The Federal Reserve: a new history
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Chicago
University of Chicago Press
2022
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xviii, 688 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780226821658 022682165X |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a22000008c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048658305 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20230406 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 230118s2022 |||| b||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780226821658 |9 978-0-226-82165-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 022682165X |9 022682165X | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1310346872 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV048658305 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-20 |a DE-355 | ||
| 084 | |a QK 910 |0 (DE-625)141686: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Hetzel, Robert L. |d 1944- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)170054020 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Federal Reserve |b a new history |c Robert L. Hetzel |
| 264 | 1 | |a Chicago |b University of Chicago Press |c 2022 | |
| 300 | |a xviii, 688 Seiten |b Diagramme | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a Federal Reserve System |b Board of Governors |0 (DE-588)43408-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1913- |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftspolitik |0 (DE-588)4066493-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Geldpolitik |0 (DE-588)4019902-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States / Federal Reserve Board / History | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / History | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Monetary policy / United States / History / 20th century | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States / Economic policy / 20th century | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Politique monétaire / États-Unis / Histoire / 20e siècle | |
| 653 | 2 | |a États-Unis / Politique économique / 20e siècle | |
| 653 | 0 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Finance / General | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States / Federal Reserve Board | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Economic policy | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Monetary policy | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States | |
| 653 | 4 | |a 1900-1999 | |
| 653 | 6 | |a History | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Federal Reserve System |b Board of Governors |0 (DE-588)43408-5 |D b |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Geldpolitik |0 (DE-588)4019902-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Wirtschaftspolitik |0 (DE-588)4066493-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1913- |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |C b |5 DE-604 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |z 978-0-226-82166-5 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034032993&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034032993 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1808678412424839168 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Contents List of Figures and Tables xvi CHAPTER ONE In Search ofthe Monetary Standard i CHAPTER TWO The Organization ofthe Book 5 CHAPTER THREE What Causes the Monetary Disorder That Produces Real Disorder? 15 Appendix: Tables of the Monetary Contraction Marker by Recession 17 CHAPTER FOUR The Creation ofthe Fed 27 4,1. Populist Opposition to a Central Bank 29 4.2. Reform of the National Banking System and the National Monetary Commission 33 4.3. The Real Bills Foundation of the Early Fed 35 4.4· A Gold Standard Mentality in a Regime of Fiat Money Creation 39 4.5· Concluding Comment 41 CHAPTER FIVE Why the Fed Failed in the Depression: The 1920s Antecedents 42 5.1. The Real Bills Ethos of the 1920s 44 5.2. Stopping Speculation without the Discipline of Real Bills and the International Gold Standard 46 5.3. The Controversy over Stabilizing the Price Level 48 5.4. Regulating the Flow of Credit: The “Tenth Annual Report” 52 5.5. Controversy over the Monetary Standard: The Eastern Establishment versus the Populists 54 5.6. Concluding Comment 56 vii
