Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements:
"The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2006]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3873 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2006 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049074751 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2006 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093224257 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392136231 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005460409 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Limão, Nuno |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |c Nuno Limao, Kamal Saggi |
| 264 | 1 | |a [Washington, D.C] |b World Bank |c [2006] | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Policy research working paper |v 3873 | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 500 | |a Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2006 | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a "The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. "--World Bank web site | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausg |n Also available in print | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Foreign trade regulation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tariff | |
| 653 | 2 | |a World Trade Organization | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Saggi, Kamal |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 710 | 2 | |a World Bank |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Limão, Nuno |a Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034336642 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |l EUV01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |l HTW01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |l FHI01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |l IOS01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185392927211520 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Limão, Nuno |
| author_facet | Limão, Nuno |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Limão, Nuno |
| author_variant | n l nl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049074751 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093224257 (OCoLC)1392136231 (DE-599)GBVNLM005460409 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03158nmm a22004811cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049074751</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2006 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093224257</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392136231</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005460409</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Limão, Nuno</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements</subfield><subfield code="c">Nuno Limao, Kamal Saggi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">[Washington, D.C]</subfield><subfield code="b">World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">[2006]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Policy research working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">3873</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. "--World Bank web site</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield><subfield code="n">Also available in print</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Foreign trade regulation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tariff</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">World Trade Organization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Saggi, Kamal</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">World Bank</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Limão, Nuno</subfield><subfield code="a">Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034336642</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873</subfield><subfield code="l">EUV01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873</subfield><subfield code="l">HTW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873</subfield><subfield code="l">FHI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873</subfield><subfield code="l">IOS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049074751 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:47Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034336642 |
| oclc_num | 1392136231 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spelling | Limão, Nuno Verfasser aut Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements Nuno Limao, Kamal Saggi [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2006] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3873 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2006 "The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Foreign trade regulation Tariff World Trade Organization Saggi, Kamal Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Limão, Nuno Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Limão, Nuno Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements Foreign trade regulation Tariff |
| title | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| title_auth | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| title_exact_search | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| title_full | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements Nuno Limao, Kamal Saggi |
| title_fullStr | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements Nuno Limao, Kamal Saggi |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements Nuno Limao, Kamal Saggi |
| title_short | Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| title_sort | tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements |
| topic | Foreign trade regulation Tariff |
| topic_facet | Foreign trade regulation Tariff |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3873 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT limaonuno tariffretaliationversusfinancialcompensationintheenforcementofinternationaltradeagreements AT saggikamal tariffretaliationversusfinancialcompensationintheenforcementofinternationaltradeagreements AT worldbank tariffretaliationversusfinancialcompensationintheenforcementofinternationaltradeagreements |