The Russian General Staff: understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress"
The Russian General Staff is unlike any single organization within the U.S. defense establishment. The absence of an analog in the United States means that audiences within the U.S. civilian and military communities largely are unfamiliar with the concept of a General Staff. Because of the increasin...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA
RAND
[2023]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-7 Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | The Russian General Staff is unlike any single organization within the U.S. defense establishment. The absence of an analog in the United States means that audiences within the U.S. civilian and military communities largely are unfamiliar with the concept of a General Staff. Because of the increasing militarization of Russian foreign policy since 2008, it is important to understand not only the formal authorities and responsibilities of this institution but also its capacity to influence Russia's national security decisionmaking process. In this report, the authors develop a foundational text for policymakers and warfighters to improve collective understanding of the Russian General Staff. The authors first draw on a variety of primary and secondary Russian-language sources-e.g., statutes, speeches by political and military elites, and academic military writings-to inform their characterization of the General Staff's statutory mandate. They then place the General Staff in a comparative institutional context, providing a high-level evaluation of the institutional roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the General Staff's U.S. counterpart-the Joint Staff. They consider what the formal roles and responsibilities of the General Staff suggest about the relative balance of power among Russia's political leaders, the General Staff, and the broader Russian military. The authors then take this understanding and apply it to the roles and responsibilities of the General Staff in a practical context by analyzing two case studies of this institution's involvement in recent conflicts: Ukraine (2014-2021) and Syria (2015-2019) |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 120 Seiten Illustrationen 28 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781977410948 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RRA1233-7 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049002134 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20240408 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 230615s2023 a||| b||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781977410948 |9 978-1-977410-94-8 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.7249/RRA1233-7 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1427319568 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV049002134 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 084 | |a OST |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Blanc, Alexis A. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1209958228 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Russian General Staff |b understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" |c Alexis A. Blanc, Alyssa Demus, Sandra Kay Evans [und fünf weitere] |
| 264 | 1 | |a Santa Monica, CA |b RAND |c [2023] | |
| 300 | |a xi, 120 Seiten |b Illustrationen |c 28 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Roles and Responsibilities of the Russian General Staff -- Chapter Three: The Russian General Staff in Comparative Context -- Chapter Four: The General Staff and the Balance of Power -- Chapter Five: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Ukraine Case Study -- Chapter Six: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Syria Case Study -- Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions About the Role of the General Staff in National Security Decisionmaking | |
| 520 | 3 | |a The Russian General Staff is unlike any single organization within the U.S. defense establishment. The absence of an analog in the United States means that audiences within the U.S. civilian and military communities largely are unfamiliar with the concept of a General Staff. Because of the increasing militarization of Russian foreign policy since 2008, it is important to understand not only the formal authorities and responsibilities of this institution but also its capacity to influence Russia's national security decisionmaking process. In this report, the authors develop a foundational text for policymakers and warfighters to improve collective understanding of the Russian General Staff. The authors first draw on a variety of primary and secondary Russian-language sources-e.g., statutes, speeches by political and military elites, and academic military writings-to inform their characterization of the General Staff's statutory mandate. They then place the General Staff in a comparative institutional context, providing a high-level evaluation of the institutional roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the General Staff's U.S. counterpart-the Joint Staff. They consider what the formal roles and responsibilities of the General Staff suggest about the relative balance of power among Russia's political leaders, the General Staff, and the broader Russian military. The authors then take this understanding and apply it to the roles and responsibilities of the General Staff in a practical context by analyzing two case studies of this institution's involvement in recent conflicts: Ukraine (2014-2021) and Syria (2015-2019) | |
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a Russland |b Generalstab |0 (DE-588)7596432-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 2014-2021 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bürgerkrieg in Syrien |0 (DE-588)1041651422 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg |0 (DE-588)106969780X |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military planning / Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Strategy | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Ukraine Conflict, 2014- | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) / Military policy | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Crimea (Ukraine) / Annexation to Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Syria / History / Civil War, 2011- / Participation, Russian | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military planning | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military policy | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Strategy | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Syria | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Ukraine / Crimea | |
| 653 | 4 | |a Since 2011 | |
| 653 | 6 | |a History | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Russland |b Generalstab |0 (DE-588)7596432-6 |D b |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg |0 (DE-588)106969780X |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Bürgerkrieg in Syrien |0 (DE-588)1041651422 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Geschichte 2014-2021 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Demus, Alyssa |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1162562900 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Evans, Sandra Kay |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-7 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Literaturverzeichnis |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 940 | 1 | |q BSB_NED_20240408 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034265295 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 090513 |g 471 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185266569609216 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt |
Contents About This Report. iii Summary. v Figures and Tables. xi CHAPTER ONE Introduction. The Issue. Research Approach. Caveats. Organization of This Report. 1 1 2 3 6 CHAPTER TWO Roles and Responsibilities of the Russian General Staff. 9 The Formal Roles and Responsibilities of the General Staff
. 10 Supporting Internal Structure and Staffing.16 Concluding Observations. 27 CHAPTER THREE The Russian General Staff in Comparative Context. 31 History and Responsibilities of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 31 Comparative Organizational Structures and Responsibilities. 36 Authorities. 38 Divergent Mandates, Divergent Aptitudes. 42 Observations Based on High-Level Comparative Analysis. 43 Concluding Observations. 47 CHAPTER FOUR The General Staff and the Balance of Power. 49 Early
Attempts at Russian Defense Reform: A Master Class in Obstruction . 50 Explaining the Generals’ Success in Obstruction.52 How the Stars Aligned Behind Change. 55 Concluding Observations. 60 CHAPTER FIVE The General Staff in a Practical Context: Ukraine Case Study. 63 Introduction. 63 Crimea, the Donbas, and the Russian General Staff. 63 Russian Intervention in Crimea.65 Russian Intervention in the Donbas. 66 The Russian General Staff’s Role in Executing the Crimea and Donbas Campaigns. 68 Executing the Donbas
Operation. 70 Key Decisions, Actors, and Relationships in the Ukraine Conflict. 72 Lessons Learned by the General Staff from Crimea and the Donbas . 76 ix
