Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis:
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin
De Gruyter
[2023]
|
| Series: | De Gruyter Graduate
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XV, 328 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9783110772838 |
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MARC
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| 020 | |a 9783110772838 |c : EUR 61.95 (DE) (freier Preis), EUR 69.95 (DE) (freier Preis), EUR 61.95 (AT) (freier Preis), EUR 69.95 (AT) (freier Preis) |9 978-3-11-077283-8 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1372481220 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)DNB1270060465 | ||
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| 084 | |a ST 276 |0 (DE-625)143642: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Warren, Micah |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1285062442 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis |c Micah Warren |
| 264 | 1 | |a Berlin |b De Gruyter |c [2023] | |
| 300 | |a XV, 328 Seiten |b Diagramme | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a De Gruyter Graduate | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum |0 (DE-588)4410515-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bitcoin |0 (DE-588)1041888279 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Blockchain |0 (DE-588)1124028595 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Kryptologie |0 (DE-588)4033329-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | |a Game theory, probability, Bitcoin | ||
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Bitcoin |0 (DE-588)1041888279 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Bitcoin |0 (DE-588)1041888279 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Kryptologie |0 (DE-588)4033329-2 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 2 | |a Blockchain |0 (DE-588)1124028595 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 3 | |a Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum |0 (DE-588)4410515-0 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 4 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG |0 (DE-588)10095502-2 |4 pbl | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe, PDF |z 978-3-11-077284-5 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe, EPUB |z 978-3-11-077305-7 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m DNB Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034083639&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034083639 | |
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CONTENTS
PREFACE
-
V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
-
VII
1
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
1.2.5
1.2.6
1.2.7
1.2.8
1.2.9
1.2.10
1.2.11
1.2.12
1.2.13
1.3
1.4
1.4.1
1.4.2
BASIC
OF
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PAYMENTS
-
1
PRELIMINARIES
ON
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SIGNATURES
-
1
BINARY
AND
HEXADECIMAL
-
1
HASHING
FUNCTION
-
2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SIGNATURES
-
4
TAKEAWAY
-
6
BLOCKCHAIN
PROTOCOLS
-
7
CONSENSUS
-
7
PROOF
OF
WORK
-
9
BLOCK
DIFFICULTY
ADJUSTMENT
-
12
LONGEST-CHAIN/HEAVIEST-CHAIN
RULE
-
12
HALVING
-
13
BLOCKSIZE
-
14
WHY
IS
IT
CALLED
"
PROOF
OF
WORK
"
?
-
15
RISE
OF
ASICS
-
15
LAYER
2
NETWORKS
-
16
CURSORY
ANALYSIS
-
16
PROOF
OF
STAKE
-
17
NODES
AND
MINERS
-
18
SOFT
FORKS
AND
HARD
FORKS
-
18
WHAT
IS
BITCOIN
AND
WHY
DOES
IT
WORK?
-
19
MORE
ON
MINING
-
20
UTXO
-
21
COMMON
ASSUMPTIONS
IN
MINING
GAMES
-
23
2
2.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.4
2.4.1
PROBABILITY
SPACES
-
25
COUNTABLY
AND
UNCOUNTABLY
INFINITE
-
26
PARTITIONS
-
27
CONDITIONAL
PROBABILITY
-
28
RANDOM
VARIABLES
-
29
EXPECTATION
-
29
CONDITIONAL
EXPECTATION
-
31
BERNOULLI
PROCESSES
AND
BERNOULLI
SCHEMES
-
32
THE
BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION
FORMULA
AND
THE
DE
MOIVRE-LAPLACE
THEOREM
-
35
2.4.2
PROBABILITY-PRESERVING
