The pecking order: social hierarchy as a philosophical problem
"Our political thinking is driven, far more than philosophers recognize, by a concern for social equality and, more specifically, a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. Niko Kolodny argues that, in order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse - the...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Harvard University Press
2023
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Our political thinking is driven, far more than philosophers recognize, by a concern for social equality and, more specifically, a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. Niko Kolodny argues that, in order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse - the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption - we cannot merely appeal to freedom (as libertarians like Nozick do) or to distributive fairness (as liberals like Rawls do). We must, instead, appeal directly to claims against inferiority, that no one stands above or below"-- |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 480 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780674248151 |
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| adam_text | Contents Introduction: A Negative Observation and a Positive Conjecture 1 I A First Instance of the Negative Observation: Justifying the State 11 1 The Received Materials: Improvement and Invasion 13 1.1 Claims 1.2 Interests in Improvement 1.3 Fair Trade-Offs 1.4 Chances 1.5 Choice Situations 1.6 Rights against Invasion 1.7 Appendix: Natural Injustice, Structural Injustice, and Claims against No One 13 15 17 19 20 28 2 Is the Claim against the State’s Force? 2.1 The Ubiquitous Presupposition: A Claim against the State 2.2 Enforcement 2.3 The Distributive Complaint 2.4 The Deontological Complaint 2.5 The Myth of the Omittites 2.6 The Natural Duty Argument 2.7 The Avoidance Principle 2.8 Avoiding State Imposition 2.9 Two Libertarian Principles 29 33 33 36 38 40 41 44 49 55 56
viii 3 CONTENTS Is the Claim against the State’s Threats? The Myth of Our Trusting Future Conditioning and Announcing Two Contrasts between Force and Threat From the Inheritance Principle to the Risk and Fear Principles 3.5 The Choice Principle 3.6 Coercion, Strictly Speaking 3.7 Exploitative Offers 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4 Last Attempts 4.1 Is the Claim against Being Obligated to Obey the State? 4.2 Is the Claim against the State’s Expropriation? II 5 The Positive Conjecture: Claims against Inferiority Relations of Inferiority 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6 Disparities of Regard 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7 8 Three Abstract Conditions, Two Paradigms Power, Authority, and Regard Is Objectionable Hierarchy Just Disparity of Regard? The Primary Tempering Factors The Structure of Claims against Inferiority Regard in General Esteem for Particular Qualities and Achievements Consideration for Persons Purely Expressive Disparities 62 62 63 64 65 68 72 76 78 78 81 85 87 89 91 95 97 101 103 103 106 108 114 Reductive Gambits 117 7.1 Expression 7.2 Psychic Cost 7.3 Recognition 117 118 119 The State and the Secondary Tempering Factors 122 8.1 A Claim against the Hierarchy of the State 8.2 Secondary Tempering Factors 8.3 Inferiority or Heteronomy: Self-Sovereignty as a Case Study 122 125 127
CONTENTS ix 8.4 Impersonal Justification and Least Discretion 8.5 Equal Application 8.6 Downward Accountability and Upward Unaccountability 8.7 8.8 8.9 Equal Influence Ruling and Being Ruled in Turn Equal Consideration and Equal Citizenship 137 138 140 The State and the Firm 9 9.1 Reviving the Parallel-Case Argument 9.2 The Firm and the Primary Tempering Factors 9.3 Impersonal Justification and Least Discretion in the Firm 9.4 A Case for Workplace Democracy? 10 145 145 148 150 Collective Inferiority III Further Instances 11 Claims against Corruption: The Negative Observation 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 The Duty to Execute Must Corruption Disserve the Public Interest? Unjust Enrichment The Duty to Exclude 12 Claims against Corruption: The Positive Conjecture 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 13 Impersonal Justification Explains the Duty to Execute Least Discretion Explains the Duty to Exclude Exploitative Offers as Violations of the Duty to Exclude Corruption without Inequality? Claims against Discrimination 13.1 Claims against Discrimination: The Negative Observation 13.2 Claims against Discrimination: The Positive Conjecture 14 131 134 135 Claims to Equal Treatment 14.1 Claims to Equal Treatment: The Negative Observation 14.2 Claims to Equal Treatment by the State: The Positive Conjecture 14.3 Claims to Equal Treatment by Officials: The Positive Conjecture 152 155 157 159 160 163 165 167 171 171 174 178 181 183 183 185 191 192 197 199
