When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit?:
This paper tests the hypothesis that enterprises may forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice. They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector invites. We test this hypothesis using enterprise-level data on 3,564 e...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | This paper tests the hypothesis that enterprises may forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice. They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector invites. We test this hypothesis using enterprise-level data on 3,564 enterprises in 29 countries. In this sample, enterprises finance approximately 57 percent of their working capital requirements with external finance. This external finance comes from formal sources, such as commercial banks (53 percent) and informal sources (42 percent), such as trade creditors, or family and friends. In our sample, 14 percent of enterprises rely exclusively on informal finance. We find that the likelihood of enterprises preferring to only use informal finance is inversely related to the quality of the regulatory environment, particularly the quality of tax administration and overall governance. For example, we find that when an enterprise has been asked for bribes by tax inspectors, it is 17 percent more likely to prefer informal finance |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten)) |
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520 | 3 | |a This paper tests the hypothesis that enterprises may forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice. They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector invites. We test this hypothesis using enterprise-level data on 3,564 enterprises in 29 countries. In this sample, enterprises finance approximately 57 percent of their working capital requirements with external finance. This external finance comes from formal sources, such as commercial banks (53 percent) and informal sources (42 percent), such as trade creditors, or family and friends. In our sample, 14 percent of enterprises rely exclusively on informal finance. We find that the likelihood of enterprises preferring to only use informal finance is inversely related to the quality of the regulatory environment, particularly the quality of tax administration and overall governance. For example, we find that when an enterprise has been asked for bribes by tax inspectors, it is 17 percent more likely to prefer informal finance | |
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spelling | Safavian, Mehnaz Verfasser aut When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? Safavian, Mehnaz Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008 1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier This paper tests the hypothesis that enterprises may forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice. They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector invites. We test this hypothesis using enterprise-level data on 3,564 enterprises in 29 countries. In this sample, enterprises finance approximately 57 percent of their working capital requirements with external finance. This external finance comes from formal sources, such as commercial banks (53 percent) and informal sources (42 percent), such as trade creditors, or family and friends. In our sample, 14 percent of enterprises rely exclusively on informal finance. We find that the likelihood of enterprises preferring to only use informal finance is inversely related to the quality of the regulatory environment, particularly the quality of tax administration and overall governance. For example, we find that when an enterprise has been asked for bribes by tax inspectors, it is 17 percent more likely to prefer informal finance Online-Ausg Access to Finance Banks and Banking Reform Bribes Capital Requirements Commercial Banks Creditors External Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Formal Finance Formal Financial Sector Informal Credit Informal Finance Working Capital Wimpey, Joshua Sonstige oth Safavian, Mehnaz Sonstige oth Safavian, Mehnaz When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4435 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Safavian, Mehnaz When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? Access to Finance Banks and Banking Reform Bribes Capital Requirements Commercial Banks Creditors External Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Formal Finance Formal Financial Sector Informal Credit Informal Finance Working Capital |
title | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? |
title_auth | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? |
title_exact_search | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? |
title_exact_search_txtP | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? |
title_full | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? Safavian, Mehnaz |
title_fullStr | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? Safavian, Mehnaz |
title_full_unstemmed | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? Safavian, Mehnaz |
title_short | When Do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit? |
title_sort | when do enterprises prefer informal credit |
topic | Access to Finance Banks and Banking Reform Bribes Capital Requirements Commercial Banks Creditors External Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Formal Finance Formal Financial Sector Informal Credit Informal Finance Working Capital |
topic_facet | Access to Finance Banks and Banking Reform Bribes Capital Requirements Commercial Banks Creditors External Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Formal Finance Formal Financial Sector Informal Credit Informal Finance Working Capital |
url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4435 |
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