Constitutional essentials: on the constitutional theory of political liberalism
"We enter here upon a history of conversational traffic between the respective departments of philosophy and law in the old academy of liberalism, where lawyers hear much from philosophers, yes-and philosophers hear from lawyers, too, in what has fruitfully been a both-ways exchange. Our philos...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2022]
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We enter here upon a history of conversational traffic between the respective departments of philosophy and law in the old academy of liberalism, where lawyers hear much from philosophers, yes-and philosophers hear from lawyers, too, in what has fruitfully been a both-ways exchange. Our philosophical protagonist is John Rawls. This book comprises a study of the rise and workings, within the Rawlsian political-liberal philosophy, of the idea of a country's higher-legal constitution as a public platform for the justification of political coercion. A study of Rawls on constitutionalism can help us, I believe, in scoping out and managing a cluster of constitutional lawyers' debates-interminable ones, it seems, in the constitutional-democratic precincts of our times-that I will catalogue soon below. But conversely, I believe, those seeking the best and truest readings of Rawls might have something to learn from the controversies of the lawyers. My approach to Rawls has accordingly been that of a critically leavened (while no doubt broadly sympathetic) exegesis, while with the legal-discursive materials I take more of a diagnostic turn. My hope is that a treatment of these two discourses in relation to each other will prove an aid to both political-philosophical and legal-practical reflection"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xv, 208 Seiten 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780197655832 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Rawls's constitution-centered "liberal principle of legitimacy" : a first look -- The constitution as procedural recourse : rawlss liberal principle of legitimacy -- Constitution as directive code -- Constitutional essentials. A singularity of reason, or a space of reasonability? -- Constitutional law and human rights : the call to civility -- Constitutional fidelity : of courts, citizens, and time -- A realistic utopia? -- Legitimacy : procedural compliance or ethical attitude? -- Offsets to proceduralism -- Constitutional application : between will and reason -- Justification-by-constitution, economic guarantees, and the rise of weak-form review -- Judicial restraint (and judicial supremacy) -- Legal formalism and the rule of law -- Constitutional rights and private legal relations -- Liberal tolerance to liberal collapse? | |
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| adam_text | Contents xiii xvii Foreword List ofAbbreviations and Short Names Introduction: An Entanglement of Missions for Constitutional Law 1. Rawls’s Constitution-Centered “Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” : A First Look 2. A Regulatory and a Justificatory Mission for Substantive Constitutional Law 3. Rawls: Justification-by-Constitution 4. Debates of the Lawyers 5. Plan of the Book 1 2 3 6 8 12 PART I. JUSTIFICATION-BY-CONSTITUTION 1. The Constitution as Procedural Recourse: Rawls’s “Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” 1. Public Reason to Constitution? 1.1. Public Reason 1.2. Constitution 2. Constitution and Justification 2.1. Justification: The Problem of Political Liberalism 2.2. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy (LPL); Justification-by-Constitution 2.3. Who’s This “We”? 2.4. Reasonability for Constitutions 3. The Constitution as a Procedure 3.1. Procedure as Deflection 3.2. Procedure Incorporating Substance 4. TJ to PL·. Justice to Justification 4.1. The Constitution in TJ: “Imperfect Procedural Justice” 4.2. The Constitution in PL: Justification (“Legitimacy”) in Place of Justice 2. A Fixation Thesis and a Secondary Proceduralization: Constitution as Positive Law 1. A Constitution in What Medium? 1.1. A Dated Exegetical Question 17 17 17 19 20 20 21 22 24 25 25 27 28 28 30 33 33 34