X CONTENTS 15 Claims to the Rule of Law 203 16 Claims to Equal Liberty 206 16.1 The Puzzle ofRawls’s Egalitarianism 16.2 Equal Basic Liberty: The Negative Observation 16.3 Equal Basic Liberty: The Positive Conjecture 17 Claims to Equality of Opportunity 17.1 Formal Equality of Opportunity 17.2 Substantive Equality of Opportunity 206 208 209 212 212 219 18 Claims against Poverty, Relative and Absolute 226 19 Claims against Illiberal Interventions: The Negative Observation 229 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 20 Illiberal Interventions Cost Effects Value-of-Compliance Effects Responsibility Public Justification Paternalism, Strictly Speaking Claims against Illiberal Interventions: The Positive Conjecture 20.1 Condemnation of Choice as a Disparity of Consideration 20.2 Rawls on Unequal Liberty 20.3 Self Sovereignty IV Contrasts 21 Being No Worse Off 21.1 Cosmic Fairness 21.2 Solidarity, Fraternity, Community 230 232 234 238 243 246 248 248 252 253 257 259 260 265 22 Relations of Equality 270 23 Nondomination 272 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 Domination and Inferiority Domination and Encroachment The Inescapability of Domination Does Republican Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? 272 276 277 286
xi CONTENTS V A Last Instance: Democracy 289 24 Preliminaries 291 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 25 292 294 295 297 Defining the Terms Three Interests in Democratic Decision-Making Substantive Interests Resolving Disagreement The Negative Observation: Correspondence 299 25.1 Securing Acceptance 25.2 Satisfying Preferences 25.3 Two Interpretations of Arrow’s Theorem 299 300 305 26 The Negative Observation: Influence 26.1 Absolute Decisiveness or Control 26.2 Positive Influence as a Means to Political Activity 26.3 Must Means to Political Activity Be Equal? 26.4 Must We Lend Ourselves to Political Activity? 26.5 The Expressive Significance of Relative Influence 309 309 310 314 316 319 27 The Positive Conjecture: Equal Influence 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 27.6 27.7 Equal Influence Equal, Not Positive, Opportunity Explaining Authority and Legitimacy Is Representation Compatible with Equal Influence? Bankers and Judges Selection Conditions: Election over Sortition Conduct Conditions: Collective Decisions, Not Aggregated Preferences 323 323 325 327 329 336 337 340 VI A Democracy Too Lenient and Too Demanding? 345 28 Pathologies of American Democracy 347 28.1 The Ills 28.2 Beyond Results 28.3 Beyond Responsive Policy 29 The Permissiveness of Formal Equality 29.1 A Priori Equality 347 350 352 354 354
CONTENTS Xii 29.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 30 31 32 Majority Rule Equal Populations Proportional Representation Persistent Minorities 357 360 362 364 Gerrymandering: A Case Study of Permissiveness 367 30.1 Defining “Gerrymandering” 30.2 Results 30.3 Responsiveness 30.4 Equal Influence and A Priori Equality 30.5 Two-Party Proportionality 30.6 Majority Proportionality 30.7 Racial Gerrymandering and Discrimination 30.8 Equal Influence and Asymmetric Information 30.9 Corruption 30.10 Frequency ofElections 367 369 370 371 372 374 375 377 380 381 The Demandingness of Informal Equality 383 31.1 Money and Time 31.2 Judgment Dependence 31.3 The Diversity of Objections to Money in Politics 383 385 388 31.4 Information and Organization 391 Arbitrary Voting 32.1 The Case against the Folk Theory 32.2 Why Arbitrary Voting Matters 32.3 Is Voting Arbitrary? 394 394 396 397 Conclusion: Not So Much Liberty As Noninferiority 402 Notes 409 References 441 Acknowledgments 459 Index 463
|
| adam_txt |
Contents Introduction: A Negative Observation and a Positive Conjecture 1 I A First Instance of the Negative Observation: Justifying the State 11 1 The Received Materials: Improvement and Invasion 13 1.1 Claims 1.2 Interests in Improvement 1.3 Fair Trade-Offs 1.4 Chances 1.5 Choice Situations 1.6 Rights against Invasion 1.7 Appendix: Natural Injustice, Structural Injustice, and Claims against No One 13 15 17 19 20 28 2 Is the Claim against the State’s Force? 2.1 The Ubiquitous Presupposition: A Claim against the State 2.2 Enforcement 2.3 The Distributive Complaint 2.4 The Deontological Complaint 2.5 The Myth of the Omittites 2.6 The Natural Duty Argument 2.7 The Avoidance Principle 2.8 Avoiding State Imposition 2.9 Two Libertarian Principles 29 33 33 36 38 40 41 44 49 55 56
