War in Ukraine: Volume 2 Russian invasion, February 2022
"On 24 February 2022, eight years after invading the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine and organising an illegal referendum in support of a subsequent Russian annexation, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both Western and Russian intelligenc...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Warwick
Helion & Company Limited
2023
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| Schriftenreihe: | Europe@war series
no. 28 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Register // Gemischte Register |
| Zusammenfassung: | "On 24 February 2022, eight years after invading the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine and organising an illegal referendum in support of a subsequent Russian annexation, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both Western and Russian intelligence services expected the invasion to quickly topple the democratically elected government in Kyiv and, with the help of collaborators, to overrun the Ukrainian armed forces in a matter of between 3 and 14 days. Early on 24 February, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) launched a series of missile and artillery strikes on the main air bases and dozens of other military facilities in Ukraine. Immediately afterwards, the VSRF launched a ground invasion, with its forces advancing on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Melitopol, and Kherson. Although following a build-up that had begun in April 2021, and expected by many, the onslaught still came as a major surprise for the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian armed forces, and the majority of its allies in the West, and also for the mass of officers and other ranks of the VSRF, many of whom believed that they were only to participate in exercises. However, the deeper the Russians rolled into Ukraine, the more resistance they encountered: while some Russian units performed as expected, elsewhere whole armies began falling apart when ordered to advance at maximum possible speed without the necessary firepower and logistic support. After suffering catastrophic losses while failing to reach downtown Kyiv, and failing to reach and enter Chernihiv and Kharkiv, the war in northern and north-eastern Ukraine quickly settled down into a bloody stalemate. In the south, the Russians initially advanced at an astonishing rate, securing Melitopol during the second day of their invasion, and Kherson only a few days later [...]." |
| Beschreibung: | 76 Seiten, xii Seiten Tafeln Karten (teilweise farbig) |
| ISBN: | 9781804512166 |
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CONTENTS Helion Company Limited Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre Budbrooke Road Warwick CV34 5WE England Tel. 01926 499 619 Email: info@helion.co.uk Website: www.helion.co.uk Twitter: @helionbooks Visit our blog http://blog.helion.co.uk/ Text ©Tom Cooper, Adrien Fontanellaz, Ed Crowther and Milos Sipos 2023 Photographs © as individually credited Colour artwork © Giorgio Albertini, David Bocquelet.Tom Cooper 2023 Maps drawn by and © Tom Cooper 2023 Designed and typeset by Farr out Publications, Wokingham, Berkshire Cover design Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk ) Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologise for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book. 2 2 Abbreviations Introduction and Acknowledgements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 From Decay to Resurgence Putin Aktiengesellschaft Putin's Cannon Fodder Last-Minute Moves The first Week of the Three-Day Invasion City Fortresses Line of Control The Race to Odesa 3 15 32 33 37 45 50 53 Appendices I Known Major Units of the Ukrainian Army, Territorial Defence National Guard as of February 2022 II Primary Combat Units of the SV/VSRF, 2014 III VKS and VMF, Major Units, 2018-20221 62 66 67 Bibliography Notes About the Authors 70 71 76 ICELAND ISBN 978-1-804512-16-6 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
SWEDEN FINLAND RUSSIA NDRWAH KES .ESTONIA’ I Netherlands 2 Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion Company Limited. Irtvia 3 Luxembourg Ч Switzerland ξ™, S Croatia L LITHUANIA Ți UNITED . KINGDOM 6 Slovenia 7 Bosnia | Herzegovina 8 Montenegro POLAND GERMANU 9 Kosovo IO North Macedonia J BELARUS C c՝ ^ UKRAINE ЛЕСН REPUBLK II Kalingrao-Dblast (Russia) Lovak FRANCE ШТЯІйГ HUNGARY We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authors. ROMANIA serbia; SPAIN ITALU BULGARIA CORSICA TURKES 'SARDINIA ÎREECI •ss MALTA ČUPRUS MAP OF EUROPE SINCE 1992 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München Note: In order to simplify the use of this book, all names, locations and geographic designations are as provided in The Times WorldAtlas, or other traditionally accepted major sources of reference, as of the time of described events.
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28 BIBLIOGRAPHY Beehner, L., Analyzing the Russian Way of War; Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia (West Point: Modern War Institute, 2018) Butowski, P., Flashpoint Russia; Russia’s Air Power: Capabilities and Structure (Wien: Harpia Publishing, 2019) Collins, L., ‘In 2014, the “decrepit” Ukrainian army hit the refresh button. Eight years later, it’s paying off’, The Conversation (online), 8 March 2022 Cooper, T., Moscow’s Game ofPoker: Russian Military Intervention in Syria, 2015-2017 (Warwick: Helion and Company, 2018) Darczewska, J., Rosgvardiya; A Special-Purpose Force (Warsaw: OSW, Point of View 78, May 2020) Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power; Building a Military to support Great Power Aspirations (DIA, 2017) Delanoe, L, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Toward a Multiregional Force (Arlington: CNA, 2019) Demonque, C., ‘La Garde nationale de Russie (Rosgvardia): Dernier rempart de Vladimir Poutine’, Défense Sécurité Internationale, No 159, May-June 2022 Dorfman, Z., ‘Secret CIA training program in Ukraine helped Kyiv prepare for Russian Invasion, Yahoo News (online), 16 March 2022 Elfving, J., An Assessment of the Russian Airborne Troops and their Role on Tomorrow’s Battlefield (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2021) Facon, L, La nouvelle armée russe (Paris: L’Observatoire franco russe, 2021) Fiore, N. J., ‘Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group’, Armour, No. CXXVIII, Spring 2017 Fox, A. C., ‘Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad: A Brief History of the Battles of the Donetsk Airport 26 May 2014 to 21 January 2015’, Land
