Game theory and international environmental cooperation: essential readings

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Karl-Göran Mäler (1989), 'The Acid Rain Game', in H. Folmer and E. van Ierland (eds), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, Chapter 12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 231-52 -- Scott Barrett (1994), 'Self-Enfor...

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Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Northampton, MA Edward Elgar Pub 2015
Schriftenreihe:Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
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Zusammenfassung:Recommended readings (Machine generated): Karl-Göran Mäler (1989), 'The Acid Rain Game', in H. Folmer and E. van Ierland (eds), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, Chapter 12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 231-52 -- Scott Barrett (1994), 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements', Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on Environmental Economics, 46, October, 878-94 -- Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (1993), 'Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment', Journal of Public Economics, 52 (3), October, 309-28 -- Michael Hoel (1992), 'International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions', Environmental and Resource Economics, 2 (2), March, 141-59 -- Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens (1997), 'The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (3), October, 379-401 --
Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Eftichios S. Sartzetakis (2006), 'Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach', Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (2), May, 247-63 -- Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2006), 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited', Oxford Economic Papers, 58 (2), April, 233-63 -- Larry Karp and Leo Simon (2013), 'Participation Games and International Environmental Agreements: A Non-Parametric Model', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65 (2), March, 326-44 -- Carsten Helm (2001), 'On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a Coalitional Game with Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 30 (1), September, 141-6 -- Rögnvaldur Hannesson (1997), 'Fishing as a Supergame', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32 (3), March, 309-22 --
Michael Finus and Sigve Tjøtta (2003), 'The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: The Great Leap Forward?' Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), September, 2031-48 -- Henk Folmer, Pierre v. Mouche and Shannon Ragland (1993), 'Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems', Environmental and Resource Economics, 3 (4), August, 313-35 -- Anke Gerber and Philipp C. Wichardt (2009), 'Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong Institutions', Journal of Public Economics, 93 (3-4), April, 429-39 -- Todd L. Cherry and David M. McEvoy (2013), 'Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis', Environmental and Resource Economics, 54 (1), January, 63-77 -- David M. McEvoy and John K. Stranlund (2009), 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance', Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (4), April, 491-508 --
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (Seiten)
ISBN:9781784713201
DOI:10.4337/9781784713201