viii CONTENTS CHAPTER SIX A Fiat Money Standard: Free Reserves Operating Procedures and Gold 57 6.1. Changing the Monetary Standard with No Understanding of the Consequences 58 6.2. The Fed’s Primitive Free Reserves Procedures 60 6.3. Reserves Adjustment and the Call Loan Market 65 6.4. The Pragmatic Development of the New Procedures 67 6.5. Gold Convertibility and Free Gold: Frozen into a Gold Standard Mentality 71 6.6. The Fed’s Incomprehension of the Consequences of Its Operating Procedures 74 6.7. Concluding Comment 78 CHAPTER SEVEN A Narrative Account ofthe 1920s 81 7.1. (Mis)Understanding a Paper Money Standard 81 7.2. Benjamin Strong 83 7.3· Adolph Miller: The Nemesis of Benjamin Strong 87 7.4. The 1920-21 Recession 89 7.5. Free Gold 96 7.6. Monetary Policy in Recession: 1923-24 and 1926-27 101 7.7·1927 109 7.8. Eliminating Credit Diversion into Securities Speculation ill 7.9. Were the 1920s the “High Tide” of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy? 113 7.10. Concluding Comment 116 CHAPTER EIGHT Attacking Speculative Mania 117 8.1. Liquidating Speculative Credit by Liquidating Total Credit 118 8.2. New York: Raise the Discount Rate and Banks Will Cut Back on Speculative Loans 120 8.3. The Board: Use “Direct Pressure” to Make Banks Cut Back on Speculative Loans 125 8.4. Marching toward the Great Depression 130 8.5. A Graphical Overview of the Transmission of Contractionary Monetary Policy 133 8.6. Identifying the Cause of the Depression as Contractionary Monetary Policy 137 8.7. Concluding Comment 141
CONTENTS ¡X CHAPTER NINE The Great Contraction: 1929-33 142 9.1. An Overview of the Great Contraction 144 9.2. The Great Contraction and Unrelievedly Contractionary Monetary Policy 147 9-3· 1930։ Why Did the Fed Back Off before Recovery Began? 152 9.4. Guarding against a Revival of Speculation by Keeping Banks in the Discount Window 156 9.5. 1931: Contractionary Monetary Policy Becomes Even More Contractionary 160 9.6. The Gold Standard Transmitted Contractionary US Monetary Policy 165 9.7.1932: Open Market Purchases and What Might Have Been 173 9.8.1932: Why Did the Fed Back Off in August 1932? 177 9.9. Early 1933: The Collapse of the Banking System 180 9.10. What Made the Great Contraction So Deep and So Long? 181 9.11. Why Did Learning Prove Impossible? 184 9.12. Concluding Comment 192 CHAPTER TEN The Roosevelt Era 193 10.1. Another Monetary Experiment 196 10.2. Ending Gold Convertibility in 1933: Setting Off and Killing the Boom 201 10.3. Return to a Gold Peg 208 10.4. Governor Marriner Eccles 210 . 10.5. The 1936-37 Recession 214 10.6. Keeping the Real Bills Faith 222 10.7. Concluding Comment 224 CHAPTER ELEVEN The Guiding Role of Governor Harrison and the NY Fed 226 11.1. Was Policy “Inept” Because Leadership Shifted Away from New York? 227 11.2. The Origin of the “New York View” 229 11.3. Assessing the Friedman-Schwartz View That Power Shifted from New York to the Board 229 11.4.1930 232 11.5.1931 «S 11.6.1932 241 11.7. The Political Economy of Open Market Purchases in 1932 250 11.8.1933 252 11.9. The 1936-37 Increases in Required Reserves 259 11.10. Concluding
Comment 261
X CONTENTS CHAPTER TWELVE Contemporary Critics in the Depression 262 12.1. H. Parker Willis 264 12.2. John Henry Williams 264 12.3. Charles O. Hardy 266 12.4. Joseph A. Schumpeter 267 12.5. Gottfried Haberler 268 12.6. Carl Snyder 270 12.7. Harold Reed 274 12.8. Lionel D. Edie 275 12.9. John R. Commons 277 12.10. Gustav Cassel 277 12.11. Ralph Hawtrey 280 12.12. T. Alan Goldsborough 285 12.13. Irving Fisher 286 12.14. Lauchlin Currie 290 CHAPTER THIRTEEN From World War II to the 1953 Recession 298 13.1. The Post-Accord Grand Experiment՜ 300 13.2. From the End of the War to the Accord 302 13.3. Explaining Recession with Prewar Inflationary Expectations 303 13.4. From Real Bills to Lean-against-the-Wind: The Crisis Leading to the Accord 308 13.5· What Did the Fed Borrow from and What Did It Abandon of Its 1920s Monetary Policy? 315 CHAPTER FOURTEEN LAW (Lean-against-the-Wind) and Long and Variable Lags 321 14.1. Lean-against-the-Wind (LAW) 322 . 14.2. LAW with Trade-Offs and Long and Variable Lags 323 14.3· LAW with Credibility or LAW with Trade-Offs? 328 14.4. LAW with Credibility and LAW with Trade-Offs as Semicontrolled Experiments 335 14.5. Concluding Comments 336 CHAPTER FIFTEEN The Early Martin Fed 337 15.1. The End of Real Bills 339 15.2. Free Reserves as the Intermediate Target and Bills Only 341 15.3· Concluding Comment 347