viii 3 CONTENTS Is the Claim against the State’s Threats? The Myth of Our Trusting Future Conditioning and Announcing Two Contrasts between Force and Threat From the Inheritance Principle to the Risk and Fear Principles 3.5 The Choice Principle 3.6 Coercion, Strictly Speaking 3.7 Exploitative Offers 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4 Last Attempts 4.1 Is the Claim against Being Obligated to Obey the State? 4.2 Is the Claim against the State’s Expropriation? II 5 The Positive Conjecture: Claims against Inferiority Relations of Inferiority 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6 Disparities of Regard 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7 8 Three Abstract Conditions, Two Paradigms Power, Authority, and Regard Is Objectionable Hierarchy Just Disparity of Regard? The Primary Tempering Factors The Structure of Claims against Inferiority Regard in General Esteem for Particular Qualities and Achievements Consideration for Persons Purely Expressive Disparities 62 62 63 64 65 68 72 76 78 78 81 85 87 89 91 95 97 101 103 103 106 108 114 Reductive Gambits 117 7.1 Expression 7.2 Psychic Cost 7.3 Recognition 117 118 119 The State and the Secondary Tempering Factors 122 8.1 A Claim against the Hierarchy of the State 8.2 Secondary Tempering Factors 8.3 Inferiority or Heteronomy: Self-Sovereignty as a Case Study 122 125 127
CONTENTS ix 8.4 Impersonal Justification and Least Discretion 8.5 Equal Application 8.6 Downward Accountability and Upward Unaccountability 8.7 8.8 8.9 Equal Influence Ruling and Being Ruled in Turn Equal Consideration and Equal Citizenship 137 138 140 The State and the Firm 9 9.1 Reviving the Parallel-Case Argument 9.2 The Firm and the Primary Tempering Factors 9.3 Impersonal Justification and Least Discretion in the Firm 9.4 A Case for Workplace Democracy? 10 145 145 148 150 Collective Inferiority III Further Instances 11 Claims against Corruption: The Negative Observation 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 The Duty to Execute Must Corruption Disserve the Public Interest? Unjust Enrichment The Duty to Exclude 12 Claims against Corruption: The Positive Conjecture 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 13 Impersonal Justification Explains the Duty to Execute Least Discretion Explains the Duty to Exclude Exploitative Offers as Violations of the Duty to Exclude Corruption without Inequality? Claims against Discrimination 13.1 Claims against Discrimination: The Negative Observation 13.2 Claims against Discrimination: The Positive Conjecture 14 131 134 135 Claims to Equal Treatment 14.1 Claims to Equal Treatment: The Negative Observation 14.2 Claims to Equal Treatment by the State: The Positive Conjecture 14.3 Claims to Equal Treatment by Officials: The Positive Conjecture 152 155 157 159 160 163 165 167 171 171 174 178 181 183 183 185 191 192 197 199
X CONTENTS 15 Claims to the Rule of Law 203 16 Claims to Equal Liberty 206 16.1 The Puzzle ofRawls’s Egalitarianism 16.2 Equal Basic Liberty: The Negative Observation 16.3 Equal Basic Liberty: The Positive Conjecture 17 Claims to Equality of Opportunity 17.1 Formal Equality of Opportunity 17.2 Substantive Equality of Opportunity 206 208 209 212 212 219 18 Claims against Poverty, Relative and Absolute 226 19 Claims against Illiberal Interventions: The Negative Observation 229 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 20 Illiberal Interventions Cost Effects Value-of-Compliance Effects Responsibility Public Justification Paternalism, Strictly Speaking Claims against Illiberal Interventions: The Positive Conjecture 20.1 Condemnation of Choice as a Disparity of Consideration 20.2 Rawls on Unequal Liberty 20.3 Self Sovereignty IV Contrasts 21 Being No Worse Off 21.1 Cosmic Fairness 21.2 Solidarity, Fraternity, Community 230 232 234 238 243 246 248 248 252 253 257 259 260 265 22 Relations of Equality 270 23 Nondomination 272 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 Domination and Inferiority Domination and Encroachment The Inescapability of Domination Does Republican Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? 272 276 277 286