ISOMORPHISMS
AND
COMPARISON
OF
EXPECTATIONS
-
37
X
-
CONTENTS
2.5
2.6
2.6.1
2.7
2.7.1
WIN-LOSE-PAY
GAME
-
39
PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTIONS
-
41
JENSEN
'
S
INEQUALITY
-
41
POISSON
PROCESSES
-
42
NATURALLY
OCCURRING
CHAIN
SPLITS
-
44
3
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.1.8
3.1.9
3.2
3.2.1
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.4
GAME
THEORY
BASICS
-
46
SINGLE-ROUND
GAMES
-
46
PAYOFF
TABLES
-
47
PREFERENCES
AND
UTILITY
FUNCTION
-
47
MATRIX
GAMES
-
49
N-PLAYER
GAMES
AND
MORE
TERMINOLOGY
-
50
DOMINANT
STRATEGIES
-
51
EXAMPLES
-
52
NASH
EQUILIBRIA
-
53
EXAMPLES
-
53
DETERMINING
NASH
EQUILIBRIA
BY
LOOKING
AT
A
TABLE
-
54
MIXED
STRATEGIES
-
55
MIXED
STRATEGIES
IN
REAL
LIFE
-
55
EXTENSIVE-FORM
GAMES
-
56
STATE
OF
A
GAME
-
56
GAME
TREES
-
58
SCHELLING
POINTS
-
60
4
4.1
MONOPOLIZING
POOL
-
62
ROUGH
APPROACH:
BERNOULLI
'
S
LAW
OF
LARGE
NUMBERS
AND
HOEFFDING
'
S
BOUND
-
62
4.2
BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION
AND
THE
DE
MOIVRE-LAPLACE
THEOREM
-
66
5
5.1
BASIC
DOUBLE-SPEND
GAME
-
69
SIMPLEST
STRATEGY:
CHARLIE
ELECTS
TO
MINE
HIS
OWN
CHAIN
WHEN
LESS
THAN
K
BLOCKS
BEHIND
-
71
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.2
5.3
5.3.1
RECURSION
FORMULAS
-
71
A
METHOD
FOR
COMPUTING
WINNING
PROBABILITY
-
72
ANOTHER
METHOD:
DIFFERENCE
EQUATIONS
-
74
COMPUTING
EXPECTED
VALUES
-
77
LONGER-DURATION
ATTACKS
-
83
STEALTH
SIX-BLOCK
DOUBLE-SPEND
-
85
NEGATIVE
BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION
-
86
6
6.1
CENSORSHIP
ATTACKS
-
90
WORKING
EXAMPLE:
TWO
RATIONAL
POOLS
-
91
CONTENTS
-
XI
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4
6.1.5
6.1.6
6.1.7
6.1.8
CONSIDERATION
FOR
THIS
CHOICE
OF
FUNCTION
-
94
THERE
ARE
MANY
STRATEGIES
-
94
CASE
1:
POOL
1
AND
POOL
2
ARE
BOTH
NON-COMPLIANT
-
95
CASE
2:
POOL
1
IS
NON-COMPLIANT
AND
POOL
2
IS
MILDLY
COMPLIANT
-
99
CASE
3:
BOTH
POOLS
ARE
MILDLY
COMPLIANT
-
106
ANALYSIS:
LOW-FEE
REGIME
-
107
HIGHER-FEE
REGIME
-
110
CONCLUSION
-
111
7
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.1.3
7.1.4
7.1.5
7.1.6
7.2
7.2.1
7.2.2
ECONOMICS
OF
MINING
-
112
HASHING
AS
A
MARKET
-
112
COURNOT
OLIGOPOLY
MODEL
-
112
A
MODEL
FOR
THE
MINING
MARKET
-
114
LINEAR
COST
MODEL
-
114
MONOPOLIST
PRICING
AND
COLLUSION
-
116
PERFECTLY
COMPETITIVE
MARKETS
-
117
NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
IN
THE
MINING
MARKET
-
118
MARKET
FOR
ASICS
-
120
NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
WITH
BERTRAND
ASSUMPTIONS
-
120
FOUR
REGIMES
-
121
8
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
SELFISH
MINING
-
123
EXPLOITING
THE
DIFFICULTY
ADJUSTMENT
-
124
BASIC
SELFISH
MINING
-
125
MARKET
DISTORTIONS
-
130
MARKOV
CHAINS
-
130
SELFISH
MINING
ANALYZED
VIA
A
MARKOV
PROCESS
WITH
CUTS
-
133
SELFISH
MINING
WITH
PARTIAL
COOPERATION
-
135
DEFENSE
AGAINST
SELFISH
MINING
-
137
9
9.1
9.1.1
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
9.1.5
9.2
9.2.1
9.2.2
9.2.3
9.2.4
STRATEGIC
MINING
-
138
PETTY
COMPLIANT
STRATEGY
AND
FEE-UNDERCUTTING
-
139
FEE-UNDERCUTTING
-
139
FEE-SNIPING
VS.
FEE-UNDERCUTTING
-
141
EMERGENCE
OF
PETTY
COMPLIANT
MINERS
-
141
SELFISH
MINING
AS
INCENTIVE
TO
USE
PETTY
COMPLIANT
MINING
-
142
MEASURES
AGAINST
UNDERCUTTING
-
143
OTHER
DEVIANT
MINING
STRATEGIES
-
143
ACCEPTING
BRIBES
-
143
BLOCK
WITHHOLDING
-
150
PROTECTING
ONE
'
S
OWN
INTERESTS
-
151
MINE
FROM
BEHIND
-
151
XII
-
CONTENTS
9.2.5
9.2.6
9.2.7
9.2.8
9.2.9
EXTENDED
EXAMPLE
-
152
DEFERRING
TO
THE
ALPHA
DOG
-
156
RESPONDING
TO
EXOGENOUS
DEMAND
FOR
HASHRATE
-
159
HARMONIC
MINING/SWITCH
MINING
-
160
MERGE-MINING,
LAYER
2,
SIDECHAINS,
AND
STRATEGIES
PLAYING
OUT
ON
OTHER
BLOCKCHAINS
-
162
9.3
WILL
THERE
BE
A
TRANSITION
FROM
DEFAULT
COMPLIANT
TO
A
FULLY
STRATEGIC
REGIME?
-
163
9.3.1
9.3.2
9.3.3
9.3.4
9.3.5
BLOCK
OPTIMIZATION
AND
TRANSACTION
SELECTION
-
164
OVERPAYING
POOLS
-
165
DIRECT
SIGNALING
AND
OPTIMIZER
TRAINING
-
165
PURGE
POOLING
-
166
PRECEDENT:
MEV
IN
ETHEREUM
-
167
10
10.1
10.2
10.2.1
10.2.2
WHAT
DISCOURAGES
STRATEGIC
MINING?