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” CHAPTER SIX The General Staff in a Practical Context: Syria Case Study. 79 Introduction. 79 Russian Intervention in Syria. 79 Command and Control and Chain of Command in Syria. 83 Syria Key Decisions, Actors, and Relationships. 85 Key Lessons Learned. 87 CHAPTER SEVEN Drawing Conclusions About the Role of the General Staff in National Security Decisionmaking.93 Formal and Informal Systems Inform Decisionmaking.93 Divining Priorities from Organizational Structure. 100 Abbreviations.103
Bibliography. 105 X
Bibliography Adamsky, Dmitry, “Discontinuity in Russian Strategic Culture? A Case Study of Mission Command Practice,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Security Insights, No. 49, February 2020. Akhromeev, S. F„ and G. Μ. Kornienko, "Glazami Marshala i diplomata,” Mezhdunarodnuye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1992. Alexandrov, Grigory, and Pavel Kanygin, “Where Are They Now? Five Years Ago, the Bloodiest European War of the 21st Century Began in Eastern Ukraine. Here’s What’s Become of Those Early Separatist Leaders,” trans. Hilah Kohen and Kevin Rothrock, Meduza, May 31,2019. Ananyev, Maxim, “Inside the Kremlin: The Presidency and Executive Branch,” in Daniel Treisman, ed., The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2018, pp. 29-48. Arbatov, Aleksei, and Petr Romashkin, "Bjudzhet как zerkalo voennoi reformy: S takim planirovaniyem voennykh rashodov nel’zya reshat’ seryeznykh zadach,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 17,2003. Aron, Leon, Russia’s Revolution: Essays 1989-2006, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2007. Baev, Pavel K., “The Evolution of Putin’s Regime: Inner Circles and Outer Walls,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 51, No. 6, 2004, pp. 3-13. Baker, Peter, and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution, New York: Scribner, 2006. Balmforth, Richard, and Lina Kushch, “Pro-Moscow Protesters Seize Arms, Declare Republic, Kiev Fears Invasion,” Reuters, April 7,2014. Baluevskii, lu. N., ed., Voennaya bezopasnost’ Rossiiskoi
Federatsii vXXI veke, Moscow: Center for MilitaryStrategic Studies of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, 2004. Baluevskii, lu. N., ed., Generalnii Stab Rosiiskoi Armii: Istokiya i sovermennost, Moscow: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2006. Barabanov, Μ. S., A. V. Lavrov, and V. A. Tseluiko, The Tanks of August, Ruslan Pukhov, ed., Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010. Baranets, Victor, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh sil Rossii general armii Valerij Gerasimov: ‘My perelomili hrebet udarnym silam terrorizma,”’ Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 26,2017. As of January 7, 2022: https://www.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693/ Barany, Zoltan, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Baranyukvand, V. V., and I. N. Akhmadishin, “Problemi postroyeniya yedinovo informatsionovo prostranstva Vooruzhennikh Sil Rossisskoi Federatsii i vozmozhenie puti ikh reshennie,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 4,2013. Barties, Charles K., “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1,2011, pp. 55-80. Barties, Charles K., “Russian Force Structure for the Conduct of Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 1, January-March 2019, pp. 52-61. Barties, Charles, and Lester Grau, “The Russian Ground-Based Contingent in Syria,” in Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein, eds., Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned, Philadelphia, Pa.: Foreign Policy Research
Institute, 2020, pp. 67-88. Barties, Charles K., and Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Military Operation in Crimea: Road-Testing Rapid Reaction Capabilities,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 61, No. 6,2014, pp. 46-63. Bassam, Laila, and Tom Perry, “How Iranian General Plotted out Syrian Assault in Moscow,” Reuters, October 6, 2015. 105
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” Bendett, Samuel, Mathieu Boulègue, Richard Connolly, Margarita Konaev, Pavel Podvig, and Katarzyna Zysk, Advanced Military Technology in Russia: Capabilities and Implications, London, UK: Chatham House, September 2021. Binnendijk, Anika, Dara Massicot, Anthony Atler, John Drennan, Khrystyna Holynska, Katya Migacheva, Marek Posard, and Yuliya Shokh, Russian Military Personnel and Proficiency: Policies, Reforms, and Recent Trends, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, forthcoming. Birnbaum, Michael, “The Secret Pact Between Russia and Syria That Gives Moscow Carte Blanche,” Washington Post, January 15,2016. Biryulin, Roman, “V chest’ vekovogo yubileya Sluzhby,” Krasnaya zvezda, No. 130,2018, p. 5. Borgatti, Stephen P„ Martin G. Everett, and Jeffrey C. Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2018. Borshchevskaya, Anna, The Russian Way of War in Syria: Threat Perception and Approaches to Counterterrorism, Philadelphia, Pa.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2020. Boss Magazine, interview with Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov, quoted in BBC Monitoring World Media Monitor, July 15,2010. Brancaleone, Marie, The Russian Elite in the Post-Putin Era, Belgium: Centre d’étude des crises et conflits internationaux, Note d’analyse No. 76, March 2021. Bronk, Justin, “Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?” blog post, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, March 4,2022.
As of August 3, 2022: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/ russian-air-force-actually-incapable-complex-air-operations Builder, Carl H., The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Bukkvoll, Tor, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas,” Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2016, pp. 13-21. Charap, Samuel, Dara Massicot, Miranda Priebe, Alyssa Demus, Clint Reach, Mark Stalczynski, Eugeniu Han, and Lynn E. Davis, Russian Grand Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4238-A, 2021. As of January 7,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4238.html Chekinov, S. G., and S. A. Bogdanov, “Prognozirovaniye kharaktera i soderzhaniya voin budushchego: problemy i suzhdeniya,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 10, 2015. “Chief of the General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov Reported About Completion of the First Stage of Transition of the Army to the New Look,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, June 6,2009, p. 2. “Chief of Russian General Staff, French General Discuss Coordination of Actions Against IS,” TASS, December 2, 2015. “Chief of Russia’s General Staff Discusses Syria with US Counterpart,” TASS, January 10,2018. Chotiner, Isaac, “The Purges in Putin’s Shrinking Inner Circle,” New Yorker, March 22,2022. Chuev, Yu. V, and Yu. B. Mikhailov, Prognozirovanie v voennom dele, trans. DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, February 6,1981. Clark, Mason, The Russian Military’s Lessons Learned
in Syria, Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, January 2021. Conflict Armament Research, Weapons of the War in Ukraine: A Three-Year Investigation of Weapon Supplies into Donetsk and Luhansk, London, UK, November 2021. Connolly, Richard, Russian Military Expenditure in Comparative Perspective: A Purchasing Power Parity Estimate, Arlington, Va.: CNA, IOP-2019-U-021955-Final, October 2019. Copp, Tara, and Patrick Tucker, “Five Reasons Why Russian Forces Are Struggling in Ukraine,” Defense One, March 1, 2022. 106
Bibliography Council of the European Union, “EU Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Eastern Ukraine and the Illegal Annexation of Crimea,” background note, July 29,2014. As of November 10, 2021: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144159.pdf Council of the European Union, “List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures over the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” February 16,2015. Coynash, Halya, “Russian Conscripts Coerced into Fighting in Ukraine,” blog post, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, February 3,2015. As of July 7, 2022: https://khpg.org/en/1422878535 Cunningham, Daniel, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis, London, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. D’Anieri, Paul, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Dawisha, Karen, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. “Decision on Crimea Made Solely by Putin-Kremlin Spokesperson,” TASS, April 19,2014. Delanoë, Igor, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Toward a Multiregional Force, Arlington, Va.: CNA, IOP-2019-U-020190Final, June 2019. Delanoë, Igor, “Russian Naval Forces in the Syrian War,” in Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein, eds., Russia’s War in Syria, Philadelphia, Pa.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2020, pp. 111-126. DFRLab, “Watchdog Finds Russian General’s Separatist Ties with a Watch,” blog post, Medium, November 21, 2017. As of July 11,2022:
https.7/medium.com/dfrlab/watchdog-finds-russian-generals-separatist-ties-with-a-watch-9103d76c7226 Dmitrev, Denis, and Grigory Levchenko, “Oh Hello, Mr. Oleg Orion’ Ivannikov: Unmasking a Chief Suspect in the MH17 Attack, Who Just Happens to Work for Russian Intelligence,” trans. Kevin Rothrock, Meduza, May 25,2018. Donnelly, Christopher N., Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1988. Dononov, A. G., A. V. Nikiforov, and V. G. Putyatin, “Tendentsii i problemi razvitiya avtomatizatsii upravleniya viyennimi silami,” Mathematical Machines and Systems, No. 3,2019. Dorofeev, Victor, “Shoigu nashel na Urale glavkoma dlya kosmosa,” URA News, July 14,2015. As of January 7, 2022: https://ura.news/articles/1036265339 Douglas, Nadja, “Civil-Military Relations in Russia: Conscript vs. Contract Army, or How Ideas Prevail Against Functional Demands,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4,2014, pp. 511-532. Duma, Gosudarstvennaia, “Vladimir Shamanov: Priniat zakon po dopolnitel’nym meram sotsial’noi podderzhki voennosluzhashchikh, ” December 18, 2018. Dvornikov, Alexander, “Headquarters for New Wars,” VPK News, July 23,2018. Dvornikov, A. V, “Forms of Combat Employment and Organization of Command and Control of Integrated Force Groupings in the Theater of Military Operations,” Bulletin of the Academy ofMilitary Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 63,2018, pp. 1-5. Edmonds, Jeffrey, Samuel Bendett, Anya Fink, Mary Chesnut, Dmitry Gorenburg, Michael Kofman, Kasey Stricklin, and Julian Waller, Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in
Russia, Arlington, Va.: CNA, DRM-2021-U029303-Final, May 2021. Egorov, Aleksei, “Voennaya priemka. Natsional’nyi tsentr upravleniya oboronoi. Chast’ 1. Dezhurnaya smena,” Telekanal Zvezda, December 15,2019a. Egorov, Aleksei, “Voennaya priemka. Natsional’nyi tsentr upravleniya oboronoi. Chast’ 2. Effektivnoe upravlenie,” Telekanal Zvezda, December 21,2019b. Egorov, Aleksei, “Voennaya priemka. Natsional’nyi tsentr upravleniya oboronoi. Chast’ 3. Dal’nie rubezhi,” Telekanal Zvezda, December 28,2019c. 107
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” Engvall, Johan, Russia ’s Military R D Infrastructure, Stockholm: FOI, FOI-R—5124—SE, April 2021. Façon, Isabelle, “The Russian Way of War: In Crisis?” in Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer, eds., The Oxford Handbook of War, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 273-286. Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, “Order of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation of September 28,2021, No. 379, On Approval of the List of Information in the Field of Military, Military-Technical Activities of the Russian Federation, Which, upon Receipt by a Foreign State, Its State Bodies, an International or Foreign Organization, Foreign Citizens or Stateless Persons Can Be Used Against the Security of the Russian Federation,’” Order No. 379, September 28, 2021. Fedotov, Igor A., “Napravleniia razvitiia operativno-strategicheskogo komandovaniia voennogo okruga na sovremennom etape stroitel’stva Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk, Vol. 4, No. 57,2016, pp. 65-69. Fedorov, Igor A., Aleksei Ramm, Aleksei Kozachenko, and Roman Kretsul, “V tsentre oborony: Genshtab naznachayut starshim sredi silovikov,” Izvestia, November 26,2019. Felgenhauer, Pavel, “Russia’s Imperial General Staff,” Perspective, Vol. 16, No. 1, October-November 2005. Felgenhauer, Pavel, “A Profound Change in the Russian Military May Be Happening as the Power of the General Staff Is Undermined,” Perspective, Vol. 19, No. 1, April 2009. Fox, Amos C., “Battle for
Debal’tseve: The Conventional Line of Effort in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine,” ARMOR, Vol. CXXVIII, No. 1, Winter 2017, pp. 45-59. Freeman, Linton C., “Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification,” Social Networks, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1978-1979, pp. 215-239. Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes, “Russia After the Global Financial Crisis,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2010, pp. 281-311. Galeotti, Mark, “Ukraine: A Perversely ‘Good’ War for the GRU,” blog post, In Moscow’s Shadows, May 1, 2014a. As of January 7,2022: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/05/01/ukraine-a-perversely-good-war-for-the-gru/ Galeotti, Mark, “Putin’s Secret Weapon,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2014b. Galeotti, Mark, “Moscow’s Spy Game: Why Russia Is Winning the Intelligence War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, October 30,2014c. Galeotti, Mark, “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s ‘New Way of War?”’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 2,2016a, pp. 282-301. Galeotti, Mark, “We Don’t Know What to Call Russian Military Intelligence and That May Be a Problem,” War on the Rocks, January 19,2016b. As of January 7,2022: https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/we-dont-know-what-to-call-russian-military-intelligence-and-that-may-bea-problem/ Galeotti, Mark, Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services, policy brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, May 11,2016c. Galeotti, Mark, The Modern Russian Army 1992-2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2017. Galeotti, Mark, “Spooks in the Kremlin,” Foreign Policy, April 27,2019a. Galeotti, Mark, “The
Intelligence and Security Services and Strategic Decision-Making,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Security Insights, No. 30, May 2019b. Galeotti, Mark, “Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Security Insights, No. 46, February 2020. Galeotti, Mark, “The Main Operations Directorate: The Head and the Heart of the General Staff,” Mayak Intelligence, 2021. Galimova, Natalia, "My idem v Rossiju. Kak—ne znaju,” Gazeta.ru, March 12,2015. Gareev, Makhmut A., “Point of View: General Staff Versus the Committee of Chiefs of Staff,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 12, 2002. 108
Bibliography Gareev, Makhmut A., “Rol stabov v sisteme voyennovo upravleniya," Vestnik Akademii voyennih nauk, No. 1, 2003. Gareev, Makhmut A., “Vidayushiicya voyennii reformator,” Krasnyi voin, No. 78, October 27,2007. “Genshtab vozglavil Valerii Gerasimov,” Interfax, November 9,2012. As of January 7,2022: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/275082 Gerasimov, Valerii V., “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii,” Voenno-promyshlenniy kur’er, Vol. 8, No. 476, FebruaryMarch 2013. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “RoF General’nogo shtaba v organizatsii oborony strany v sootvetstvii s novym polozheniyem о General’nom shtabe, utverzhdennym Prezidentom Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk, No. 1,2014, pp. 14-22. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “Opyt otdaleniya v Velikoy Оtechestvennoy voyne i Organizatsiya upravleniya oboronoy strany v sovremennykh usloviyakh,” Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk, Vol. 2, No. 51,2015, pp. 5-15. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “On the Syria Experience,” VPKNews, March 7, 2016. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “World on the Brink of War,” VPK News, March 13, 2017. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “Vliiane sovremennogo kharaktera vooruzhennoi bor’by na napravlennost' stroitel'stva i razvitiia Vooruzhennykh sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Prioritetnye zadachi voennoi nauki v obespechenii oborony strany,” Vestnik Akademii voennyh nauk, Vol. 62, No. 1,2018a, pp. 16-22. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “Thoughts on Future Military Conflict,” presentation to the General Staff Academy, March 2018b. Gerasimov, Valerii V, “Vectors of the Development of Military Strategy,” Krasnaya zvezda, March 4,2019. Gerasimov, Valerii V,
S. F. Rudskoi, V. V. Trushin, and S. P. Belokon, Osnovy pobedy v Boiu, Moscow: General’nyi shtab Vooruzhennykh sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2018. Geroi Strany, “Rudskoi Sergei Fedorovich,” webpage, undated. As of January 7,2022: https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=29742 Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” New York Times, May 24,2018. Golts, Alecsandr, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2019. Golts, Alecsandr, and Tonya L. Putnam, “State Militarism and Its Legacies: Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 121-158. Gomart, Thomas, Russian Civil-Military Relations: Putin’s Legacy, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. Gorenburg, Dmitry, “Russia’s Military Modernization Plans: 2018-2027,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 495, November 22, 2017. Gorenburg, Dmitry, “The Political Elite Under Putin,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Security Insights, No. 53, April 2020. Gostev, Aleksandr, and Robert Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge from the Shadows,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 16,2016. Grau, Lester W., and Charles K. Barties, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016. Gregory, Paul Roderick, “Putin’s ‘Human Rights Council’ Accidentally Posts Real Crimean Election Results,” Forbes, May 5,2014.
