Microeconomics of banking:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts
MIT Press
[2023]
|
| Ausgabe: | Third edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xiv, 214 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780262048194 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Microeconomics of banking |c Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| 250 | |a Third edition | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Massachusetts |b MIT Press |c [2023] | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Contents Preface to the Third Edition Introduction What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do? Liquidity and Payment Services 1.2.1 What Came First: Money or Credit? 1.2.2 Money Is Memory 1.2.3 Money as a Bubble 1.2.4 The Three Functions of Money 1.2.5 Money Changing 1.2.6 Payment Services 1.3 Managing Financial Risks 1.3.1 Transformation Risk 1.3.2 Credit Risk 1.3.3 Financial Markets Risk 1.4 Alleviating Asymmetric Information Problems 1.4.1 Ex Ante Asymmetric Information 1.4.2 Interim Asymmetric Information 1.4.3 Ex Post Asymmetric Information 1.5 Banking in a World without Frictions 1.5.1 The Consumer 1.5.2 The Firm 1.5.3 The Bank 1.5.4 The Competitive Equilibrium 1.6 Outline of the Book 1.7 Problem 1.8 Solution Notes References 1.1 1.2 χ{ϋ 1 1 շ 2 3 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 10 11 11 11 12 13 14 14 15
yļ Contents 2 Banks and Informational Frictions 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Maturity Transformation and Liquidity Insurance 2.2.1 The Diamond-Dybvig Model 2.2.2 The Symmetric Pareto Optimal Allocation 2.2.3 Autarky 2.2.4 Financial Markets 2.2.5 Bank Deposit Contracts 2.3 Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 2.4 Moral Hazard and the Monitoring Role of Banks 2.5 Credit Risk and Dilution Costs 2.5.1 The Model 2.5.2 Bond Financing 2.5.3 Equity Issue 2.5.4 Bank Loan 2.6 Further Reading 2.7 Problems 2.7.1 Market versus Bank Finance 2.7.2 Banks and Moral Hazard 2.8 Solutions 2.8.1 Market versus Bank Finance 2.8.2 Banks and Moral Hazard Note References 17 17 18 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 28 28 28 29 29 30 31 31 32 32 32 33 34 34 3 The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking 3.1 The Old Approach to Monetary Policy: Money and Credit Multipliers 3.2 Perfectly Competitive Banking 3.2.1 The Model 3.2.2 How Do Interest Rates Influence the Volumes of Deposits and Loans? 3.2.3 The Competitive Equilibrium 3.3 Imperfect Competition 3.3.1 The Monti-Klein Model of a Monopoly Bank 3.3.2 The Oligopoly Version 3.3.3 Product Differentiation 3.3.4 Empirical Evidence 37 38 39 39 40 40 41 42 43 44 47
Contents vii Is There a Trade-off between Competition and Financial Stability? 3.4.1 The Fragility View 3.4.2 The Stability View 3.4.3 The Impact of CapitalRequirements 3.4.4 Empirical Evidence 3.5 Competition and Lending Standards 3.5.1 The Screening Externality 3.5.2 Lending Standards through theBusiness Cycle 3.5.3 Empirical Evidence 3.6 Relationship Banking 3.6.1 A Simple Model 3.6.2 Public and Private Informationabout Borrowers 3.6.3 Empirical Evidence 3.7 Platform Competition and Two-Sided Markets 3.7.1 A Model of the Payment Card Industry 3.7.2 Card Use 3.7.3 Monopoly Network 3.7.4 Competing Networks 3.7.5 Welfare Analysis 3.7.6 Bigtechs 3.8 Further Reading 3.9 Problems 3.9.1 Double Bertrand Competition 3.9.2 Deposit Rate Regulation 3.10 Solutions 3.10.1 Double Bertrand Competition 3.10.2 Deposit Rate Regulation Notes References 47 47 48 48 49 50 50 51 51 52 52 53 53 55 56 57 57 58 59 59 60 62 62 63 63 63 64 65 65 The Lender-Borrower Relationship 4.1 The Complete Information Benchmark 4.2 Costly State Verification 4.2.1 Incentive-Compatible Contracts 4.2.2 Efficient Incentive-Compatible Contracts 4.3 Debt as the Least Information-Sensitive Security 4.4 Incentives to Repay 4.4.1 Promise to Lend Again 4.4.2 The Impact of Judicial Enforcement 69 70 72 72 73 74 75 75 76 3.4 4
