Moral relativism and pluralism:
"The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many exam...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore
Cambridge University Press
2023
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements : elements in ethics
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases"-- |
| Beschreibung: | V, 71 Seiten 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781009044301 |
Internformat
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| 505 | 8 | |a Why are people so exercised about moral relativism? -- How should theses about moral relativism be framed? -- Relationship and community, autonomy and rights -- Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities -- An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views -- Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities -- Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities -- The underdiscussed question of what morality is -- A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities -- Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality -- Constraints on the range of viable moralities -- The social construction of morality: by the individual or group? -- When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree? -- Why we have different beliefs in metaethics -- How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations -- Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism -- Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism -- An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism -- Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be -- What is female genital cutting? -- Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion -- Undermining stereotypes of the other side -- Fostering pluralistic encounters -- Summary of normative moral relativism | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents 1 Why Are People So Exercised about Moral Relativism? 1 2 How Should Theses about Moral Relativism Be Framed? 2 3 Relationship and Community, Autonomy and Rights 3 4 Epistemic Reasons to Delve Further into the Conflict between Relationship-Centered and Rights-Centered Moralities 6 5 An Ethical Argument for Extended Inquiry into Rivals to One s Own Ethical Views 9 6 Overcoming Stereotypes of Relationship-Centered Moralities 13 7 Complicating the Contrast between Relationship- and Autonomy-Centered Moralities 18 8 The Underdiscussed Question of What Morality Is 22 9 A Naturalistic Approach to Understanding Why Human Beings Have Moralities 24 10 Putting Together Moral Ambivalence and a Naturalistic Conception of Morality 27 11 Constraints on the Range of Viable Moralities 12 The Social Construction of Morality: By the Individual or Group? 32 13 When People Differ in Their Moral Beliefs about an Issue, When Do They Actually Disagree? 37 28
Contents 14 Why We Have Different Beliefs in Metaethics v 40 15 How Moral Reasons Enter into the Truth Conditions of Moral Judgments and Help Shape Our Moral Motivations 42 16 Summary of the Argument for a Pluralistic Form of Metaethical Moral Relativism 45 17 Confused Reasoning That Is Sometimes Attributed to Those Who Believe in Normative Moral Relativism 46 18 An Argument for Normative Moral Relativism That Is Contingent upon the Acceptance of Certain Values and the Adoption of Metaethical Moral Relativism 47 19 Why Normative Moral Relativism Cannot Be a Simple Matter of Letting Others Be 48 20 What Is Female Genital Cutting? 49 21 Accommodation and the Fraught Issue of Abortion 53 22 Undermining Stereotypes of the Other Side 57 23 Fostering Pluralistic Encounters 59 24 Summary of Normative Moral Relativism 61 References
|
| adam_txt |
Contents 1 Why Are People So Exercised about Moral Relativism? 1 2 How Should Theses about Moral Relativism Be Framed? 2 3 Relationship and Community, Autonomy and Rights 3 4 Epistemic Reasons to Delve Further into the Conflict between Relationship-Centered and Rights-Centered Moralities 6 5 An Ethical Argument for Extended Inquiry into Rivals to One's Own Ethical Views 9 6 Overcoming Stereotypes of Relationship-Centered Moralities 13 7 Complicating the Contrast between Relationship- and Autonomy-Centered Moralities 18 8 The Underdiscussed Question of What Morality Is 22 9 A Naturalistic Approach to Understanding Why Human Beings Have Moralities 24 10 Putting Together Moral Ambivalence and a Naturalistic Conception of Morality 27 11 Constraints on the Range of Viable Moralities 12 The Social Construction of Morality: By the Individual or Group? 32 13 When People Differ in Their Moral Beliefs about an Issue, When Do They Actually Disagree? 37 28
Contents 14 Why We Have Different Beliefs in Metaethics v 40 15 How Moral Reasons Enter into the Truth Conditions of Moral Judgments and Help Shape Our Moral Motivations 42 16 Summary of the Argument for a Pluralistic Form of Metaethical Moral Relativism 45 17 Confused Reasoning That Is Sometimes Attributed to Those Who Believe in Normative Moral Relativism 46 18 An Argument for Normative Moral Relativism That Is Contingent upon the Acceptance of Certain Values and the Adoption of Metaethical Moral Relativism 47 19 Why Normative Moral Relativism Cannot Be a Simple Matter of Letting Others Be 48 20 What Is Female Genital Cutting? 49 21 Accommodation and the Fraught Issue of Abortion 53 22 Undermining Stereotypes of the Other Side 57 23 Fostering Pluralistic Encounters 59 24 Summary of Normative Moral Relativism 61 References |
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| author | Wong, David B. 1949- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049061679 |
| contents | Why are people so exercised about moral relativism? -- How should theses about moral relativism be framed? -- Relationship and community, autonomy and rights -- Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities -- An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views -- Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities -- Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities -- The underdiscussed question of what morality is -- A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities -- Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality -- Constraints on the range of viable moralities -- The social construction of morality: by the individual or group? -- When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree? -- Why we have different beliefs in metaethics -- How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations -- Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism -- Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism -- An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism -- Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be -- What is female genital cutting? -- Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion -- Undermining stereotypes of the other side -- Fostering pluralistic encounters -- Summary of normative moral relativism |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1401177565 (DE-599)BVBBV049061679 |
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| id | DE-604.BV049061679 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:24:21Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:08Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781009044301 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034323818 |
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| physical | V, 71 Seiten 23 cm |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| series2 | Cambridge elements : elements in ethics |
| spelling | Wong, David B. 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)172457076 aut Moral relativism and pluralism David B. Wong (Duke University) Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore Cambridge University Press 2023 V, 71 Seiten 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge elements : elements in ethics Why are people so exercised about moral relativism? -- How should theses about moral relativism be framed? -- Relationship and community, autonomy and rights -- Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities -- An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views -- Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities -- Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities -- The underdiscussed question of what morality is -- A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities -- Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality -- Constraints on the range of viable moralities -- The social construction of morality: by the individual or group? -- When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree? -- Why we have different beliefs in metaethics -- How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations -- Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism -- Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism -- An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism -- Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be -- What is female genital cutting? -- Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion -- Undermining stereotypes of the other side -- Fostering pluralistic encounters -- Summary of normative moral relativism "The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases"-- Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd rswk-swf Ethical relativism Ethics / Methodology Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 s DE-604 Online version Wong, David B. Moral relativism and pluralism Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2022 9781009043496 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034323818&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Wong, David B. 1949- Moral relativism and pluralism Why are people so exercised about moral relativism? -- How should theses about moral relativism be framed? -- Relationship and community, autonomy and rights -- Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities -- An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views -- Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities -- Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities -- The underdiscussed question of what morality is -- A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities -- Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality -- Constraints on the range of viable moralities -- The social construction of morality: by the individual or group? -- When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree? -- Why we have different beliefs in metaethics -- How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations -- Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism -- Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism -- An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism -- Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be -- What is female genital cutting? -- Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion -- Undermining stereotypes of the other side -- Fostering pluralistic encounters -- Summary of normative moral relativism Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4015602-3 (DE-588)4177682-3 |
| title | Moral relativism and pluralism |
| title_auth | Moral relativism and pluralism |
| title_exact_search | Moral relativism and pluralism |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Moral relativism and pluralism |
| title_full | Moral relativism and pluralism David B. Wong (Duke University) |
| title_fullStr | Moral relativism and pluralism David B. Wong (Duke University) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral relativism and pluralism David B. Wong (Duke University) |
| title_short | Moral relativism and pluralism |
| title_sort | moral relativism and pluralism |
| topic | Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ethik Relativismus |
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