Warfare Paper, No. 125, May 2019 Galeotti, Μ., ‘Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role’, Marshall Center Security Insight, no. 46, Febuary 2020 Galeotti, Μ., ‘Russian Airborne Forces re-tool for expanded Role’, Jane’s (online), 25 October 2021 Garamone, J., ‘Ukraine-California Ties Show Worth of National Guard Program’, DoD News (online), 18 March 2022 Goya, Μ., Offensives éclairs dans le Donbass- août 2014/janvier 2015’, La voix de l’épée (online), 21 February 2022 Grant, G., ‘Seven Years of Deadlock: Why Ukraine’s Military Reforms Have Gone Nowhere, and How the US Should Respond’, The Jamestown Foundation, 16 July 2021 Grau, L. W. Barties, C. K., The Russian Way of War; Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2017) Grau, L. W. Barties, C. K., ‘Getting to Know the Russian Battalion Tactical Group’, The Royal United Services Institute (online), 14 April 2022 Gressel, G., ‘Waves of Ambition: Russia’s Military Build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea’ (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021) Harris, Catherine, Kagan Frederick W, Russia’s Military Posture: Ground Forces order of battle (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2018) 70 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-2-3; The Soviet Army, Troops, Organization and Equipment (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1991) Henrotin, Joseph, Guerre en Ukraine: le rôle de l’artillerie, in Défense Sécurité Internationale (Hors-Série) no 72, June-July 2020 Henrotin, Joseph, L’armée
ukrainienne: Une réforme impossible ?, in Défense Sécurité Internationale no 157, JanuaryFebruary 2022 Holcomb, Franklin, The order of Battle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: A key component in European Security (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2016) Hunder Max, Government to create 26 Territorial Defense battalions, in The Kyiv Independent, 19 January 2022 Hunter, James, F-15 Eagle Driver On What It Is Like Flying Against Ukraine’s Fighter Pilots, in The Drive (online), 29 March 2022 Janes, Ukraine conflict, Equipment profile, Janes (on line), 28 February 2022 Karber, Phillip A., Lessons learnedfrom the Russo-Ukrainian War (Draft), The Potomac Foundation, 29 September 2015 Karber, Phillip A., Thibeault, Josuah, Russia’s New Generation Warfare, in Army, June 2016 Kossov, Igor, Ukraine’s new military branch: Citizens protecting their neighborhood, in Politico, 13 February 2022 Lapaiev Yuri, Reforming Territorial Defense in Ukraine: Danger in Delay, in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 18, Issue 30, 23 February 2021 Manash Pratim, Boruah Prathamesh, Karl, Ukrainian Navy: A force in distress, Janes (online), 15 February 2022 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2013; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2014) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2014; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2015) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2015; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2016) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2016; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2017) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2017; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2018)
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2019-2020; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2021) Mladenov, A., ‘Tough Days for Ukraine’s military Helicopter Community’, Kiakaha Medias, 23 August 2020 Muzyka, К., Russian Forces in the Western Military District (Arlington: CNA, 2021) National Guard of Ukraine; National Guard of Ukraine. Changes, development, achievements (Documentary, July 2020) Newdick, Thomas, Ukrainian MiG-29 Pilot’s Front-Line Account Of The Air War Against Russia, The Drive (online), 1 April 2022 Ostensen, A. G. Bukkvoll, T., Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies - the Implications for European and Norwegian Security (Kjeller: The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment/FFI, 2018) Ponomarenko, Ulia, Who can and can’t join Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Force, in The Kyiv Independent, 7 January 2022 Pukhov, Ruslan, The Tanks ofAugust (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010)
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022 Putiata, Dmytro, Karbivnychyi, Andrii, Rudyka, Vasyl, Ukraine Armed Forces on the Eve of the Conflict in mil.in.ua (online) 12 March 2020 Rector, Alexander, N.Y Army Guard Soldiers mentor and learn in Ukraine, National Guard (online) 22 June 2018 Ripley, Tim, Operation Aleppo; Russia’s War in Syria (Lancaster: Telic-Herrick Publications, 2018) Roblin, Sebastian, Meet the BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles, 1945 (online), 19 March 2022 Sanders, Deborah, “Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy” in Naval War College Review, Volume 70, Number 4, 2017 Singh, Mandeep, The First Casualty: Suppression of Ukraine’s Air Defences, Northlines (online), 26 February 2022 Stepanenko, Kateryna, Frederick W. Kagan, and Brian BabcockLumish, Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization, Institutefor the Study War The Critical Threats Project 2022 (online), 5 March 2022 Sukhankin, Sergey, and Hurska Alla, The Ukrainian Navy in the Black and Azov Seas after 2014: losses, achievements, prospects. Policy Brief, Special Edition. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Russia Military; Quick Reference Guide (TRADOC, 2020) Trendafilovski, Vladimir, Ukrainian Naval Aviation Update, KeyMilitary (online), 16 January 2020 Welt, Cory, Russia’s Use of Force Against the Ukrainian Navy, CRS INSIGHT, December 3,2018 Wiik, Andrzej, OS W Studies no 66: The best army Ukraine has ever had; Changes in Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian aggression (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2017) White, Andrew, Ukraine