-
169
MARKET
FRAGILITY
HYPOTHESIS
-
169
REPEATED
GAMES
AND
INSTITUTIONAL
NORMS
-
169
MINING
THAT
CAN
BE
PUNISHED
-
172
PROBLEMS
WITH
PUNISHMENT
-
172
11
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.4.1
11.5
DECLINING
BLOCK
SUBSIDY
-
174
SECURITY
BUDGET
-
175
THE
MINING
GAP
-
177
PROBLEMS
WITH
A
MINING
GAP
-
179
UNDERCUTTING
-
180
PRIVATE
TRANSACTION
BROKERING
-
181
SUMMARY
-
183
12
12.1
12.2
12.2.1
12.3
12.3.1
12.4
THE
FLATTENING
ASIC
COST
CURVE
-
184
HASH
DEPLOYMENT
RATIO
-
184
PURGE
POOLS
-
185
PROTECTION
AGAINST
A
PURGE
ATTACK
WHEN
HDR
IS
LOW
-
186
THE
DYNAMICAL
SYSTEM
DETERMINED
BY
THE
DIFFICULTY
ADJUSTMENT
-
186
PHASE
TRANSITION
TO
GALLOPING
GERTIE
-
194
FINANCIALIZATION
OF
HASHRATE
MARKETS
-
196
13
13.1
13.2
13.2.1
13.2.2
13.2.3
ATTACKS
-
198
WHY
HAVE
THERE
BEEN
NO
ATTACKS
YET?
-
198
NATION-STATE/AUTHORITARIAN
ATTACKS
-
199
THE
EMPTY-BLOCK
ATTACK
-
200
OBVIOUS
CRITICISM
OF
THE
EMPTY-BLOCK
ATTACK
-
200
LAYER
2S
UNDER
AN
EMPTY-BLOCK
ATTACK
-
202
CONTENTS
-
-
XIII
13.2.4
13.2.5
13.2.6
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.6.1
13.6.2
13.6.3
13.7
13.7.1
13.7.2
13.7.3
13.8
13.8.1
13.8.2
13.8.3
13.8.4
13.8.5
THE
SEESAW
ATTACK
-
202
BRIBE-FLOODING
ATTACK
-
202
EMPTY-BLOCK
PURGE
ATTACK
-
203
CHECKPOINTING
AGAINST
A
PERSISTENT
51
%
ATTACK
-
203
BUYOUT
ATTACKS
-
206
NUCLEAR
OPTION:
NEW
PROOF-OF-WORK
ALGORITHM
-
207
LESS-THAN-BRUTE-FORCE
ATTACKS
-
208
NUDGING
TOWARDS
A
STRATEGIC
REGIME
-
208
FUD
AND
SOCIAL
ATTACKS
-
209
REGULATIONS
-
210
GOLDFINGER
ATTACKS
-
211
SLIPPERY-SLOPE
ATTACKS
-
212
SELFISH
MINING
AS
A
SLIPPERY-SLOPE
ATTACK
-
213
LOW-PROBABILITY
ATTACKS
-
214
SOFT-FORKABILITY:
CAN
THE
COMMUNITY
SUSPEND
NAKAMOTO
CONSENSUS?
-
216
ADDITIONAL
SECURITY
LAYERS
-
218
EXAMPLE:
PURGE
EXPLOIT
AND
THE
BUYER
BEWARE
RESPONSE
-
220
THE
GOVERNMENT
TO
THE
RESCUE
-
221
ECONOMIC
MAJORITY
VS.
MINING
MAJORITY
-
222
A
TETRALEMMA
-
223
14
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
14.5
14.6
14.7
14.8
14.9
14.10
DIRECT
FRONTAL
TAKEOVERS
-
225
INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSE
-
226
CREEPING
CORPORATE
TAKEOVER
-
227
ALLIANCES
ARE
BENEFICIAL
-
228
ESG
TAKEOVERS
-
228
GOVERNMENT
KYC
TAKEOVERS
-
229
OVEREXPOSED
BAGHOLDER
EXPLOIT
-
230
FEE
MARKET
AND
LONG-TERM
VIABILITY
-
230
HOW
MUCH
IS
CENSORSHIP
RESISTANCE
WORTH?
-
231
A
67
%
FIAT
ATTACK
-
232
PERMISSIONED
BYPASS
-
233
15
15.1
15.1.1
15.1.2
15.1.3
15.1.4
15.1.5
15.2
15.2.1
NASH
BARGAINING
-
234
THE
BARGAINING
PROBLEM
-
235
MOTIVATING
REAL-WORLD
PROBLEMS
-
235
MOTIVATING
GAME
THEORY
GAMES
-
236
DIVIDING
A
SURPLUS
AND
THE
NASH
BARGAINING
SOLUTION
-
236
EXOGENOUS
PROBABILITY
OF
BREAKDOWN
-
238
WHAT
IF
PLAYERS
CAN
DETERMINE
THE
PROBABILITY
OF
BREAKDOWN?
-
240
CREATING
COMMITMENT
-
242
ENTER
BLOCKCHAINS?
