Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements:
Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agr...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible | |
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| spelling | Nilsson, Desiree Verfasser aut Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements Nilsson, Desiree Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008 1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible Online-Ausg Armed conflict Armed conflicts Civil War Civil wars Conflict Conflict Research Conflict and Development Peace Peace agreements Peace and Peacekeeping Post Conflict Reconstruction Post Conflict Reintegration Rebel Violence Nilsson, Desiree Sonstige oth Nilsson, Desiree Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4572 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Nilsson, Desiree Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements Armed conflict Armed conflicts Civil War Civil wars Conflict Conflict Research Conflict and Development Peace Peace agreements Peace and Peacekeeping Post Conflict Reconstruction Post Conflict Reintegration Rebel Violence |
| title | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements |
| title_auth | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements |
| title_exact_search | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements |
| title_full | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements Nilsson, Desiree |
| title_fullStr | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements Nilsson, Desiree |
| title_full_unstemmed | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements Nilsson, Desiree |
| title_short | Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside And Outside Civil War Settlements |
| title_sort | partial peace rebel groups inside and outside civil war settlements |
| topic | Armed conflict Armed conflicts Civil War Civil wars Conflict Conflict Research Conflict and Development Peace Peace agreements Peace and Peacekeeping Post Conflict Reconstruction Post Conflict Reintegration Rebel Violence |
| topic_facet | Armed conflict Armed conflicts Civil War Civil wars Conflict Conflict Research Conflict and Development Peace Peace agreements Peace and Peacekeeping Post Conflict Reconstruction Post Conflict Reintegration Rebel Violence |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4572 |
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