conflict: Ukrainian special operations forces in focus, Janes (online), 4 March 2022 Zagorodnyuk, Andriy, Alina Frolova, Hans Petter Midtunn Oleksii Pavliuchyk, Is Ukraine’s reformed military ready to repel a new Russian Invasion? The Atlantic Council (online), 23 December 2021 NOTES Chapter 1 1 ‘Putin shares the opinion that if there is a ‘Revolution’ in Ukraine, then there is a new state on its territory’ (in Ukrainian), Mirror Weekly, 4 March 2014. 2 These events will be thoroughly covered in forthcoming volumes of this mini-series. 3 Galeotti (2019) pp. 54-56, Grant et al; Wiik pp. 10-11,17-18,25, White Book 2013, p. 67. 4 ‘Ukraine’s Army is back’, Untan Information Agency, 28 February 2018. 5 Notably, by issuing of refurbished MT-12 Rapirà 100mm anti tank guns to the anti-tank ‘divisions’ of every brigade. Although outdated, these proved highly effective during the fighting in Donbas. 6 Organisation-wise, ZSU mechanised brigades are very similar to motor rifle regiments of the VSRE 7 Dorfman, Zagorodnyuk Ali, Garamone, Collins, Rector, Wiik, pp. 22-24. 8 Including Land Forces, Naval Infantry and Air Assault brigades. 9 White Book 2013; pp. 66, 70, White Book 2014; pp. 20, 30, 74; White Book 2015; pp. 10,21, 24-26, 97-98; White Book 2016; pp. 11, 29, 30, 107-109; White Book 2017; pp. 14,47, 68, 148-49, WhiteBook 2019-2020; pp. 76, 83-84; Wiik, p. 16; Galeotti (2019) pp. 45-46; interview with Siarhei Franchuk, 10 March 2022. 10 Vladimir Shchetinin, quoted by Grant. 11 Wiik, pp. 28-30; Galeotti (2019), pp. 47-48; Grant; Ukroboronprom website. Content of successive White
Books published by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) attest to the massive scale of the Ukrainian re-armament program, but much of the data they provide is contradictory, at other times unclear, and it remains unclear exactly how many of what major weapons systems had been overhauled and returned to service, and how many newly acquired. The above-listed numbers are thus within realms of‘best estimates’. 12 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (as of 16 March 2022); Gotkowska, Justyna Ali, ‘NATO member states on arms deliveries to Ukraine’, OS W Commentary No 423, 3 February 2022; Mitzer, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Stijn, ‘Keeping The Peace - Bayraktar TB2s Over Ukraine’, Oryx blog, 7 January 2022. Data provided in this sub-chapter and Appendix I is drawn from a wide range of Ukrainian sources, including official publications and the White Book 2019-2021, pp. 173-175, MilitaryLand.net website; Henrotin (2022); Siarhei Franchuk, interview, March 2022; White et al, pp. 21, 35-36; and Holcomb, pp. 11-15. For easier oversight, all units belonging to different commands of the Land Forces and the National Guard had been listed in Appendix I. This does not necessarily reflect their actual assignment as of February-March 2022. Fontanellaz, Guerre en Ukraine, Orties: l’App disruptive au service du dieu de la guerre', Linkedln.com, 21 May 2022. Axe, 12 February 2022; Mladenov, 23 August 2020, White Book 2019-2020, p. 182. Lapaiev, Kossov, Ponomarenko, Hunder, Grant, and interview with Siarhei Franchuk, 10 March 2022. National Guard of Ukraine. Changes, development, achievements, July 2020,
FIEP, the National Guard of Ukraine; MilitaryLand, consulted 19 March 2022. ‘Juice’ (MiG-29 pilot), interview with Newdick, 1 April 2022. Hunter, 29 March 2022. White Book 2013, pp. 12, 71; White Book 2014. p. 78; White Book 2016, p. 108; White Book 2017, pp. 50,148; White Book 20192020, pp. 182-183; Hunter, James, 29 March 2022; Newdick, 1 April 2022. Axe, David, 27 January 2022; Boruah Manash Pratim Karl Prathamesh, 15 February 2022; Janes (online), 28 February 2022; Sukhankin Sergey Alla Hurska; Deborah Sanders, Cory Welt. Trendafilovski, 16 January 2020. Chapter 2 1 The German word Aktiengesellschaft defines a corporation limited by share ownership (i.e. one owned by its shareholders), and traded on a stock market. Considering the organisation and methods of operation of the regime of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin in the Russian Federation, the authors find that this is the most suitable description. 71
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28 2 The two conventions in question are the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, from 1978, and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts, of 1983. 3 The only former state of the USSR not recognising the exclusive Russian claims to succession of the Soviet Union was Ukraine: ever since 1991, Kyiv continued to pursue claims against the Russian Federation in foreign courts, seeking to recover its share of the foreign property that was formerly owned by the USSR. 4 Facon, pp. 11,14-18,23-26, 37, 39. 5 Beehner et al (2018), pp. 41-43, Pukov, pp. 18, 20,40-41,45, 49, 57, 75, 96, 113, 130-135, 142-143. 6 Facon, p. 35; Beehner et al (2018), pp. 49-50; Pukhov pp. 40, 136, 142. 7 Facon pp. 37, 38, 39,49, Galeotti (2017), pp. 20-21, 25-34,41,49, Grau (2017), pp. 10, 27-29, 31, Stepanenko Ali. 8 Facon p. 50-51, 54. 9 Fiore, Grau (2017) pp. 36-38, Grau (2022). 10 Based on Fox (2019) pp. 7-11, Galeotti (2019) pp. 11,14,16-17, 31-35. Goya, 21 February 2022, Karber (2015), Karber and Thibeault (2016), Henrotin (2020). 11 For details on the Russian military intervention in Syria, see Cooper, Moscow’s Game ofPoker. 12 Fore a more favourable assessment of the VSRF’s capabilities demonstrated in Syria, see Ripley, pp. 197-1982 and 197. 13 Grauetal,p. 11. 14 Based on Fox (2019) pp. 7-11; Galeotti (2019), pp. 11, 14, 16-17, 31-35; Goya, 21 February 2022; Karber (2015); Karber and Thibeault (2016); Henrotin (2020). 15 Unless stated otherwise, based on Pavel Luzin, ‘The Russian Army in 2023’,
