What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ?: The Russian paradox
The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2005
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten)) |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level | |
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650 | 4 | |a Budgets | |
650 | 4 | |a Debt Markets | |
650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory and Research | |
650 | 4 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
650 | 4 | |a Fiscal Decentralization | |
650 | 4 | |a Fiscal Federalism | |
650 | 4 | |a Governance | |
650 | 4 | |a Governments | |
650 | 4 | |a Inflation | |
650 | 4 | |a Interest | |
650 | 4 | |a Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management | |
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650 | 4 | |a Municipal Financial Management | |
650 | 4 | |a Public Sector Economics and Finance | |
650 | 4 | |a Urban Development | |
700 | 1 | |a Plekhanov, Alexander |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Freinkman, Lev |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Freinkman, Lev |a What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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spelling | Freinkman, Lev Verfasser aut What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox Freinkman, Lev Washington, D.C The World Bank 2005 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level Online-Ausg Autonomy Bank Banks and Banking Reform Budget Budgets Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Decentralization Fiscal Federalism Governance Governments Inflation Interest Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management Land Local Government Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Municipal Financial Management Public Sector Economics and Finance Urban Development Plekhanov, Alexander Sonstige oth Freinkman, Lev Sonstige oth Freinkman, Lev What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3710 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Freinkman, Lev What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox Autonomy Bank Banks and Banking Reform Budget Budgets Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Decentralization Fiscal Federalism Governance Governments Inflation Interest Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management Land Local Government Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Municipal Financial Management Public Sector Economics and Finance Urban Development |
title | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox |
title_auth | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox |
title_exact_search | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox |
title_exact_search_txtP | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox |
title_full | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox Freinkman, Lev |
title_fullStr | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox Freinkman, Lev |
title_full_unstemmed | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox Freinkman, Lev |
title_short | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? |
title_sort | what determines the extent of fiscal decentralization the russian paradox |
title_sub | The Russian paradox |
topic | Autonomy Bank Banks and Banking Reform Budget Budgets Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Decentralization Fiscal Federalism Governance Governments Inflation Interest Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management Land Local Government Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Municipal Financial Management Public Sector Economics and Finance Urban Development |
topic_facet | Autonomy Bank Banks and Banking Reform Budget Budgets Debt Markets Economic Theory and Research Finance and Financial Sector Development Fiscal Decentralization Fiscal Federalism Governance Governments Inflation Interest Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management Land Local Government Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Municipal Financial Management Public Sector Economics and Finance Urban Development |
url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3710 |
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