xi CONTENTS V A Last Instance: Democracy 289 24 Preliminaries 291 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 25 292 294 295 297 Defining the Terms Three Interests in Democratic Decision-Making Substantive Interests Resolving Disagreement The Negative Observation: Correspondence 299 25.1 Securing Acceptance 25.2 Satisfying Preferences 25.3 Two Interpretations of Arrow’s Theorem 299 300 305 26 The Negative Observation: Influence 26.1 Absolute Decisiveness or Control 26.2 Positive Influence as a Means to Political Activity 26.3 Must Means to Political Activity Be Equal? 26.4 Must We Lend Ourselves to Political Activity? 26.5 The Expressive Significance of Relative Influence 309 309 310 314 316 319 27 The Positive Conjecture: Equal Influence 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 27.6 27.7 Equal Influence Equal, Not Positive, Opportunity Explaining Authority and Legitimacy Is Representation Compatible with Equal Influence? Bankers and Judges Selection Conditions: Election over Sortition Conduct Conditions: Collective Decisions, Not Aggregated Preferences 323 323 325 327 329 336 337 340 VI A Democracy Too Lenient and Too Demanding? 345 28 Pathologies of American Democracy 347 28.1 The Ills 28.2 Beyond Results 28.3 Beyond Responsive Policy 29 The Permissiveness of Formal Equality 29.1 A Priori Equality 347 350 352 354 354
CONTENTS Xii 29.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 30 31 32 Majority Rule Equal Populations Proportional Representation Persistent Minorities 357 360 362 364 Gerrymandering: A Case Study of Permissiveness 367 30.1 Defining “Gerrymandering” 30.2 Results 30.3 Responsiveness 30.4 Equal Influence and A Priori Equality 30.5 Two-Party Proportionality 30.6 Majority Proportionality 30.7 Racial Gerrymandering and Discrimination 30.8 Equal Influence and Asymmetric Information 30.9 Corruption 30.10 Frequency ofElections 367 369 370 371 372 374 375 377 380 381 The Demandingness of Informal Equality 383 31.1 Money and Time 31.2 Judgment Dependence 31.3 The Diversity of Objections to Money in Politics 383 385 388 31.4 Information and Organization 391 Arbitrary Voting 32.1 The Case against the Folk Theory 32.2 Why Arbitrary Voting Matters 32.3 Is Voting Arbitrary? 394 394 396 397 Conclusion: Not So Much Liberty As Noninferiority 402 Notes 409 References 441 Acknowledgments 459 Index 463 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:25:44Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:45:59Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780674248151 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Kolodny, Niko Verfasser (DE-588)1044664568 aut The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem Niko Kolodny Cambridge, Massachusetts Harvard University Press 2023 XII, 480 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "Our political thinking is driven, far more than philosophers recognize, by a concern for social equality and, more specifically, a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. Niko Kolodny argues that, in order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse - the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption - we cannot merely appeal to freedom (as libertarians like Nozick do) or to distributive fairness (as liberals like Rawls do). We must, instead, appeal directly to claims against inferiority, that no one stands above or below"-- Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 gnd rswk-swf Unterlegenheit (DE-588)4193209-2 gnd rswk-swf Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 gnd rswk-swf Social stratification / Philosophy Political science / Philosophy Philosophy and social sciences Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 s Unterlegenheit (DE-588)4193209-2 s Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034057017&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Kolodny, Niko The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 gnd Unterlegenheit (DE-588)4193209-2 gnd Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4024842-2 (DE-588)4193209-2 (DE-588)4076226-9 |
| title | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem |
| title_auth | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem |
| title_exact_search | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem |
| title_full | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem Niko Kolodny |
| title_fullStr | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem Niko Kolodny |
| title_full_unstemmed | The pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem Niko Kolodny |
| title_short | The pecking order |
| title_sort | the pecking order social hierarchy as a philosophical problem |
| title_sub | social hierarchy as a philosophical problem |
| topic | Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 gnd Unterlegenheit (DE-588)4193209-2 gnd Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Hierarchie Unterlegenheit Politische Philosophie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034057017&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kolodnyniko thepeckingordersocialhierarchyasaphilosophicalproblem |