ridl.io, 18 January 2023. 16 All brigades bore the official designation ‘independent/separate’, thus designating them as not part of divisions; this is omitted from all such designations in this book for reasons of space. 17 An abbreviation for spetsialnovo naznacheniya, or ‘special purpose, Spetsnaz has a wide range of meanings in Russian but has come to be used colloquially to refer to special forces. 18 Muzyka, pp. 26, 30-32; Elfving, pp. 9-13,17-20,27; Galeotti (2017), pp. 49-51; Galeotti (2021); Grau (2017), pp. 32, 359-360; DIA (2017) p. 55. 19 Galleotti (2017), pp. 45-46, 51, 54; Grau (2017); pp. 32,279-280, 362-363; Muzyka, p. 49; DIA (2017), pp. 56, 71. 20 Circular Error Probable (or CEP) is the distance from the target within which 50 percent of weapons could be expected to land, thus 50 percent of Iskander missiles could be expected to land within 20-30 metres of the aiming point. 21 Muzyka, pp. 10, 13, 23; Grau (2017), p. 31, 32, 34, 35, 100, 101, 209-211,224, 264; Harris and Kagan, pp. 52-53; Galeotti (2017) p. 28; TRADOC (2020); DIA (2017) pp. 50-51, 53-54. Notably, the VSRF deployed about a dozen TOS-1/TOS-1A multiple rocket launcher systems to Ukraine in 2022. However, these short ranged tactical 220mm rocket systems, firing thermobaric warheads, were not assigned to the army’s artillery units, but to the Russian NBC Protection Troops. This is why the weapon had no designation based on the designation system of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defence (so-called GRAUdesignation). 22 Despite quite a lot of related reporting in the
West of 2015-2017, as of the first half of 2022, there was no evidence that the UTCS was in service with МВТ and IFV crews of the VSRF. Furthermore, while the Russian armed forces did have an ATMS at strategic and 72 23 24 25 26 27 28 operational levels - and operated their air defences with the help of ATMS - they were yet to introduce a link between these and the UTCS and the ATMS used at higher command levels. Unless stated otherwise, based on Butowski pp. 118,124; Grau (2017), pp. 25-26; Demonque et al (2020), pp. 7-8, 14-15, 22, 33, 39-40, 44, 54-57. ‘Roughly speaking, we started the War: How sending Wagner PMC to the Front helped Prigozhin to improve Relations with Putin, and what is Sobyaninsky Regiment’ (in Russian), Meduza.io, 13 July 2022. Unless stated otherwise, based on Butowski (2019) and Cooper (2018). Aerial warfare over Ukraine in 2022 will be covered in much more detail in another book in this sub-series. Gressel 2021, pp. 6,10, Delanoe, pp. 1, 3-7,11,14,16-17, 22,24: Pukhov, p. 66; DIA (2017), pp. 67-69, 83. Grau (2017), p. 143. Based on Grau (2017) pp. 16, 25, 46-47, 51,54-58, 143, 212, 224, 232-235, 239,265, 289, 329-330. Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 21.02.2022 № 71 “О признании Донецкой Народной Республики”; http:// publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202202220002 ; Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 21 February 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828; Путин: Россия признала ДНР и ЛНР в границах Донецкой и Луганской областей, ВВС News website, 22 February 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60483790. 2 Volodymyr Zolkin, ‘Aiming in the Residential Quarters of Mariinka’, YouTube, 8 July 2022. 3 ‘Ukraine munitions blasts prompt mass Evacuations’, BBC News, 23 March 2017; ‘NATO Envoys arrive in Balaklia to assist in humanitarian demining’, UNIAN, 25 March 2017; ‘Ammo Depot explosions in Kharkiv region’s Balaklia stop on Thursday afternoon’, UNIAN, 3 May 2018; ‘Ukraine’s exploding Munition Depots give Ammunition to Security Concerns’, Radio Free Europe, 6 October 2017. 4 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border’, Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2022, Rochan Consulting, ‘Tracking Russian Deployments near Ukraine Autumn-Winter 2021-22’, 15 November 2021. For details on Operation Danube, see Francois, Operation Danube, Europe@War. 5 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border’, Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2022, Rochan Consulting, ‘Tracking Russian Deployments near Ukraine Autumn-Winter 2021-22’, 15 November 2021; Dan Sabbagh, ‘Putin involved in War “at level of Colonel or Brigadier”, say Western Sources’, The Guardian, 16 May 2022. 6 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border’, Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2022, Rochan Consulting, ‘Tracking Russian Deployments near Ukraine Autumn-Winter 2021-22’, 15 November 2021. 7 Garamon. 8 Slava (veteran NCO of the ZSU), interview, 20 February 2022; Dan Rice, ‘The Untold Story of the Battle for Kyiv’, Small Wars Journal (online), 31 May 2022; Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan,
Serhiy Morgunov, Kostiantyn Khudov, ‘Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders combined to save the Capital’, WP, 24 August 2022. 1
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022 Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Robert Person, Michael McFaul, ‘What Putin fears most’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 33/Issue 2, April 2022; Samuel Ramani, ‘Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership’, Middle East Policy, 25 April 2020; Maria Tsvetkova, ‘How Russia allowed homegrown Radicals to go and fight in Syria’, Reuters, 13 May 2016; Stuart Ramsay, ‘IS Files reveal Assad’s Deal with Militants’, Sky News, 2 May 2016; Sabra Ayres, ‘Thousands of Russians joined Islamic State and brought their Children. Now Relatives are trying to bring them Home’, Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2017; Hassan Hassan, ‘Insurgents Again: the Islamic State’s calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria-Iraq Border Region and beyond’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Volume 10, Issue 11, December 2017; for a detailed reconstruction of the Iranian and then the Russian military interventions in Syria, see Cooper, Syrian Conflagration Cooper, Moscow’s Game ofPoker (details in Bibliography). ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion, RUSI, Special Report, 22 April 2022, p. 2. Joe Tidy, ‘Ukrainian power grid “lucky” to withstand Russian cyber-attack’, BBC, 12 April 2022. ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion) RUSI, Special Report, 22 April 2022, p. 2. Unless stated otherwise, the following reconstruction of the fighting north-west of Kyiv between 24 and 28 February is based on cross-examination of dozens of reports in the mainstream and social media, including - for example - Dan Rice, ‘The untold