Gregory, Paul Roderick, “Russian Combat Medals Put Lie to Putin’s Claim of No Russian Troops in Ukraine,” Forbes, September 6,2016. Hamilton, Robert, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein, “Setting the Stage for the Intervention,” in Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein, eds., Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned, Philadelphia, Pa.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020, pp. 1-14. 109
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” Hanson, Philip, “Managing the Economy,” in Richard Sakwa, Henry E. Hale, and Stephen White, eds., Developments in Russian Politics, 9th ed., Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2019, pp. 133-149. Hauer, Neil, “The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army,” Foreign Policy, October 6, 2019. Hauptman, Max, “Russia’s 40-Mile-Long Convoy Outside of Kyiv Is ‘Stalled’—and a Big Sitting Duck,” Task and Purpose, March 3,2022. Herszenhorn, David Μ., and Andrew Roth, “In East Ukraine, Protesters Seek Russian Troops,” New York Times, April 7, 2014. Higgins, Andrew, “The War That Continues to Shape Russia, 25 Years Later,” New York Times, December 10, 2019. Hill, Fiona, “Understanding and Deterring Russia: U.S. Policies and Strategies,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, February 10,2016. Hodgson, Quentin E., Logan Ma, Krystyna Marcinek, and Karen Schwindt, Fighting Shadows in the Dark: Understanding and Countering Coercion in Cyberspace, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2961OSD, 2019. As of January 7,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2961.html Hu, Y. F„ “Efficient and High-Quality Force-Directed Graph Drawing,” Mathematica Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2006, pp. 37-71. Ilyushina, Mary, “A Russian Court Document Mentioned Russian Troops ‘Stationed’ in Eastern Ukraine. Moscow Insists There Are None,” CBS News, December 17,2021. “In Leaked Tapes, MH17 Suspects Discussed Buk Transfer Hours Before and After Plane Downing,”
Moscow Times, April 12,2021. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003, Vol. 103, London, UK: Routledge, 2003. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, London, UK: Routledge, 2013. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2017, Vol. 117, London, UK: Routledge, 2017. “Istochnik: nachal’nikom GRU naznachen vitse-admiral Igor’ Kostyukov,” TASS, December 10,2018. As of January 7, 2022: https://tass.ru/politika/5892182 Ivanov, Vladimir, “General-Polkovnik Baluyevskiy—Post Prinyal,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2004-07-23 NVO-No. 027, July 23, 2004. Jackson, Kimberly, Katherine L. Kidder, Sean Mann, William H. Waggy II, Natasha Lander, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4347-OSD, 2020. As of July 8,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4347.html Jamestown Foundation, “War by Other Means: Russia’s Use of Private Military Contractors at Home and Abroad,” webpage, undated. As of January 14,2022: https://jamestown.org/programs/russ-pmc/ JCS—See Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Joint Staff,” webpage, undated-a. As of January 7,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/About/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JI: Manpower and Personnel,” webpage, undated-b. As of August 9,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/Jl-Manpower-and-Personnel/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J2: Joint Staff Intelligence,” webpage, undated-c. As of August 9,2022:
https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J2-Joint-Staff-Intelligence/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J3: Operations,” webpage, undated-d. As of August 9,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J3-Operations/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J4: Logistics,” webpage, undated-e. As of August 9,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J4-Logistics/ 110
Bibliography Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J5: Strategy, Plans and Policy,” webpage, undated-f. As of August 9,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J5-Strategy-Plans-and-Policy/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J6: Command, Control, Communications, and Computers/Cyber,” webpage, undated-g. As of August 9, 2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J6-C4-Cyber/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J7: Joint Force Development,” webpage, undated-h. As of August 9, 2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J8: Force Structure, Resource and Assessment,” webpage, undated-i. As of August 9,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J8-Force-Structure-Resources-Assessment/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff Celebrates 72 Years Today,” July 26,2019. As of January 7,2022: https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/1911127/ the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-celebrates-72-years-today/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, last updated November 2021. Jones, Sam, John Paul Rathbone, and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘“A Serious Failure’: Scale of Russia’s Military Blunders Becomes Clear,” Financial Times, March 12,2022. Jonsson, Oscar, The Military Instrument and the Influence of the General Staff forthcoming. Kalin, Stephen, “Iraq Says Russia, Iran, Syria Cooperating on Security Issues in Baghdad,” Reuters, September 27, 2015. Kholkhov, Aleksandr, “Ministr proveril: Svyaz’ bez Braka,” Novie Izvestiya, April 8,1999. Khudoleev, Viktor, "Operativnost' prinyatiya reshenii povyshena v razy,”
Krasnaya zvezda, No. 100,2019, p. 5. Kim, Lucian, “Should Putin Fear the Man Who ‘Pulled the Trigger of War’ in Ukraine?” Reuters, November 25, 2014. Kim, Lucian, “Kremlin TV: Vladimir Putin’s New Faux Documentary Is Trying to Rewrite the History of His Own Aggression,” Slate, March 19,2015. Kim, Lucian, “Russian Defense Minister Says His Military Has Tested 162 Weapons in Syria,” NPR, February 23, 2017. Kjellén, Jonas, Russian Electronic Warfare: The Role of Electronic Warfare in the Russian Armed Forces, Stockholm: FOI, FOI-R—4625—SE, September 2018. Kofman, Michael, “Syria and the Russian Armed Forces: An Evaluation of Moscow’s Military Strategy and Operational Performance,” in Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein, eds., Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned, Philadelphia, Pa.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020, pp. 35-66. Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts, Arlington, Va.: CNA, DRM-2019-U-022455-lRev, April 2020. Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, Jeffrey Edmonds, and Julian Waller, Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, Arlington, Va.: CNA, DRM-2021-U-029755-Final, August 2021. Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Oleysa Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, RR-1498-A, 2017. As of January 7,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html
Kokoshin, A. A., Defense Leadership in Russia: The General Staff and Strategic Management in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Mass.: Kennedy School of Government, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Discussion Paper 2002-15, November 2002. Korol, О. V, and N. L. Romas, “Formy voyennykh deystviy: Znacheniye kategorii,” Voennaya mysl’, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2008, pp. 149-153. 111
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress’’ Kots, Alexander, and Dmitry Steshin, "Komandujushhij samooboronoj Slavjanska Igor’ Strelkov: Zaderzhannye nabljudateli—kadrovye razvedchiki,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 26,2014. Kozak, Yuliya, “Effektivnoe planirovanie—Zalog uspekha,” Krasnaya zvezda, No. 21,2021, p. 3. Kozanchuk, Fedor, “Dal”neishee sovershenstvovanie informatsionnogo vzaimodeistviya v oblasti oborony strany,” Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 11,2015. Kramer, Andrew E., “Russian Warships Said to Be Going to Naval Base in Syria,” New York Times, June 18,2012. Kramer, Andrew E„ and Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Sent Tanks to Ukrainian Separatists, U.S. Says,” New York Times, June 13,2014a. Kramer, Andrew E„ and Michael R. Gordon, “Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front,” New York Times, August 27, 2014b. Kramnik, Ilya, “ReformaSerdyukova-Makarova,”NatsionaTnaya oborona, No. 12, 2011. Krebs, Ronald A., “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 85-124. Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4,2003, pp. 289-306. Kuzio, Taras, The Crimea: Europe’s Next Flashpoint, Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2010a. Kuzio, Taras, “The FSB Returns to Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 100, May 24,2010b. Kuznetsov, Yurii, “Sto let na okhrane sekretov gosudarstva,” Krasnaya zvezda, No. 123,2018, p. 7. Lapin, Aleksandr, “The Syrian Academy,”
VPKNews, April 24, 2018. Lavrov, Anton, “Russia Again, the Military Operation for Crimea,” in Colby Howard and Ruslan Pushkov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, 2nd ed., Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Press, 2015. Lavrov, Anton, The Russian Air Campaign in Syria: A Preliminary Analysis, Arlington, Va.: CNA, COP-2018-U017903-Final, June 2018. Ledeneva, Alena, “Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2011, pp. 720-736. Litovkin, Viktor, “General’s Afront,” RIA Novosti, March 28,2008. Litovkin, Viktor, “Genshtab informiruet zagranitsu,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 46, DecemberJanuary 2008/2009. Lowrey, Nathan S., The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1949-2016, Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016. MacFarquhar, Neil, and Anne Barnard, “Putin Orders Start of Syria Withdrawal, Saying Goals Are Achieved,” New York Times, March 14,2016. Main, Steven J„ “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, Occasional Brief No. 77, April 2000. Main, Steven J., Couch for the MoD or the CGS? The Russian Ministry ofDefense and The General Staff20012004, Camberley, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2004. Makarov, Nikolay, “Glavnii Organ voyennovo upravleniya, ili gvardiya zarozhdayushihsya idei,” Rossiiskoye voyennoye obozrenie, No. 2, February 2009, pp. 10-15. Makarov, Nikolay, “Reformi prodolzhayutsa,” Armeiskii Zbornik, No. 8, August 2013, pp. 35-37. Malyshev, Mikhail, “Kadrovye izmeneniya v vostochnom voennom