CONTENTS ХІ CHAPTER SIXTEEN From Price Stability to Inflation 349 16. J. Back-to-Back Recessions: 1957Q3 to 1958Q2 and 1960Q2 to 1961Q1 350 16.2. How Did the Early Martin Fed Lose Its Way in the Second Half of the 1960s? 359 16.3. Martin’s Ill-Fated Bargain 361 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN The Burns Fed 365 17.1. The Political and Intellectual Environment 366 17.2. Burns’s View of the Business Cycle and Economic Stabilization 369 17.3. Burns as FOMC Chairman 373 17.4. Inflation as a Cost-Push Phenomenon 374 17.5· “Macroeconometric Failure on a Grand Scale” 378 17.6. Concluding Comment 380 CHAPTER EIGHTEEN Stop-Go and the Collapse ofa Stable Nominal Anchor 381 18.1 The Complicated Politics of an Incomes Policy and Stop-Go Monetary Policy 382 18.2. Lean-against-the-Wind with Trade-Offs or Stop-Go Monetary Policy: A Taxonomy 386 18.3. Burns’s Juggling Act 389 18.4. G. William Miller 395 18.5. The Cost ofAllowing Inflation to Emerge in Economic Recovery 396 18.6. Concluding Comment 397 Appendix: Real Rate of Interest 398 CHAPTER NINETEEN The Volcker Fed and the Birth ofa New Monetary Standard 402 19.1. Restoring a Stable Nominal Anchor 403 19.2. Creating a New Monetary Standard: LAW with Credibility 405 19·3· The Louvre Accord 417 19·4· A Graphical Overview of Monetary Policy in the Great Moderation 418 19.5· A New Monetary Standard 422 CHAPTER TWENTY The Greenspan FOMC 424 20.1. Restoring a Stable Nominal Anchor 425 20.2. A Rocky Start with Louvre and the 1987 Stock Market Crash 427 20.3. The 1990 Recession, the Jobless Recovery, an Inflation Scare, and Finally Credibility 430
xii CONTENTS 20.4. The Asia Crisis and the 2000 Recession 433 20,5. Balancing Price Stability with Cost-Push Pressures 435 20.6. Fear of Deflation 438 20.7. Did Expansionary Monetary Policy Cause a Housing Bubble? 440 CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE The Great Recession 445 21,1. An Overview: This Time Was Not Different from Past Recessions 446 21.2. A Chronology of the Great Recession 448 21.3. Fall 2008, the Lehman Bankruptcy, and the Flight of the Cash tovestors 457 21.4. Monetary Policy Takes a Back Seat 459 21.5. Bernanke and thįCredit Channel 462 21.6. Reviving Real Bills Theories of the Collapse of Speculative Excess 465 21.7. Contractionary Monetary Policy 467 CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO The 2008 Financial Crisis 471 22.1. The Financial Safety Net and Moral Hazard 473 22.2. The Cash Investors Run the SIVs in Summer 2007 474 22.3. From Bear Stearns to Lehman Brothers 478 22.4. After Lehman 486 22.5. Putting Out the Fires in Fall 2008 489 22.6. Bank Bailouts 496 22.7. The Political Economy of Credit Policy 499 22.8. Credit Policy Crowded Out Monetary Policy 500 22.9. Crossing the Rubicon to Allocating Credit 502 22.10. The Great Financial Crisis and Erosion of Support for Free Markets 5p5 CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE The Eurozone Crisis 507 23.1. A Narrative Account of the Great Recession in the Eurozone 509 23.2. The Interaction of Financial Crisis and Contractionary Monetary Policy 521 23.3. The Quantitative Impact of a Monetary Shock 524 23.4. Concluding Comment 526 CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR Recoveryfrom the Great Recession s^7 24.1. Monetary Policy Was Initially Moderately Contractionary in the
Recovery 529 24.2. A Slow Start to the Recovery and Preemptive Increases in the Funds Rate 534