viii CONTENTS 1.2. Ambiguities of “Unwritten” 1.2.1. A Directive Constitution But Conventional (Not Legal)? 1.2.2. A Constitution Empirical (Not Directive)? 2. Constitution as Directive Code 2.1. Lecture VI of PL 2.2. The Second Procedural Turn: Institutional Settlement: Objectivity, Abstraction, Deferral, and Dependence on a Referee 41 3. Constitution as What Happens 3.1. Shadow Norms 3.2. Each Our Own Hercules? 35 35 36 37 38 44 45 46 3. Constitutional Essentials: A Singularity of Reason, or a Space of Reasonability? 51 1. A Scheme of Rights and Their Central Ranges 1.1. Between Thick and Thin: “Completeness” Without Repression 1.2. The Fallback to “Central Ranges” in a “Scheme of Liberties” 1.3. The Burdens of Judgment 1.4. Supreme Court as Referee 2. Liberal Justice Conceptions as a “Family”: A Complication fortheLPL? 3. The Idea ofthe“At-Least Reasonable” as Bridge 51 51 52 54 54 56 59 4. Constitutional Law and Human Rights: The Call to Civility 1. Domains and Constituencies of Political-Normative Discourses 1.1. Domains 1.2. Constituencies 2. Morality and Civility: Convergence or Division? 2.1. Moral Fault to Moral Obligation to Repair? 2.2. A Question of the Applicable (Sub)Morality? 2.3. Beyond Pragmatism, Relativism, and Popular Constitutionalism: Justification-by-Constitution 3. Civility a Moral Trump? 3.1. For Citizens at Large (“You and Me”)? 3.2. For Courts of Law 61 62 62 64 64 64 65 65 68 68 69 5. Constitutional Fidelity: Of Courts, Citizens, and Time 1. Public Reason and Constitution: “Stricter” for Courts than for Citizens 1.1. Justification as to Means:
“Guidelines of Inquiry” 1.2. Justification as to Ends: “Principles and Values” 2. Due Regard for the Constitution in Force 2.1. Application, Not Revision 2.2. “This” Constitution, or Its Family? 2.3. The Counter-Logic of the Proceduralist LPL 2.4. Aspiration for Citizens, Obligation for Courts? 71 71 72 73 74 74 75 77 78
CONTENTS 3. Temporality 3.1. Dialectical Liberal Reasonability 3.2. Flashback: The Sequence of Stages in 77 3.3. An Idea of Constitutional-Moral Progress? 3.4. Fixture and Project; Court and People 4. A Common-Law Constitution? 6. A Realistic Utopia? 1. Justification as Speculative Sociology 1.1. A State of Society 2. Elements 2.1. A Political Conception of the Reasonable 2.2. Burdens of Judgment (Including Raw Pluralism) 2.3. Liberal Political Toleration: The Idea of the At-Least Reasonable 2.4. The Idea of Democratic Openness 2.5. The Idea of a Constraint of Public Reason 3. Remainders ІХ 78 79 80 82 84 87 89 90 90 91 92 95 97 97 98 99 PART II. “THE CRITERION OF RECIPROCITY” 7. Legitimacy: Procedural Compliance or Ethical Attitude? 1. 2. 3. 4. “The Idea of Legitimacy Based on the Criterion of Reciprocity” Objective Constitutionality Displaced? Reciprocity on the “Constitution” Level On the Particular Statute Level, a Totalization of Public Reason? 4.1. Reciprocity as Aspirational 4.2. “The Proviso” 4.3. Borderline Uncertainty 4.4. Constitutional Proceduralism to Satisfy Reciprocity? 8. Offsets to Proceduralism 1. 2. 3. 4. Alternative Readings Whither Institutional Settlement? Proceduralism Softened? Whence the Democratic-Monist Alternative? 105 105 107 108 109 111 112 112 113 115 116 117 119 122 PARTIIL SOME CHRONIC DEBATES 9. Constitutional Application: Between Will and Reason 1. 2. 3. 4. A Contradiction of Aims Not a Digression: Rawls to Dworkin and Back A Gap That Cannot Be Closed? Originalism Either Way? 127 128 130 132 133