Contents viii 4.5 Sovereign Debt 4.5.1 The Eaton-Gersovitz Paradigm 4.5.2 Critiques of the Eaton-Gersovitz Paradigm 4.5.3 The Politica! Economy Approach 4.6 Complements 4.6.1 Moral Hazard 4.6.2 Incomplete Contracts 4.6.3 Soft Budget Constraints 4.7 Further Reading 4.8 Problems 4.8.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 4.8.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard 4.8.3 The Pareto Frontier in the Townsend Model 4.8.4 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes 4.9 Solutions 4.9.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 4.9.2 Optimal Loan Contracts with Moral Hazard 4.9.3 The Pareto Frontier in the Townsend Model 4.9.4 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes Notes References 5 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Imperfections 5.1 A Short Historical Perspective 5.2 Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy 5.2.1 The Money View and the Interest Rate Channel 5.2.2 The Credit View and the Lending Channel 5.2.3 Credit View versus Money View: Comparing the Underlying Assumptions 5.2.4 Empirical Evidence 5.2.5 Nonconventional Monetary Policy 5.3 Financial Fragility and Economic Performance 5.3.1 First Best Allocation (Perfect Information) 5.3.2 Credit Constraints and Limited Liability 5.3.3 Macroeconomic Implications 5.4 Credit Cycles 5.4.1 The Financial Accelerator 5.4.2 Changing Credit Standards 5.4.3 Collateral-Driven Credit Cycles 78 78 79 80 81 81 82 83 85 86 86 86 87 87 88 88 88 89 89 90 91 93 94 95 95 96 98 100 102 102 103 104 106 107 107 108 109
Ij Contents įю 5.5 Aggregate Credit Rationing 5.5.1 The Backward-Bending Supply of Credit 5.5.2 Adverse Selection 5.5,3 Cash Flow Diversion 5.5.4 Moral Hazard 5.6 Financial Development and Economic Growth 5.7 Further Reading 5.8 Problems 5.8.1 Adverse Selection and Aggregate Credit Rationing 5.8.2 Too Much Investment 5.9 Solutions 5.9.1 Adverse Selection and Aggregate Credit Rationing 5.9.2 Too Much Investment Notes References 6 Bank Runs« Bank Panics, and the Lender of Last Resort 6.1 The Fractional Reserve System 6.1.1 The Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig Model 6.1.2 Implementing the Optimal Allocation 6.1.3 Multiple Equilibria 6.1.4 Speculative Bank Runs 6.1.5 Fundamental Bank Runs 6.2 How to Remedy Banks Fragility 6.2.1 Narrow Banking: From the Chicago Plan to Stablecoins 6.2.2 Deposit Insurance and Prudential Regulation 6.2.3 Equity Financed Banks 6.3 Interbank Markets 6.3.1 Insuring Liquidity Shocks 6.3.2 Adverse Selection 6.3.3 Liquidity Hoarding 6.4 The Lender of Last Resort (LLR) 6.4.1 Bagehot’s Doctrine 6.4.2 The Practice of LLR Assistance 6.4.3 Criticisms of the LLR Policy and the Modern Form of Bank Runs 6.5 Further Reading 6.6 Problems 6.6.1 Nominal Bank Runs 6.6.2 Aggregated Liquidity Shocks 111 щ ПЗ 114 115 118 120 120 120 121 121 121 122 123 129 130 130 130 131 132 133 134 134 134 135 136 137 137 138 138 138 139 140 142 143 143 144
Contents x 6.7 Solutions 6.7.1 Nominal Bank Runs 6.7.2Aggregated Liquidity Shocks Notes References 145 145 145 146 146 7 Liquidity 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Different Forms of Liquidity 7.2.1 Defining Liquidity 7.2.2 Public and Private Liquidity 7.2.3 Funding Liquidity and Market Liquidity 7.3 The Supply of Private Money 7.3.1 Do Banks Issue Too Much Money? 