CONTENTS ХІІІ 24.3. Secular Stagnation, Fear of Global Recession, and Central Banks Out of Ammunition 538 24.4. Quantitative Easing 541 24.5 . What Accounts for the Near Price Stability in the Recovery from the Great Recession? 544 24.6. Concluding Comment 548 Appendix: The FOMC’s QE Programs 549 CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE Covid-19 and the Fed’s Credit Policy 550 25.1. Chair Powell Defines the Narrative 552 25.2. What Destabilized Financial Markets in March 2020? 554 25.3. What Calmed Financial Markets in March 2020? 560 25.4. Credit Policy Does Not Draw Forth Real Resources 569 25.5. Supporting Financial Markets While Avoiding Credit Allocation 573 25.6. Can the Fed Maintain Its Independence? 576 25.7. Concluding Comment 577 Appendix: Program Definitions 579 Appendix: The Political Economy of Credit Policy 581 CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX Covid-19 and the Fed’s Monetary Policy: Flexible-Average-Inflation Targeting 584 26.1 . FOMC Commentary 585 26.2 . An Evolving Phillips Curve Sidelines Inflation 588 26.3 · The Return of the Phillips Curve 591 26.4 · Monetary Policy Becomes Expansionary 592 CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN How Can the Fed Control Inflation? 595 27.1. Is Monetizing Government Debt by the Fed Inflationary? 596 27.2. The Control of Money Creation and Inflation with IOR (Interest on Reserves) 601 27.3. Restoring Money as an Indicator 604 27.4. Concluding Comment 605 CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT Making the Monetary Standard Explicit 606 28.1. Why the FOMC Communicates the Way It Does 607 28.2. Rules versus Discretion as Seen by a Fed Insider 608 28.3. A Case Study in FOMC Decision-Making: The
August 2011 Meeting 611 28.4. Using the SEP to Move toward Rule-Based Policy 615
xiv CONTENTS 28.5. Using a Model to Explain the Monetary Standard 619 28.6. Rules, Independence, and Accountability 622 CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE What Is the Optimal Monetary Standard? 625 29.1. From Monetarism to the “Basic” New Keynesian DSGE Model 627 29.2. The NK Model 628 29.3. LAW with Credibility and LAW with Trade-Offs (Cyclical Inertia) 630 29.4. The Optimal Rule 632 29.5. Money and the NK Model 634 29.6. Concluding Comment 634 CHAPTER THIRTY Why Is Learning So Hard? 636 Acknowledgments 639 Bibliography 641 Index 671 |
| adam_txt |
Contents List of Figures and Tables xvi CHAPTER ONE In Search ofthe Monetary Standard i CHAPTER TWO The Organization ofthe Book 5 CHAPTER THREE What Causes the Monetary Disorder That Produces Real Disorder? 15 Appendix: Tables of the Monetary Contraction Marker by Recession 17 CHAPTER FOUR The Creation ofthe Fed 27 4,1. Populist Opposition to a Central Bank 29 4.2. Reform of the National Banking System and the National Monetary Commission 33 4.3. The Real Bills Foundation of the Early Fed 35 4.4· A Gold Standard Mentality in a Regime of Fiat Money Creation 39 4.5· Concluding Comment 41 CHAPTER FIVE Why the Fed Failed in the Depression: The 1920s Antecedents 42 5.1. The Real Bills Ethos of the 1920s 44 5.2. Stopping Speculation without the Discipline of Real Bills and the International Gold Standard 46 5.3. The Controversy over Stabilizing the Price Level 48 5.4. Regulating the Flow of Credit: The “Tenth Annual Report” 52 5.5. Controversy over the Monetary Standard: The Eastern Establishment versus the Populists 54 5.6. Concluding Comment 56 vii
viii CONTENTS CHAPTER SIX A Fiat Money Standard: Free Reserves Operating Procedures and Gold 57 6.1. Changing the Monetary Standard with No Understanding of the Consequences 58 6.2. The Fed’s Primitive Free Reserves Procedures 60 6.3. Reserves Adjustment and the Call Loan Market 65 6.4. The Pragmatic Development of the New Procedures 67 6.5. Gold Convertibility and Free Gold: Frozen into a Gold Standard Mentality 71 6.6. The Fed’s Incomprehension of the Consequences of Its Operating Procedures 74 6.7. Concluding Comment 78 CHAPTER SEVEN A Narrative Account ofthe 1920s 81 7.1. (Mis)Understanding a Paper Money Standard 81 7.2. Benjamin Strong 83 7.3· Adolph Miller: The Nemesis of Benjamin Strong 87 7.4. The 1920-21 Recession 89 7.5. Free Gold 96 7.6. Monetary Policy in Recession: 1923-24 and 1926-27 101 7.7·1927 109 7.8. Eliminating Credit Diversion into Securities Speculation ill 7.9. Were the 1920s the “High Tide” of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy? 113 7.10. Concluding Comment 116 CHAPTER EIGHT Attacking Speculative Mania 117 8.1. Liquidating Speculative Credit by Liquidating Total Credit 118 8.2. New York: Raise the Discount Rate and Banks Will Cut Back on Speculative Loans 120 8.3. The Board: Use “Direct Pressure” to Make Banks Cut Back on Speculative Loans 125 8.4. Marching toward the Great Depression 130 8.5. A Graphical Overview of the Transmission of Contractionary Monetary Policy 133 8.6. Identifying the Cause of the Depression as Contractionary Monetary Policy 137 8.7. Concluding Comment 141