-
243
XIV
-
CONTENTS
15.2.2
15.3
15.3.1
15.4
15.4.1
15.5
COMMITMENT
CAN
BACKFIRE
-
244
MIXED
STRATEGIES
AND
SCHELLING
THREATS
-
244
JANE
'
S
EXAMPLE,
AGAIN
-
245
EXTORTION
AND
GRIEFING
-
246
SCHELLING
ATTACKS
AS
AN
INEXPENSIVE
WAY
TO
DESTROY
A
NETWORK
-
249
WARS
OF
ATTRITION
-
249
16
16.1
16.2
16.3
16.4
16.4.1
16.4.2
16.4.3
16.4.4
16.4.5
16.5
COALITIONAL
GAME
THEORY
-
251
MOTIVATING
EXAMPLES
-
251
CHARACTERISTIC
FORM
AND
PAYOFF
CONFIGURATIONS
-
253
STANDARD
COALITIONAL
GAME
THEORY
AND
THE
BITCOIN
MINING
GAME
-
254
SOLUTION
CONCEPTS
-
255
THE
CORE
-
256
THE
STABLE
SET
-
257
THE
BARGAINING
SET
-
259
THE
KERNEL
-
260
THE
NUCLEOLUS
-
261
ANALYSIS
OF
SOLUTION
CONCEPTS
FOR
WEIGHTED
MAJORITY
GAMES
AND
CBMGS
-
261
16.6
16.6.1
16.6.2
16.6.3
16.6.4
16.7
THE
THREE-PLAYER
CASE
-
267
KERNEL
-
267
NUCLEOLUS
-
268
BEYOND
N
=
3
-
270
NOTES
ON
C
AND
D
-
271
DISCUSSION
-
271
17
17.1
17.1.1
17.2
17.3
17.3.1
17.3.2
17.3.3
17.4
17.4.1
17.4.2
17.5
17.5.1
17.6
STOCK,
FLOW,
AND
ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS
-
273
DOUBLE-SPEND
EXPLOITS
-
275
FINALITY
-
277
SABOTAGE
(GOLDFINGER)
ATTACK
-
280
DETERMINING
THE
STOCK
VALUE
OF
ASICS
-
281
MOORE
'
S
LAW
-
282
FLOW-BASED
MINER
COST
MODEL
-
283
STOCK
VALUE
OF
LATENT
HASHRATE
AS
A
THREAT
-
284
STABLE
REGIMES
-
284
STRONG
EXPECTATION
OF
COMMUNITY
REORG,
NO
MAJOR
ADVERSARIES
-
284
ATTACKS
HAPPEN,
BUT
ONLY
AFFECT
A
MINORITY
OF
USERS
-
285
EFFICIENCY,
SECURITY,
AND
DECENTRALIZATION
-
285
EFFICIENCY
-
286
THEORETICAL
PUSHOUT
AND
EPSILON-ATTACKS
-
289
18
BITCOIN
AS
IT
MATURES
-
291
CONTENTS
-
XV
BIBLIOGRAPHY
-
321
18.1
18.1.1
18.1.2
18.1.3
18.2
18.2.1
HYPERBITCOINIZATION
-
291
DECENTRALIZED
HYPERBITCOINIZATION
-
292
CENTRALIZED
HYPERBITCOINIZATION
-
295
SOVEREIGN
CURRENCY
WILL
NOT
DIE
-
297
WILL
NATION-STATES
SUPPORT
BITCOIN?
-
299
REASONS
WHY
A
NATION
WOULD
SUPPORT
BITCOIN
USE
(CENTRALIZED
OR
DECENTRALIZED)
-
300
18.2.2
REASONS
WHY
A
NATION
WOULD
OPPOSE
BITCOIN
USE
(CENTRALIZED
OR
DECENTRALIZED)
-
300
18.2.3
REASONS
FOR
A
NATION
TO
MAINTAIN
BITCOIN
SPECIFICALLY
AS
A
DECENTRALIZED
NETWORK
-
301
18.2.4
18.2.5
18.2.6
18.3
18.3.1
18.4
18.4.1
18.4.2
18.5
18.6
18.6.1
18.6.2
18.7
18.7.1
18.7.2
18.7.3
REASONS
FOR
A
NATION
TO
DISCOURAGE
USE
OF
DECENTRALIZED
BITCOIN
-
301
INDIFFERENCE
TO
CENTRALIZATION
AND
THE
SOFT-FORKABILITY
HYPOTHESIS
-
302
BITCOIN
MINING
-
303
NON-PROFITABLE
MINING
-
304
WILL
CORPORATIONS
PROTECT
THEIR
BAGS?
-
306
GEOPOLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
IN
ADVERSARIAL
CONDITIONS
-
306
NICE
AND
NAUGHTY
NATIONS
-
310
THE
FREE-RIDER
PROBLEM
WITH
A
FINITE
SUPPLY
CURRENCY
-
311
CAN
THE
SUPPLY
BE
INCREASED?
