Managing unilateral market power in electricity:
"This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2005]
|
Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3691 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | "This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process. This paper provides examples of both the successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More than 10 years of experience with the electricity industry restructuring process has shown that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market. "--World Bank web site |
Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005 |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Wolak, Frank A. |
author_facet | Wolak, Frank A. |
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discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
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index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:47Z |
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institution | BVB |
language | English |
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publishDate | 2005 |
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publisher | World Bank |
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series2 | Policy research working paper |
spelling | Wolak, Frank A. Verfasser aut Managing unilateral market power in electricity Frank A. Wolak [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2005] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3691 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005 "This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process. This paper provides examples of both the successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More than 10 years of experience with the electricity industry restructuring process has shown that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Electric power Government policy Case studies World Bank Sonstige oth Wolak, Frank A Managing unilateral market power in electricity http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3691 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Wolak, Frank A. Managing unilateral market power in electricity Electric power Government policy Case studies |
title | Managing unilateral market power in electricity |
title_auth | Managing unilateral market power in electricity |
title_exact_search | Managing unilateral market power in electricity |
title_exact_search_txtP | Managing unilateral market power in electricity |
title_full | Managing unilateral market power in electricity Frank A. Wolak |
title_fullStr | Managing unilateral market power in electricity Frank A. Wolak |
title_full_unstemmed | Managing unilateral market power in electricity Frank A. Wolak |
title_short | Managing unilateral market power in electricity |
title_sort | managing unilateral market power in electricity |
topic | Electric power Government policy Case studies |
topic_facet | Electric power Government policy Case studies |
url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3691 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT wolakfranka managingunilateralmarketpowerinelectricity AT worldbank managingunilateralmarketpowerinelectricity |