CONTENTS ¡X CHAPTER NINE The Great Contraction: 1929-33 142 9.1. An Overview of the Great Contraction 144 9.2. The Great Contraction and Unrelievedly Contractionary Monetary Policy 147 9-3· 1930։ Why Did the Fed Back Off before Recovery Began? 152 9.4. Guarding against a Revival of Speculation by Keeping Banks in the Discount Window 156 9.5. 1931: Contractionary Monetary Policy Becomes Even More Contractionary 160 9.6. The Gold Standard Transmitted Contractionary US Monetary Policy 165 9.7.1932: Open Market Purchases and What Might Have Been 173 9.8.1932: Why Did the Fed Back Off in August 1932? 177 9.9. Early 1933: The Collapse of the Banking System 180 9.10. What Made the Great Contraction So Deep and So Long? 181 9.11. Why Did Learning Prove Impossible? 184 9.12. Concluding Comment 192 CHAPTER TEN The Roosevelt Era 193 10.1. Another Monetary Experiment 196 10.2. Ending Gold Convertibility in 1933: Setting Off and Killing the Boom 201 10.3. Return to a Gold Peg 208 10.4. Governor Marriner Eccles 210 . 10.5. The 1936-37 Recession 214 10.6. Keeping the Real Bills Faith 222 10.7. Concluding Comment 224 CHAPTER ELEVEN The Guiding Role of Governor Harrison and the NY Fed 226 11.1. Was Policy “Inept” Because Leadership Shifted Away from New York? 227 11.2. The Origin of the “New York View” 229 11.3. Assessing the Friedman-Schwartz View That Power Shifted from New York to the Board 229 11.4.1930 232 11.5.1931 «S 11.6.1932 241 11.7. The Political Economy of Open Market Purchases in 1932 250 11.8.1933 252 11.9. The 1936-37 Increases in Required Reserves 259 11.10. Concluding
Comment 261
X CONTENTS CHAPTER TWELVE Contemporary Critics in the Depression 262 12.1. H. Parker Willis 264 12.2. John Henry Williams 264 12.3. Charles O. Hardy 266 12.4. Joseph A. Schumpeter 267 12.5. Gottfried Haberler 268 12.6. Carl Snyder 270 12.7. Harold Reed 274 12.8. Lionel D. Edie 275 12.9. John R. Commons 277 12.10. Gustav Cassel 277 12.11. Ralph Hawtrey 280 12.12. T. Alan Goldsborough 285 12.13. Irving Fisher 286 12.14. Lauchlin Currie 290 CHAPTER THIRTEEN From World War II to the 1953 Recession 298 13.1. The Post-Accord Grand Experiment՜ 300 13.2. From the End of the War to the Accord 302 13.3. Explaining Recession with Prewar Inflationary Expectations 303 13.4. From Real Bills to Lean-against-the-Wind: The Crisis Leading to the Accord 308 13.5· What Did the Fed Borrow from and What Did It Abandon of Its 1920s Monetary Policy? 315 CHAPTER FOURTEEN LAW (Lean-against-the-Wind) and Long and Variable Lags 321 14.1. Lean-against-the-Wind (LAW) 322 . 14.2. LAW with Trade-Offs and Long and Variable Lags 323 14.3· LAW with Credibility or LAW with Trade-Offs? 328 14.4. LAW with Credibility and LAW with Trade-Offs as Semicontrolled Experiments 335 14.5. Concluding Comments 336 CHAPTER FIFTEEN The Early Martin Fed 337 15.1. The End of Real Bills 339 15.2. Free Reserves as the Intermediate Target and Bills Only 341 15.3· Concluding Comment 347
CONTENTS ХІ CHAPTER SIXTEEN From Price Stability to Inflation 349 16. J. Back-to-Back Recessions: 1957Q3 to 1958Q2 and 1960Q2 to 1961Q1 350 16.2. How Did the Early Martin Fed Lose Its Way in the Second Half of the 1960s? 359 16.3. Martin’s Ill-Fated Bargain 361 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN The Burns Fed 365 17.1. The Political and Intellectual Environment 366 17.2. Burns’s View of the Business Cycle and Economic Stabilization 369 17.3. Burns as FOMC Chairman 373 17.4. Inflation as a Cost-Push Phenomenon 374 17.5· “Macroeconometric Failure on a Grand Scale” 378 17.6. Concluding Comment 380 CHAPTER EIGHTEEN Stop-Go and the Collapse ofa Stable