Crafting Consensus: Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy
Crafting Consensus offers a new theory of committee decision making and provides a rich understanding of modern-day central banking by studying central banks' communication with the public. Using extensive empirical analysis, Nicole Baerg explains how central bank transparency depends on the co...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press, Incorporated
2020
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Crafting Consensus offers a new theory of committee decision making and provides a rich understanding of modern-day central banking by studying central banks' communication with the public. Using extensive empirical analysis, Nicole Baerg explains how central bank transparency depends on the configuration of central bank committee members' preferences and the institutional rules governing how committee members set policy. The book shows that monetary policy committees comprised of bankers with opposing inflation preferences communicate more precisely and that precise communication then has positive economic effects |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (218 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780190499501 9780190499488 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Cover -- Crafting Consensus: Why Central Bankers Change their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter1: Crafting Consensus -- 1.1 The Girth of Greenspan's Briefcase -- 1.2 Central Bankers as Wordsmiths -- 1.3 The Statement-Writing Process -- 1.4 The Importance of Committee Composition -- 1.5 What Comes Next? -- Chapter 2: Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Central Bank Committees and Institutional Design -- 2.2.1 Committee Size -- 2.2.2 Committee Composition -- 2.2.3 Decision-Making Protocol -- 2.3 Central Bank Communication -- 2.3.1 How to Communicate? -- 2.3.2 Formal Models of Political Communication -- 2.3.3 Communication and Expectations -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: A Model of Central Bank Communication -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Model -- 3.2.1 Strategic Vagueness -- 3.2.2 Model Departures -- 3.2.3 Actors -- 3.2.4 Utility Functions -- 3.2.5 Game Sequence -- 3.2.6 Equilibrium -- 3.3 Disseminating Economic Information -- 3.4 Empirical Implications -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Central Bank Committees and Political Communication -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Research Design -- 4.2.1 The Sample -- 4.2.2 Dependent Variables -- 4.2.3 Independent Variables -- 4.3 Empirical Model and Results -- 4.3.1 Results for Diversity on Policy Statement Uncertainty -- 4.3.2 Results for Diversity on Policy Editing -- 4.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Central Bank Announcements and Inflation Expectations -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Origins of Inflation Expectations -- 5.3 Research Design -- 5.4 Data and Results -- 5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Posterior Inflation Expectations -- 5.4.2 Independent Variables -- 5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 5.4.4 Regression Analysis -- 5.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis -- 5.5 Conclusion | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter 6: Testing the Theory in Latin America -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Data and Analysis -- 6.2.1 Dependent Variable: Inflation -- 6.2.2 Independent Variables: Inflation Expectations -- 6.2.3 Information Precision -- 6.2.4 Control Variables -- 6.3 Main Results -- 6.4 Sensitivity Analysis -- 6.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Putting It All Together -- 7.1 Summary of the Findings -- 7.2 Accountability and Transparency -- 7.3 Horizontal Accountability and Central Bank Appointments -- 7.4 Future Research -- 7.4.1 Rotational Voting -- 7.4.2 Qualifications -- 7.5 Applications beyond Central Banking -- 7.5.1 Judicial Politics -- 7.5.2 Corporate Governance -- 7.6 Final Thoughts -- Appendix -- References -- Index | |
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| contents | Cover -- Crafting Consensus: Why Central Bankers Change their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter1: Crafting Consensus -- 1.1 The Girth of Greenspan's Briefcase -- 1.2 Central Bankers as Wordsmiths -- 1.3 The Statement-Writing Process -- 1.4 The Importance of Committee Composition -- 1.5 What Comes Next? -- Chapter 2: Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Central Bank Committees and Institutional Design -- 2.2.1 Committee Size -- 2.2.2 Committee Composition -- 2.2.3 Decision-Making Protocol -- 2.3 Central Bank Communication -- 2.3.1 How to Communicate? -- 2.3.2 Formal Models of Political Communication -- 2.3.3 Communication and Expectations -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: A Model of Central Bank Communication -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Model -- 3.2.1 Strategic Vagueness -- 3.2.2 Model Departures -- 3.2.3 Actors -- 3.2.4 Utility Functions -- 3.2.5 Game Sequence -- 3.2.6 Equilibrium -- 3.3 Disseminating Economic Information -- 3.4 Empirical Implications -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Central Bank Committees and Political Communication -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Research Design -- 4.2.1 The Sample -- 4.2.2 Dependent Variables -- 4.2.3 Independent Variables -- 4.3 Empirical Model and Results -- 4.3.1 Results for Diversity on Policy Statement Uncertainty -- 4.3.2 Results for Diversity on Policy Editing -- 4.