Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules:
"The authors explore the relationship between fiscal rules and capital budgeting. The current budgetary approach to limit deficits to a fixed portion of GDP or to balance budgets could undermine incentives to invest in public capital with long-run returns since politicians concerned about elect...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2006]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3860 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The authors explore the relationship between fiscal rules and capital budgeting. The current budgetary approach to limit deficits to a fixed portion of GDP or to balance budgets could undermine incentives to invest in public capital with long-run returns since politicians concerned about electoral prospects would favor expenditures providing immediate benefits to their voters. An alternative budgetary approach is to separate capital from current revenues and expenditures and relax fiscal constraints by allowing governments to finance capital expenditures with debt, as suggested by the golden rule approach to capital funding. But the effect of capital budgeting would be to provide opportunities to politicians to escape the fiscal rule constraints by shifting current expenditures into capital accounts that are difficult to measure properly, thereby leading to increased borrowing. As an alternative, the authors propose a modified golden rule limiting debt finance to a proportion of the government's investment in self-liquidating assets. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/8/2006 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV049074764 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:47Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| oclc_num | 1392149383 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
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| publisher | World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spelling | Mintz, Jack M. Verfasser aut Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules Jack M. Mintz, Michael Smart [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2006] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3860 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/8/2006 "The authors explore the relationship between fiscal rules and capital budgeting. The current budgetary approach to limit deficits to a fixed portion of GDP or to balance budgets could undermine incentives to invest in public capital with long-run returns since politicians concerned about electoral prospects would favor expenditures providing immediate benefits to their voters. An alternative budgetary approach is to separate capital from current revenues and expenditures and relax fiscal constraints by allowing governments to finance capital expenditures with debt, as suggested by the golden rule approach to capital funding. But the effect of capital budgeting would be to provide opportunities to politicians to escape the fiscal rule constraints by shifting current expenditures into capital accounts that are difficult to measure properly, thereby leading to increased borrowing. As an alternative, the authors propose a modified golden rule limiting debt finance to a proportion of the government's investment in self-liquidating assets. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Capital budget Gross domestic product Investment of public funds Smart, Michael Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Mintz, Jack M Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3860 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Mintz, Jack M. Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules Capital budget Gross domestic product Investment of public funds |
| title | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules |
| title_auth | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules |
| title_exact_search | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules |
| title_full | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules Jack M. Mintz, Michael Smart |
| title_fullStr | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules Jack M. Mintz, Michael Smart |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules Jack M. Mintz, Michael Smart |
| title_short | Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules |
| title_sort | incentives for public investment under fiscal rules |
| topic | Capital budget Gross domestic product Investment of public funds |
| topic_facet | Capital budget Gross domestic product Investment of public funds |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3860 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mintzjackm incentivesforpublicinvestmentunderfiscalrules AT smartmichael incentivesforpublicinvestmentunderfiscalrules AT worldbank incentivesforpublicinvestmentunderfiscalrules |