Story of the Battle for Kyiv’, Small Wars Journal (online), 31 May 2022 - and a review of videos released on YouTube, including ‘The Hostomel Landing Analysis’, 26 May 2022; ‘Russian Ka-52 Emergency Landing during Combat Sortie at Hostomel Airport’, 19 March 2022; ‘Helmet Cam captured Russian Air Assault Troops First Capture of Hostomel Airport’, 12 March 2022; Russian ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine, 25 March 2022 and ‘Survivor: Russian VDV Airborne Soldier talks about their initial Invasion of Hostomel Airport’, 21 April 2022. Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Serhiy Morgunov, Kostiantyn Khudov, ‘Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders combined to save the Capital’, The Washington Post (WP), 24 August 2022. Notably, members of the 4th Rapid Intervention Brigade, NG, reported the arrival of 34 Russian helicopters at Antonov LAP, and to have shot down three of these (see ‘Video shows Helicopters flying towards Gostomel Airfield in Ukraine’, WP, 24 February 2022). If the Russian formation originally included a total of 40 helicopters, this might be a cross-confirmation of the loss of up to six, and heavy damage of at least three Ka-52s, Mi-8s and Mi-24s to PSU interceptors and ZSU MANPADs. Sonne et al, ‘Battle for Kyiv.”, WP, 24 August 2022. Zolkin, ‘Survivor.’, YouTube՛, 21 April 2022; Ukrainian Military TV, ‘Zeus: A Man who beat Russians hard in Hostomel’, YooTube, 15 August 2022; James Marson, ‘The Ragtag Army that won the Battle of Kyiv and saved Ukraine’, WSJ, 20 September 2022. Julian Duplain, ’Russians twice targeted Zelensky compound with
attacks, Ukraine says’, Washington Post, 29 April 2022; Sonne et al, ‘Battle for Kyiv.”, WP, 24 August 2022. ‘The Destruction of a Convoy of Chechen Special Forces near Hostomel on Feb. 26 officially confirmed by the President’s Office’, Kyiv Independent, 27 February 2022 Slava (veteran NCO of the ZSU), interview, 10 March 2022. James Marson, ‘The Ragtag Army.’, WSJ, 20 September 2022. 13 Zolkin, ‘Survivor.’, YouTube, 21 April 2022. 14 ‘How this War began: Interview with General Krivonos by Mark Solonin (in Ukrainian), YouTube.com, 29 July 2022. 15 Based on media reports (for example; Kyiv Independent, Washington Examiner, CNN etc.) by mayor of Vasylkiv, Natalya Balasinovich, and Kryvonos’s interview with Mark Solonin. Zaluzhny claimed an 11-76 shot down over Vasylkiv via his Telegram account early on 26 February, and this claim was repeated by the Associated Press. The Pentagon ‘confirmed’ the downing of two Il-76s. That said, as of summer 2022, the Ukrainians have not provided any kind of evidence for any of these intercepts or at least for a major engagement with the VDV on the ground. Chapter б 1 2 3 4 5 Andrew Milburn, ‘They own the long Clock: How the Russian military is starting to adapt in Ukraine’, Taskandpurpose.com, 21 March 2022; Andrew Milburn, ‘Russia’s War in Ukraine is far from over’, Taskandpurpose.com, 21 March 2022; Andrew Milburn, Interview, Taskandpurpose.com, 25 March 2022; ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion, RUSI, Special Report, 22 April 2022, p. 4. Isobel Koshiw, ‘How Sumy’s Residents kept Russian Forces out of their City’,
The Guardian, 2 January 2023. Awaiting an Order: Battalion Commander on Kharkiv Counteroffensive, Possibility of War in Russia (in Ukrainian), Hromadske, 23 May 2022. Cross-examination of reports by Stariy Butusov, 25 Russian Military Vehicles destroyed near Stariy Saltiv, 9 May 2022. Awaiting an
Order: Battalion Commander on Kharkiv Counteroffensive, Possibility of War in Russia’ (in Ukrainian), Hromadske, 23 May 2022. Chapter 7 1 2 3 4 5 В “ДНР” и “ЛНР” объявлена всеобщая мобилизация, DW, 19 February2022; ‘Глава ЛНР Пасечник подписал указ о всеобщей мобилизации в республике’, RT, 19
February 2022, ‘В ДНР и ЛНР военные силой забирают жителей на войну’, URA.ua, 21 February 2022, ‘Росія почала військову окупацію частини Донбасу: з’явилось відео входження колони техніки’, TSN, 21 February 2022. ‘В ЛНР заявили, что у республики не будет легкой операции в Донбассе’, Ria Novosti, 24
February 2022. ‘Оккупанты “ЛНР” объявили о начале штурма прифронтового Счастья (видео)’, Focus.ua, 24 February 2022; ‘«Счастье не дадим потерять стране». Как жители города в Луганской области выживают во время обострения на фронте, Hromadske.ua, 24 February 2022. ‘ВСУ отбили атаку на прифронтовое
Счастье, город остается под контролем Украины’, Focus.ua, 24 February 2022, ‘Плацдарменное положение: Луганская республика начала решающие бои’, Izvestia, 28 February 2022. In early March 2022, the government of Ukraine opened a case for treason against the head of the Stanytssia Luhanska civil-
military administration and his two deputies, allegedly for switching sides and providing intelligence and support
to the LPR and Russian forces (see: ‘Держзрада керівників селищної військово-цивільної адміністрації на Луганщині ֊ розпочато розслідування’, Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office website, 2 March 2022). Ukrainian Military TV, ‘AFU destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 1 IFV near Triokhizbenka’, YouTube, 25 February 2022; ‘Город Счастье и семь поселков освобождены в ЛНР’, Don24.ru, 28 February 2022. 73
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28 6 7 8 9 ‘Кольцевая линия: войска республик Донбасса и России блокировали Мариуполь’, Izvestia, 2 March 2022; Теперь работаем вместе, ‘Войска ЛНР и армия России вышли навстречу друг другу в Донбассе’, YouTube, 4 March 2022. This is a common community name in Donbas, for reference
this is the Petrivske listed in the Ukrainian gazetteer as being located at 37.83651 47.63066. ‘Басурин заявил, что силы ДНР будут освобождать территорию области’, RIA Novosti, 24 February 2022; ‘Луганское Счастье: как в ЛНР налаживают жизнь под залпы артиллерии’, Izvestia, 5 March 2022. ‘Українські
військові поблизу Волновахи збили російський винищувач-бомбардувальник, Slovo І Dilo, 3 March 2022; ‘Освобождение Мариуполя: морпехи Новороссии против морпехов Украинского Государства’, 9111.ru, 24 March 2022; ‘В Волновахе уничтожен командир батальона “Спарта” из ДНР’, Dnepr Express, 6 March 2022.