okruge,” Komsomol’skaya Pravda, June 1, 2011. As of January 7, 2022: https://www.hab.kp.ru/online/news/905003/ Marsh, Christopher, Developments in Russian Special Operations: Russia’s Spetsnaz, SOP, and Special Operations Forces Command, Winnipeg: CANSOFCOM Education and Research Centre, 2017. Marten, Kimberly, “Informal Political Networks and Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Examples of Iran and Syria,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 62, No. 2,2015, pp. 71-87. 112
Bibliography Marten, Kimberly, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2019, pp. 181-204. Massicott, Dara, “Anticipating a New Russian Military Doctrine in 2020: What It Might Contain and Why It Matters,” War on the Rocks, September 9,2019. McDermott, Roger N., “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,” Parameters, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 2009, pp. 65-80. McDermott, Roger N., “Moscow Showcases Breakthrough in Automated Command and Control,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 16, No. 164, November 20, 2019. McDermott, Roger N., and Charles K. Barties, The Russian Military Decision-Making Process and Automated Command and Control, Hamburg: German Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, 2020. Menning, Bruce, and Shane E. Mahoney, Final Report to National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Washington, D.C.: Council for Soviet and East European Research, May 10,1982. “MH-17: Four Charged with Shooting Down Plane over Ukraine,” BBC News, June 19,2019. Minchenko Consulting, The Politburo 2.0 and the Anti-Establishment Wave, Moscow: Minchenko Consulting, Summer 2019. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Arkhivnaya sluzhba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-a. As of January 7, 2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=11425@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Burdinskii Evgenii Vladimirovich,” webpage, undated-b. As of January 7, 2022:
https://structure.mil.ru/management/details.htm?id=12178324@SD_Employee Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Gerasimov Valerii Vasilevich,” webpage, undated-c. As of January 7, 2022: https://structure.mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-d. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9710@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Glavnoe organizatsionno-mobilizatsionnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-e. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9712@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Glavnoe upravlenie svyazi Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-f. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9587@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Glavnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-g. As of January 7, 2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9711@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Mizintsev Mikhail Evgen’evich,” webpage, undated-h. As of January 7, 2022: https://structure.mil.ru/management/details.htm?id=12000953@SD_Employee Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, "Natsional'nyi
Tsentr Upravleniya Oboronoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-i. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=11206@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Sarvarov Fanil Fanisovich,” webpage, undated-j. As of January 7, 2022: https://structure.mil.ru/management/details.htm?id=12083081@SD_Employee Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Upravlenie nachal’nika voisk radioelektronnoi bor’by Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-к. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9713@egOrganization 113
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Upravlenie operativnoi podgotovki Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-1. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=11156@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Voenno-topograficheskoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” webpage, undated-m. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9715@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, [title unavailable], webpage, undated-n. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/management.htm Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, [title unavailable], webpage, undated-о. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/structuremorf.htm Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, [title unavailable], webpage, undated-p. As of January 7,2022: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/airborne/structure/details.htm?id=9802@egOrganization Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, [title unavailable], webpage, undated-q. As of January 7,2022: https://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/ministry_of_defence.htm Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “V Vostochnom voennom okruge nachalas’ masshtabnaya trenirovka po svyazi,” webpage, July 8,2014. As of January 7,2022: https.7/function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11967880@egNews Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation, “Statement of the Russian Defence Ministry concerning downing of the Syrian Su-22 near the town of Resafa,” Facebook post, June 19, 2017. As of January 5,2022: https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/posts/1943173689258711/ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Ministr oborony RF Sergei Shoigu zayavil о sozdanii zakrytoi sistemy dlya obsuzhdenii s predstavitelyami vlasti,” webpage, November 20, 2020. As of January 7,2022: https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12325733@egNews Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “Servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces Who Took Part in Combat Actions in Ukraine,” accessed through the Internet Archive, June 8,2019. As of January 7,2022: https://bit.ly/2YOaiM4 “The Ministry of Defense Will Create a Department for Working with Artificial Intelligence by December 1,” TASS, May 31,2021. As of January 7,2022: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11515073 “Minoborony oprovergio ‘Soldatskim materjam’ soobshhenija о rossijskih voennyh v Ukraine,” TVDozhd, October 3,2014. Miron, Marina, and Rod Thornton, “Emerging as the ‘Victor’(?): Syria and Russia’s Grand and Military Strategies,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1,2021, pp. 1-23. Mirovalev, Mansur, “Is Russia’s Defence Chief Emerging as Putin’s Possible Successor?” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2021. Mishustin, Mikhail, Ό persone. Pravitel’stvo Mikhaila Mishustina. Kartapolov Andrei Valerievich,” Kommersant, January 20,2020. MoD—See Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Monaghan, Andrew, Defibrillating the Vertikal? Putin and Russian Grand Strategy,
London, UK: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, October 2014. “More Than 48 Thousand Russian Soldiers Received Combat Experience in Syria,” RIA Novosti, December 22, 2017. Mukhin, Vladimir, “V voennykh reformakh zaputalos’ ne tol’ko obshchetvo, no i rukovodstvo strany,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 21,1997. Mukhin, Vladimir, “Serdyukov optimiziruet oboronu,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, April 12,2007. Mukhin, Vladimir, “Rossiiskaya armiya u Shoigu stanet prezhde vsego armiei,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 9,2012. As of January 7,2022: https://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2012-ll-09/l_army.html 114
Bibliography Munoz, Carlo, “U.S. European Commander: Russia Supplying Anti-Aircraft Weapons to Ukrainian Separatists,” USNINews, June 30,2014. Myers, Steven Lee, “Giant Helicopter Crashes in Russia,” New York Times, August 20,2002. “Nachinaet pokazyvat’sia iz teni,” Russkii Reporter, February 4,2011. “Netanyahu to Discuss Situation in Syria with Lavrov, Russian General Staff Chief,” TASS, July 23,2018. Nichol, Jim, Russian Military Reform and the Defense Policy, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R42006, August 24, 2011. Nikolsky, Alexey, “Russian Special Operations Forces-Eight Years and Three Wars,” in Ruslan Pushkov and Christopher Marsh, eds., Elite Warriors: Special Operations Forces from Around the World, Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Press, 2017. Nilsson, Rasmus, “Russian Policy Concerning the Black Sea Fleet and Its Being Based in Ukraine 2008-2010: Three Interpretations,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 65, No. 6, August 2013, pp. 1154-1170. “No Denial from Putin on Wagner Mercenaries in Donbas,” UNIAN, December 20,2018. Noorman, Randy, “The Battle of Debaltseve: A Hybrid Army in a Classic Battle of Encirclement,” Small Wars Journal, July 17,2020. Norberg, Johan, and Martin Goliath, “The Fighting Power of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2019,” in Fredrik Westerlund and Susanne Oxenstierna, eds., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2019, Stockholm: FOI, FOI-R—4758—SE, December 2019. Novikov, A. V, V. V. Zevin, and I. A. Rasshchepkin, “Problemy ekspluatatsii robototekhnicheskikh kompleksov voennogo naznacheniya vozdushnogo primeneniya v
Vooruzhennykh Silakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 7,2018, p. 80. “NTsUO Rossiiskoi Federatsii zastupil naboevoe dezhurstvo,” Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 12,2014, pp. 8-11. Ogarkov, N. V, ed., Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1983. Ostankov, V. L, “Strategicheskikh rezervov net,” Voenno-promyshlennvi kur’er, March 17,2014. “Over 90% of Russian Military Pilots Have Combat Experience, Says Defense Chief,” TASS, November 7,2021. Oxenstierna, Susanne, “Russia’s Defense Spending and the Economic Decline,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2016, pp. 60-70. Parker, John W., Understanding Putin Through a Middle Eastern Looking Glass, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Perspectives 19, July 2015. Pavlovskiy, Gleb, “Russian Politics Under Putin: The System Will Outlast the Master,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016. Peters, B. Guy, The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration, 7th ed., New York: Routledge Press, 2018. Petrov, Nikolay, and Eugenia Nazrullaeva, “Regional Elites and Moscow,” in Daniel Treisman, ed., The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018, pp. 109-136. Pifer, Steven, “Five Years After Crimea’s Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution,” blog post, Brookings Institution, March 18,2019. As of January 7,2022: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/ five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-
