Verfügbarkeit: Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis

Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis:

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Warren, Micah (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Berlin De Gruyter [2023]
Schriftenreihe:	De Gruyter Graduate
Schlagworte:	Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum Bitcoin Spieltheorie Blockchain Kryptologie Game theory, probability, Bitcoin
Online-Zugang:	Inhaltsverzeichnis
Beschreibung:	XV, 328 Seiten Diagramme
ISBN:	9783110772838

Internformat

MARC


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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	CONTENTS PREFACE - V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - VII 1 1.1 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.2.9 1.2.10 1.2.11 1.2.12 1.2.13 1.3 1.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 BASIC OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PAYMENTS - 1 PRELIMINARIES ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES - 1 BINARY AND HEXADECIMAL - 1 HASHING FUNCTION - 2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES - 4 TAKEAWAY - 6 BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOLS - 7 CONSENSUS - 7 PROOF OF WORK - 9 BLOCK DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT - 12 LONGEST-CHAIN/HEAVIEST-CHAIN RULE - 12 HALVING - 13 BLOCKSIZE - 14 WHY IS IT CALLED " PROOF OF WORK " ? - 15 RISE OF ASICS - 15 LAYER 2 NETWORKS - 16 CURSORY ANALYSIS - 16 PROOF OF STAKE - 17 NODES AND MINERS - 18 SOFT FORKS AND HARD FORKS - 18 WHAT IS BITCOIN AND WHY DOES IT WORK? - 19 MORE ON MINING - 20 UTXO - 21 COMMON ASSUMPTIONS IN MINING GAMES - 23 2 2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.4 2.4.1 PROBABILITY SPACES - 25 COUNTABLY AND UNCOUNTABLY INFINITE - 26 PARTITIONS - 27 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY - 28 RANDOM VARIABLES - 29 EXPECTATION - 29 CONDITIONAL EXPECTATION - 31 BERNOULLI PROCESSES AND BERNOULLI SCHEMES - 32 THE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION FORMULA AND THE DE MOIVRE-LAPLACE THEOREM - 35 2.4.2 PROBABILITY-PRESERVING ISOMORPHISMS AND COMPARISON OF EXPECTATIONS - 37 X - CONTENTS 2.5 2.6 2.6.1 2.7 2.7.1 WIN-LOSE-PAY GAME - 39 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS - 41 JENSEN ' S INEQUALITY - 41 POISSON PROCESSES - 42 NATURALLY OCCURRING CHAIN SPLITS - 44 3 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.1.7 3.1.8 3.1.9 3.2 3.2.1 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.4 GAME THEORY BASICS - 46 SINGLE-ROUND GAMES - 46 PAYOFF TABLES - 47 PREFERENCES AND UTILITY FUNCTION - 47 MATRIX GAMES - 49 N-PLAYER GAMES AND MORE TERMINOLOGY - 50 DOMINANT STRATEGIES - 51 EXAMPLES - 52 NASH EQUILIBRIA - 53 EXAMPLES - 53 DETERMINING NASH EQUILIBRIA BY LOOKING AT A TABLE - 54 MIXED STRATEGIES - 55 MIXED STRATEGIES IN REAL LIFE - 55 EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES - 56 STATE OF A GAME - 56 GAME TREES - 58 SCHELLING POINTS - 60 4 4.1 MONOPOLIZING POOL - 62 ROUGH APPROACH: BERNOULLI ' S LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS AND HOEFFDING ' S BOUND - 62 4.2 BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION AND THE DE MOIVRE-LAPLACE THEOREM - 66 5 5.1 BASIC DOUBLE-SPEND GAME - 69 SIMPLEST STRATEGY: CHARLIE ELECTS TO MINE HIS OWN CHAIN WHEN LESS THAN K BLOCKS BEHIND - 71 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.2 5.3 5.3.1 RECURSION FORMULAS - 71 A METHOD FOR COMPUTING WINNING PROBABILITY - 72 ANOTHER METHOD: DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS - 74 COMPUTING EXPECTED VALUES - 77 LONGER-DURATION ATTACKS - 83 STEALTH SIX-BLOCK DOUBLE-SPEND - 85 NEGATIVE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION - 86 6 6.1 CENSORSHIP ATTACKS - 90 WORKING EXAMPLE: TWO RATIONAL POOLS - 91 CONTENTS - XI 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.6 6.1.7 6.1.8 CONSIDERATION FOR THIS CHOICE OF FUNCTION - 94 THERE ARE MANY STRATEGIES - 94 CASE 1: POOL 1 AND POOL 2 ARE BOTH NON-COMPLIANT - 95 CASE 2: POOL 1 IS NON-COMPLIANT AND POOL 2 IS MILDLY COMPLIANT - 99 CASE 3: BOTH POOLS ARE MILDLY COMPLIANT - 106 ANALYSIS: LOW-FEE REGIME - 107 HIGHER-FEE REGIME - 110 CONCLUSION - 111 7 7.1 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.5 7.1.6 7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 ECONOMICS OF MINING - 112 HASHING AS A MARKET - 112 COURNOT OLIGOPOLY MODEL - 112 A MODEL FOR THE MINING MARKET - 114 LINEAR COST MODEL - 114 MONOPOLIST PRICING AND COLLUSION - 116 PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS - 117 NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MINING MARKET - 118 MARKET FOR ASICS - 120 NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH BERTRAND ASSUMPTIONS - 120 FOUR REGIMES - 121 8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 SELFISH MINING - 123 EXPLOITING THE DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT - 124 BASIC SELFISH MINING - 125 MARKET DISTORTIONS - 130 MARKOV CHAINS - 130 SELFISH MINING ANALYZED VIA A MARKOV PROCESS WITH CUTS - 133 SELFISH MINING WITH PARTIAL COOPERATION - 135 DEFENSE AGAINST SELFISH MINING - 137 9 9.1 9.1.1 9.1.2 9.1.3 9.1.4 9.1.5 9.2 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 STRATEGIC MINING - 138 PETTY COMPLIANT STRATEGY AND FEE-UNDERCUTTING - 139 FEE-UNDERCUTTING - 139 FEE-SNIPING VS. FEE-UNDERCUTTING - 141 EMERGENCE OF PETTY COMPLIANT MINERS - 141 SELFISH MINING AS INCENTIVE TO USE PETTY COMPLIANT MINING - 142 MEASURES AGAINST UNDERCUTTING - 143 OTHER DEVIANT MINING STRATEGIES - 143 ACCEPTING BRIBES - 143 BLOCK WITHHOLDING - 150 PROTECTING ONE ' S OWN INTERESTS - 151 MINE FROM BEHIND - 151 XII - CONTENTS 9.2.5 9.2.6 9.2.7 9.2.8 9.2.9 EXTENDED EXAMPLE - 152 DEFERRING TO THE ALPHA DOG - 156 RESPONDING TO EXOGENOUS DEMAND FOR HASHRATE - 159 HARMONIC MINING/SWITCH MINING - 160 MERGE-MINING, LAYER 2, SIDECHAINS, AND STRATEGIES PLAYING OUT ON OTHER BLOCKCHAINS - 162 9.3 WILL THERE BE A TRANSITION FROM DEFAULT COMPLIANT TO A FULLY STRATEGIC REGIME? - 163 9.3.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 9.3.4 9.3.5 BLOCK OPTIMIZATION AND TRANSACTION SELECTION - 164 OVERPAYING POOLS - 165 DIRECT SIGNALING AND OPTIMIZER TRAINING - 165 PURGE POOLING - 166 PRECEDENT: MEV IN ETHEREUM - 167 10 10.1 10.2 10.2.1 10.2.2 WHAT DISCOURAGES STRATEGIC MINING? - 169 MARKET FRAGILITY HYPOTHESIS - 169 REPEATED GAMES AND INSTITUTIONAL NORMS - 169 MINING THAT CAN BE PUNISHED - 172 PROBLEMS WITH PUNISHMENT - 172 11 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.4.1 11.5 DECLINING BLOCK SUBSIDY - 174 SECURITY BUDGET - 175 THE MINING GAP - 177 PROBLEMS WITH A MINING GAP - 179 UNDERCUTTING - 180 PRIVATE TRANSACTION BROKERING - 181 SUMMARY - 183 12 12.1 12.2 