Studies in no-self physicalism:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Singapore
Springer
2023
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Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | XIII, 568 Seiten Illustrationen |
ISBN: | 9789811981425 |
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adam_text | Contents 1 Introduction: Steps Toward No-Self Physicalism .................................. PCS: Physicalism About Human Cognitive Subjects....................... 1.1.1 What is PCS? ......................................................................... 1.1.2 Reasons Supporting PCS........................................................ 1.1.3 Who Should Accept PCS?...................................................... 1.2 The Problem of Subject in Contemporary Philosophy ..................... 1.2.1 The Subject in Contemporary Philosophy............................. 1.2.2 Implications of PCS and Their Clash with Traditional Philosophy ............................................................................... 1.2.3 On Some Attempted Reconciliations..................................... 1.2.4 The Grip of an Illusory Self .................................................. 1.3 No-Self Physicalism ........................................................................... 1.3.1 What is No-Self Physicalism?................................................. 1.3.2 Defending Eliminative Physicalism on Phenomenal Experiences ............................................................................. 1.3.3 The Content, Method and Some Other Aspects of No-Self Physicalism .......................................................... References .................................................................................................... 1.1 2 The Subject in Carnap, Quine and Others ............................................... 2.1 The Fictitious Subject in
Carnap’sPhilosophy ................................... 2.2 The Subject in Quine’s Philosophy..................................................... 2.2.1 Preliminary Explanations ..................................................... 2.2.2 From the Beginning to Reifying Physical Objects............ 2.2.3 Reifying Abstract Objects ..................................................... 2.2.4 Holism .................................................................................... 2.2.5 Disquotational Reference and Truth............................... 81 2.2.6 Indeterminacy of Reference and Ontological Relativity .... 2.2.7 Can Non-reductive Physicalism Save Quine?............... 92 2.3 The Subject in Other Philosophical Concepts and Views ................ 2.3.1 The Subject in ‘You Can’t Jump Out of Your Language’ ... 1 4 4 9 23 25 26 29 32 38 43 43 45 55 61 65 66 69 69 71 77 79 83 94 95 ix
x Contents 2.3.2 The Subject in the Notions of Objectivity and Subjectivity ......................................................... 97 2.3.3 The Subject in Realism Versus Anti-realism Debates .......... 2.3.4 The Subject in Analyticity, Modality and Logical Truth .... References ..................................................................................................... 3 Concepts and Conceptual Representation.............................................. 3.1 Background and Overview................................................................. 3.1.1 Ontological Assumptions ....................................................... 3.1.2 Concepts and Their Linguistic Expressions ......................... 3.1.3 Types of Concepts ................................................................... 3.1.4 Structural Constituents of a Simple Material Concept ........ 3.1.5 Semantic Types........................................................................ 3.1.6 Characterizing Conceptual Representation ........................... 3.1.7 Social Phenomena of Concepts............................................... 3.1.8 Some Clarifications ................................................................. 3.2 Perceptual Images ............................................................................... 3.2.1 What are Perceptual Images? ................................................. 3.2.2 Identifying the Representation Relation for Perceptual Images ......................................................................... 129 3.2.3 Some Features of Perceptual Images
..................................... 3.3 A Weight Accumulation Model.......................................................... 3.4 Exemplars and Exemplified Properties............................................... 3.4.1 The Representation Relation for Exemplars ......................... 3.4.2 Exemplified Properties: The Simple Cases ........................... 3.4.3 Exemplified Properties: The Cases of Mixed Semantic Types ........................................................................... 144 3.5 Conceptual Representation ................................................................. 3.5.1 General Conditions for Conceptual Representation............. 3.5.2 Weight Distributions for Non-Deferential Concepts ........... 3.5.3 Public Referents and Deferential Concepts.......................... 3.5.4 Some Clarifications ............................................................... 3.6 Resolving the Puzzles ......................................................................... 3.6.1 Frege’s Puzzle ......................................................................... 3.6.2 The Twin-Earth Puzzle........................................................... 3.6.3 The Swampman Puzzle .......................................................... 3.6.4 The Puzzle of Conceptual Changes ...................................... 3.6.5 The Puzzle of Disjunctive Concepts .................................... 3.6.6 The Puzzle of Vacuous Concepts .......................................... 3.6.7 The Puzzle of Representing Oneself .................................... 3.7 Social
Phenomena About Concepts ................................................... 3.7.1 Concept Individuation ........................................................... 3.7.2 Public Meanings of Words .................................................... 3.8 Composite Concepts ........................................................................... References .................................................................................................... 98 99 102 103 105 105 107 109 Ill 114 117 118 119 127 127 131 134 135 135 136 146 146 147 150 152 155 155 158 161 163 165 166 167 168 169 177 184 187