annexation-the-issue-is-no-closer-to-resolution/ Pinchuk, Denis, and Tom Balmforth, “Russia to Deploy Military Police on Golan Heights,” Reuters, August 2, 2018. Pomeranz, William, E., “Putin’s Cosmetic Constitutionalism,” blog post, Wilson Center, January 16, 2020. As of January 7, 2022: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-cosmetic-constitutionalism President of the Russian Federation, “Ob oborone,” Federal Law No. 61-FZ, December 30,2012. 115
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” President of the Russian Federation, Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 19.04.2017, No. 177, April 19,2017a. President of the Russian Federation, “Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 23.07.2013 No. 631 (red. ot 21.12.2020), Voprosy General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii,’ July 23, 2017b. As of January 7,2021: https://legalacts.ru/doc/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-ot-23072013-n-631/ Public Law 85-599, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, August 6,1958. Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1,1986. Pukhov, Ruslan, “Rossiiskaia vozdushnaia operatsiia v Sirii,” in Μ. J. Shepovalenko, ed., Siriiskii rybezh, Moscow: Tsentr analiza strategii i texhnologii, 2016, pp. 105-120. “Putin Chef’s Kisses of Death: Russia’s Shadow Army’s State-Run Structure Exposed,” Bellingcat, August 14, 2020. “Putin Orders Russian Military to Act Tough in Syria,” Moscow Times, December 11,2015. “Putin prisvoil zvaniye generala armii glavkomu VKS RF Sergeyu Surovikinu,” TASS, August 16,2017. As of January 7, 2022: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/12142507 Putin, Vladimir, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu,” webpage, March 1,2018. As of January 7,2022: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 Puzenkin, V., and V. V. Mikhailov, “The Role of Information and Psychological Means in Ensuring the Defense of the State,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 7, July 2015, pp. 11-15. Râcz, Andras, “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State,” blog post,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 21,2020. As of January 7,2022: https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state Radin, Andrew, Lynn E. Davis, Edward Geist, Eugeniu Han, Dara Massicot, Matthew Povlock, Clint Reach, Scott Boston, Samuel Charap, William Mackenzie, Katya Migacheva, Trevor Johnston, and Austin Long, The Future of the Russian Military: Russia’s Ground Combat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia Competition, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, RR-3099-A, 2019. As of July 11,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3099.html Radin, Andrew, Alyssa Demus, and Krystyna Marcinek, Understanding Russian Subversion: Patterns, Threats, and Responses, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-331-A, 2020. As of January 7,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE331.html Ramm, Aleksey, Aleksey Kozachenko, and Roman Kretsul, “Pamyatnaya bigdata: generalam pomozhet iskusstvennyi Intellekt,” Izvestiya, November 13, 2019. Reach, Clint, “The Origins of Russian Conduct,” PRISM, Vol. 9, No. 3,2021, pp. 2-16. Reach, Clint, Alexis Blanc, and Edward Geist, Russian Military Strategy: Organizingfor Operations in the Initial Period of War, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, RR-A1233-1, 2022. As of March 7, 2023: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-l.html Reach, Clint, Alyssa Demus, Eugeniu Han, Bilyana Lilly, Krystyna Marcinek, and Yuliya Shokh, Russian Military Forecasting and Analysis: The Military-Political Situation and Military Security in Strategic Planning, Santa
Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, RR-A198-4,2022. As of July 11,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA198-4.html Rearden, Steven, L., The Role and Influence of the Chairman: A Short History, Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2011. Rearden, Steven, L., Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012. Renz, Bettina, “Putin’s Militocracy? An Alternative Interpretation of Siloviki in Contemporary Russian Politics,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 6, September 2006, pp. 903-924. Renz, Bettina, “Civil-Military Relations and Russian Military Modernisation,” in Roger N. McDermott, Bertil Nygren, and Carolina Vendil Pallin, eds., The Russian Armed Forces in Transition: Economic, Geopolitical and Institutional Uncertainties, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012, pp. 193-208. 116
Bibliography Renz, Bettina, Russia’s Military Revival, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018. Rivera, David W., and Sharon Werning Rivera, “The Militarization of the Russian Elite Under Putin: What We Know, What We Think We Know (but Don’t), and What We Need to Know,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2018, pp. 221-232. Rodionov, Igor, "Osnovniye napravleniya voennoi reformy,” Nazavisimoye Gazeta, April 4,1996. Rodionov, Igor, “Osnovy voyennoy doktriny Rossii (Proyekt),” Voennaya mysl’, June 16,1992. Roman, Peter J., and David W. Tarr, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 91-111. Rondeaux, Candace, Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare, Washington, D.C.: New America, November 2019. Rosenburg, Steven, “Ukraine Crisis: Meeting the Little Green Men,” BBC News, April 30,2014. ‘“Royal Flush.’ Russian Special Forces Soldier Fighting in Ukraine Showed Us All!” InformNapalm, June 3,2015. Rudskoi, Sergei, “Pul’s oborony strany,” Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 17,2017. Rudskoi, Sergei, “Generator idei i zamyslov,” Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18, 2018. Rudskoi, Sergei, “Ugrozy pariruem vdumchivo,” Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 19, 2019. Rukshin, A. S., “Doktrinal’nye vzgliady po voprosam primeneniia i stroitel’stva Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossii,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 3,2007, p. 27. “Russia Aviation’s Flights in Syria Reduced to Minimum—General Staff,” TASS, July 29,2019. “Russia Expanding Second Syrian Air Base Near IS-Held Areas,” Radio Free
Europe Radio Liberty, December 4, 2015. “Russia Involves 10 Reconnaissance Satellites in Syria Operation-General Staff,” TASS, November 17, 2015. “Russia Lost 64 Troops in Georgian War, 283 Wounded,” Reuters, February 21,2009. “Russia Says Its Military Advisers, Special Forces Behind Palmyra Recapture,” Reuters, March 3,2017. “Russia Says New Blast at Arms Depot Kills 8,” Reuters, November 23, 2009. “Russian Air Force Chief Discusses Reform, Training, Modernization, Projects,” Interfax, August 5,2009. “Russian, French General Staff Chiefs Confirm Intention to Preserve Undivided Syria,” TASS, December 24, 2015. “Russian FSB Agents to Leave Crimea,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 3,2009. “Russian Navy Ships May Join Syria Operation-General Staff,” TASS, October 16,2015. Ryabikhin, Leonid, “Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, July 11,2019. As of January 7,2022: https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/russias-nc3-and-early-warning-systems/ Safronov, Ivan, “Komandir udarnoi dizizii,” Kommersant, November 6,2013. Shamiev, Kirill, Understanding Senior Leadership Dynamics Within the Russian Military, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2021. Shargunov, Sergey, “Semnadcat’ kilometrov my shli marshem cherez granicu,” Svobodnaya Pressa, November 11, 2014. As of January 7,2022: https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/103643/ Sherr, James, “Ukraine and the Black Sea Region: The Russian Military Perspective,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., The Russian Military in Contemporary
Perspective, Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2019, pp. 779-822. Shinkman, Paul D., “The Joint Chiefs’ Power Surge,” U.S. News and World Report, September 30,2019. Shlapak, David A., and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1253-A, 2016. As of August 10,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html 117
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” “Shoigu rasskazal о moshchnosti superkomp’yutera Tsentra upravleniya oboronoi,” RBK, December 31,2016. As of January 7,2022: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5866e8ea9a794764cca51276 “Shoigu: Russia Is Creating Automated Command and Control” [“Shoigu: Rossiya Sozdayet Avtomatizirovannayu Sistemy Upravleniya Voiskami”], Eurasia Daily, December 4,2020. Shoigu, S. K., “Vystuplenie ministra oborny Rossiiskoi Federatsii generala armii S. K. Shoigu,” Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk, Vol. 1, No. 42,2013. “Situation in Syria Improves After Signing Deal on De-Escalation Zones-General Staff,” TASS, June 9,2017. Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny, “SBU zatrymala pozashtatnoho spivrobitnyka HRU, yakyj buv odnym iz kuratoriv kerivnyctva ‘DNR,’” video, YouTube, July 7, 2020. As of January 7,2022: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECorJNONa70 Soldatov, Andrei, and Michael Rochlitz, “The Siloviki in Russian Politics,” in Daniel Treisman, ed., The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018, pp. 83-108. Solopov, Maxim, “Sluzhba ponevole: как srochnikam navjazyvajut kontrakt i poezdku pod Rostov,” RBC, February 3,2015. Strobel, Warren P„ “Russia Facing Military Shortcomings in Ukraine Invasion,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2022. “Sud Priznal Zakonnym Prodlenie Aresta Eks-Zamglave Genshtaba Arslanovu,” TASS, September 16,2020. As of January 7,2022: https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/9474359 Sukhankin, Sergey, “Russian PMCs in the
Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond,” blog post, Jamestown Foundation, December 18,2019. As of July 11,2022: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-groupand-beyond/ Synovitz, Ron, “Explainer: What Do Russian Troop Movements Near Ukraine’s Border Signify?” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 13,2014. “Syria Conflict: ‘Thousands Flee Aleppo Offensive,’” BBC News, October 19,2015. “Syria Crisis: Russian Air Strikes Against Assad Enemies,” BBC News, September 30,2015. “Syria to Cut Task Force in Syria—General Staff,” TASS, November 23,2017. Taylor, Brian D., State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Telekanal Zvezda, “Voennaya priemka. Natsional’nyitsentr upravleniya oboronoi. Chast’ 1. Dezhurnaya smena,” video, YouTube, December 15,2019. As of January 7,2022: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMyVks3RJhM Thomas, Timothy L., “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” Parameters, Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 87-110. Thornton, Rod, Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces: The Lessons of the Georgian Conflict, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 1,2011. Tikhonov, Aleksandr, “Kreativ mezhvedomstvennogo vzaimodeistviya,” Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 129,2017, p. 1. Treisman, Daniel, “Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 3, MayJune 2016, pp. 47-54. Treisman, Daniel, “Crimea, Anatomy of a Decision,” in Daniel
Treisman, ed., The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018a, pp. 274-288. Treisman, Daniel, ed., The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2018b. 118
Bibliography Tsypkin, Mikhail, “Lessons Not to Learn: Post-Communist Russia,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, eds., Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013, pp. 110-122. Turchenko, Sergey, “The Smaller the Army, the More the Crimes,” Svobodnaya Pressa, March 24,2010. “Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane-What We Know,” BBC News, December 1,2015. “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane on Syria Border,” BBC News, November 24,2015. Turovsky, Daniil, “What Is the GRU? Who Gets Recruited to Be A Spy? Why Are They Exposed So Often? Here Are the Most Important Things You Should Know About Russia’s Intelligence Community,” trans. Kevin Rothrock, Meduza, November 6,2018. “Ukraine Detains Deep Cover GRU Sleeper Agent Who Might Be Highest Ranking MH 17 Witness Yet,” Euromaidan Press, July 8,2020. U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces. U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces; Section 151, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Composition, Functions, 2019. U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces; Section 152, Chairman: Appointment; Grade and Rank, 2019. U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces; Section 153, Chairman: Functions. U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces; Section 155, Joint Staff. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, Washington, D.C., 2017. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “National Security Act of 1947,” webpage, undated. As of January 7, 2022: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act Vendil Pallin, Carolina, “The Russian Power Ministries:
Tool and Insurance of Power,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-25. Vendil Pallin, Carolina, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making, New York: Routledge, 2009. Vendil Pallin, Carolina, and Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2009, pp. 400-424. Veneri, Michael C., “The U.S. Military’s Implementation of the Joint Duty Promotion Requirement,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 34, No. 3, April 2008, pp. 413-432. Voronin, Dmitrii, “Park ‘Patriot’ v Efire!” Soyuz radiolyubitelei Rossii, October 20,2016. Walker, Shaun, “Russian Parliament Grants Vladimir Putin Right to Deploy Military in Syria,” The Guardian, September 30,2015. Walker, Shaun, “Putin Admits Russian Military Presence in Ukraine for First Time,” The Guardian, December 17,2015. Watling, Jack, “Just How Tall Are Russian Soldiers?” RUSIDefence Systems, Vol. 24, March 11,2022. Westerlund, Fredrik, The Role of the Military in Putin’s Foreign Policy: An Overview of Current Research, Stockholm: FOI, FOI-R—5070—SE, February 2021. Wheildon, L. B., “Militarization,” Editorial Research Reports 1948, Vol. 1,1948, pp. 299-316. Whisler, Greg, “Strategic Command and Control in the Russian Armed Forces: Untangling the General Staff, Military Districts, and Service Main Commands (Part One),” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2019, pp. 463-484. Whisler, Greg, “Strategic Command and Control in the Russian Armed Forces: Untangling the General Staff, Military Districts, and Service
Main Commands (Part Two),” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2020a, pp. 89-112. 119
The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military's Decisionmaking Role in a “Besieged Fortress” Whisler, Greg, “Strategic Command and Control in the Russian Armed Forces: Untangling the General Staff, Military Districts, and Service Main Commands (Part Three),” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2020b, pp. 237-258. Whisler, Greg, “Carving a Peacetime Force from a Mobilization Military: The Overlooked Pillar of Post-Soviet Russian Defense Reform,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3,2021, pp. 357-383. Wilkinson, Spenser, The Brain of the Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff, Westminster, UK: Archibald, 1895. Wilson, Andrew, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 4th ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015. Wilson, Jeanne L., “Russia’s Relationship with China: The Role of Domestic and Ideational Factors,” International Politics, Vol. 56, No. 1,2019, pp. 778-794. Wintour, Patrick, and Julian Borger, “Russia Warns US Its Fighter Jets Are Now Potential Target in Syria,” The Guardian, June 19,2017. Yampolskii, Sergei, “Konceptualnii podhod к sovershenstovoniyu deyaternosti organov viyennovo upravleniya na osnove primeneniya intellektualnih sistem,” Informatics, Computer Engineering and Control, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2019. “Yuriy Baluyevskiy: S NATO voyevat’ ne sobirayemsya,” Rosiiskaya Gazeta, 2005-ll-19NBP-No. 089, November 19,2005. Zarunitsky, V. B„ “Kharakter i soderzhaniye voyennykh konfliktov segodnya i v obozrimom budushchem,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 1,2021. Zherebtsov, Viacheslav, “On Some Directions of Russian Armed Forces
Organizational Development at the Present Stage,” Armeyskiy Sbornik, April 1996. Zhuravlev, Sergey, “Glavnii Shtab как dumayushii organizm,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 31, September 5,2003. Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden, and Rebeca Orrie, Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence Among the U.S. Military Services, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2270-OSD, 2 019. As of January 7,2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2270.html Zygar, Mikhail, All the Kremlins Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin, New York: Public Affairs, 2016. 120 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Blanc, Alexis A. Demus, Alyssa Evans, Sandra Kay |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1209958228 (DE-588)1162562900 |
| author_facet | Blanc, Alexis A. Demus, Alyssa Evans, Sandra Kay |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Blanc, Alexis A. |
| author_variant | a a b aa aab a d ad s k e sk ske |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049002134 |
| contents | Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Roles and Responsibilities of the Russian General Staff -- Chapter Three: The Russian General Staff in Comparative Context -- Chapter Four: The General Staff and the Balance of Power -- Chapter Five: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Ukraine Case Study -- Chapter Six: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Syria Case Study -- Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions About the Role of the General Staff in National Security Decisionmaking |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1427319568 (DE-599)BVBBV049002134 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7249/RRA1233-7 |
| era | Geschichte 2014-2021 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 2014-2021 |
| format | Electronic Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05119nam a2200709 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049002134</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240408 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230615s2023 a||| b||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781977410948</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-977410-94-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.7249/RRA1233-7</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1427319568</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV049002134</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">OST</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Blanc, Alexis A.