Nominal Anchor 381 18.1 The Complicated Politics of an Incomes Policy and Stop-Go Monetary Policy 382 18.2. Lean-against-the-Wind with Trade-Offs or Stop-Go Monetary Policy: A Taxonomy 386 18.3. Burns’s Juggling Act 389 18.4. G. William Miller 395 18.5. The Cost ofAllowing Inflation to Emerge in Economic Recovery 396 18.6. Concluding Comment 397 Appendix: Real Rate of Interest 398 CHAPTER NINETEEN The Volcker Fed and the Birth ofa New Monetary Standard 402 19.1. Restoring a Stable Nominal Anchor 403 19.2. Creating a New Monetary Standard: LAW with Credibility 405 19·3· The Louvre Accord 417 19·4· A Graphical Overview of Monetary Policy in the Great Moderation 418 19.5· A New Monetary Standard 422 CHAPTER TWENTY The Greenspan FOMC 424 20.1. Restoring a Stable Nominal Anchor 425 20.2. A Rocky Start with Louvre and the 1987 Stock Market Crash 427 20.3. The 1990 Recession, the Jobless Recovery, an Inflation Scare, and Finally Credibility 430
xii CONTENTS 20.4. The Asia Crisis and the 2000 Recession 433 20,5. Balancing Price Stability with Cost-Push Pressures 435 20.6. Fear of Deflation 438 20.7. Did Expansionary Monetary Policy Cause a Housing Bubble? 440 CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE The Great Recession 445 21,1. An Overview: This Time Was Not Different from Past Recessions 446 21.2. A Chronology of the Great Recession 448 21.3. Fall 2008, the Lehman Bankruptcy, and the Flight of the Cash tovestors 457 21.4. Monetary Policy Takes a Back Seat 459 21.5. Bernanke and thįCredit Channel 462 21.6. Reviving Real Bills Theories of the Collapse of Speculative Excess 465 21.7. Contractionary Monetary Policy 467 CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO The 2008 Financial Crisis 471 22.1. The Financial Safety Net and Moral Hazard 473 22.2. The Cash Investors Run the SIVs in Summer 2007 474 22.3. From Bear Stearns to Lehman Brothers 478 22.4. After Lehman 486 22.5. Putting Out the Fires in Fall 2008 489 22.6. Bank Bailouts 496 22.7. The Political Economy of Credit Policy 499 22.8. Credit Policy Crowded Out Monetary Policy 500 22.9. Crossing the Rubicon to Allocating Credit 502 22.10. The Great Financial Crisis and Erosion of Support for Free Markets 5p5 CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE The Eurozone Crisis 507 23.1. A Narrative Account of the Great Recession in the Eurozone 509 23.2. The Interaction of Financial Crisis and Contractionary Monetary Policy 521 23.3. The Quantitative Impact of a Monetary Shock 524 23.4. Concluding Comment 526 CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR Recoveryfrom the Great Recession s^7 24.1. Monetary Policy Was Initially Moderately Contractionary in the
Recovery 529 24.2. A Slow Start to the Recovery and Preemptive Increases in the Funds Rate 534
CONTENTS ХІІІ 24.3. Secular Stagnation, Fear of Global Recession, and Central Banks Out of Ammunition 538 24.4. Quantitative Easing 541 24.5 . What Accounts for the Near Price Stability in the Recovery from the Great Recession? 544 24.6. Concluding Comment 548 Appendix: The FOMC’s QE Programs 549 CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE Covid-19 and the Fed’s Credit Policy 550 25.1. Chair Powell Defines the Narrative 552 25.2. What Destabilized Financial Markets in March 2020? 554 25.3. What Calmed Financial Markets in March 2020? 560 25.4. Credit Policy Does Not Draw Forth Real Resources 569 25.5. Supporting Financial Markets While Avoiding Credit Allocation 573 25.6. Can the Fed Maintain Its Independence? 576 25.7. Concluding Comment 577 Appendix: Program Definitions 579 Appendix: The Political Economy of Credit Policy 581 CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX Covid-19 and the Fed’s Monetary Policy: Flexible-Average-Inflation Targeting 584 26.1 . FOMC Commentary 585 26.2 . An Evolving Phillips Curve Sidelines Inflation 588 26.3 · The Return of the Phillips Curve 591 26.4 · Monetary Policy Becomes Expansionary 592 CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN How Can the Fed Control Inflation? 595 27.1. Is Monetizing Government Debt by the Fed Inflationary? 596 27.2. The Control of Money Creation and Inflation with IOR (Interest on Reserves) 601 27.3. Restoring Money as an Indicator 604 27.4. Concluding Comment 605 CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT Making the Monetary Standard Explicit 606 28.1. Why the FOMC Communicates the Way It Does 607 28.2. Rules versus Discretion as Seen by a Fed Insider 608 28.3. A Case Study in FOMC Decision-Making: The