Contents 4 Thoughts and Truth ........................................................................................ Thoughts in Individual Brains ...................................................... 4.1.1 Structures of Thoughts............................................................ 4.1.2 Thoughts as Bearers of Cognitive Attitudes ........................ 4.1.3 Testing Procedures for Thoughts .......................................... 4.1.4 Inferential Roles of Thoughts ................................................. 4.2 Truth .................................................................................................... 4.2.1 Truth Conditions for Thoughts ............................................... 4.2.2 The Nature of Truth Under Physicalism .............................. 4.2.3 Truth and Usefulness ............................................................... 4.3 Social Phenomena About Thoughts .................................................. 4.3.1 Thought Individuation ............................................................ 4.3.2 Public Meanings and Truth Values of Sentences ................. 4.4 Belief Ascription ................................................................................. 4.4.1 Introduction............................................................................. 4.4.2 De Re Belief Ascriptions ........................................................ 4.4.3 De Dicto Belief Ascriptions .................................................. 4.4.4 De Dicto Belief Ascriptions Modulo Translations............... 4.4.5 The
Priority Rule .................................................................... 4.4.6 De Se Belief Ascriptions ........................................................ 4.5 Analyticity ........................................................................................... 4.5.1 Introduction .............................................................................. 4.5.2 Analyticity at the Individual Level......................................... 4.5.3 Social-Level Analyticity ......................................................... 4.5.4 Universal Analyticity ............................................................... 4.5.5 Resolving Puzzles About Analyticity .................................... 4.6 Modality ............................................................................................... 4.6.1 Modality Under Physicalism.................................................... 4.6.2 Scenario Descriptions and Their Constraints ........................ 4.6.3 Defining Naturalized Notions of Modality ............................ 4.6.4 The Relation Between Analyticity, Necessity and Apriority............................................................... 252 References ..................................................................................................... 4.1 5 Mathematical Concepts and Thoughts ..................................................... Mathematical Theories as Fictions .................................................... 5.1.1 A Physicalistic Account of Fictions...................................... 5.1.2 Mathematical Theories
as Fictions: An Argument............... 5.1.3 Mathematical Theories as Fictions: Some Other Evidence ................................................................................. 5.1.4 The Real Differences Between Mathematics and Fictions ............................................................................. 5.1.5 Looking Ahead ....................................................................... 5.2 Structures and Functions of Mathematical Concepts ....................... 5.2.1 Elementary Mathematical Concepts....................................... 5.1 xi 189 189 189 195 196 197 199 199 200 202 206 206 208 211 211 212 214 216 217 220 221 221 223 226 229 233 243 243 245 251 257 259 262 262 266 272 276 283 286 286
xii Contents 5.2.2 Mathematical Concepts in Axiomatized Theories ............... Resolving Philosophical Puzzles......................................................... 5.3.1 Understanding, Knowledge and Intuitions in Mathematics ............................................................ 297 5.3.2 ‘Truth’ in Mathematics ............................................................ 5.3.3 Objectivity in Mathematics .................................... 5.3.4 Infinity in Mathematics and the Problem of Consistency............................................................. 310 5.4 Explaining the Applicability of Mathematics ................................... 5.4.1 Characterizing the Problem of Applicability ........................ 5.4.2 A Strategy for Explaining Applicability ............................... 5.4.3 Strict Finitism (SF): A Brief Introduction.............................. References ..................................................................................................... 5.3 6 Epistemology and Methodology................................................................... Cognitive Procedures and Cognitive Process Tokens ....................... 6.1.1 The Cognitive Module ............................................................ 6.1.2 Cognitive Procedures .............................................................. 6.1.3 Cognitive Process Tokens ...................................................... 6.2 Reliability of Cognitive Procedures ................................................... 6.2.1 An Engineering
Example........................................................ 6.2.2 Defining Reliability for Cognitive Procedures ..................... 6.2.3 The Generality Problem.......................................................... 6.3 Epistemic Properties of Cognitive Process Tokens............................ 6.3.1 An Engineering Example (Again) ........................................ 6.3.2 Classifying Cognitive Process Tokens.................................. 6.3.3 Epistemic Values of Cognitive Process Tokens ................... 6.3.4 Folk Epistemic Notions: Knowledge and Justification ....... 6.3.5 Examples ................................................................................. 6.4 Apriority ................................................................................................ 6.4.1 Why Naturalizing Apriority? ................................................ 6.4.2 Defining Apriority ................................................................. 6.4.3 Defending the a Priori Entailment Thesis ............................ 6.5 Intuition and Other Methodological Issues ....................................... 6.5.1 Introduction: The Problem of Intuition for Physicalism .... 6.5.2 A Methodological Principle for Physicalists........................ 6.5.3 Intuitions as Complex Pattern Recognition Abilities........... 6.5.4 Intuitions Versus Hard-Scientific Methods Under Physicalism ................................................................. 459 References ....................................................................................................
