What drives corporate governance reform?: firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe
"The authors study differences in the use of two corporate governance provisions - cumulative voting and proxy by mail voting - in a sample of 224 firms located in four Eastern European countries. The report finds a significant relationship between ownership structure, and the use of corporate...
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2005]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3600 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The authors study differences in the use of two corporate governance provisions - cumulative voting and proxy by mail voting - in a sample of 224 firms located in four Eastern European countries. The report finds a significant relationship between ownership structure, and the use of corporate governance provisions. Firms with a controlling owner (owning more than 50 percent of shares) are less likely to adopt either of the two provisions. However, firms that have large, minority shareholders are more likely to adopt these provisions. The authors do not find any significant relationship between the use of these provisions, and foreign ownership. The results suggest that the decision to adopt these corporate governance provisions is influenced by large, minority shareholders in their battle for representation in the board, and in managerial decisions. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/24/2005 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| spelling | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe Patricio Aroca Gonzalez ... [et al.] [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2005] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3600 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/24/2005 "The authors study differences in the use of two corporate governance provisions - cumulative voting and proxy by mail voting - in a sample of 224 firms located in four Eastern European countries. The report finds a significant relationship between ownership structure, and the use of corporate governance provisions. Firms with a controlling owner (owning more than 50 percent of shares) are less likely to adopt either of the two provisions. However, firms that have large, minority shareholders are more likely to adopt these provisions. The authors do not find any significant relationship between the use of these provisions, and foreign ownership. The results suggest that the decision to adopt these corporate governance provisions is influenced by large, minority shareholders in their battle for representation in the board, and in managerial decisions. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Corporate governance Europe, Eastern Stock ownership Europe, Eastern Voting Europe, Eastern Aroca González, Patricio Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe What drives corporate governance reform? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3600 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe Corporate governance Europe, Eastern Stock ownership Europe, Eastern Voting Europe, Eastern |
| title | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe |
| title_auth | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe |
| title_exact_search | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe |
| title_exact_search_txtP | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe |
| title_full | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe Patricio Aroca Gonzalez ... [et al.] |
| title_fullStr | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe Patricio Aroca Gonzalez ... [et al.] |
| title_full_unstemmed | What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe Patricio Aroca Gonzalez ... [et al.] |
| title_short | What drives corporate governance reform? |
| title_sort | what drives corporate governance reform firm level evidence from eastern europe |
| title_sub | firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe |
| topic | Corporate governance Europe, Eastern Stock ownership Europe, Eastern Voting Europe, Eastern |
| topic_facet | Corporate governance Europe, Eastern Stock ownership Europe, Eastern Voting Europe, Eastern |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3600 |
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