Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations
American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, MA
Harvard University Press
[2014]
|
| Ausgabe: | Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAB01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UPA01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought against a major company in the United States. Federal prosecutors benefit from expansive statutes that allow an entire firm to be held liable for a crime by a single employee. But when prosecutors target the Goliaths of the corporate world, they find themselves at a huge disadvantage. The government that bailed out corporations considered too economically important to fail also negotiates settlements permitting giant firms to avoid the consequences of criminal convictions. Presenting detailed data from more than a decade of federal cases, Brandon Garrett reveals a pattern of negotiation and settlement in which prosecutors demand admissions of wrongdoing, impose penalties, and require structural reforms. However, those reforms are usually vaguely defined. Many companies pay no criminal fine, and even the biggest blockbuster payments are often greatly reduced. While companies must cooperate in the investigations, high-level employees tend to get off scot-free. The practical reality is that when prosecutors face Hydra-headed corporate defendants prepared to spend hundreds of millions on lawyers, such agreements may be the only way to get any result at all. Too Big to Jail describes concrete ways to improve corporate law enforcement by insisting on more stringent prosecution agreements, ongoing judicial review, and greater transparency |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 01. Dez 2022) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (340 Seiten) 1 line illustration, 17 graphs, 3 tables |
| ISBN: | 9780674735712 |
| DOI: | 10.4159/9780674735712 |
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| 520 | |a American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought against a major company in the United States. Federal prosecutors benefit from expansive statutes that allow an entire firm to be held liable for a crime by a single employee. But when prosecutors target the Goliaths of the corporate world, they find themselves at a huge disadvantage. The government that bailed out corporations considered too economically important to fail also negotiates settlements permitting giant firms to avoid the consequences of criminal convictions. Presenting detailed data from more than a decade of federal cases, Brandon Garrett reveals a pattern of negotiation and settlement in which prosecutors demand admissions of wrongdoing, impose penalties, and require structural reforms. However, those reforms are usually vaguely defined. Many companies pay no criminal fine, and even the biggest blockbuster payments are often greatly reduced. While companies must cooperate in the investigations, high-level employees tend to get off scot-free. The practical reality is that when prosecutors face Hydra-headed corporate defendants prepared to spend hundreds of millions on lawyers, such agreements may be the only way to get any result at all. Too Big to Jail describes concrete ways to improve corporate law enforcement by insisting on more stringent prosecution agreements, ongoing judicial review, and greater transparency | ||
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:11:19Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:42:50Z |
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| spelling | Garrett, Brandon L. Verfasser aut Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations Brandon L. Garrett Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press [2014] © 2014 1 Online-Ressource (340 Seiten) 1 line illustration, 17 graphs, 3 tables txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 01. Dez 2022) American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought against a major company in the United States. Federal prosecutors benefit from expansive statutes that allow an entire firm to be held liable for a crime by a single employee. But when prosecutors target the Goliaths of the corporate world, they find themselves at a huge disadvantage. The government that bailed out corporations considered too economically important to fail also negotiates settlements permitting giant firms to avoid the consequences of criminal convictions. Presenting detailed data from more than a decade of federal cases, Brandon Garrett reveals a pattern of negotiation and settlement in which prosecutors demand admissions of wrongdoing, impose penalties, and require structural reforms. However, those reforms are usually vaguely defined. Many companies pay no criminal fine, and even the biggest blockbuster payments are often greatly reduced. While companies must cooperate in the investigations, high-level employees tend to get off scot-free. The practical reality is that when prosecutors face Hydra-headed corporate defendants prepared to spend hundreds of millions on lawyers, such agreements may be the only way to get any result at all. Too Big to Jail describes concrete ways to improve corporate law enforcement by insisting on more stringent prosecution agreements, ongoing judicial review, and greater transparency In English LAW / Criminal Law / General bisacsh Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- United States Corporate governance Law and legislation United States Corporation law -- United States -- Criminal provisions Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Corporations -- Corrupt practices -- United States Corporations Corrupt practices United States Criminal liability of juristic persons -- United States Criminal liability of juristic persons United States Tort liability of corporations -- United States Tort liability of corporations United States https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674735712?locatt=mode:legacy Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Garrett, Brandon L. Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations LAW / Criminal Law / General bisacsh Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- United States Corporate governance Law and legislation United States Corporation law -- United States -- Criminal provisions Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Corporations -- Corrupt practices -- United States Corporations Corrupt practices United States Criminal liability of juristic persons -- United States Criminal liability of juristic persons United States Tort liability of corporations -- United States Tort liability of corporations United States |
| title | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations |
| title_auth | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations |
| title_exact_search | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations |
| title_full | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations Brandon L. Garrett |
| title_fullStr | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations Brandon L. Garrett |
| title_full_unstemmed | Too Big to Jail How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations Brandon L. Garrett |
| title_short | Too Big to Jail |
| title_sort | too big to jail how prosecutors compromise with corporations |
| title_sub | How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations |
| topic | LAW / Criminal Law / General bisacsh Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- United States Corporate governance Law and legislation United States Corporation law -- United States -- Criminal provisions Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Corporations -- Corrupt practices -- United States Corporations Corrupt practices United States Criminal liability of juristic persons -- United States Criminal liability of juristic persons United States Tort liability of corporations -- United States Tort liability of corporations United States |
| topic_facet | LAW / Criminal Law / General Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- United States Corporate governance Law and legislation United States Corporation law -- United States -- Criminal provisions Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Corporations -- Corrupt practices -- United States Corporations Corrupt practices United States Criminal liability of juristic persons -- United States Criminal liability of juristic persons United States Tort liability of corporations -- United States Tort liability of corporations United States |
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