-
312
LIMITS
AS
A
DECENTRALIZED
STORE
OF
VALUE
-
313
ASYMMETRIC
RISK
PREMIUM
-
314
FAILURE
AS
A
FUNCTIONAL
STORE
OF
VALUE
-
315
BEASTS
IN
THE
JUNGLE:
CENTRALIZATION,
CAPTURE,
AND
COLLAPSE
-
316
CENTRALIZATION
-
316
CAPTURE
-
318
COLLAPSE
-
319
INDEX
-
325 |
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS
PREFACE
-
V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
-
VII
1
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
1.2.5
1.2.6
1.2.7
1.2.8
1.2.9
1.2.10
1.2.11
1.2.12
1.2.13
1.3
1.4
1.4.1
1.4.2
BASIC
OF
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PAYMENTS
-
1
PRELIMINARIES
ON
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SIGNATURES
-
1
BINARY
AND
HEXADECIMAL
-
1
HASHING
FUNCTION
-
2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SIGNATURES
-
4
TAKEAWAY
-
6
BLOCKCHAIN
PROTOCOLS
-
7
CONSENSUS
-
7
PROOF
OF
WORK
-
9
BLOCK
DIFFICULTY
ADJUSTMENT
-
12
LONGEST-CHAIN/HEAVIEST-CHAIN
RULE
-
12
HALVING
-
13
BLOCKSIZE
-
14
WHY
IS
IT
CALLED
"
PROOF
OF
WORK
"
?
-
15
RISE
OF
ASICS
-
15
LAYER
2
NETWORKS
-
16
CURSORY
ANALYSIS
-
16
PROOF
OF
STAKE
-
17
NODES
AND
MINERS
-
18
SOFT
FORKS
AND
HARD
FORKS
-
18
WHAT
IS
BITCOIN
AND
WHY
DOES
IT
WORK?
-
19
MORE
ON
MINING
-
20
UTXO
-
21
COMMON
ASSUMPTIONS
IN
MINING
GAMES
-
23
2
2.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.4
2.4.1
PROBABILITY
SPACES
-
25
COUNTABLY
AND
UNCOUNTABLY
INFINITE
-
26
PARTITIONS
-
27
CONDITIONAL
PROBABILITY
-
28
RANDOM
VARIABLES
-
29
EXPECTATION
-
29
CONDITIONAL
EXPECTATION
-
31
BERNOULLI
PROCESSES
AND
BERNOULLI
SCHEMES
-
32
THE
BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION
FORMULA
AND
THE
DE
MOIVRE-LAPLACE
THEOREM
-
35
2.4.2
PROBABILITY-PRESERVING
ISOMORPHISMS
AND
COMPARISON
OF
EXPECTATIONS
-
37
X
-
CONTENTS
2.5
2.6
2.6.1
2.7
2.7.1
WIN-LOSE-PAY
GAME
-
39
PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTIONS
-
41
JENSEN
'
S
INEQUALITY
-
41
POISSON
PROCESSES
-
42
NATURALLY
OCCURRING
CHAIN
SPLITS
-
44
3
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.1.8
3.1.9
3.2
3.2.1
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.4
GAME
THEORY
BASICS
-
46
SINGLE-ROUND
GAMES
-
46
PAYOFF
TABLES
-
47
PREFERENCES
AND
UTILITY
FUNCTION
-
47
MATRIX
GAMES
-
49
N-PLAYER
GAMES
AND
MORE
TERMINOLOGY
-
50
DOMINANT
STRATEGIES
-
51
EXAMPLES
-
52
NASH
EQUILIBRIA
-
53
EXAMPLES
-
53
DETERMINING
NASH
EQUILIBRIA
BY
LOOKING
AT
A
TABLE
-
54
MIXED
STRATEGIES
-
55
MIXED
STRATEGIES
IN
REAL
LIFE
-
55
EXTENSIVE-FORM
GAMES
-
56
STATE
OF
A
GAME
-
56
GAME
TREES
-
58
SCHELLING
POINTS
-
60
4
4.1
MONOPOLIZING
POOL
-
62
ROUGH
APPROACH:
BERNOULLI
'
S
LAW
OF
LARGE
NUMBERS
AND
HOEFFDING
'
S
BOUND
-
62
4.2
BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION
AND
THE
DE
MOIVRE-LAPLACE
THEOREM
-
66
5
5.1
BASIC
DOUBLE-SPEND
GAME
-
69
SIMPLEST
STRATEGY:
CHARLIE
ELECTS
TO
MINE
HIS
OWN
CHAIN
WHEN
LESS
THAN
K
BLOCKS
BEHIND
-
71
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.2
5.3
5.3.1
RECURSION
FORMULAS
-
71
A
METHOD
FOR
COMPUTING
WINNING
PROBABILITY
-
72
ANOTHER
METHOD:
DIFFERENCE
EQUATIONS
-
74
COMPUTING
EXPECTED
VALUES
-
77
LONGER-DURATION
ATTACKS
-
83
STEALTH
SIX-BLOCK
DOUBLE-SPEND
-
85
NEGATIVE
BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION
-
86
6
6.1
CENSORSHIP
ATTACKS
-
90
WORKING
EXAMPLE:
TWO
