Infrastructure concessions in Latin America: government-led renegotiations
"The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative o...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2005]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3749 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/7/2005 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. "--World Bank web site | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV049074875 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:47Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spelling | Guasch, J. Luis Verfasser aut Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Stephane Straub [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2005] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3749 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/7/2005 "The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Infrastructure (Economics) Latin America Case studies Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947- Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Guasch, J. Luis Infrastructure concessions in Latin America http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3749 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Guasch, J. Luis Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations Infrastructure (Economics) Latin America Case studies |
| title | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations |
| title_auth | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations |
| title_exact_search | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations |
| title_full | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Stephane Straub |
| title_fullStr | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Stephane Straub |
| title_full_unstemmed | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America government-led renegotiations J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Stephane Straub |
| title_short | Infrastructure concessions in Latin America |
| title_sort | infrastructure concessions in latin america government led renegotiations |
| title_sub | government-led renegotiations |
| topic | Infrastructure (Economics) Latin America Case studies |
| topic_facet | Infrastructure (Economics) Latin America Case studies |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3749 |
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