Otvătre navăn: a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene
Отвътре навън a priori обосноваване, интуиции и концептуално владеене
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Sofija
Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Sv. Kliment Ochridski"
2022
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| Ausgabe: | Părvo izdanie |
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverzeichnis Seite 211-219 |
| Beschreibung: | 222 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9789540756172 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Съдържание Благодарности ............................................................................... 9 Встъпителни бележки........................................................................................................... 11 Увод
........................................................................................................................................... 15 ГЛАВА ПЪРВА РАЗГРАНИЧЕНИЕТО A PRIORI -A POSTERIORI........................................................ 21 1.1. Класическата концепция за a priori
.................................................................... 23 1.1.1. Какво може и какво не може да бъде априорно.............................................24 1.1.2. Аналитични и концептуални истини.................................... .......................... 26 1.1.3. Необходимост и
априорност............................................................................ 32 1.1.4. Негативна и позитивна концепция...................................................................36 1.1.5. Аргумент срещу класическото разграничение............................................... 37
1.1.6. Мотивация за запазване на концепцията ....................................................... 48 1.2. Новото a priori .........................................................................................................53 1.2.1. Аргіогі-
та............................................................................................................... 54 1.2.2. Контингентност на априорните твърдения..................................................... 60
1.2.3. Фалсифицируемост на априорните твърдения.............................................. 64 1.2.4. Опит и априорност .............................................................................................. 66 1.2.5. Процеси и способности...................................................................................... 72 1.2.6. Ролята на разбирането в новата концепция ................................................... 75 1.2.7. Функция на новата концепция........................................................................... 79
ГЛАВА ВТОРА СТОЙНОСТТА НА ИНТУИЦИИТЕ ................................................................................ 83 2.1. Интуиции и нагледи.............................................................................................. 85 2.1.1. Интуицията като концептуална
компетентност.......................................... 89 2.1.2. Интуиции и самоочевидни твърдения........................................................... 91 2.1.3. Дефиниране на интуиция..................................................................................95 2.1.4. Сурови интуиции
(brute intuitions).................................................................. 99 2.2. Евиденциален статус на интуициите .............................................................. 102 2.2.1. Претенции срещу липсата на надеждност................................................... 103 2.2.2.
Специфичен неемпиричен евиденциален статус........................................ 107 2.2.3. Добри и лоши интуиции...................................................................................ПО 2.2.4. Аргументът от липса на
знание...................................................................... 112 ГЛАВА ТРЕТА ОБОСНОВАВАНЕ БЕЗ ИНТУИЦИИ ПО ФИЛОСОФСКИ ...................................... 115 3.1. Философско познание и абдукция.....................................................................119 3.1.1.
Характеристики на абдуктивните изводи..................................................... 121 3.1.2. Проблеми пред извода към най-доброто обяснение................................... 125 3.1.3.
Прецизиране на абдуктивните допускания и формулиране на критерии за изводимост........................................128 3.2. Мисловно равновесие (МР) ....................... 133 3.2.1. Какво представлява мисловното равновесие................................................ 134 3.2.2. Обмислени съждения........................................................................................ 144 3.2.2.1. Как да дефинираме обмислените съждения.............................................. 145 3.2.2.2. Какво прави моралните съждения специални...........................................147 3.2.2.3. Ограниченията върху обмислените съждения.......................................... 152 3.2.3. Актуално равновесие........................................................................................ 156 3.3. Изводи към дебата екстернализъм срещу интернализъм по отношение на обосноваването.................................. 165 6
ГЛАВА ЧЕТВЪРТА МЕНТАЛНО СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ ........................................................................................... 167 4.1. Какво се разбира под „ментално съдържание“............................................... 169 4.1.1. Езикови изрази и техните ментални
еквиваленти........................................171 4.1.2. Представяне на менталното съдържание посредством „че“ клаузи.......172 4.1.3. Позиции по отношение на менталното съдържание ................................. 174 4.2. Притежаване на концепти и концептуални
истини........................................179 4.2.1. Концептуално владеене .................................................................................. 180 4.2.2. Перфектни говорители ................................................................................... 183 4.2.3. Импликации
от приемането на перфектни говорители.............................. 187 4.2.4. Импликации от отказа от перфектни говорители........................................ 190 4.3. Функционални теории за концепциите............................................................ 194 4.3.1. Перцептивни
(сензорно-моторни) и концептуални примитиви.............. 195 4.3.2. Аналогията между функция на употребата в езика и функция на концептуалната употреба............................................. 197 4.3.3. Функция на системата срещу функция на концепта.................................. 200 4.3.4.