X CONTENTS 10. Justifícation-by-Constitution, Economie Guarantees, and the Rise of Weak-Form Review 1. Socioeconomic Rights in a Liberal Constitutional Conception 1.1. “SER” and “Social Minimum” as Constitutional Matters 1.2. A Standard Worry 2. Four Questions: From Justice to Justiciability 2.1. Social Minimum and Justice in the Basic Structure 2.2. Social Minimum and Legitimacy in the Political Order 2.3. Social Minimum as Constitutional Essential 2.4. Social Minimum and Judicialization 3. Constitutional Essentials and Transparency 4. “The Bind” 4.1. A “Best Efforts” Commitment 4.2. Discursive Cogency 5. Enter Weak-Form Judicial Review 11. Judicial Restraint (and Judicial Supremacy) 1. Three Axes of Judicial Restraint 1.1. Restrained as Reserved (Opposite: Free-Spoken) 1.2. Restrained as Tolerant (Opposite: Dogmatist) 1.3. Restrained as “Weak-Form” (Opposite: “Strong-Form”) 2. Grounds for Judicial Restraint: Democracy and Legitimacy 3. Restraint for the Rawlsian Supreme Court 3.1. Reserved Court? (“Justiciability”) 3.2. Weak(er) Court? 3.2.1. Short-Term Legislative Consultation 3.2.2. Strong-Form Interagency Constitutional Colloquy 3.3. Tolerant Court? 4. Summation: Rawls and Judicial Supremacy 12. Legal Formalism and the Rule of Law 1. Fixing Ideas 1.1. “The Rule of Law” 1.2. “Legal Formalism” 1.3. A Question: “Liberal Legalism” Applied to Rawls? 2. What the Rawlsian Liberal “Rule of Law” Principle Is Not 2.1. Higher Law in a Dualist System 2.2. “The Rule of Law” as Constitutional Essential 3. Formalist Remainders in Rawlsian Constitutional Rights 4. How Does Strong
Democracy Finally Differ? 13. Constitutional Rights and “Private” Legal Relations 1. The “Horizontal Application” Question, Addressed to Rawls 2. Main Liberal Arguments Pro and Con Horizontal Application 2.1. On the Side of Horizontality 2.2. Against Horizontality 137 138 138 139 140 140 142 144 145 146 148 148 148 150 .153 154 154 156 157 158 159 160 162 162 163 165 168 173 173 173 174 174 176 176 178 179 181 183 183 185 185 186
CONTENTS 3. The Rawlsian Case for Horizontality 3.1. “Basic Structure” as Subject 3.2. Justificatory Function 3.3. Scheme of Liberties, “At-Least” Reasonability ХІ -188 188 189 191 14. Liberal Tolerance to Liberal Collapse? 193 Bibliography Index 199 205
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| adam_txt |
Contents xiii xvii Foreword List ofAbbreviations and Short Names Introduction: An Entanglement of Missions for Constitutional Law 1. Rawls’s Constitution-Centered “Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” : A First Look 2. A Regulatory and a Justificatory Mission for Substantive Constitutional Law 3. Rawls: Justification-by-Constitution 4. Debates of the Lawyers 5. Plan of the Book 1 2 3 6 8 12 PART I. JUSTIFICATION-BY-CONSTITUTION 1. The Constitution as Procedural Recourse: Rawls’s “Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” 1. Public Reason to Constitution? 1.1. Public Reason 1.2. Constitution 2. Constitution and Justification 2.1. Justification: The Problem of Political Liberalism 2.2. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy (LPL); Justification-by-Constitution 2.3. Who’s This “We”? 2.4. Reasonability for Constitutions 3. The Constitution as a Procedure 3.1. Procedure as Deflection 3.2. Procedure Incorporating Substance 4. TJ to PL·. Justice to Justification 4.1. The Constitution in TJ: “Imperfect Procedural Justice” 4.2. The Constitution in PL: Justification (“Legitimacy”) in Place of Justice 2. A Fixation Thesis and a Secondary Proceduralization: Constitution as Positive Law 1. A Constitution in What Medium? 1.1. A Dated Exegetical Question 17 17 17 19 20 20 21 22 24 25 25 27 28 28 30 33 33 34
viii CONTENTS 1.2. Ambiguities of “Unwritten” 1.2.1. A Directive Constitution But Conventional (Not Legal)? 1.2.2. A Constitution Empirical (Not Directive)? 2. Constitution as Directive Code 2.1. Lecture VI of PL 2.2. The Second Procedural Turn: Institutional Settlement: Objectivity, Abstraction, Deferral, and Dependence on a Referee 41 3. Constitution as What Happens 3.1. Shadow Norms 3.2. Each Our Own Hercules? 35 35 36 37 38 44 45 46 3. Constitutional Essentials: A Singularity of Reason, or a Space of Reasonability? 51 1. A Scheme of Rights and Their Central Ranges 1.1. Between Thick and Thin: “Completeness” Without Repression 1.2. The Fallback to “Central Ranges” in a “Scheme of Liberties” 1.3. The Burdens of Judgment 1.4. Supreme Court as Referee 2. Liberal Justice Conceptions as a “Family”: A Complication fortheLPL? 