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1209958228</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Russian General Staff</subfield><subfield code="b">understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress"</subfield><subfield code="c">Alexis A. Blanc, Alyssa Demus, Sandra Kay Evans [und fünf weitere]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Santa Monica, CA</subfield><subfield code="b">RAND</subfield><subfield code="c">[2023]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xi, 120 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen</subfield><subfield code="c">28 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Roles and Responsibilities of the Russian General Staff -- Chapter Three: The Russian General Staff in Comparative Context -- Chapter Four: The General Staff and the Balance of Power -- Chapter Five: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Ukraine Case Study -- Chapter Six: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Syria Case Study -- Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions About the Role of the General Staff in National Security Decisionmaking</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The Russian General Staff is unlike any single organization within the U.S. defense establishment. The absence of an analog in the United States means that audiences within the U.S. civilian and military communities largely are unfamiliar with the concept of a General Staff. Because of the increasing militarization of Russian foreign policy since 2008, it is important to understand not only the formal authorities and responsibilities of this institution but also its capacity to influence Russia's national security decisionmaking process. In this report, the authors develop a foundational text for policymakers and warfighters to improve collective understanding of the Russian General Staff. The authors first draw on a variety of primary and secondary Russian-language sources-e.g., statutes, speeches by political and military elites, and academic military writings-to inform their characterization of the General Staff's statutory mandate. They then place the General Staff in a comparative institutional context, providing a high-level evaluation of the institutional roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the General Staff's U.S. counterpart-the Joint Staff. They consider what the formal roles and responsibilities of the General Staff suggest about the relative balance of power among Russia's political leaders, the General Staff, and the broader Russian military. The authors then take this understanding and apply it to the roles and responsibilities of the General Staff in a practical context by analyzing two case studies of this institution's involvement in recent conflicts: Ukraine (2014-2021) and Syria (2015-2019)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="2" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Russland</subfield><subfield code="b">Generalstab</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)7596432-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 2014-2021</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bürgerkrieg in Syrien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1041651422</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)106969780X</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Military planning / Russia (Federation)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Strategy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Ukraine Conflict, 2014-</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Russia (Federation) / Military policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Crimea (Ukraine) / Annexation to Russia (Federation)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Syria / History / Civil War, 2011- / Participation, Russian</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Military planning</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Military policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Strategy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Russia (Federation)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Syria</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Ukraine / Crimea</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Since 2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">History</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Russland</subfield><subfield code="b">Generalstab</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)7596432-6</subfield><subfield code="D">b</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)106969780X</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Bürgerkrieg in Syrien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1041651422</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 2014-2021</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Demus, Alyssa</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1162562900</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Evans, Sandra Kay</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Literaturverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_NED_20240408</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034265295</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090513</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049002134 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:09:45Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:52:30Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781977410948 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034265295 |
| oclc_num | 1427319568 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xi, 120 Seiten Illustrationen 28 cm |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20240408 |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Blanc, Alexis A. Verfasser (DE-588)1209958228 aut The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" Alexis A. Blanc, Alyssa Demus, Sandra Kay Evans [und fünf weitere] Santa Monica, CA RAND [2023] xi, 120 Seiten Illustrationen 28 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia c rdamedia nc rdacarrier cr rdacarrier Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Roles and Responsibilities of the Russian General Staff -- Chapter Three: The Russian General Staff in Comparative Context -- Chapter Four: The General Staff and the Balance of Power -- Chapter Five: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Ukraine Case Study -- Chapter Six: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Syria Case Study -- Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions About the Role of the General Staff in National Security Decisionmaking The Russian General Staff is unlike any single organization within the U.S. defense establishment. The absence of an analog in the United States means that audiences within the U.S. civilian and military communities largely are unfamiliar with the concept of a General Staff. Because of the increasing militarization of Russian foreign policy since 2008, it is important to understand not only the formal authorities and responsibilities of this institution but also its capacity to influence Russia's national security decisionmaking process. In this report, the authors develop a foundational text for policymakers and warfighters to improve collective understanding of the Russian General Staff. The authors first draw on a variety of primary and secondary Russian-language sources-e.g., statutes, speeches by political and military elites, and academic military writings-to inform their characterization of the General Staff's statutory mandate. They then place the General Staff in a comparative institutional context, providing a high-level evaluation of the institutional roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the General Staff's U.S. counterpart-the Joint Staff. They consider what the formal roles and responsibilities of the General Staff suggest about the relative balance of power among Russia's political leaders, the General Staff, and the broader Russian military. The authors then take this understanding and apply it to the roles and responsibilities of the General Staff in a practical context by analyzing two case studies of this institution's involvement in recent conflicts: Ukraine (2014-2021) and Syria (2015-2019) Russland Generalstab (DE-588)7596432-6 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 2014-2021 gnd rswk-swf Bürgerkrieg in Syrien (DE-588)1041651422 gnd rswk-swf Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg (DE-588)106969780X gnd rswk-swf Military planning / Russia (Federation) Strategy Ukraine Conflict, 2014- Russia (Federation) / Military policy Crimea (Ukraine) / Annexation to Russia (Federation) Syria / History / Civil War, 2011- / Participation, Russian Military planning Military policy Russia (Federation) Syria Ukraine / Crimea Since 2011 History Russland Generalstab (DE-588)7596432-6 b Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg (DE-588)106969780X s Bürgerkrieg in Syrien (DE-588)1041651422 s Geschichte 2014-2021 z DE-604 Demus, Alyssa Verfasser (DE-588)1162562900 aut Evans, Sandra Kay Verfasser aut https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-7 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Blanc, Alexis A. Demus, Alyssa Evans, Sandra Kay The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Roles and Responsibilities of the Russian General Staff -- Chapter Three: The Russian General Staff in Comparative Context -- Chapter Four: The General Staff and the Balance of Power -- Chapter Five: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Ukraine Case Study -- Chapter Six: The General Staff in a Practical Context: Syria Case Study -- Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions About the Role of the General Staff in National Security Decisionmaking Russland Generalstab (DE-588)7596432-6 gnd Bürgerkrieg in Syrien (DE-588)1041651422 gnd Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg (DE-588)106969780X gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)7596432-6 (DE-588)1041651422 (DE-588)106969780X |
| title | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" |
| title_auth | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" |
| title_exact_search | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" |
| title_full | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" Alexis A. Blanc, Alyssa Demus, Sandra Kay Evans [und fünf weitere] |
| title_fullStr | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" Alexis A. Blanc, Alyssa Demus, Sandra Kay Evans [und fünf weitere] |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Russian General Staff understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" Alexis A. Blanc, Alyssa Demus, Sandra Kay Evans [und fünf weitere] |
| title_short | The Russian General Staff |
| title_sort | the russian general staff understanding the military s decisionmaking role in a besieged fortress |
| title_sub | understanding the military's decisionmaking role in a "Besieged Fortress" |
| topic | Russland Generalstab (DE-588)7596432-6 gnd Bürgerkrieg in Syrien (DE-588)1041651422 gnd Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg (DE-588)106969780X gnd |
| topic_facet | Russland Generalstab Bürgerkrieg in Syrien Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-7 http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034265295&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT blancalexisa therussiangeneralstaffunderstandingthemilitarysdecisionmakingroleinabesiegedfortress AT demusalyssa therussiangeneralstaffunderstandingthemilitarysdecisionmakingroleinabesiegedfortress AT evanssandrakay therussiangeneralstaffunderstandingthemilitarysdecisionmakingroleinabesiegedfortress |