7.3.2 Shadow Banking 7.4 Private and Public Supply of Liquidity 7.4.1 The Mode! 7.4.2 Symmetric Information 7.4.3 Moral Hazard 7.4.4 Aggregate Shocks 7.5 Bubbles: When Asset Prices Diverge from Fundamentals 7.5.1 Bubbles as Sources of Liquidity 7.5.2 Cash in the Market Pricing 7.5.3 Liquidity Spirals 7.6 Liquidity Dry-Ups 7.7 Liquidity and Collateral Prices 7.7.1 Informational Sensitivity of Securities 7.7.2 Implications 7.8 Further Reading 7.9 Problem 7.10 Solution Notes References 149 149 150 150 151 151 152 152 154 156 156 156 157 158 158 158 159 159 160 160 161 161 162 163 164 165 165 8 Banking Regulation: The Microprudential Approach 8.1 Introduction: Why Are Banks Regulated? 8.2 Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard 8.2.1 The Moral Hazard Issue 8.2.2 Risk-Related Insurance Premiums 169 169 170 171 172
xj Contents Capital Regulation 1 : The Theory 8.3,1 The Value at Risk Approach 8.3.2 Risk-Weighted Capital Regulation 8.3.3 Portfolio Distortions 8.3.4 What Level for Banks’ Capital? 8.4 Capital Requirements 2: The Practice 8.4.1 The Costs of Capital Regulation 8.4.2 Empirical Evidence 8.4.3 Regulatory Competition 8.4.4 Accounting Rules and the Supplementary Leverage Ratio 8.4.5 Supervisors’Information and Managers’Incentives 8.4.6 Market Discipline 8.5 Further Reading 8.5.1 Banks’ Portfolio and Bankruptcy Risk 8.5.2 Liquidity Regulation 8.5.3 Disclosure and Market Discipline 8.6 Problems 8.6.1 Capital Regulation and Speculative Activities 8.6.2 Capital Requirements and Business Cycles 8.7 Solutions 8.7.1 Capital Regulation and Speculative Activities 8.7.2 Capital Requirements and Business Cycles Notes References 173 173 174 175 176 176 176 177 178 8.3 9 Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Regulation 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Systemic Risk 9.2.1 The Determinants of Systemic Risk 9.2.2 Shadow Banks and Systemic Risk 9.2.3 Measuring Systemic Risk 9.3 Ex Post Policies: Bank Restructuring and Resolution 9.3.1 A Bargaining Game between Bankers and Regulators 9.3.2 Bank Resolution and Managers’Incentives 9.3.3 Optimal Bailout Mechanisms 9.3.4 Debt Overhang after a Banking Crisis 9.3.5 How to Restart a Frozen Market? 9.3.6 Bail-Ins and C0C0 Bonds 17g 179 180 182 182 183 183 184 184 185 185 185 186 186 186 191 191 191 192 193 194 195 195 196 196 199 199 200
xii Contents 9.5 Notes References 200 201 202 203 207 207 208 Index 211 9.4 Externalities and Macroprudential Policy 9.4.1 Nonpecuniary Externalities 9.4.2 Fire-Sale Externalities 9.4.3 Procyclical Leverage and Credit Cycles Further Reading |
| adam_txt |
Contents Preface to the Third Edition Introduction What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do? Liquidity and Payment Services 1.2.1 What Came First: Money or Credit? 1.2.2 Money Is Memory 1.2.3 Money as a Bubble 1.2.4 The Three Functions of Money 1.2.5 Money Changing 1.2.6 Payment Services 1.3 Managing Financial Risks 1.3.1 Transformation Risk 1.3.2 Credit Risk 1.3.3 Financial Markets Risk 1.4 Alleviating Asymmetric Information Problems 1.4.1 Ex Ante Asymmetric Information 1.4.2 Interim Asymmetric Information 1.4.3 Ex Post Asymmetric Information 1.5 Banking in a World without Frictions 1.5.1 The Consumer 1.5.2 The Firm 1.5.3 The Bank 1.5.4 The Competitive Equilibrium 1.6 Outline of the Book 1.7 Problem 1.8 Solution Notes References 1.1 1.2 χ{ϋ 1 1 շ 2 3 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 10 11 11 11 12 13 14 14 15