12.2.1 12.3 12.3.1 12.4 THE FLATTENING ASIC COST CURVE - 184 HASH DEPLOYMENT RATIO - 184 PURGE POOLS - 185 PROTECTION AGAINST A PURGE ATTACK WHEN HDR IS LOW - 186 THE DYNAMICAL SYSTEM DETERMINED BY THE DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT - 186 PHASE TRANSITION TO GALLOPING GERTIE - 194 FINANCIALIZATION OF HASHRATE MARKETS - 196 13 13.1 13.2 13.2.1 13.2.2 13.2.3 ATTACKS - 198 WHY HAVE THERE BEEN NO ATTACKS YET? - 198 NATION-STATE/AUTHORITARIAN ATTACKS - 199 THE EMPTY-BLOCK ATTACK - 200 OBVIOUS CRITICISM OF THE EMPTY-BLOCK ATTACK - 200 LAYER 2S UNDER AN EMPTY-BLOCK ATTACK - 202 CONTENTS - - XIII 13.2.4 13.2.5 13.2.6 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.6.1 13.6.2 13.6.3 13.7 13.7.1 13.7.2 13.7.3 13.8 13.8.1 13.8.2 13.8.3 13.8.4 13.8.5 THE SEESAW ATTACK - 202 BRIBE-FLOODING ATTACK - 202 EMPTY-BLOCK PURGE ATTACK - 203 CHECKPOINTING AGAINST A PERSISTENT 51 % ATTACK - 203 BUYOUT ATTACKS - 206 NUCLEAR OPTION: NEW PROOF-OF-WORK ALGORITHM - 207 LESS-THAN-BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS - 208 NUDGING TOWARDS A STRATEGIC REGIME - 208 FUD AND SOCIAL ATTACKS - 209 REGULATIONS - 210 GOLDFINGER ATTACKS - 211 SLIPPERY-SLOPE ATTACKS - 212 SELFISH MINING AS A SLIPPERY-SLOPE ATTACK - 213 LOW-PROBABILITY ATTACKS - 214 SOFT-FORKABILITY: CAN THE COMMUNITY SUSPEND NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS? - 216 ADDITIONAL SECURITY LAYERS - 218 EXAMPLE: PURGE EXPLOIT AND THE BUYER BEWARE RESPONSE - 220 THE GOVERNMENT TO THE RESCUE - 221 ECONOMIC MAJORITY VS. MINING MAJORITY - 222 A TETRALEMMA - 223 14 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.10 DIRECT FRONTAL TAKEOVERS - 225 INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE - 226 CREEPING CORPORATE TAKEOVER - 227 ALLIANCES ARE BENEFICIAL - 228 ESG TAKEOVERS - 228 GOVERNMENT KYC TAKEOVERS - 229 OVEREXPOSED BAGHOLDER EXPLOIT - 230 FEE MARKET AND LONG-TERM VIABILITY - 230 HOW MUCH IS CENSORSHIP RESISTANCE WORTH? - 231 A 67 % FIAT ATTACK - 232 PERMISSIONED BYPASS - 233 15 15.1 15.1.1 15.1.2 15.1.3 15.1.4 15.1.5 15.2 15.2.1 NASH BARGAINING - 234 THE BARGAINING PROBLEM - 235 MOTIVATING REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS - 235 MOTIVATING GAME THEORY GAMES - 236 DIVIDING A SURPLUS AND THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION - 236 EXOGENOUS PROBABILITY OF BREAKDOWN - 238 WHAT IF PLAYERS CAN DETERMINE THE PROBABILITY OF BREAKDOWN? - 240 CREATING COMMITMENT - 242 ENTER BLOCKCHAINS? - 243 XIV - CONTENTS 15.2.2 15.3 15.3.1 15.4 15.4.1 15.5 COMMITMENT CAN BACKFIRE - 244 MIXED STRATEGIES AND SCHELLING THREATS - 244 JANE ' S EXAMPLE, AGAIN - 245 EXTORTION AND GRIEFING - 246 SCHELLING ATTACKS AS AN INEXPENSIVE WAY TO DESTROY A NETWORK - 249 WARS OF ATTRITION - 249 16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.4.1 16.4.2 16.4.3 16.4.4 16.4.5 16.5 COALITIONAL GAME THEORY - 251 MOTIVATING EXAMPLES - 251 CHARACTERISTIC FORM AND PAYOFF CONFIGURATIONS - 253 STANDARD COALITIONAL GAME THEORY AND THE BITCOIN MINING GAME - 254 SOLUTION CONCEPTS - 255 THE CORE - 256 THE STABLE SET - 257 THE BARGAINING SET - 259 THE KERNEL - 260 THE NUCLEOLUS - 261 ANALYSIS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS FOR WEIGHTED MAJORITY GAMES AND CBMGS - 261 16.6 16.6.1 16.6.2 16.6.3 16.6.4 16.7 THE THREE-PLAYER CASE - 267 KERNEL - 267 NUCLEOLUS - 268 BEYOND N = 3 - 270 NOTES ON C AND D - 271 DISCUSSION - 271 17 17.1 17.1.1 17.2 17.3 17.3.1 17.3.2 17.3.3 17.4 17.4.1 17.4.2 17.5 17.5.1 17.6 STOCK, FLOW, AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS - 273 DOUBLE-SPEND EXPLOITS - 275 FINALITY - 277 SABOTAGE (GOLDFINGER) ATTACK - 280 DETERMINING THE STOCK VALUE OF ASICS - 281 MOORE ' S LAW - 282 FLOW-BASED MINER COST MODEL - 283 STOCK VALUE OF LATENT HASHRATE AS A THREAT - 284 STABLE REGIMES - 284 STRONG EXPECTATION OF COMMUNITY REORG, NO MAJOR ADVERSARIES - 284 ATTACKS HAPPEN, BUT ONLY AFFECT A MINORITY OF USERS - 285 EFFICIENCY, SECURITY, AND DECENTRALIZATION - 285 EFFICIENCY - 286 THEORETICAL PUSHOUT AND EPSILON-ATTACKS - 289 18 BITCOIN AS IT MATURES - 291 CONTENTS - XV BIBLIOGRAPHY - 321 18.1 18.1.1 18.1.2 18.1.3 18.2 18.2.1 HYPERBITCOINIZATION - 291 DECENTRALIZED HYPERBITCOINIZATION - 292 CENTRALIZED HYPERBITCOINIZATION - 295 SOVEREIGN CURRENCY WILL NOT DIE - 297 WILL NATION-STATES SUPPORT BITCOIN? - 299 REASONS WHY A NATION WOULD SUPPORT BITCOIN USE (CENTRALIZED OR DECENTRALIZED) - 300 18.2.2 REASONS WHY A NATION WOULD OPPOSE BITCOIN USE (CENTRALIZED OR DECENTRALIZED) - 300 18.2.3 REASONS FOR A NATION TO MAINTAIN BITCOIN SPECIFICALLY AS A DECENTRALIZED NETWORK - 301 18.2.4 18.2.5 18.2.6 18.3 18.3.1 18.4 18.4.1 18.4.2 18.5 18.6 18.6.1 18.6.2 18.7 18.7.1 18.7.2 18.7.3 REASONS FOR A NATION TO DISCOURAGE USE OF DECENTRALIZED BITCOIN - 301 INDIFFERENCE TO CENTRALIZATION AND THE SOFT-FORKABILITY HYPOTHESIS - 302 BITCOIN MINING - 303 NON-PROFITABLE MINING - 304 WILL CORPORATIONS PROTECT THEIR BAGS? - 306 GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ADVERSARIAL CONDITIONS - 306 NICE AND NAUGHTY NATIONS - 310 THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM WITH A FINITE SUPPLY CURRENCY - 311 CAN THE SUPPLY BE INCREASED? - 312 LIMITS AS A DECENTRALIZED STORE OF VALUE - 313 ASYMMETRIC RISK PREMIUM - 314 FAILURE AS A FUNCTIONAL STORE OF VALUE - 315 BEASTS IN THE JUNGLE: CENTRALIZATION, CAPTURE, AND COLLAPSE - 316 CENTRALIZATION - 316 CAPTURE - 318 COLLAPSE - 319 INDEX - 325
adam_txt	CONTENTS PREFACE - V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - VII 1 1.1 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.2.9 1.2.10 1.2.11 1.2.12 1.2.13 1.3 1.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 BASIC OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PAYMENTS - 1 PRELIMINARIES ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES - 1 BINARY AND HEXADECIMAL - 1 HASHING FUNCTION - 2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES - 4 TAKEAWAY - 6 BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOLS - 7 CONSENSUS - 7 PROOF OF WORK - 9 BLOCK DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT - 12 LONGEST-CHAIN/HEAVIEST-CHAIN RULE - 12 HALVING - 13 BLOCKSIZE - 14 WHY IS IT CALLED " PROOF OF WORK " ? - 15 RISE OF ASICS - 15 LAYER 2 NETWORKS - 16 CURSORY ANALYSIS - 16 PROOF OF STAKE - 17 NODES AND MINERS - 18 SOFT FORKS AND HARD FORKS - 18 WHAT IS BITCOIN AND WHY DOES IT WORK? - 19 MORE ON MINING - 20 UTXO - 21 COMMON ASSUMPTIONS IN MINING GAMES - 23 2 2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.4 2.4.1 PROBABILITY SPACES - 25 COUNTABLY AND UNCOUNTABLY INFINITE - 26 PARTITIONS - 27 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY - 28 RANDOM VARIABLES - 29 EXPECTATION - 29 CONDITIONAL EXPECTATION - 31 BERNOULLI PROCESSES AND BERNOULLI SCHEMES - 32 THE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION FORMULA AND THE DE MOIVRE-LAPLACE THEOREM - 35 2.4.2 PROBABILITY-PRESERVING ISOMORPHISMS AND COMPARISON OF EXPECTATIONS - 37 X - CONTENTS 2.5 2.6 2.6.1 2.7 2.7.1 WIN-LOSE-PAY GAME - 39 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS - 41 JENSEN ' S INEQUALITY - 41 POISSON PROCESSES - 42 NATURALLY OCCURRING CHAIN SPLITS - 44 3 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.1.7 3.1.8 3.1.9 3.2 3.2.1 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.4 GAME THEORY BASICS - 46 SINGLE-ROUND GAMES - 46 PAYOFF TABLES - 47 PREFERENCES AND UTILITY FUNCTION - 47 MATRIX GAMES - 49 N-PLAYER GAMES AND MORE TERMINOLOGY - 50 DOMINANT STRATEGIES - 51 EXAMPLES - 52 NASH EQUILIBRIA - 53 EXAMPLES - 53 DETERMINING NASH EQUILIBRIA BY LOOKING AT A TABLE - 54 MIXED STRATEGIES - 55 MIXED STRATEGIES IN REAL LIFE - 55 EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES - 56 STATE OF A GAME - 56 GAME TREES - 58 SCHELLING POINTS - 60 4 4.1 MONOPOLIZING POOL - 62 ROUGH APPROACH: BERNOULLI ' S LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS AND HOEFFDING ' S BOUND - 62 4.2 BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION AND THE DE MOIVRE-LAPLACE THEOREM - 66 5 5.1 BASIC DOUBLE-SPEND GAME - 69 SIMPLEST STRATEGY: CHARLIE ELECTS TO MINE HIS OWN CHAIN WHEN LESS THAN K BLOCKS BEHIND - 71 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.2 5.3 5.3.1 RECURSION FORMULAS - 71 A METHOD FOR COMPUTING WINNING PROBABILITY - 72 ANOTHER METHOD: DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS - 74 COMPUTING EXPECTED VALUES - 77 LONGER-DURATION ATTACKS - 83 STEALTH SIX-BLOCK DOUBLE-SPEND - 85 NEGATIVE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION - 86 6 6.1 CENSORSHIP ATTACKS - 90 WORKING EXAMPLE: TWO RATIONAL POOLS - 91 CONTENTS - XI 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.6 6.1.7 6.1.8 CONSIDERATION FOR THIS CHOICE OF FUNCTION - 94 THERE ARE MANY STRATEGIES - 94 CASE 1: POOL 1 AND POOL 2 ARE BOTH NON-COMPLIANT - 95 CASE 2: POOL 1 IS NON-COMPLIANT AND POOL 2 IS MILDLY COMPLIANT - 99 CASE 3: BOTH POOLS ARE MILDLY COMPLIANT - 106 ANALYSIS: LOW-FEE REGIME - 107 HIGHER-FEE REGIME - 110 CONCLUSION - 111 7 7.1 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.5 7.1.6 7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 ECONOMICS OF MINING - 112 HASHING AS A MARKET - 112 COURNOT OLIGOPOLY MODEL - 112 A MODEL FOR THE MINING MARKET - 114 LINEAR COST MODEL - 114 MONOPOLIST PRICING AND COLLUSION - 116 PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS - 117 NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MINING MARKET - 118 MARKET FOR ASICS - 120 NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH BERTRAND ASSUMPTIONS - 120 FOUR REGIMES - 121 8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 SELFISH MINING - 123 EXPLOITING THE DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT - 124 BASIC SELFISH MINING - 125 MARKET DISTORTIONS - 130 MARKOV CHAINS - 130 SELFISH MINING ANALYZED VIA A MARKOV PROCESS WITH CUTS - 133 SELFISH MINING WITH PARTIAL COOPERATION - 135 DEFENSE AGAINST SELFISH MINING - 137 9 9.1 9.1.1 9.1.2 9.1.3 9.1.4 9.1.5 9.2 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 STRATEGIC MINING - 138 PETTY COMPLIANT STRATEGY AND FEE-UNDERCUTTING - 139 FEE-UNDERCUTTING - 139 FEE-SNIPING VS. FEE-UNDERCUTTING - 141 EMERGENCE OF PETTY COMPLIANT MINERS - 141 SELFISH MINING AS INCENTIVE TO USE PETTY COMPLIANT MINING - 142 MEASURES AGAINST UNDERCUTTING - 143 OTHER DEVIANT MINING STRATEGIES - 143 ACCEPTING BRIBES - 143 BLOCK WITHHOLDING - 150 PROTECTING ONE ' S OWN INTERESTS - 151 MINE FROM BEHIND - 151 XII - CONTENTS 9.2.5 9.2.6 9.2.7 9.2.8 9.2.9 EXTENDED EXAMPLE - 152 DEFERRING TO THE ALPHA DOG - 156 RESPONDING TO EXOGENOUS DEMAND FOR HASHRATE - 159 HARMONIC MINING/SWITCH MINING - 160 MERGE-MINING, LAYER 2, SIDECHAINS, AND STRATEGIES PLAYING OUT ON OTHER BLOCKCHAINS - 162 9.3 WILL THERE BE A TRANSITION FROM DEFAULT COMPLIANT TO A FULLY STRATEGIC REGIME? - 163 9.3.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 9.3.4 9.3.5 BLOCK OPTIMIZATION AND TRANSACTION SELECTION - 164 OVERPAYING POOLS - 165 DIRECT SIGNALING AND OPTIMIZER TRAINING - 165 PURGE POOLING - 166 PRECEDENT: MEV IN ETHEREUM - 167 10 10.1 10.2 10.2.1 10.2.2 WHAT DISCOURAGES STRATEGIC MINING? - 169 MARKET FRAGILITY HYPOTHESIS - 169 REPEATED GAMES AND INSTITUTIONAL NORMS - 169 MINING THAT CAN BE PUNISHED - 172 PROBLEMS WITH PUNISHMENT - 172 11 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.4.1 11.5 DECLINING BLOCK SUBSIDY - 174 SECURITY BUDGET - 175 THE MINING GAP - 177 PROBLEMS WITH A MINING GAP - 179 UNDERCUTTING - 180 PRIVATE TRANSACTION BROKERING - 181 SUMMARY - 183 12 12.1 12.2 12.2.1 12.3 12.3.1 12.4 THE FLATTENING ASIC COST CURVE - 184 HASH DEPLOYMENT RATIO - 184 PURGE POOLS - 185 PROTECTION AGAINST A PURGE ATTACK WHEN HDR IS LOW - 186 THE DYNAMICAL SYSTEM DETERMINED BY THE DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT - 186 PHASE TRANSITION TO GALLOPING GERTIE - 194 FINANCIALIZATION OF HASHRATE MARKETS - 196 13 13.1 13.2 13.2.1 13.2.2 13.2.3 ATTACKS - 198 WHY HAVE THERE BEEN NO ATTACKS YET? - 198 NATION-STATE/AUTHORITARIAN ATTACKS - 199 THE EMPTY-BLOCK ATTACK - 200 OBVIOUS CRITICISM OF THE EMPTY-BLOCK ATTACK - 200 LAYER 2S UNDER AN EMPTY-BLOCK ATTACK - 202 CONTENTS - - XIII 13.2.4 13.2.5 13.2.6 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.6.1 13.6.2 13.6.3 13.7 13.7.1 13.7.2 13.7.3 13.8 13.8.1 13.8.2 13.8.3 13.8.4 13.8.5 THE SEESAW ATTACK - 202 BRIBE-FLOODING ATTACK - 202 EMPTY-BLOCK PURGE ATTACK - 203 CHECKPOINTING AGAINST A PERSISTENT 51 % ATTACK - 203 BUYOUT ATTACKS - 206 NUCLEAR OPTION: NEW PROOF-OF-WORK ALGORITHM - 207 LESS-THAN-BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS - 208 NUDGING TOWARDS A STRATEGIC REGIME - 208 FUD AND SOCIAL ATTACKS - 209 REGULATIONS - 210 GOLDFINGER ATTACKS - 211 SLIPPERY-SLOPE ATTACKS - 212 SELFISH MINING AS A SLIPPERY-SLOPE ATTACK - 213 LOW-PROBABILITY ATTACKS - 214 SOFT-FORKABILITY: CAN THE COMMUNITY SUSPEND NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS? - 216 ADDITIONAL SECURITY LAYERS - 218 EXAMPLE: PURGE EXPLOIT AND THE BUYER BEWARE RESPONSE - 220 THE GOVERNMENT TO THE RESCUE - 221 ECONOMIC MAJORITY VS. MINING MAJORITY - 222 A TETRALEMMA - 223 14 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.10 DIRECT FRONTAL TAKEOVERS - 225 INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE - 226 CREEPING CORPORATE TAKEOVER - 227 ALLIANCES ARE BENEFICIAL - 228 ESG TAKEOVERS - 228 GOVERNMENT KYC TAKEOVERS - 229 OVEREXPOSED BAGHOLDER EXPLOIT - 230 FEE MARKET AND LONG-TERM VIABILITY - 230 HOW MUCH IS CENSORSHIP RESISTANCE WORTH? - 231 A 67 % FIAT ATTACK - 232 PERMISSIONED