3. The Idea ofthe“At-Least Reasonable” as Bridge 51 51 52 54 54 56 59 4. Constitutional Law and Human Rights: The Call to Civility 1. Domains and Constituencies of Political-Normative Discourses 1.1. Domains 1.2. Constituencies 2. Morality and Civility: Convergence or Division? 2.1. Moral Fault to Moral Obligation to Repair? 2.2. A Question of the Applicable (Sub)Morality? 2.3. Beyond Pragmatism, Relativism, and Popular Constitutionalism: Justification-by-Constitution 3. Civility a Moral Trump? 3.1. For Citizens at Large (“You and Me”)? 3.2. For Courts of Law 61 62 62 64 64 64 65 65 68 68 69 5. Constitutional Fidelity: Of Courts, Citizens, and Time 1. Public Reason and Constitution: “Stricter” for Courts than for Citizens 1.1. Justification as to Means:
“Guidelines of Inquiry” 1.2. Justification as to Ends: “Principles and Values” 2. Due Regard for the Constitution in Force 2.1. Application, Not Revision 2.2. “This” Constitution, or Its Family? 2.3. The Counter-Logic of the Proceduralist LPL 2.4. Aspiration for Citizens, Obligation for Courts? 71 71 72 73 74 74 75 77 78
CONTENTS 3. Temporality 3.1. Dialectical Liberal Reasonability 3.2. Flashback: The Sequence of Stages in 77 3.3. An Idea of Constitutional-Moral Progress? 3.4. Fixture and Project; Court and People 4. A Common-Law Constitution? 6. A Realistic Utopia? 1. Justification as Speculative Sociology 1.1. A State of Society 2. Elements 2.1. A Political Conception of the Reasonable 2.2. Burdens of Judgment (Including Raw Pluralism) 2.3. Liberal Political Toleration: The Idea of the At-Least Reasonable 2.4. The Idea of Democratic Openness 2.5. The Idea of a Constraint of Public Reason 3. Remainders ІХ 78 79 80 82 84 87 89 90 90 91 92 95 97 97 98 99 PART II. “THE CRITERION OF RECIPROCITY” 7. Legitimacy: Procedural Compliance or Ethical Attitude? 1. 2. 3. 4. “The Idea of Legitimacy Based on the Criterion of Reciprocity” Objective Constitutionality Displaced? Reciprocity on the “Constitution” Level On the Particular Statute Level, a Totalization of Public Reason? 4.1. Reciprocity as Aspirational 4.2. “The Proviso” 4.3. Borderline Uncertainty 4.4. Constitutional Proceduralism to Satisfy Reciprocity? 8. Offsets to Proceduralism 1. 2. 3. 4. Alternative Readings Whither Institutional Settlement? Proceduralism Softened? Whence the Democratic-Monist Alternative? 105 105 107 108 109 111 112 112 113 115 116 117 119 122 PARTIIL SOME CHRONIC DEBATES 9. Constitutional Application: Between Will and Reason 1. 2. 3. 4. A Contradiction of Aims Not a Digression: Rawls to Dworkin and Back A Gap That Cannot Be Closed? Originalism Either Way? 127 128 130 132 133
X CONTENTS 10. Justifícation-by-Constitution, Economie Guarantees, and the Rise of Weak-Form Review 1. Socioeconomic Rights in a Liberal Constitutional Conception 1.1. “SER” and “Social Minimum” as Constitutional Matters 1.2. A Standard Worry 2. Four Questions: From Justice to Justiciability 2.1. Social Minimum and Justice in the Basic Structure 2.2. Social Minimum and Legitimacy in the Political Order 2.3. Social Minimum as Constitutional Essential 2.4. Social Minimum and Judicialization 3. Constitutional Essentials and Transparency 4. “The Bind” 4.1. A “Best Efforts” Commitment 4.2. Discursive Cogency 5. Enter Weak-Form Judicial Review 11. Judicial Restraint (and Judicial Supremacy) 1. Three Axes of Judicial Restraint 1.1. Restrained as Reserved (Opposite: Free-Spoken) 1.2. Restrained as Tolerant (Opposite: Dogmatist) 1.3. Restrained as “Weak-Form” (Opposite: “Strong-Form”) 2. Grounds for Judicial Restraint: Democracy and Legitimacy 3. Restraint for the Rawlsian Supreme Court 3.1. Reserved Court? (“Justiciability”) 3.2. Weak(er) Court? 3.2.1. Short-Term Legislative Consultation 3.2.2. Strong-Form Interagency Constitutional Colloquy 3.3. Tolerant Court? 4. Summation: Rawls and Judicial Supremacy 12. Legal Formalism and the Rule of Law 1. Fixing Ideas 1.1. “The Rule of Law” 1.2. “Legal Formalism” 1.3. A Question: “Liberal Legalism” Applied to Rawls? 2. What the Rawlsian Liberal “Rule of Law” Principle Is Not 2.1. Higher Law in a Dualist System 2.2. “The Rule of Law” as Constitutional Essential 3. Formalist Remainders in Rawlsian Constitutional Rights 4. How Does Strong
