclosure Emerging Markets Financial Crises Governance Governance Indicators Governments Institutional Capacity Macroeconomics and Economic Growth National Governance Nationalization Political Economy Political Power Private Sector Development Privatization Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Perotti, Enrico Sonstige oth Perotti, Enrico State Ownership http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3407 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Perotti, Enrico State Ownership A Residual Role? Accountability Constituencies Corporate Governance Degree of Autonomy Disclosure Emerging Markets Financial Crises Governance Governance Indicators Governments Institutional Capacity Macroeconomics and Economic Growth National Governance Nationalization Political Economy Political Power Private Sector Development Privatization Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures |
| title | State Ownership A Residual Role? |
| title_auth | State Ownership A Residual Role? |
| title_exact_search | State Ownership A Residual Role? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | State Ownership A Residual Role? |
| title_full | State Ownership A Residual Role? Perotti, Enrico |
| title_fullStr | State Ownership A Residual Role? Perotti, Enrico |
| title_full_unstemmed | State Ownership A Residual Role? Perotti, Enrico |
| title_short | State Ownership |
| title_sort | state ownership a residual role |
| title_sub | A Residual Role? |
| topic | Accountability Constituencies Corporate Governance Degree of Autonomy Disclosure Emerging Markets Financial Crises Governance Governance Indicators Governments Institutional Capacity Macroeconomics and Economic Growth National Governance Nationalization Political Economy Political Power Private Sector Development Privatization Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures |
| topic_facet | Accountability Constituencies Corporate Governance Degree of Autonomy Disclosure Emerging Markets Financial Crises Governance Governance Indicators Governments Institutional Capacity Macroeconomics and Economic Growth National Governance Nationalization Political Economy Political Power Private Sector Development Privatization Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3407 |
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