Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement: Are There Any Fringe Bidders?
Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competi...
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (24 Seiten)) |
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| spelling | Estache, Antonio Verfasser aut Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? Estache, Antonio Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008 1 Online-Ressource (24 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency Online-Ausg Affiliated Affiliated organizations Auction Auctions Bid Bidders Bidding Competition Debt Markets E-Business Finance and Financial Sector Development Government Procurement Infrastructure Economics Infrastructure Economics and Finance International development Investment and Investment Climate Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets and Market Access Private Sector Development Public disclosure Estache, Antonio Sonstige oth Iimi, Atsushi Sonstige oth Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4660 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? Affiliated Affiliated organizations Auction Auctions Bid Bidders Bidding Competition Debt Markets E-Business Finance and Financial Sector Development Government Procurement Infrastructure Economics Infrastructure Economics and Finance International development Investment and Investment Climate Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets and Market Access Private Sector Development Public disclosure |
| title | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? |
| title_auth | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? |
| title_exact_search | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? |
| title_full | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? Estache, Antonio |
| title_fullStr | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? Estache, Antonio |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement Are There Any Fringe Bidders? Estache, Antonio |
| title_short | Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement |
| title_sort | bidder asymmetry in infrastructure procurement are there any fringe bidders |
| title_sub | Are There Any Fringe Bidders? |
| topic | Affiliated Affiliated organizations Auction Auctions Bid Bidders Bidding Competition Debt Markets E-Business Finance and Financial Sector Development Government Procurement Infrastructure Economics Infrastructure Economics and Finance International development Investment and Investment Climate Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets and Market Access Private Sector Development Public disclosure |
| topic_facet | Affiliated Affiliated organizations Auction Auctions Bid Bidders Bidding Competition Debt Markets E-Business Finance and Financial Sector Development Government Procurement Infrastructure Economics Infrastructure Economics and Finance International development Investment and Investment Climate Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Markets and Market Access Private Sector Development Public disclosure |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4660 |
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