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Central Bank Announcements and Inflation Expectations -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Origins of Inflation Expectations -- 5.3 Research Design -- 5.4 Data and Results -- 5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Posterior Inflation Expectations -- 5.4.2 Independent Variables -- 5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 5.4.4 Regression Analysis -- 5.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis -- 5.5 Conclusion Chapter 6: Testing the Theory in Latin America -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Data and Analysis -- 6.2.1 Dependent Variable: Inflation -- 6.2.2 Independent Variables: Inflation Expectations -- 6.2.3 Information Precision -- 6.2.4 Control Variables -- 6.3 Main Results -- 6.4 Sensitivity Analysis -- 6.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Putting It All Together -- 7.1 Summary of the Findings -- 7.2 Accountability and Transparency -- 7.3 Horizontal Accountability and Central Bank Appointments -- 7.4 Future Research -- 7.4.1 Rotational Voting -- 7.4.2 Qualifications -- 7.5 Applications beyond Central Banking -- 7.5.1 Judicial Politics -- 7.5.2 Corporate Governance -- 7.6 Final Thoughts -- Appendix -- References -- Index |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV048631414 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:16:05Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:44:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780190499501 9780190499488 |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2020 |
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| spelling | Baerg, Nicole Verfasser aut Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy Oxford Oxford University Press, Incorporated 2020 ©2020 1 Online-Ressource (218 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cover -- Crafting Consensus: Why Central Bankers Change their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter1: Crafting Consensus -- 1.1 The Girth of Greenspan's Briefcase -- 1.2 Central Bankers as Wordsmiths -- 1.3 The Statement-Writing Process -- 1.4 The Importance of Committee Composition -- 1.5 What Comes Next? -- Chapter 2: Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Central Bank Committees and Institutional Design -- 2.2.1 Committee Size -- 2.2.2 Committee Composition -- 2.2.3 Decision-Making Protocol -- 2.3 Central Bank Communication -- 2.3.1 How to Communicate? -- 2.3.2 Formal Models of Political Communication -- 2.3.3 Communication and Expectations -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: A Model of Central Bank Communication -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Model -- 3.2.1 Strategic Vagueness -- 3.2.2 Model Departures -- 3.2.3 Actors -- 3.2.4 Utility Functions -- 3.2.5 Game Sequence -- 3.2.6 Equilibrium -- 3.3 Disseminating Economic Information -- 3.4 Empirical Implications -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Central Bank Committees and Political Communication -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Research Design -- 4.2.1 The Sample -- 4.2.2 Dependent Variables -- 4.2.3 Independent Variables -- 4.3 Empirical Model and Results -- 4.3.1 Results for Diversity on Policy Statement Uncertainty -- 4.3.2 Results for Diversity on Policy Editing -- 4.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Central Bank Announcements and Inflation Expectations -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Origins of Inflation Expectations -- 5.3 Research Design -- 5.4 Data and Results -- 5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Posterior Inflation Expectations -- 5.4.2 Independent Variables -- 5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 5.4.4 Regression Analysis -- 5.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis -- 5.5 Conclusion Chapter 6: Testing the Theory in Latin America -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Data and Analysis -- 6.2.1 Dependent Variable: Inflation -- 6.2.2 Independent Variables: Inflation Expectations -- 6.2.3 Information Precision -- 6.2.4 Control Variables -- 6.3 Main Results -- 6.4 Sensitivity Analysis -- 6.