Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan: the game between Juba and Khartoum
"This paper presents a game theory model of the strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba leading up to the referendum on Sudan's partition in 2011. The findings show that excessive militarization and brinksmanship is a rational response for both actors, neither of which can credibly...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2008]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
4684 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This paper presents a game theory model of the strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba leading up to the referendum on Sudan's partition in 2011. The findings show that excessive militarization and brinksmanship is a rational response for both actors, neither of which can credibly commit to lower levels of military spending under the current status quo. This militarization is often at the expense of health and education expenditures, suggesting that the opportunity cost of militarization is foregone economic development. These credibility issues might be resolved by democratization, increased transparency, reduction of information asymmetries, and efforts to promote economic and political cooperation. The paper explores these devices, demonstrating how they can contribute to Pareto preferred outcomes in equilibrium. The authors characterize the military expenditure associated with the commitment problem experienced by both sides, estimate its costs from data for Sudan, and identify the opportunity cost of foregone development implied by continued, excessive, and unsustainable militarization. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2009 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:45Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:28Z |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Elbadawi, Ibrahim Verfasser aut Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum Ibrahim Elbadawi, Gary Milante, Costantino Pischedda [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2008] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 4684 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2009 "This paper presents a game theory model of the strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba leading up to the referendum on Sudan's partition in 2011. The findings show that excessive militarization and brinksmanship is a rational response for both actors, neither of which can credibly commit to lower levels of military spending under the current status quo. This militarization is often at the expense of health and education expenditures, suggesting that the opportunity cost of militarization is foregone economic development. These credibility issues might be resolved by democratization, increased transparency, reduction of information asymmetries, and efforts to promote economic and political cooperation. The paper explores these devices, demonstrating how they can contribute to Pareto preferred outcomes in equilibrium. The authors characterize the military expenditure associated with the commitment problem experienced by both sides, estimate its costs from data for Sudan, and identify the opportunity cost of foregone development implied by continued, excessive, and unsustainable militarization. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Referendum Sudan Pischedda, Costantino Sonstige oth Milante, Gary John Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Elbadawi, Ibrahim Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4684 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Elbadawi, Ibrahim Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum Referendum Sudan |
| title | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum |
| title_auth | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum |
| title_exact_search | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum |
| title_full | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum Ibrahim Elbadawi, Gary Milante, Costantino Pischedda |
| title_fullStr | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum Ibrahim Elbadawi, Gary Milante, Costantino Pischedda |
| title_full_unstemmed | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan the game between Juba and Khartoum Ibrahim Elbadawi, Gary Milante, Costantino Pischedda |
| title_short | Referendum, response, and consequences for Sudan |
| title_sort | referendum response and consequences for sudan the game between juba and khartoum |
| title_sub | the game between Juba and Khartoum |
| topic | Referendum Sudan |
| topic_facet | Referendum Sudan |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4684 |
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