Интернализъм, функционализъм, субективизъм ........................................201 4.4. Натурализация на екстернализма по отношение на менталното
съдържание..........................................................................203 4.4.1. Социален екстернализъм и широк физически екстернализъм................. 204 4.4.2. Натурализация на екстернализма.................................................................. 205 ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ ................................................................................................................... 207 БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ ........................................ 211 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 1. ПРЕВОДИ HA ПОНЯТИЯ .............................................................. 220 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 2. ИЗПОЛЗВАНИ АБРЕВИАТУРИ ................................................... 222 7
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Съдържание Благодарности . 9 Встъпителни бележки. 11 Увод
. 15 ГЛАВА ПЪРВА РАЗГРАНИЧЕНИЕТО A PRIORI -A POSTERIORI. 21 1.1. Класическата концепция за a priori
. 23 1.1.1. Какво може и какво не може да бъде априорно.24 1.1.2. Аналитични и концептуални истини. . 26 1.1.3. Необходимост и
априорност. 32 1.1.4. Негативна и позитивна концепция.36 1.1.5. Аргумент срещу класическото разграничение. 37
1.1.6. Мотивация за запазване на концепцията . 48 1.2. Новото a priori .53 1.2.1. Аргіогі-
та. 54 1.2.2. Контингентност на априорните твърдения. 60
1.2.3. Фалсифицируемост на априорните твърдения. 64 1.2.4. Опит и априорност . 66 1.2.5. Процеси и способности. 72 1.2.6. Ролята на разбирането в новата концепция . 75 1.2.7. Функция на новата концепция. 79
ГЛАВА ВТОРА СТОЙНОСТТА НА ИНТУИЦИИТЕ . 83 2.1. Интуиции и нагледи. 85 2.1.1. Интуицията като концептуална
компетентност. 89 2.1.2. Интуиции и самоочевидни твърдения. 91 2.1.3. Дефиниране на интуиция.95 2.1.4. Сурови интуиции
(brute intuitions). 99 2.2. Евиденциален статус на интуициите . 102 2.2.1. Претенции срещу липсата на надеждност. 103 2.2.2.
Специфичен неемпиричен евиденциален статус. 107 2.2.3. Добри и лоши интуиции.ПО 2.2.4. Аргументът от липса на
знание. 112 ГЛАВА ТРЕТА ОБОСНОВАВАНЕ БЕЗ ИНТУИЦИИ ПО ФИЛОСОФСКИ . 115 3.1. Философско познание и абдукция.119 3.1.1.
Характеристики на абдуктивните изводи. 121 3.1.2. Проблеми пред извода към най-доброто обяснение. 125 3.1.3.
Прецизиране на абдуктивните допускания и формулиране на критерии за изводимост.128 3.2. Мисловно равновесие (МР) . 133 3.2.1. Какво представлява мисловното равновесие. 134 3.2.2. Обмислени съждения. 144 3.2.2.1. Как да дефинираме обмислените съждения. 145 3.2.2.2. Какво прави моралните съждения специални.147 3.2.2.3. Ограниченията върху обмислените съждения. 152 3.2.3. Актуално равновесие. 156 3.3. Изводи към дебата екстернализъм срещу интернализъм по отношение на обосноваването. 165 6
ГЛАВА ЧЕТВЪРТА МЕНТАЛНО СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ . 167 4.1. Какво се разбира под „ментално съдържание“. 169 4.1.1. Езикови изрази и техните ментални
еквиваленти.171 4.1.2. Представяне на менталното съдържание посредством „че“ клаузи.172 4.1.3. Позиции по отношение на менталното съдържание . 174 4.2. Притежаване на концепти и концептуални
истини.179 4.2.1. Концептуално владеене . 180 4.2.2. Перфектни говорители . 183 4.2.3. Импликации
от приемането на перфектни говорители. 187 4.2.4. Импликации от отказа от перфектни говорители. 190 4.3. Функционални теории за концепциите. 194 4.3.1. Перцептивни
(сензорно-моторни) и концептуални примитиви. 195 4.3.2. Аналогията между функция на употребата в езика и функция на концептуалната употреба. 197 4.3.3. Функция на системата срещу функция на концепта. 200 4.3.4.
Интернализъм, функционализъм, субективизъм .201 4.4. Натурализация на екстернализма по отношение на менталното
съдържание.203 4.4.1. Социален екстернализъм и широк физически екстернализъм. 204 4.4.2. Натурализация на екстернализма. 205 ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ . 207 БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ . 211 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 1. ПРЕВОДИ HA ПОНЯТИЯ . 220 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 2. ИЗПОЛЗВАНИ АБРЕВИАТУРИ . 222 7
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| id | DE-604.BV048970402 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:02:43Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:51:36Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789540756172 |
| language | Bulgarian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034234021 |
| oclc_num | 1392146640 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 222 Seiten |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20230913 |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Sv. Kliment Ochridski" |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | 880-01 Angelova-Elčinova, Madlen 1997- Verfasser aut 880-03 Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene Madlen Angelova-Elčinova 880-02 Părvo izdanie 880-04 Sofija Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Sv. Kliment Ochridski" 2022 222 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis Seite 211-219 Text bulgarisch Kyrillisch Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd rswk-swf Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Ljuckanov, Rosen 1979- edt Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034234021&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034234021&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis 100-01/(N Ангелова-Елчинова, Мадлен ut 250-02/(N Първо издание 245-03/(N Отвътре навън a priori обосноваване, интуиции и концептуално владеене Мадлен Ангелова-Елчинова 264-04/(N София Университетско издателство "Св. Климент Охридски" 2022 |
| spellingShingle | Angelova-Elčinova, Madlen 1997- Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4027532-2 |
| title | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene |
| title_auth | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene |
| title_exact_search | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene |
| title_full | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene Madlen Angelova-Elčinova |
| title_fullStr | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene Madlen Angelova-Elčinova |
| title_full_unstemmed | Otvătre navăn a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene Madlen Angelova-Elčinova |
| title_short | Otvătre navăn |
| title_sort | otvatre navan a priori obosnovavane intuicii i konceptualno vladeene |
| title_sub | a priori obosnovavane, intuicii i konceptualno vladeene |
| topic | Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Erkenntnistheorie Intuition |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034234021&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034234021&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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