yļ Contents 2 Banks and Informational Frictions 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Maturity Transformation and Liquidity Insurance 2.2.1 The Diamond-Dybvig Model 2.2.2 The Symmetric Pareto Optimal Allocation 2.2.3 Autarky 2.2.4 Financial Markets 2.2.5 Bank Deposit Contracts 2.3 Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 2.4 Moral Hazard and the Monitoring Role of Banks 2.5 Credit Risk and Dilution Costs 2.5.1 The Model 2.5.2 Bond Financing 2.5.3 Equity Issue 2.5.4 Bank Loan 2.6 Further Reading 2.7 Problems 2.7.1 Market versus Bank Finance 2.7.2 Banks and Moral Hazard 2.8 Solutions 2.8.1 Market versus Bank Finance 2.8.2 Banks and Moral Hazard Note References 17 17 18 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 28 28 28 29 29 30 31 31 32 32 32 33 34 34 3 The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking 3.1 The Old Approach to Monetary Policy: Money and Credit Multipliers 3.2 Perfectly Competitive Banking 3.2.1 The Model 3.2.2 How Do Interest Rates Influence the Volumes of Deposits and Loans? 3.2.3 The Competitive Equilibrium 3.3 Imperfect Competition 3.3.1 The Monti-Klein Model of a Monopoly Bank 3.3.2 The Oligopoly Version 3.3.3 Product Differentiation 3.3.4 Empirical Evidence 37 38 39 39 40 40 41 42 43 44 47
Contents vii Is There a Trade-off between Competition and Financial Stability? 3.4.1 The Fragility View 3.4.2 The Stability View 3.4.3 The Impact of CapitalRequirements 3.4.4 Empirical Evidence 3.5 Competition and Lending Standards 3.5.1 The Screening Externality 3.5.2 Lending Standards through theBusiness Cycle 3.5.3 Empirical Evidence 3.6 Relationship Banking 3.6.1 A Simple Model 3.6.2 Public and Private Informationabout Borrowers 3.6.3 Empirical Evidence 3.7 Platform Competition and Two-Sided Markets 3.7.1 A Model of the Payment Card Industry 3.7.2 Card Use 3.7.3 Monopoly Network 3.7.4 Competing Networks 3.7.5 Welfare Analysis 3.7.6 Bigtechs 3.8 Further Reading 3.9 Problems 3.9.1 Double Bertrand Competition 3.9.2 Deposit Rate Regulation 3.10 Solutions 3.10.1 Double Bertrand Competition 3.10.2 Deposit Rate Regulation Notes References 47 47 48 48 49 50 50 51 51 52 52 53 53 55 56 57 57 58 59 59 60 62 62 63 63 63 64 65 65 The Lender-Borrower Relationship 4.1 The Complete Information Benchmark 4.2 Costly State Verification 4.2.1 Incentive-Compatible Contracts 4.2.2 Efficient Incentive-Compatible Contracts 4.3 Debt as the Least Information-Sensitive Security 4.4 Incentives to Repay 4.4.1 Promise to Lend Again 4.4.2 The Impact of Judicial Enforcement 69 70 72 72 73 74 75 75 76 3.4 4
Contents viii 4.5 Sovereign Debt 4.5.1 The Eaton-Gersovitz Paradigm 4.5.2 Critiques of the Eaton-Gersovitz Paradigm 4.5.3 The Politica! Economy Approach 4.6 Complements 4.6.1 Moral Hazard 4.6.2 Incomplete Contracts 4.6.3 Soft Budget Constraints 4.7 Further Reading 4.8 Problems 4.8.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 4.8.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard 4.8.3 The Pareto Frontier in the Townsend Model 4.8.4 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes 4.9 Solutions 4.9.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 4.9.2 Optimal Loan Contracts with Moral Hazard 4.9.3 The Pareto Frontier in the Townsend Model 4.9.4 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes Notes References 5 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Imperfections 5.1 A Short Historical Perspective 5.2 Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy 5.2.1 The Money View and the Interest Rate Channel 5.2.2 The Credit View and the Lending Channel 5.2.3 Credit View versus Money View: Comparing the Underlying Assumptions 5.2.4 Empirical Evidence 5.2.5 Nonconventional Monetary Policy 5.3 Financial Fragility and Economic Performance 5.3.1 First Best Allocation (Perfect Information) 5.3.2 Credit Constraints and Limited Liability 5.3.3 Macroeconomic Implications 5.4 Credit Cycles 5.4.1 The Financial Accelerator 5.4.2 Changing Credit Standards 5.4.3 Collateral-Driven Credit Cycles 78 78 79 80 81 81 82 83 85 86 86 86 87 87 88 88 88 89 89 90 91 93 94 95 95 96 98 100 102 102 103 104 106 107 107 108 109