RATIONAL
POOLS
-
91
CONTENTS
-
XI
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4
6.1.5
6.1.6
6.1.7
6.1.8
CONSIDERATION
FOR
THIS
CHOICE
OF
FUNCTION
-
94
THERE
ARE
MANY
STRATEGIES
-
94
CASE
1:
POOL
1
AND
POOL
2
ARE
BOTH
NON-COMPLIANT
-
95
CASE
2:
POOL
1
IS
NON-COMPLIANT
AND
POOL
2
IS
MILDLY
COMPLIANT
-
99
CASE
3:
BOTH
POOLS
ARE
MILDLY
COMPLIANT
-
106
ANALYSIS:
LOW-FEE
REGIME
-
107
HIGHER-FEE
REGIME
-
110
CONCLUSION
-
111
7
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.1.3
7.1.4
7.1.5
7.1.6
7.2
7.2.1
7.2.2
ECONOMICS
OF
MINING
-
112
HASHING
AS
A
MARKET
-
112
COURNOT
OLIGOPOLY
MODEL
-
112
A
MODEL
FOR
THE
MINING
MARKET
-
114
LINEAR
COST
MODEL
-
114
MONOPOLIST
PRICING
AND
COLLUSION
-
116
PERFECTLY
COMPETITIVE
MARKETS
-
117
NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
IN
THE
MINING
MARKET
-
118
MARKET
FOR
ASICS
-
120
NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
WITH
BERTRAND
ASSUMPTIONS
-
120
FOUR
REGIMES
-
121
8
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
SELFISH
MINING
-
123
EXPLOITING
THE
DIFFICULTY
ADJUSTMENT
-
124
BASIC
SELFISH
MINING
-
125
MARKET
DISTORTIONS
-
130
MARKOV
CHAINS
-
130
SELFISH
MINING
ANALYZED
VIA
A
MARKOV
PROCESS
WITH
CUTS
-
133
SELFISH
MINING
WITH
PARTIAL
COOPERATION
-
135
DEFENSE
AGAINST
SELFISH
MINING
-
137
9
9.1
9.1.1
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
9.1.5
9.2
9.2.1
9.2.2
9.2.3
9.2.4
STRATEGIC
MINING
-
138
PETTY
COMPLIANT
STRATEGY
AND
FEE-UNDERCUTTING
-
139
FEE-UNDERCUTTING
-
139
FEE-SNIPING
VS.
FEE-UNDERCUTTING
-
141
EMERGENCE
OF
PETTY
COMPLIANT
MINERS
-
141
SELFISH
MINING
AS
INCENTIVE
TO
USE
PETTY
COMPLIANT
MINING
-
142
MEASURES
AGAINST
UNDERCUTTING
-
143
OTHER
DEVIANT
MINING
STRATEGIES
-
143
ACCEPTING
BRIBES
-
143
BLOCK
WITHHOLDING
-
150
PROTECTING
ONE
'
S
OWN
INTERESTS
-
151
MINE
FROM
BEHIND
-
151
XII
-
CONTENTS
9.2.5
9.2.6
9.2.7
9.2.8
9.2.9
EXTENDED
EXAMPLE
-
152
DEFERRING
TO
THE
ALPHA
DOG
-
156
RESPONDING
TO
EXOGENOUS
DEMAND
FOR
HASHRATE
-
159
HARMONIC
MINING/SWITCH
MINING
-
160
MERGE-MINING,
LAYER
2,
SIDECHAINS,
AND
STRATEGIES
PLAYING
OUT
ON
OTHER
BLOCKCHAINS
-
162
9.3
WILL
THERE
BE
A
TRANSITION
FROM
DEFAULT
COMPLIANT
TO
A
FULLY
STRATEGIC
REGIME?
-
163
9.3.1
9.3.2
9.3.3
9.3.4
9.3.5
BLOCK
OPTIMIZATION
AND
TRANSACTION
SELECTION
-
164
OVERPAYING
POOLS
-
165
DIRECT
SIGNALING
AND
OPTIMIZER
TRAINING
-
165
PURGE
POOLING
-
166
PRECEDENT:
MEV
IN
ETHEREUM
-
167
10
10.1
10.2
10.2.1
10.2.2
WHAT
DISCOURAGES
STRATEGIC
MINING?
-
169
MARKET
FRAGILITY
HYPOTHESIS
-
169
REPEATED
GAMES
AND
INSTITUTIONAL
NORMS
-
169
MINING
THAT
CAN
BE
PUNISHED
-
172
PROBLEMS
WITH
PUNISHMENT
-
172
11
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.4.1
11.5
DECLINING
BLOCK
SUBSIDY
-
174
SECURITY
BUDGET
-
175
THE
MINING
GAP
-
177
PROBLEMS
WITH
A
MINING
GAP
-
179
UNDERCUTTING
-
180
PRIVATE
TRANSACTION
BROKERING
-
181
SUMMARY
-
183
12
12.1
12.2
12.2.1
12.3
12.3.1
12.4
THE
FLATTENING
ASIC
COST
CURVE
-
184
HASH
DEPLOYMENT
RATIO
-
184
PURGE
POOLS
-
185
PROTECTION
AGAINST
A
PURGE
ATTACK
WHEN
HDR
IS
LOW
-
186
THE
DYNAMICAL
SYSTEM
DETERMINED
BY
THE
DIFFICULTY
ADJUSTMENT
-
186
PHASE
TRANSITION
TO
GALLOPING
GERTIE
-
194
FINANCIALIZATION
OF
HASHRATE
MARKETS
-
196
13
13.1
13.2
13.2.1
13.2.2
13.2.3
ATTACKS
-
198
WHY
HAVE
THERE
BEEN
NO
ATTACKS
YET?