6.1 7 A Physicalistic Ontology ............................................................................... Introduction: The Ground and the Scope ........................................... 7.1.1 An Answer to Hempel’s Dilemma ......................................... 7.1.2 Classical Versus Quantum Ontology ..................................... 7.2 Against the Object-Property Framework ........................................... 7.1 292 297 300 302 314 315 321 328 335 337 339 339 343 350 352 353 361 365 368 369 376 391 396 406 431 431 434 438 445 445 447 450 462 465 466 467 469 473
Contents 7.2.1 Problems with the Notion ‘IndividualPhysical Object’ .... 7.2.2 Problems with the Notion‘Mereological Fusion’ ................ 7.2.3 Problems with the Notion‘Property’ ............................ 7.3 The Ontology of Physical Systems .................................................... 7.3.1 The Constitution and Identity of a Physical System ............ 7.3.2 The Structure and Structural Aspects of a Physical System ........................................................................ 498 7.3.3 Describing Physical Systems ................................................. 7.4 The Mental-Physical Relationship .................................................... 7.4.1 The Semantics of Mental Predicates ..................................... 7.4.2 On Reducibility or Irreducibility of the Mental ................... References .................................................................................................... 8 xiii 474 482 483 491 492 509 519 520 525 533 535 The Basic Tenets of No-Self Physicalism ......................................... 535 Responses to Well-Known Arguments Against Physicalism........... 539 8.2.1 The Knowledge Argument ..................................................... 540 8.2.2 The Conceivability (Or Modal, Zombie) Argument ............ 544 8.2.3 The Explanation Gap Argument............................................. 553 References ..................................................................................................... 559 A Physicalistic Characterization of No-Self Physicalism...................... 8.1
8.2 9Conclusions........................................................................................................... 561 Index......................................................................................................................... 565
|
adam_txt |
Contents 1 Introduction: Steps Toward No-Self Physicalism . PCS: Physicalism About Human Cognitive Subjects. 1.1.1 What is PCS? . 1.1.2 Reasons Supporting PCS. 1.1.3 Who Should Accept PCS?. 1.2 The Problem of Subject in Contemporary Philosophy . 1.2.1 The Subject in Contemporary Philosophy. 1.2.2 Implications of PCS and Their Clash with Traditional Philosophy . 1.2.3 On Some Attempted Reconciliations. 1.2.4 The Grip of an Illusory Self . 1.3 No-Self Physicalism . 1.3.1 What is No-Self Physicalism?. 1.3.2 Defending Eliminative Physicalism on Phenomenal Experiences . 1.3.3 The Content, Method and Some Other Aspects of No-Self Physicalism . References . 1.1 2 The Subject in Carnap, Quine and Others . 2.1 The Fictitious Subject in
Carnap’sPhilosophy . 2.2 The Subject in Quine’s Philosophy. 2.2.1 Preliminary Explanations . 2.2.2 From the Beginning to Reifying Physical Objects. 2.2.3 Reifying Abstract Objects . 2.2.4 Holism . 2.2.5 Disquotational Reference and Truth. 81 2.2.6 Indeterminacy of Reference and Ontological Relativity . 2.2.7 Can Non-reductive Physicalism Save Quine?. 92 2.3 The Subject in Other Philosophical Concepts and Views . 2.3.1 The Subject in ‘You Can’t Jump Out of Your Language’ . 1 4 4 9 23 25 26 29 32 38 43 43 45 55 61 65 66 69 69 71 77 79 83 94 95 ix
x Contents 2.3.2 The Subject in the Notions of Objectivity and Subjectivity . 97 2.3.3 The Subject in Realism Versus Anti-realism Debates . 2.3.4 The Subject in Analyticity, Modality and Logical Truth . References . 3 Concepts and Conceptual Representation. 3.1 Background and Overview. 3.1.1 Ontological Assumptions . 3.1.2 Concepts and Their Linguistic Expressions . 3.1.3 Types of Concepts . 3.1.4 Structural Constituents of a Simple Material Concept . 3.1.5 Semantic Types. 3.1.6 Characterizing Conceptual Representation . 3.1.7 Social Phenomena of Concepts. 3.1.8 Some Clarifications . 3.2 Perceptual Images . 3.2.1 What are Perceptual Images? . 3.2.2 Identifying the Representation Relation for Perceptual Images . 129 3.2.3 Some Features of Perceptual Images