August 2011 Meeting 611 28.4. Using the SEP to Move toward Rule-Based Policy 615
xiv CONTENTS 28.5. Using a Model to Explain the Monetary Standard 619 28.6. Rules, Independence, and Accountability 622 CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE What Is the Optimal Monetary Standard? 625 29.1. From Monetarism to the “Basic” New Keynesian DSGE Model 627 29.2. The NK Model 628 29.3. LAW with Credibility and LAW with Trade-Offs (Cyclical Inertia) 630 29.4. The Optimal Rule 632 29.5. Money and the NK Model 634 29.6. Concluding Comment 634 CHAPTER THIRTY Why Is Learning So Hard? 636 Acknowledgments 639 Bibliography 641 Index 671 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Hetzel, Robert L. 1944- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170054020 |
| author_facet | Hetzel, Robert L. 1944- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Hetzel, Robert L. 1944- |
| author_variant | r l h rl rlh |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048658305 |
| classification_rvk | QK 910 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1310346872 (DE-599)BVBBV048658305 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| era | Geschichte 1913- gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1913- |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a22000008c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048658305</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230406</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230118s2022 |||| b||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780226821658</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-226-82165-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">022682165X</subfield><subfield code="9">022682165X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1310346872</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048658305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QK 910</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141686:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hetzel, Robert L.</subfield><subfield code="d">1944-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)170054020</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Federal Reserve</subfield><subfield code="b">a new history</subfield><subfield code="c">Robert L. Hetzel</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Chicago</subfield><subfield code="b">University of Chicago Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xviii, 688 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Diagramme</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="2" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Federal Reserve System</subfield><subfield code="b">Board of Governors</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)43408-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1913-</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftspolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066493-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geldpolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4019902-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">United States / Federal Reserve Board / History</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / History</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Monetary policy / United States / History / 20th century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">United States / Economic policy / 20th century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Politique monétaire / États-Unis / Histoire / 20e siècle</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">États-Unis / Politique économique / 20e siècle</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Finance / General</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">United States / Federal Reserve