-
198
NATION-STATE/AUTHORITARIAN
ATTACKS
-
199
THE
EMPTY-BLOCK
ATTACK
-
200
OBVIOUS
CRITICISM
OF
THE
EMPTY-BLOCK
ATTACK
-
200
LAYER
2S
UNDER
AN
EMPTY-BLOCK
ATTACK
-
202
CONTENTS
-
-
XIII
13.2.4
13.2.5
13.2.6
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.6.1
13.6.2
13.6.3
13.7
13.7.1
13.7.2
13.7.3
13.8
13.8.1
13.8.2
13.8.3
13.8.4
13.8.5
THE
SEESAW
ATTACK
-
202
BRIBE-FLOODING
ATTACK
-
202
EMPTY-BLOCK
PURGE
ATTACK
-
203
CHECKPOINTING
AGAINST
A
PERSISTENT
51
%
ATTACK
-
203
BUYOUT
ATTACKS
-
206
NUCLEAR
OPTION:
NEW
PROOF-OF-WORK
ALGORITHM
-
207
LESS-THAN-BRUTE-FORCE
ATTACKS
-
208
NUDGING
TOWARDS
A
STRATEGIC
REGIME
-
208
FUD
AND
SOCIAL
ATTACKS
-
209
REGULATIONS
-
210
GOLDFINGER
ATTACKS
-
211
SLIPPERY-SLOPE
ATTACKS
-
212
SELFISH
MINING
AS
A
SLIPPERY-SLOPE
ATTACK
-
213
LOW-PROBABILITY
ATTACKS
-
214
SOFT-FORKABILITY:
CAN
THE
COMMUNITY
SUSPEND
NAKAMOTO
CONSENSUS?
-
216
ADDITIONAL
SECURITY
LAYERS
-
218
EXAMPLE:
PURGE
EXPLOIT
AND
THE
BUYER
BEWARE
RESPONSE
-
220
THE
GOVERNMENT
TO
THE
RESCUE
-
221
ECONOMIC
MAJORITY
VS.
MINING
MAJORITY
-
222
A
TETRALEMMA
-
223
14
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
14.5
14.6
14.7
14.8
14.9
14.10
DIRECT
FRONTAL
TAKEOVERS
-
225
INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSE
-
226
CREEPING
CORPORATE
TAKEOVER
-
227
ALLIANCES
ARE
BENEFICIAL
-
228
ESG
TAKEOVERS
-
228
GOVERNMENT
KYC
TAKEOVERS
-
229
OVEREXPOSED
BAGHOLDER
EXPLOIT
-
230
FEE
MARKET
AND
LONG-TERM
VIABILITY
-
230
HOW
MUCH
IS
CENSORSHIP
RESISTANCE
WORTH?
-
231
A
67
%
FIAT
ATTACK
-
232
PERMISSIONED
BYPASS
-
233
15
15.1
15.1.1
15.1.2
15.1.3
15.1.4
15.1.5
15.2
15.2.1
NASH
BARGAINING
-
234
THE
BARGAINING
PROBLEM
-
235
MOTIVATING
REAL-WORLD
PROBLEMS
-
235
MOTIVATING
GAME
THEORY
GAMES
-
236
DIVIDING
A
SURPLUS
AND
THE
NASH
BARGAINING
SOLUTION
-
236
EXOGENOUS
PROBABILITY
OF
BREAKDOWN
-
238
WHAT
IF
PLAYERS
CAN
DETERMINE
THE
PROBABILITY
OF
BREAKDOWN?
-
240
CREATING
COMMITMENT
-
242
ENTER
BLOCKCHAINS?
-
243
XIV
-
CONTENTS
15.2.2
15.3
15.3.1
15.4
15.4.1
15.5
COMMITMENT
CAN
BACKFIRE
-
244
MIXED
STRATEGIES
AND
SCHELLING
THREATS
-
244
JANE
'
S
EXAMPLE,
AGAIN
-
245
EXTORTION
AND
GRIEFING
-
246
SCHELLING
ATTACKS
AS
AN
INEXPENSIVE
WAY
TO
DESTROY
A
NETWORK
-
249
WARS
OF
ATTRITION
-
249
16
16.1
16.2
16.3
16.4
16.4.1
16.4.2
16.4.3
16.4.4
16.4.5
16.5
COALITIONAL
GAME
THEORY
-
251
MOTIVATING
EXAMPLES
-
251
CHARACTERISTIC
FORM
AND
PAYOFF
CONFIGURATIONS
-
253
STANDARD
COALITIONAL
GAME
THEORY
AND
THE
BITCOIN
MINING
GAME
-
254
SOLUTION
CONCEPTS
-
255
THE
CORE
-
256
THE
STABLE
SET
-
257
THE
BARGAINING
SET
-
259
THE
KERNEL
-
260
THE
NUCLEOLUS
-
261
ANALYSIS
OF
SOLUTION
CONCEPTS
FOR
WEIGHTED
MAJORITY
GAMES
AND
CBMGS
-
261
16.6
16.6.1
16.6.2
16.6.3
16.6.4
16.7
THE
THREE-PLAYER
CASE
-
267
KERNEL
-
267
NUCLEOLUS
-
268
BEYOND
N
=
3
-
270
NOTES
ON
C
AND
D
-
271
DISCUSSION
-
271
17
17.1
17.1.1
17.2
17.3
17.3.1
17.3.2
17.3.3
17.4
17.4.1
17.4.2
17.5
17.5.1
17.6
STOCK,
FLOW,
AND
ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS
-
273
DOUBLE-SPEND
EXPLOITS
-
275
FINALITY
-
277
SABOTAGE
(GOLDFINGER)
ATTACK
-
280
DETERMINING
THE
STOCK
VALUE
OF
ASICS
-
281
MOORE
'
S
LAW
-
282
FLOW-BASED
MINER
COST
MODEL
-
283
STOCK
VALUE
OF
LATENT
HASHRATE
AS
A
THREAT
-
284
STABLE
REGIMES
-
284
STRONG
EXPECTATION
OF
COMMUNITY
REORG,
NO
MAJOR
ADVERSARIES
-
284
ATTACKS
HAPPEN,
BUT
ONLY
AFFECT
A
MINORITY
OF
USERS
-
285
EFFICIENCY,
SECURITY,
AND
DECENTRALIZATION
-
285
EFFICIENCY
-
286
THEORETICAL
PUSHOUT
AND
EPSILON-ATTACKS
-
289
18
BITCOIN
AS
IT
MATURES
-
291
CONTENTS
-
XV
BIBLIOGRAPHY
-
321
18.1
18.1.1
18.1.2
18.1.3
18.2
18.2.1
HYPERBITCOINIZATION
-
291
DECENTRALIZED
HYPERBITCOINIZATION
-
292
CENTRALIZED
HYPERBITCOINIZATION
-
295
SOVEREIGN
CURRENCY
WILL
NOT
DIE
-
297
WILL
NATION-STATES
SUPPORT
BITCOIN?
-
299
REASONS
WHY
A
NATION
WOULD
SUPPORT
BITCOIN
USE
(CENTRALIZED
OR
DECENTRALIZED)
-
300
18.2.2
REASONS
WHY
A
NATION
WOULD
OPPOSE
BITCOIN
USE
(CENTRALIZED
OR
DECENTRALIZED)
-
300
18.2.3
REASONS
FOR
A
NATION
TO
MAINTAIN
BITCOIN
SPECIFICALLY
AS
A
DECENTRALIZED
NETWORK
-
301
18.2.4
18.2.5
18.2.6
18.3
18.3.1
18.4
18.4.1
18.4.2
18.5
18.6
18.6.1
18.6.2
18.7
18.7.1
18.7.2
18.7.3
REASONS
FOR
A
NATION
TO
