Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues:
The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water related issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising t...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2005
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water related issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the " rules of the game" that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water related issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the " rules of the game" that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource | |
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| spelling | Carraro, Carlo Verfasser aut Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues Carraro, Carlo Washington, D.C The World Bank 2005 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water related issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the " rules of the game" that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource Online-Ausg Common Problems Environment Environmental Environmental Economics Environmental Economics and Policies Environmental Problems Equilibrium Equity Incentives Industry Information Interest Labor Law and Development Marginal Cost Models Natural Resources Rural Development Town Water Supply and Sanitation Water Conservation Water Resources Water Supply and Sanitation Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions Water Supply and Systems Water and Industry Sgobbi, Alessandra Sonstige oth Carraro, Carlo Sonstige oth Marchiori, Carmen Sonstige oth Carraro, Carlo Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3641 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Carraro, Carlo Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues Common Problems Environment Environmental Environmental Economics Environmental Economics and Policies Environmental Problems Equilibrium Equity Incentives Industry Information Interest Labor Law and Development Marginal Cost Models Natural Resources Rural Development Town Water Supply and Sanitation Water Conservation Water Resources Water Supply and Sanitation Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions Water Supply and Systems Water and Industry |
| title | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues |
| title_auth | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues |
| title_exact_search | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues |
| title_full | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues Carraro, Carlo |
| title_fullStr | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues Carraro, Carlo |
| title_full_unstemmed | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues Carraro, Carlo |
| title_short | Applications of Negotiation Theory To Water Issues |
| title_sort | applications of negotiation theory to water issues |
| topic | Common Problems Environment Environmental Environmental Economics Environmental Economics and Policies Environmental Problems Equilibrium Equity Incentives Industry Information Interest Labor Law and Development Marginal Cost Models Natural Resources Rural Development Town Water Supply and Sanitation Water Conservation Water Resources Water Supply and Sanitation Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions Water Supply and Systems Water and Industry |
| topic_facet | Common Problems Environment Environmental Environmental Economics Environmental Economics and Policies Environmental Problems Equilibrium Equity Incentives Industry Information Interest Labor Law and Development Marginal Cost Models Natural Resources Rural Development Town Water Supply and Sanitation Water Conservation Water Resources Water Supply and Sanitation Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions Water Supply and Systems Water and Industry |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3641 |
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