BYPASS - 233 15 15.1 15.1.1 15.1.2 15.1.3 15.1.4 15.1.5 15.2 15.2.1 NASH BARGAINING - 234 THE BARGAINING PROBLEM - 235 MOTIVATING REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS - 235 MOTIVATING GAME THEORY GAMES - 236 DIVIDING A SURPLUS AND THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION - 236 EXOGENOUS PROBABILITY OF BREAKDOWN - 238 WHAT IF PLAYERS CAN DETERMINE THE PROBABILITY OF BREAKDOWN? - 240 CREATING COMMITMENT - 242 ENTER BLOCKCHAINS? - 243 XIV - CONTENTS 15.2.2 15.3 15.3.1 15.4 15.4.1 15.5 COMMITMENT CAN BACKFIRE - 244 MIXED STRATEGIES AND SCHELLING THREATS - 244 JANE ' S EXAMPLE, AGAIN - 245 EXTORTION AND GRIEFING - 246 SCHELLING ATTACKS AS AN INEXPENSIVE WAY TO DESTROY A NETWORK - 249 WARS OF ATTRITION - 249 16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.4.1 16.4.2 16.4.3 16.4.4 16.4.5 16.5 COALITIONAL GAME THEORY - 251 MOTIVATING EXAMPLES - 251 CHARACTERISTIC FORM AND PAYOFF CONFIGURATIONS - 253 STANDARD COALITIONAL GAME THEORY AND THE BITCOIN MINING GAME - 254 SOLUTION CONCEPTS - 255 THE CORE - 256 THE STABLE SET - 257 THE BARGAINING SET - 259 THE KERNEL - 260 THE NUCLEOLUS - 261 ANALYSIS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS FOR WEIGHTED MAJORITY GAMES AND CBMGS - 261 16.6 16.6.1 16.6.2 16.6.3 16.6.4 16.7 THE THREE-PLAYER CASE - 267 KERNEL - 267 NUCLEOLUS - 268 BEYOND N = 3 - 270 NOTES ON C AND D - 271 DISCUSSION - 271 17 17.1 17.1.1 17.2 17.3 17.3.1 17.3.2 17.3.3 17.4 17.4.1 17.4.2 17.5 17.5.1 17.6 STOCK, FLOW, AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS - 273 DOUBLE-SPEND EXPLOITS - 275 FINALITY - 277 SABOTAGE (GOLDFINGER) ATTACK - 280 DETERMINING THE STOCK VALUE OF ASICS - 281 MOORE ' S LAW - 282 FLOW-BASED MINER COST MODEL - 283 STOCK VALUE OF LATENT HASHRATE AS A THREAT - 284 STABLE REGIMES - 284 STRONG EXPECTATION OF COMMUNITY REORG, NO MAJOR ADVERSARIES - 284 ATTACKS HAPPEN, BUT ONLY AFFECT A MINORITY OF USERS - 285 EFFICIENCY, SECURITY, AND DECENTRALIZATION - 285 EFFICIENCY - 286 THEORETICAL PUSHOUT AND EPSILON-ATTACKS - 289 18 BITCOIN AS IT MATURES - 291 CONTENTS - XV BIBLIOGRAPHY - 321 18.1 18.1.1 18.1.2 18.1.3 18.2 18.2.1 HYPERBITCOINIZATION - 291 DECENTRALIZED HYPERBITCOINIZATION - 292 CENTRALIZED HYPERBITCOINIZATION - 295 SOVEREIGN CURRENCY WILL NOT DIE - 297 WILL NATION-STATES SUPPORT BITCOIN? - 299 REASONS WHY A NATION WOULD SUPPORT BITCOIN USE (CENTRALIZED OR DECENTRALIZED) - 300 18.2.2 REASONS WHY A NATION WOULD OPPOSE BITCOIN USE (CENTRALIZED OR DECENTRALIZED) - 300 18.2.3 REASONS FOR A NATION TO MAINTAIN BITCOIN SPECIFICALLY AS A DECENTRALIZED NETWORK - 301 18.2.4 18.2.5 18.2.6 18.3 18.3.1 18.4 18.4.1 18.4.2 18.5 18.6 18.6.1 18.6.2 18.7 18.7.1 18.7.2 18.7.3 REASONS FOR A NATION TO DISCOURAGE USE OF DECENTRALIZED BITCOIN - 301 INDIFFERENCE TO CENTRALIZATION AND THE SOFT-FORKABILITY HYPOTHESIS - 302 BITCOIN MINING - 303 NON-PROFITABLE MINING - 304 WILL CORPORATIONS PROTECT THEIR BAGS? - 306 GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ADVERSARIAL CONDITIONS - 306 NICE AND NAUGHTY NATIONS - 310 THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM WITH A FINITE SUPPLY CURRENCY - 311 CAN THE SUPPLY BE INCREASED? - 312 LIMITS AS A DECENTRALIZED STORE OF VALUE - 313 ASYMMETRIC RISK PREMIUM - 314 FAILURE AS A FUNCTIONAL STORE OF VALUE - 315 BEASTS IN THE JUNGLE: CENTRALIZATION, CAPTURE, AND COLLAPSE - 316 CENTRALIZATION - 316 CAPTURE - 318 COLLAPSE - 319 INDEX - 325