‘Бронеавтомобили “Варта” на вооружении народной милиции ДНР’, ѴК website, 12 March 2022 Chapter 8 1 2 3 ‘The Heroes of the Moment in Time: Blew up Bridge together with Himself’, GenStab-U, 25 February 2022. Ukrainian Military TV, Thor Skybiuk, about the first Days of War and Defending Voznesensk’,
16 July 2022; ‘Поранені майже не виживають: у розвідці назвали кількість втрат серед мобілізованих на Донбасі’, Kanal 24,19 May 2022; UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine ֊ 22 June 2022’ Ά Ukrainian Town deals Russia one of the War’s most decisive
Routs’. WSJ, 16 March 2022; Sravasti Dasgupta, ‘Ukrainian Soldiers and Volunteers defeated larger
Russian force in strategically important Town’, The Independent, 17 March 2022; ‘Paratroopers from the Lviv Region repulsed the enemy attack on in the Battle for Voznesensk’, 26 March 2022; ‘Film shows Battle for Voznesensk, which kept Russians from reaching Odesa’, 15 April 2022; Ukrainian Military TV, Thor Skybiuk, about the first Days of War and Defending Vozunesenks’, 16 July 2022. Appendix III 1 74 Unless stated otherwise, based on Butowski. |
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS Helion Company Limited Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre Budbrooke Road Warwick CV34 5WE England Tel. 01926 499 619 Email: info@helion.co.uk Website: www.helion.co.uk Twitter: @helionbooks Visit our blog http://blog.helion.co.uk/ Text ©Tom Cooper, Adrien Fontanellaz, Ed Crowther and Milos Sipos 2023 Photographs © as individually credited Colour artwork © Giorgio Albertini, David Bocquelet.Tom Cooper 2023 Maps drawn by and © Tom Cooper 2023 Designed and typeset by Farr out Publications, Wokingham, Berkshire Cover design Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk ) Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologise for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book. 2 2 Abbreviations Introduction and Acknowledgements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 From Decay to Resurgence Putin Aktiengesellschaft Putin's Cannon Fodder Last-Minute Moves The first Week of the Three-Day Invasion City Fortresses Line of Control The Race to Odesa 3 15 32 33 37 45 50 53 Appendices I Known Major Units of the Ukrainian Army, Territorial Defence National Guard as of February 2022 II Primary Combat Units of the SV/VSRF, 2014 III VKS and VMF, Major Units, 2018-20221 62 66 67 Bibliography Notes About the Authors 70 71 76 ICELAND ISBN 978-1-804512-16-6 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
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EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28 BIBLIOGRAPHY Beehner, L., Analyzing the Russian Way of War; Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia (West Point: Modern War Institute, 2018) Butowski, P., Flashpoint Russia; Russia’s Air Power: Capabilities and Structure (Wien: Harpia Publishing, 2019) Collins, L., ‘In 2014, the “decrepit” Ukrainian army hit the refresh button. Eight years later, it’s paying off’, The Conversation (online), 8 March 2022 Cooper, T., Moscow’s Game ofPoker: Russian Military Intervention in Syria, 2015-2017 (Warwick: Helion and Company, 2018) Darczewska, J., Rosgvardiya; A Special-Purpose Force (Warsaw: OSW, Point of View 78, May 2020) Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power; Building a Military to support Great Power Aspirations (DIA, 2017) Delanoe, L, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Toward a Multiregional Force (Arlington: CNA, 2019) Demonque, C., ‘La Garde nationale de Russie (Rosgvardia): Dernier rempart de Vladimir Poutine’, Défense Sécurité Internationale, No 159, May-June 2022 Dorfman, Z., ‘Secret CIA training program in Ukraine helped Kyiv prepare for Russian Invasion, Yahoo News (online), 16 March 2022 Elfving, J., An Assessment of the Russian Airborne Troops and their Role on Tomorrow’s Battlefield (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2021) Facon, L, La nouvelle armée russe (Paris: L’Observatoire franco russe, 2021) Fiore, N. J., ‘Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group’, Armour, No. CXXVIII, Spring 2017 Fox, A. C., ‘Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad: A Brief History of the Battles of the Donetsk Airport 26 May 2014 to 21 January 2015’, Land
Warfare Paper, No. 125, May 2019 Galeotti, Μ., ‘Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role’, Marshall Center Security Insight, no. 46, Febuary 2020 Galeotti, Μ., ‘Russian Airborne Forces re-tool for expanded Role’, Jane’s (online), 25 October 2021 Garamone, J., ‘Ukraine-California Ties Show Worth of National Guard Program’, DoD News (online), 18 March 2022 Goya, Μ., Offensives éclairs dans le Donbass- août 2014/janvier 2015’, La voix de l’épée (online), 21 February 2022 Grant, G., ‘Seven Years of Deadlock: Why Ukraine’s Military Reforms Have Gone Nowhere, and How the US Should Respond’, The Jamestown Foundation, 16 July 2021 Grau, L. W. Barties, C. K., The Russian Way of War; Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2017) Grau, L. W. Barties, C. K., ‘Getting to Know the Russian Battalion Tactical Group’, The Royal United Services Institute (online), 14 April 2022 Gressel, G., ‘Waves of Ambition: Russia’s Military Build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea’ (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021) Harris, Catherine, Kagan Frederick W, Russia’s Military Posture: Ground Forces order of battle (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2018) 70 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-2-3; The Soviet Army, Troops, Organization and Equipment (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1991) Henrotin, Joseph, Guerre en Ukraine: le rôle de l’artillerie, in Défense Sécurité Internationale (Hors-Série) no 72, June-July 2020 Henrotin, Joseph, L’armée