Ij Contents įю 5.5 Aggregate Credit Rationing 5.5.1 The Backward-Bending Supply of Credit 5.5.2 Adverse Selection 5.5,3 Cash Flow Diversion 5.5.4 Moral Hazard 5.6 Financial Development and Economic Growth 5.7 Further Reading 5.8 Problems 5.8.1 Adverse Selection and Aggregate Credit Rationing 5.8.2 Too Much Investment 5.9 Solutions 5.9.1 Adverse Selection and Aggregate Credit Rationing 5.9.2 Too Much Investment Notes References 6 Bank Runs« Bank Panics, and the Lender of Last Resort 6.1 The Fractional Reserve System 6.1.1 The Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig Model 6.1.2 Implementing the Optimal Allocation 6.1.3 Multiple Equilibria 6.1.4 Speculative Bank Runs 6.1.5 Fundamental Bank Runs 6.2 How to Remedy Banks Fragility 6.2.1 Narrow Banking: From the Chicago Plan to Stablecoins 6.2.2 Deposit Insurance and Prudential Regulation 6.2.3 Equity Financed Banks 6.3 Interbank Markets 6.3.1 Insuring Liquidity Shocks 6.3.2 Adverse Selection 6.3.3 Liquidity Hoarding 6.4 The Lender of Last Resort (LLR) 6.4.1 Bagehot’s Doctrine 6.4.2 The Practice of LLR Assistance 6.4.3 Criticisms of the LLR Policy and the Modern Form of Bank Runs 6.5 Further Reading 6.6 Problems 6.6.1 Nominal Bank Runs 6.6.2 Aggregated Liquidity Shocks 111 щ ПЗ 114 115 118 120 120 120 121 121 121 122 123 129 130 130 130 131 132 133 134 134 134 135 136 137 137 138 138 138 139 140 142 143 143 144
Contents x 6.7 Solutions 6.7.1 Nominal Bank Runs 6.7.2Aggregated Liquidity Shocks Notes References 145 145 145 146 146 7 Liquidity 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Different Forms of Liquidity 7.2.1 Defining Liquidity 7.2.2 Public and Private Liquidity 7.2.3 Funding Liquidity and Market Liquidity 7.3 The Supply of Private Money 7.3.1 Do Banks Issue Too Much Money? 7.3.2 Shadow Banking 7.4 Private and Public Supply of Liquidity 7.4.1 The Mode! 7.4.2 Symmetric Information 7.4.3 Moral Hazard 7.4.4 Aggregate Shocks 7.5 Bubbles: When Asset Prices Diverge from Fundamentals 7.5.1 Bubbles as Sources of Liquidity 7.5.2 Cash in the Market Pricing 7.5.3 Liquidity Spirals 7.6 Liquidity Dry-Ups 7.7 Liquidity and Collateral Prices 7.7.1 Informational Sensitivity of Securities 7.7.2 Implications 7.8 Further Reading 7.9 Problem 7.10 Solution Notes References 149 149 150 150 151 151 152 152 154 156 156 156 157 158 158 158 159 159 160 160 161 161 162 163 164 165 165 8 Banking Regulation: The Microprudential Approach 8.1 Introduction: Why Are Banks Regulated? 8.2 Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard 8.2.1 The Moral Hazard Issue 8.2.2 Risk-Related Insurance Premiums 169 169 170 171 172
xj Contents Capital Regulation 1 : The Theory 8.3,1 The Value at Risk Approach 8.3.2 Risk-Weighted Capital Regulation 8.3.3 Portfolio Distortions 8.3.4 What Level for Banks’ Capital? 8.4 Capital Requirements 2: The Practice 8.4.1 The Costs of Capital Regulation 8.4.2 Empirical Evidence 8.4.3 Regulatory Competition 8.4.4 Accounting Rules and the Supplementary Leverage Ratio 8.4.5 Supervisors’Information and Managers’Incentives 8.4.6 Market Discipline 8.5 Further Reading 8.5.1 Banks’ Portfolio and Bankruptcy Risk 8.5.2 Liquidity Regulation 8.5.3 Disclosure and Market Discipline 8.6 Problems 8.6.1 Capital Regulation and Speculative Activities 8.6.2 Capital Requirements and Business Cycles 8.7 Solutions 8.7.1 Capital Regulation and Speculative Activities 8.7.2 Capital Requirements and Business Cycles Notes References 173 173 174 175 176 176 176 177 178 8.3 9 Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Regulation 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Systemic Risk 9.2.1 The Determinants of Systemic Risk 9.2.2 Shadow Banks and Systemic Risk 9.2.3 Measuring Systemic Risk 9.3 Ex Post Policies: Bank Restructuring and Resolution 9.3.1 A Bargaining Game between Bankers and Regulators 9.3.2 Bank Resolution and Managers’Incentives 9.3.3 Optimal Bailout Mechanisms 9.3.4 Debt Overhang after a Banking Crisis 9.3.5 How to Restart a Frozen Market? 9.3.6 Bail-Ins and C0C0 Bonds 17g 179 180 182 182 183 183 184 184 185 185 185 186 186 186 191 191 191 192 193 194 195 195 196 196 199 199 200