. 3.3 A Weight Accumulation Model. 3.4 Exemplars and Exemplified Properties. 3.4.1 The Representation Relation for Exemplars . 3.4.2 Exemplified Properties: The Simple Cases . 3.4.3 Exemplified Properties: The Cases of Mixed Semantic Types . 144 3.5 Conceptual Representation . 3.5.1 General Conditions for Conceptual Representation. 3.5.2 Weight Distributions for Non-Deferential Concepts . 3.5.3 Public Referents and Deferential Concepts. 3.5.4 Some Clarifications . 3.6 Resolving the Puzzles . 3.6.1 Frege’s Puzzle . 3.6.2 The Twin-Earth Puzzle. 3.6.3 The Swampman Puzzle . 3.6.4 The Puzzle of Conceptual Changes . 3.6.5 The Puzzle of Disjunctive Concepts . 3.6.6 The Puzzle of Vacuous Concepts . 3.6.7 The Puzzle of Representing Oneself . 3.7 Social
Phenomena About Concepts . 3.7.1 Concept Individuation . 3.7.2 Public Meanings of Words . 3.8 Composite Concepts . References . 98 99 102 103 105 105 107 109 Ill 114 117 118 119 127 127 131 134 135 135 136 146 146 147 150 152 155 155 158 161 163 165 166 167 168 169 177 184 187
Contents 4 Thoughts and Truth . Thoughts in Individual Brains . 4.1.1 Structures of Thoughts. 4.1.2 Thoughts as Bearers of Cognitive Attitudes . 4.1.3 Testing Procedures for Thoughts . 4.1.4 Inferential Roles of Thoughts . 4.2 Truth . 4.2.1 Truth Conditions for Thoughts . 4.2.2 The Nature of Truth Under Physicalism . 4.2.3 Truth and Usefulness . 4.3 Social Phenomena About Thoughts . 4.3.1 Thought Individuation . 4.3.2 Public Meanings and Truth Values of Sentences . 4.4 Belief Ascription . 4.4.1 Introduction. 4.4.2 De Re Belief Ascriptions . 4.4.3 De Dicto Belief Ascriptions . 4.4.4 De Dicto Belief Ascriptions Modulo Translations. 4.4.5 The
Priority Rule . 4.4.6 De Se Belief Ascriptions . 4.5 Analyticity . 4.5.1 Introduction . 4.5.2 Analyticity at the Individual Level. 4.5.3 Social-Level Analyticity . 4.5.4 Universal Analyticity . 4.5.5 Resolving Puzzles About Analyticity . 4.6 Modality . 4.6.1 Modality Under Physicalism. 4.6.2 Scenario Descriptions and Their Constraints . 4.6.3 Defining Naturalized Notions of Modality . 4.6.4 The Relation Between Analyticity, Necessity and Apriority. 252 References . 4.1 5 Mathematical Concepts and Thoughts . Mathematical Theories as Fictions . 5.1.1 A Physicalistic Account of Fictions. 5.1.2 Mathematical Theories
as Fictions: An Argument. 5.1.3 Mathematical Theories as Fictions: Some Other Evidence . 5.1.4 The Real Differences Between Mathematics and Fictions . 5.1.5 Looking Ahead . 5.2 Structures and Functions of Mathematical Concepts . 5.2.1 Elementary Mathematical Concepts. 5.1 xi 189 189 189 195 196 197 199 199 200 202 206 206 208 211 211 212 214 216 217 220 221 221 223 226 229 233 243 243 245 251 257 259 262 262 266 272 276 283 286 286
xii Contents 5.2.2 Mathematical Concepts in Axiomatized Theories . Resolving Philosophical Puzzles. 5.3.1 Understanding, Knowledge and Intuitions in Mathematics . 297 5.3.2 ‘Truth’ in Mathematics . 5.3.3 Objectivity in Mathematics . 5.3.4 Infinity in Mathematics and the Problem of Consistency. 310 5.4 Explaining the Applicability of Mathematics . 5.4.1 Characterizing the Problem of Applicability . 5.4.2 A Strategy for Explaining Applicability . 5.4.3 Strict Finitism (SF): A Brief Introduction. References . 5.3 6 Epistemology and Methodology. Cognitive Procedures and Cognitive Process Tokens . 6.1.1 The Cognitive Module . 6.1.2 Cognitive Procedures . 6.1.3 Cognitive Process Tokens . 6.2 Reliability of Cognitive Procedures . 6.2.1 An Engineering
Example. 6.2.2 Defining Reliability for Cognitive Procedures . 6.2.3 The Generality Problem. 6.3 Epistemic Properties of Cognitive Process Tokens. 6.3.1 An Engineering Example (Again) . 6.3.2 Classifying Cognitive Process Tokens. 6.3.3 Epistemic Values of Cognitive Process Tokens . 6.3.4 Folk Epistemic Notions: Knowledge and Justification . 6.3.5 Examples . 6.4 Apriority . 6.4.1 Why Naturalizing Apriority? . 6.4.2 Defining Apriority . 6.4.3 Defending the a Priori Entailment Thesis . 6.5 Intuition and Other Methodological Issues . 6.5.1 Introduction: The Problem of Intuition for Physicalism . 6.5.2 A Methodological Principle for Physicalists. 6.5.3 Intuitions as Complex Pattern Recognition Abilities. 6.5.4 Intuitions Versus Hard-Scientific Methods Under Physicalism . 459 References .