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Putting It All Together -- 7.1 Summary of the Findings -- 7.2 Accountability and Transparency -- 7.3 Horizontal Accountability and Central Bank Appointments -- 7.4 Future Research -- 7.4.1 Rotational Voting -- 7.4.2 Qualifications -- 7.5 Applications beyond Central Banking -- 7.5.1 Judicial Politics -- 7.5.2 Corporate Governance -- 7.6 Final Thoughts -- Appendix -- References -- Index Crafting Consensus offers a new theory of committee decision making and provides a rich understanding of modern-day central banking by studying central banks' communication with the public. Using extensive empirical analysis, Nicole Baerg explains how central bank transparency depends on the configuration of central bank committee members' preferences and the institutional rules governing how committee members set policy. The book shows that monetary policy committees comprised of bankers with opposing inflation preferences communicate more precisely and that precise communication then has positive economic effects Banks and banking, Central-Language Communication in financial institutions Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf Kommunikation (DE-588)4031883-7 gnd rswk-swf Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd rswk-swf Electronic books Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 s Kommunikation (DE-588)4031883-7 s Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Baerg, Nicole Crafting Consensus Oxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated,c2020 9780190499488 |
| spellingShingle | Baerg, Nicole Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy Cover -- Crafting Consensus: Why Central Bankers Change their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter1: Crafting Consensus -- 1.1 The Girth of Greenspan's Briefcase -- 1.2 Central Bankers as Wordsmiths -- 1.3 The Statement-Writing Process -- 1.4 The Importance of Committee Composition -- 1.5 What Comes Next? -- Chapter 2: Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Central Bank Committees and Institutional Design -- 2.2.1 Committee Size -- 2.2.2 Committee Composition -- 2.2.3 Decision-Making Protocol -- 2.3 Central Bank Communication -- 2.3.1 How to Communicate? -- 2.3.2 Formal Models of Political Communication -- 2.3.3 Communication and Expectations -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: A Model of Central Bank Communication -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Model -- 3.2.1 Strategic Vagueness -- 3.2.2 Model Departures -- 3.2.3 Actors -- 3.2.4 Utility Functions -- 3.2.5 Game Sequence -- 3.2.6 Equilibrium -- 3.3 Disseminating Economic Information -- 3.4 Empirical Implications -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Central Bank Committees and Political Communication -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Research Design -- 4.2.1 The Sample -- 4.2.2 Dependent Variables -- 4.2.3 Independent Variables -- 4.3 Empirical Model and Results -- 4.3.1 Results for Diversity on Policy Statement Uncertainty -- 4.3.2 Results for Diversity on Policy Editing -- 4.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Central Bank Announcements and Inflation Expectations -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Origins of Inflation Expectations -- 5.3 Research Design -- 5.4 Data and Results -- 5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Posterior Inflation Expectations -- 5.4.2 Independent Variables -- 5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics -- 5.4.4 Regression Analysis -- 5.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis -- 5.5 Conclusion Chapter 6: Testing the Theory in Latin America -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Data and Analysis -- 6.2.1 Dependent Variable: Inflation -- 6.2.2 Independent Variables: Inflation Expectations -- 6.2.3 Information Precision -- 6.2.4 Control Variables -- 6.3 Main Results -- 6.4 Sensitivity Analysis -- 6.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Putting It All Together -- 7.1 Summary of the Findings -- 7.2 Accountability and Transparency -- 7.3 Horizontal Accountability and Central Bank Appointments -- 7.4 Future Research -- 7.4.1 Rotational Voting -- 7.4.2 Qualifications -- 7.5 Applications beyond Central Banking -- 7.5.1 Judicial Politics -- 7.5.2 Corporate Governance -- 7.6 Final Thoughts -- Appendix -- References -- Index Banks and banking, Central-Language Communication in financial institutions Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Kommunikation (DE-588)4031883-7 gnd Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4019902-2 (DE-588)4031883-7 (DE-588)4042669-5 |
| title | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_auth | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_exact_search | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_full | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_fullStr | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Crafting Consensus Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| title_short | Crafting Consensus |
| title_sort | crafting consensus why central bankers change their speech and how speech changes the economy |
| title_sub | Why Central Bankers Change Their Speech and How Speech Changes the Economy |
| topic | Banks and banking, Central-Language Communication in financial institutions Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Kommunikation (DE-588)4031883-7 gnd Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Banks and banking, Central-Language Communication in financial institutions Geldpolitik Kommunikation Notenbank |
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