Board</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Economic policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Monetary policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">1900-1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">History</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Federal Reserve System</subfield><subfield code="b">Board of Governors</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)43408-5</subfield><subfield code="D">b</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geldpolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4019902-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftspolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066493-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1913-</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="C">b</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-226-82166-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034032993&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034032993</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV048658305 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:21:02Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-29T00:09:08Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780226821658 022682165X |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034032993 |
| oclc_num | 1310346872 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-20 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-20 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | xviii, 688 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | University of Chicago Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Hetzel, Robert L. 1944- Verfasser (DE-588)170054020 aut The Federal Reserve a new history Robert L. Hetzel Chicago University of Chicago Press 2022 xviii, 688 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (DE-588)43408-5 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1913- gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd rswk-swf Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf United States / Federal Reserve Board / History Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / History Monetary policy / United States / History / 20th century United States / Economic policy / 20th century Politique monétaire / États-Unis / Histoire / 20e siècle États-Unis / Politique économique / 20e siècle BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Finance / General Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) United States / Federal Reserve Board Economic policy Monetary policy United States 1900-1999 History USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (DE-588)43408-5 b Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 s Geschichte 1913- z b DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-226-82166-5 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034032993&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Hetzel, Robert L. 1944- The Federal Reserve a new history Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (DE-588)43408-5 gnd Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)43408-5 (DE-588)4066493-4 (DE-588)4019902-2 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | The Federal Reserve a new history |
| title_auth | The Federal Reserve a new history |
| title_exact_search | The Federal Reserve a new history |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Federal Reserve a new history |
| title_full | The Federal Reserve a new history Robert L. Hetzel |
| title_fullStr | The Federal Reserve a new history Robert L. Hetzel |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Federal Reserve a new history Robert L. Hetzel |
| title_short | The Federal Reserve |
| title_sort | the federal reserve a new history |
| title_sub | a new history |
| topic | Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (DE-588)43408-5 gnd Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Federal Reserve System Board of Governors Wirtschaftspolitik Geldpolitik USA |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034032993&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hetzelrobertl thefederalreserveanewhistory |