Democracy Finally Differ? 13. Constitutional Rights and “Private” Legal Relations 1. The “Horizontal Application” Question, Addressed to Rawls 2. Main Liberal Arguments Pro and Con Horizontal Application 2.1. On the Side of Horizontality 2.2. Against Horizontality 137 138 138 139 140 140 142 144 145 146 148 148 148 150 .153 154 154 156 157 158 159 160 162 162 163 165 168 173 173 173 174 174 176 176 178 179 181 183 183 185 185 186
CONTENTS 3. The Rawlsian Case for Horizontality 3.1. “Basic Structure” as Subject 3.2. Justificatory Function 3.3. Scheme of Liberties, “At-Least” Reasonability ХІ -188 188 189 191 14. Liberal Tolerance to Liberal Collapse? 193 Bibliography Index 199 205 |
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Michelman</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">New York, NY</subfield><subfield code="b">Oxford University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[2022]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xv, 208 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="c">25 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rawls's constitution-centered "liberal principle of legitimacy" : a first look -- The constitution as procedural recourse : rawlss liberal principle of legitimacy -- Constitution as directive code -- Constitutional essentials. A singularity of reason, or a space of reasonability? -- Constitutional law and human rights : the call to civility -- Constitutional fidelity : of courts, citizens, and time -- A realistic utopia? -- Legitimacy : procedural compliance or ethical attitude? -- Offsets to proceduralism -- Constitutional application : between will and reason -- Justification-by-constitution, economic guarantees, and the rise of weak-form review -- Judicial restraint (and judicial supremacy) -- Legal formalism and the rule of law -- Constitutional rights and private legal relations -- Liberal tolerance to liberal collapse?</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"We enter here upon a history of conversational traffic between the respective departments of philosophy and law in the old academy of liberalism, where lawyers hear much from philosophers, yes-and philosophers hear from lawyers, too, in what has fruitfully been a both-ways exchange. 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| id | DE-604.BV048592661 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:07:53Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:42:25Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780197655832 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033968340 |
| oclc_num | 1350742688 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xv, 208 Seiten 25 cm |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20230123 |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Michelman, Frank I. 1936- Verfasser (DE-588)13011264X aut Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism Frank I. Michelman New York, NY Oxford University Press [2022] xv, 208 Seiten 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Rawls's constitution-centered "liberal principle of legitimacy" : a first look -- The constitution as procedural recourse : rawlss liberal principle of legitimacy -- Constitution as directive code -- Constitutional essentials. A singularity of reason, or a space of reasonability? -- Constitutional law and human rights : the call to civility -- Constitutional fidelity : of courts, citizens, and time -- A realistic utopia? -- Legitimacy : procedural compliance or ethical attitude? -- Offsets to proceduralism -- Constitutional application : between will and reason -- Justification-by-constitution, economic guarantees, and the rise of weak-form review -- Judicial restraint (and judicial supremacy) -- Legal formalism and the rule of law -- Constitutional rights and private legal relations -- Liberal tolerance to liberal collapse? "We enter here upon a history of conversational traffic between the respective departments of philosophy and law in the old academy of liberalism, where lawyers hear much from philosophers, yes-and philosophers hear from lawyers, too, in what has fruitfully