DISCOURAGE
USE
OF
DECENTRALIZED
BITCOIN
-
301
INDIFFERENCE
TO
CENTRALIZATION
AND
THE
SOFT-FORKABILITY
HYPOTHESIS
-
302
BITCOIN
MINING
-
303
NON-PROFITABLE
MINING
-
304
WILL
CORPORATIONS
PROTECT
THEIR
BAGS?
-
306
GEOPOLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
IN
ADVERSARIAL
CONDITIONS
-
306
NICE
AND
NAUGHTY
NATIONS
-
310
THE
FREE-RIDER
PROBLEM
WITH
A
FINITE
SUPPLY
CURRENCY
-
311
CAN
THE
SUPPLY
BE
INCREASED?
-
312
LIMITS
AS
A
DECENTRALIZED
STORE
OF
VALUE
-
313
ASYMMETRIC
RISK
PREMIUM
-
314
FAILURE
AS
A
FUNCTIONAL
STORE
OF
VALUE
-
315
BEASTS
IN
THE
JUNGLE:
CENTRALIZATION,
CAPTURE,
AND
COLLAPSE
-
316
CENTRALIZATION
-
316
CAPTURE
-
318
COLLAPSE
-
319
INDEX
-
325 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Warren, Micah |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1285062442 |
| author_facet | Warren, Micah |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Warren, Micah |
| author_variant | m w mw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048817853 |
| classification_rvk | QK 305 ST 276 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1372481220 (DE-599)DNB1270060465 |
| discipline | Informatik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Informatik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV048817853 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:32:10Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-20T08:24:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)10095502-2 |
| isbn | 9783110772838 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034083639 |
| oclc_num | 1372481220 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-92 DE-703 DE-945 DE-634 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-92 DE-703 DE-945 DE-634 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | XV, 328 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | De Gruyter |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | De Gruyter Graduate |
| spelling | Warren, Micah Verfasser (DE-588)1285062442 aut Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren Berlin De Gruyter [2023] XV, 328 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier De Gruyter Graduate Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 gnd rswk-swf Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 gnd rswk-swf Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 gnd rswk-swf Game theory, probability, Bitcoin Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 s Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 s Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 s Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG (DE-588)10095502-2 pbl Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF 978-3-11-077284-5 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB 978-3-11-077305-7 DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034083639&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Warren, Micah Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 gnd Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 gnd Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4410515-0 (DE-588)1041888279 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)1124028595 (DE-588)4033329-2 |
| title | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis |
| title_auth | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis |
| title_exact_search | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis |
| title_full | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren |
| title_fullStr | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren |
| title_short | Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis |
| title_sort | bitcoin a game theoretic analysis |
| topic | Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 gnd Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 gnd Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum Bitcoin Spieltheorie Blockchain Kryptologie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034083639&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT warrenmicah bitcoinagametheoreticanalysis AT walterdegruytergmbhcokg bitcoinagametheoreticanalysis |