xii Contents 9.5 Notes References 200 201 202 203 207 207 208 Index 211 9.4 Externalities and Macroprudential Policy 9.4.1 Nonpecuniary Externalities 9.4.2 Fire-Sale Externalities 9.4.3 Procyclical Leverage and Credit Cycles Further Reading |
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| author | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)123139937 (DE-588)120833557 |
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| dewey-full | 332.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
| dewey-raw | 332.1 |
| dewey-search | 332.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3332.1 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | Third edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV048839845 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:37:24Z |
| indexdate | 2025-01-03T15:01:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780262048194 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034105283 |
| oclc_num | 1350572659 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-945 DE-384 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-N2 |
| owner_facet | DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-945 DE-384 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-N2 |
| physical | xiv, 214 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)123139937 aut Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet Third edition Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press [2023] © 2023 xiv, 214 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd rswk-swf Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 gnd rswk-swf Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 gnd rswk-swf Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 s Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s DE-604 Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 s Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 s Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 s Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)120833557 aut Erscheint auch als Onlineausgabe, EPUB 978-0-262-37529-0 Erscheint auch als Onlineausgabe, PDF 978-0-262-37528-3 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034105283&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- Microeconomics of banking Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 gnd Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 gnd Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4078614-6 (DE-588)4112667-1 (DE-588)4004436-1 (DE-588)4212226-0 (DE-588)4039225-9 |
| title | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_auth | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_exact_search | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_full | Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| title_fullStr | Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| title_full_unstemmed | Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| title_short | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_sort | microeconomics of banking |
| topic | Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 gnd Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 gnd Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Unternehmenstheorie Bankgeschäft Bank Finanzdienstleistung Mikroökonomie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034105283&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT freixasxavier microeconomicsofbanking AT rochetjeancharles microeconomicsofbanking |