Corporate governance and finance:
Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding cu...
Gespeichert in:
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
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Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam ; Boston
JAI
2003
|
Ausgabe: | 1st ed |
Schriftenreihe: | Advances in financial economics
v. 8 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | DE-634 DE-1043 DE-M347 DE-523 DE-91 DE-473 DE-19 DE-355 DE-703 DE-20 DE-706 DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 DE-1046 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 193 Seiten) ill |
ISBN: | 9781849502146 |
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contents | Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey |
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edition | 1st ed |
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spelling | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija 1st ed Amsterdam ; Boston JAI 2003 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 193 Seiten) ill c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Advances in financial economics v. 8 Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task Business & Economics Corporate Finance Business & Economics Finance Corporate finance Politics & government Corporate governance Corporations Finance Hirschey, Mark Sonstige oth John, Kose Sonstige oth Makhija, Anil K. Sonstige oth https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1016/S1569-3732(2003)8 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Corporate governance and finance Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey Business & Economics Corporate Finance Business & Economics Finance Corporate finance Politics & government Corporate governance Corporations Finance |
title | Corporate governance and finance |
title_auth | Corporate governance and finance |
title_exact_search | Corporate governance and finance |
title_exact_search_txtP | Corporate governance and finance |
title_full | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
title_fullStr | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
title_full_unstemmed | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
title_short | Corporate governance and finance |
title_sort | corporate governance and finance |
topic | Business & Economics Corporate Finance Business & Economics Finance Corporate finance Politics & government Corporate governance Corporations Finance |
topic_facet | Business & Economics Corporate finance Politics & government Corporate governance Corporations Finance |
url | https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1016/S1569-3732(2003)8 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT hirscheymark corporategovernanceandfinance AT johnkose corporategovernanceandfinance AT makhijaanilk corporategovernanceandfinance |