6.1 7 A Physicalistic Ontology . Introduction: The Ground and the Scope . 7.1.1 An Answer to Hempel’s Dilemma . 7.1.2 Classical Versus Quantum Ontology . 7.2 Against the Object-Property Framework . 7.1 292 297 300 302 314 315 321 328 335 337 339 339 343 350 352 353 361 365 368 369 376 391 396 406 431 431 434 438 445 445 447 450 462 465 466 467 469 473
Contents 7.2.1 Problems with the Notion ‘IndividualPhysical Object’ . 7.2.2 Problems with the Notion‘Mereological Fusion’ . 7.2.3 Problems with the Notion‘Property’ . 7.3 The Ontology of Physical Systems . 7.3.1 The Constitution and Identity of a Physical System . 7.3.2 The Structure and Structural Aspects of a Physical System . 498 7.3.3 Describing Physical Systems . 7.4 The Mental-Physical Relationship . 7.4.1 The Semantics of Mental Predicates . 7.4.2 On Reducibility or Irreducibility of the Mental . References . 8 xiii 474 482 483 491 492 509 519 520 525 533 535 The Basic Tenets of No-Self Physicalism . 535 Responses to Well-Known Arguments Against Physicalism. 539 8.2.1 The Knowledge Argument . 540 8.2.2 The Conceivability (Or Modal, Zombie) Argument . 544 8.2.3 The Explanation Gap Argument. 553 References . 559 A Physicalistic Characterization of No-Self Physicalism. 8.1
8.2 9Conclusions. 561 Index. 565 |
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illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T21:32:52Z |
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institution | BVB |
isbn | 9789811981425 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034085903 |
oclc_num | 1374566468 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | XIII, 568 Seiten Illustrationen |
publishDate | 2023 |
publishDateSearch | 2023 |
publishDateSort | 2023 |
publisher | Springer |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Lu, Gong 1920-1996 Verfasser (DE-588)113569947X aut Studies in no-self physicalism by Feng Ye Singapore Springer 2023 XIII, 568 Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mathematics Epistemology Philosophy of mind Language and languages—Philosophy Mathematics—Philosophy Knowledge, Theory of Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 gnd rswk-swf Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 s Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 s Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-981-1981-43-2 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034085903&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Lu, Gong 1920-1996 Studies in no-self physicalism Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mathematics Epistemology Philosophy of mind Language and languages—Philosophy Mathematics—Philosophy Knowledge, Theory of Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4031630-0 (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4248301-3 (DE-588)4174611-9 |
title | Studies in no-self physicalism |
title_auth | Studies in no-self physicalism |
title_exact_search | Studies in no-self physicalism |
title_exact_search_txtP | Studies in no-self physicalism |
title_full | Studies in no-self physicalism by Feng Ye |
title_fullStr | Studies in no-self physicalism by Feng Ye |
title_full_unstemmed | Studies in no-self physicalism by Feng Ye |
title_short | Studies in no-self physicalism |
title_sort | studies in no self physicalism |
topic | Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mathematics Epistemology Philosophy of mind Language and languages—Philosophy Mathematics—Philosophy Knowledge, Theory of Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 gnd |
topic_facet | Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mathematics Epistemology Philosophy of mind Language and languages—Philosophy Mathematics—Philosophy Knowledge, Theory of Kognition Erkenntnistheorie Physikalismus |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034085903&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT lugong studiesinnoselfphysicalism |