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id	DE-604.BV048817853
illustrated	Not Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-03T21:32:10Z
indexdate	2024-07-20T08:24:04Z
institution	BVB
institution_GND	(DE-588)10095502-2
isbn	9783110772838
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034083639
oclc_num	1372481220
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-92 DE-703 DE-945 DE-634 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR
owner_facet	DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-92 DE-703 DE-945 DE-634 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR
physical	XV, 328 Seiten Diagramme
publishDate	2023
publishDateSearch	2023
publishDateSort	2023
publisher	De Gruyter
record_format	marc
series2	De Gruyter Graduate
spelling	Warren, Micah Verfasser (DE-588)1285062442 aut Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren Berlin De Gruyter [2023] XV, 328 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier De Gruyter Graduate Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 gnd rswk-swf Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 gnd rswk-swf Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 gnd rswk-swf Game theory, probability, Bitcoin Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 s Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 s Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 s Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG (DE-588)10095502-2 pbl Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF 978-3-11-077284-5 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB 978-3-11-077305-7 DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034083639&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis
spellingShingle	Warren, Micah Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 gnd Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 gnd Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4410515-0 (DE-588)1041888279 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)1124028595 (DE-588)4033329-2
title	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis
title_auth	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis
title_exact_search	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis
title_exact_search_txtP	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis
title_full	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren
title_fullStr	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren
title_full_unstemmed	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis Micah Warren
title_short	Bitcoin: a game-theoretic analysis
title_sort	bitcoin a game theoretic analysis
topic	Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum (DE-588)4410515-0 gnd Bitcoin (DE-588)1041888279 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Blockchain (DE-588)1124028595 gnd Kryptologie (DE-588)4033329-2 gnd
topic_facet	Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum Bitcoin Spieltheorie Blockchain Kryptologie
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034083639&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
work_keys_str_mv	AT warrenmicah bitcoinagametheoreticanalysis AT walterdegruytergmbhcokg bitcoinagametheoreticanalysis

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MARC

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