been a both-ways exchange. Our philosophical protagonist is John Rawls. This book comprises a study of the rise and workings, within the Rawlsian political-liberal philosophy, of the idea of a country's higher-legal constitution as a public platform for the justification of political coercion. A study of Rawls on constitutionalism can help us, I believe, in scoping out and managing a cluster of constitutional lawyers' debates-interminable ones, it seems, in the constitutional-democratic precincts of our times-that I will catalogue soon below. But conversely, I believe, those seeking the best and truest readings of Rawls might have something to learn from the controversies of the lawyers. My approach to Rawls has accordingly been that of a critically leavened (while no doubt broadly sympathetic) exegesis, while with the legal-discursive materials I take more of a diagnostic turn. My hope is that a treatment of these two discourses in relation to each other will prove an aid to both political-philosophical and legal-practical reflection"-- Rawls, John 1921-2002 (DE-588)118598678 gnd rswk-swf Liberalismus (DE-588)4035582-2 gnd rswk-swf Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd rswk-swf Verfassungstheorie (DE-588)4127485-4 gnd rswk-swf Constitutional law / Philosophy Constitutional law / Political aspects Liberalism / Political aspects Legitimacy of governments Rawls, John / 1921-2002 Verfassungstheorie (DE-588)4127485-4 s Liberalismus (DE-588)4035582-2 s DE-604 Rawls, John 1921-2002 (DE-588)118598678 p Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 s Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-765585-6 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033968340&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Michelman, Frank I. 1936- Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism Rawls's constitution-centered "liberal principle of legitimacy" : a first look -- The constitution as procedural recourse : rawlss liberal principle of legitimacy -- Constitution as directive code -- Constitutional essentials. A singularity of reason, or a space of reasonability? -- Constitutional law and human rights : the call to civility -- Constitutional fidelity : of courts, citizens, and time -- A realistic utopia? -- Legitimacy : procedural compliance or ethical attitude? -- Offsets to proceduralism -- Constitutional application : between will and reason -- Justification-by-constitution, economic guarantees, and the rise of weak-form review -- Judicial restraint (and judicial supremacy) -- Legal formalism and the rule of law -- Constitutional rights and private legal relations -- Liberal tolerance to liberal collapse? Rawls, John 1921-2002 (DE-588)118598678 gnd Liberalismus (DE-588)4035582-2 gnd Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd Verfassungstheorie (DE-588)4127485-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118598678 (DE-588)4035582-2 (DE-588)4048821-4 (DE-588)4127485-4 |
| title | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism |
| title_auth | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism |
| title_exact_search | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism |
| title_full | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism Frank I. Michelman |
| title_fullStr | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism Frank I. Michelman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism Frank I. Michelman |
| title_short | Constitutional essentials |
| title_sort | constitutional essentials on the constitutional theory of political liberalism |
| title_sub | on the constitutional theory of political liberalism |
| topic | Rawls, John 1921-2002 (DE-588)118598678 gnd Liberalismus (DE-588)4035582-2 gnd Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd Verfassungstheorie (DE-588)4127485-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Rawls, John 1921-2002 Liberalismus Rechtsphilosophie Verfassungstheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033968340&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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