ukrainienne: Une réforme impossible ?, in Défense Sécurité Internationale no 157, JanuaryFebruary 2022 Holcomb, Franklin, The order of Battle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: A key component in European Security (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2016) Hunder Max, Government to create 26 Territorial Defense battalions, in The Kyiv Independent, 19 January 2022 Hunter, James, F-15 Eagle Driver On What It Is Like Flying Against Ukraine’s Fighter Pilots, in The Drive (online), 29 March 2022 Janes, Ukraine conflict, Equipment profile, Janes (on line), 28 February 2022 Karber, Phillip A., Lessons learnedfrom the Russo-Ukrainian War (Draft), The Potomac Foundation, 29 September 2015 Karber, Phillip A., Thibeault, Josuah, Russia’s New Generation Warfare, in Army, June 2016 Kossov, Igor, Ukraine’s new military branch: Citizens protecting their neighborhood, in Politico, 13 February 2022 Lapaiev Yuri, Reforming Territorial Defense in Ukraine: Danger in Delay, in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 18, Issue 30, 23 February 2021 Manash Pratim, Boruah Prathamesh, Karl, Ukrainian Navy: A force in distress, Janes (online), 15 February 2022 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2013; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2014) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2014; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2015) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2015; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2016) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2016; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2017) Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2017; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2018)
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2019-2020; The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2021) Mladenov, A., ‘Tough Days for Ukraine’s military Helicopter Community’, Kiakaha Medias, 23 August 2020 Muzyka, К., Russian Forces in the Western Military District (Arlington: CNA, 2021) National Guard of Ukraine; National Guard of Ukraine. Changes, development, achievements (Documentary, July 2020) Newdick, Thomas, Ukrainian MiG-29 Pilot’s Front-Line Account Of The Air War Against Russia, The Drive (online), 1 April 2022 Ostensen, A. G. Bukkvoll, T., Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies - the Implications for European and Norwegian Security (Kjeller: The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment/FFI, 2018) Ponomarenko, Ulia, Who can and can’t join Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Force, in The Kyiv Independent, 7 January 2022 Pukhov, Ruslan, The Tanks ofAugust (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010)
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022 Putiata, Dmytro, Karbivnychyi, Andrii, Rudyka, Vasyl, Ukraine Armed Forces on the Eve of the Conflict in mil.in.ua (online) 12 March 2020 Rector, Alexander, N.Y Army Guard Soldiers mentor and learn in Ukraine, National Guard (online) 22 June 2018 Ripley, Tim, Operation Aleppo; Russia’s War in Syria (Lancaster: Telic-Herrick Publications, 2018) Roblin, Sebastian, Meet the BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles, 1945 (online), 19 March 2022 Sanders, Deborah, “Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy” in Naval War College Review, Volume 70, Number 4, 2017 Singh, Mandeep, The First Casualty: Suppression of Ukraine’s Air Defences, Northlines (online), 26 February 2022 Stepanenko, Kateryna, Frederick W. Kagan, and Brian BabcockLumish, Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization, Institutefor the Study War The Critical Threats Project 2022 (online), 5 March 2022 Sukhankin, Sergey, and Hurska Alla, The Ukrainian Navy in the Black and Azov Seas after 2014: losses, achievements, prospects. Policy Brief, Special Edition. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Russia Military; Quick Reference Guide (TRADOC, 2020) Trendafilovski, Vladimir, Ukrainian Naval Aviation Update, KeyMilitary (online), 16 January 2020 Welt, Cory, Russia’s Use of Force Against the Ukrainian Navy, CRS INSIGHT, December 3,2018 Wiik, Andrzej, OS W Studies no 66: The best army Ukraine has ever had; Changes in Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian aggression (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2017) White, Andrew, Ukraine
conflict: Ukrainian special operations forces in focus, Janes (online), 4 March 2022 Zagorodnyuk, Andriy, Alina Frolova, Hans Petter Midtunn Oleksii Pavliuchyk, Is Ukraine’s reformed military ready to repel a new Russian Invasion? The Atlantic Council (online), 23 December 2021 NOTES Chapter 1 1 ‘Putin shares the opinion that if there is a ‘Revolution’ in Ukraine, then there is a new state on its territory’ (in Ukrainian), Mirror Weekly, 4 March 2014. 2 These events will be thoroughly covered in forthcoming volumes of this mini-series. 3 Galeotti (2019) pp. 54-56, Grant et al; Wiik pp. 10-11,17-18,25, White Book 2013, p. 67. 4 ‘Ukraine’s Army is back’, Untan Information Agency, 28 February 2018. 5 Notably, by issuing of refurbished MT-12 Rapirà 100mm anti tank guns to the anti-tank ‘divisions’ of every brigade. Although outdated, these proved highly effective during the fighting in Donbas. 6 Organisation-wise, ZSU mechanised brigades are very similar to motor rifle regiments of the VSRE 7 Dorfman, Zagorodnyuk Ali, Garamone, Collins, Rector, Wiik, pp. 22-24. 8 Including Land Forces, Naval Infantry and Air Assault brigades. 9 White Book 2013; pp. 66, 70, White Book 2014; pp. 20, 30, 74; White Book 2015; pp. 10,21, 24-26, 97-98; White Book 2016; pp. 11, 29, 30, 107-109; White Book 2017; pp. 14,47, 68, 148-49, WhiteBook 2019-2020; pp. 76, 83-84; Wiik, p. 16; Galeotti (2019) pp. 45-46; interview with Siarhei Franchuk, 10 March 2022. 10 Vladimir Shchetinin, quoted by Grant. 11 Wiik, pp. 28-30; Galeotti (2019), pp. 47-48; Grant; Ukroboronprom website. Content of successive White
Books published by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) attest to the massive scale of the Ukrainian re-armament program, but much of the data they provide is contradictory, at other times unclear, and it remains unclear exactly how many of what major weapons systems had been overhauled and returned to service, and how many newly acquired. The above-listed numbers are thus within realms of‘best estimates’. 12 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (as of 16 March 2022); Gotkowska, Justyna Ali, ‘NATO member states on arms deliveries to Ukraine’, OS W Commentary No 423, 3 February 2022; Mitzer, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Stijn, ‘Keeping The Peace - Bayraktar TB2s Over Ukraine’, Oryx blog, 7 January 2022. Data provided in this sub-chapter and Appendix I is drawn from a wide range of Ukrainian sources, including official publications and the White Book 2019-2021, pp. 173-175, MilitaryLand.net website; Henrotin (2022); Siarhei Franchuk, interview, March 2022; White et al, pp. 21, 35-36; and Holcomb, pp. 11-15. For easier oversight, all units belonging to different commands of the Land Forces and the National Guard had been listed in Appendix I. This does not necessarily reflect their actual assignment as of February-March 2022. Fontanellaz, Guerre en Ukraine, Orties: l’App disruptive au service du dieu de la guerre', Linkedln.com, 21 May 2022. Axe, 12 February 2022; Mladenov, 23 August 2020, White Book 2019-2020, p. 182. Lapaiev, Kossov, Ponomarenko, Hunder, Grant, and interview with Siarhei Franchuk, 10 March 2022. National Guard of Ukraine. Changes, development, achievements, July 2020,
