Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises?:
"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2005]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3660 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049074964 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2005 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093222122 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392137797 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005458277 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Feijen, Erik |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |c Erik Feijen |
| 264 | 1 | |a [Washington, D.C] |b World Bank |c [2005] | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Policy research working paper |v 3660 | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 500 | |a Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005 | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a "The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. "--World Bank web site | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausg |n Also available in print | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Banks and banking | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Financial crises | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Political corruption | |
| 710 | 2 | |a World Bank |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Feijen, Erik |a Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034336855 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |l EUV01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |l HTW01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |l FHI01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |l IOS01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185393421090816 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Feijen, Erik |
| author_facet | Feijen, Erik |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Feijen, Erik |
| author_variant | e f ef |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049074964 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093222122 (OCoLC)1392137797 (DE-599)GBVNLM005458277 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03096nmm a22004811cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049074964</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2005 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093222122</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392137797</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005458277</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Feijen, Erik</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises?</subfield><subfield code="c">Erik Feijen</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">[Washington, D.C]</subfield><subfield code="b">World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">[2005]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Policy research working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">3660</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. "--World Bank web site</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield><subfield code="n">Also available in print</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banks and banking</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Financial crises</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Political corruption</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">World Bank</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Feijen, Erik</subfield><subfield code="a">Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises?</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034336855</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660</subfield><subfield code="l">EUV01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660</subfield><subfield code="l">HTW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660</subfield><subfield code="l">FHI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660</subfield><subfield code="l">IOS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049074964 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:47Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034336855 |
| oclc_num | 1392137797 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spelling | Feijen, Erik Verfasser aut Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? Erik Feijen [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2005] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3660 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005 "The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Banks and banking Finance Financial crises Political corruption World Bank Sonstige oth Feijen, Erik Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Feijen, Erik Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? Banks and banking Finance Financial crises Political corruption |
| title | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| title_auth | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| title_exact_search | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| title_full | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? Erik Feijen |
| title_fullStr | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? Erik Feijen |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? Erik Feijen |
| title_short | Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| title_sort | do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises |
| topic | Banks and banking Finance Financial crises Political corruption |
| topic_facet | Banks and banking Finance Financial crises Political corruption |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3660 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT feijenerik doincumbentsmanipulateaccesstofinanceduringbankingcrises AT worldbank doincumbentsmanipulateaccesstofinanceduringbankingcrises |