FIEP, the National Guard of Ukraine; MilitaryLand, consulted 19 March 2022. ‘Juice’ (MiG-29 pilot), interview with Newdick, 1 April 2022. Hunter, 29 March 2022. White Book 2013, pp. 12, 71; White Book 2014. p. 78; White Book 2016, p. 108; White Book 2017, pp. 50,148; White Book 20192020, pp. 182-183; Hunter, James, 29 March 2022; Newdick, 1 April 2022. Axe, David, 27 January 2022; Boruah Manash Pratim Karl Prathamesh, 15 February 2022; Janes (online), 28 February 2022; Sukhankin Sergey Alla Hurska; Deborah Sanders, Cory Welt. Trendafilovski, 16 January 2020. Chapter 2 1 The German word Aktiengesellschaft defines a corporation limited by share ownership (i.e. one owned by its shareholders), and traded on a stock market. Considering the organisation and methods of operation of the regime of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin in the Russian Federation, the authors find that this is the most suitable description. 71
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28 2 The two conventions in question are the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, from 1978, and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts, of 1983. 3 The only former state of the USSR not recognising the exclusive Russian claims to succession of the Soviet Union was Ukraine: ever since 1991, Kyiv continued to pursue claims against the Russian Federation in foreign courts, seeking to recover its share of the foreign property that was formerly owned by the USSR. 4 Facon, pp. 11,14-18,23-26, 37, 39. 5 Beehner et al (2018), pp. 41-43, Pukov, pp. 18, 20,40-41,45, 49, 57, 75, 96, 113, 130-135, 142-143. 6 Facon, p. 35; Beehner et al (2018), pp. 49-50; Pukhov pp. 40, 136, 142. 7 Facon pp. 37, 38, 39,49, Galeotti (2017), pp. 20-21, 25-34,41,49, Grau (2017), pp. 10, 27-29, 31, Stepanenko Ali. 8 Facon p. 50-51, 54. 9 Fiore, Grau (2017) pp. 36-38, Grau (2022). 10 Based on Fox (2019) pp. 7-11, Galeotti (2019) pp. 11,14,16-17, 31-35. Goya, 21 February 2022, Karber (2015), Karber and Thibeault (2016), Henrotin (2020). 11 For details on the Russian military intervention in Syria, see Cooper, Moscow’s Game ofPoker. 12 Fore a more favourable assessment of the VSRF’s capabilities demonstrated in Syria, see Ripley, pp. 197-1982 and 197. 13 Grauetal,p. 11. 14 Based on Fox (2019) pp. 7-11; Galeotti (2019), pp. 11, 14, 16-17, 31-35; Goya, 21 February 2022; Karber (2015); Karber and Thibeault (2016); Henrotin (2020). 15 Unless stated otherwise, based on Pavel Luzin, ‘The Russian Army in 2023’,
ridl.io, 18 January 2023. 16 All brigades bore the official designation ‘independent/separate’, thus designating them as not part of divisions; this is omitted from all such designations in this book for reasons of space. 17 An abbreviation for spetsialnovo naznacheniya, or ‘special purpose, Spetsnaz has a wide range of meanings in Russian but has come to be used colloquially to refer to special forces. 18 Muzyka, pp. 26, 30-32; Elfving, pp. 9-13,17-20,27; Galeotti (2017), pp. 49-51; Galeotti (2021); Grau (2017), pp. 32, 359-360; DIA (2017) p. 55. 19 Galleotti (2017), pp. 45-46, 51, 54; Grau (2017); pp. 32,279-280, 362-363; Muzyka, p. 49; DIA (2017), pp. 56, 71. 20 Circular Error Probable (or CEP) is the distance from the target within which 50 percent of weapons could be expected to land, thus 50 percent of Iskander missiles could be expected to land within 20-30 metres of the aiming point. 21 Muzyka, pp. 10, 13, 23; Grau (2017), p. 31, 32, 34, 35, 100, 101, 209-211,224, 264; Harris and Kagan, pp. 52-53; Galeotti (2017) p. 28; TRADOC (2020); DIA (2017) pp. 50-51, 53-54. Notably, the VSRF deployed about a dozen TOS-1/TOS-1A multiple rocket launcher systems to Ukraine in 2022. However, these short ranged tactical 220mm rocket systems, firing thermobaric warheads, were not assigned to the army’s artillery units, but to the Russian NBC Protection Troops. This is why the weapon had no designation based on the designation system of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defence (so-called GRAUdesignation). 22 Despite quite a lot of related reporting in the
West of 2015-2017, as of the first half of 2022, there was no evidence that the UTCS was in service with МВТ and IFV crews of the VSRF. Furthermore, while the Russian armed forces did have an ATMS at strategic and 72 23 24 25 26 27 28 operational levels - and operated their air defences with the help of ATMS - they were yet to introduce a link between these and the UTCS and the ATMS used at higher command levels. Unless stated otherwise, based on Butowski pp. 118,124; Grau (2017), pp. 25-26; Demonque et al (2020), pp. 7-8, 14-15, 22, 33, 39-40, 44, 54-57. ‘Roughly speaking, we started the War: How sending Wagner PMC to the Front helped Prigozhin to improve Relations with Putin, and what is Sobyaninsky Regiment’ (in Russian), Meduza.io, 13 July 2022. Unless stated otherwise, based on Butowski (2019) and Cooper (2018). Aerial warfare over Ukraine in 2022 will be covered in much more detail in another book in this sub-series. Gressel 2021, pp. 6,10, Delanoe, pp. 1, 3-7,11,14,16-17, 22,24: Pukhov, p. 66; DIA (2017), pp. 67-69, 83. Grau (2017), p. 143. Based on Grau (2017) pp. 16, 25, 46-47, 51,54-58, 143, 212, 224, 232-235, 239,265, 289, 329-330. Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 21.02.2022 № 71 “О признании Донецкой Народной Республики”; http:// publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202202220002 ; Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 21 February 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828; Путин: Россия признала ДНР и ЛНР в границах Донецкой и Луганской областей, ВВС News website, 22 February 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60483790. 2 Volodymyr Zolkin, ‘Aiming in the Residential Quarters of Mariinka’, YouTube, 8 July 2022. 3 ‘Ukraine munitions blasts prompt mass Evacuations’, BBC News, 23 March 2017; ‘NATO Envoys arrive in Balaklia to assist in humanitarian demining’, UNIAN, 25 March 2017; ‘Ammo Depot explosions in Kharkiv region’s Balaklia stop on Thursday afternoon’, UNIAN, 3 May 2018; ‘Ukraine’s exploding Munition Depots give Ammunition to Security Concerns’, Radio Free Europe, 6 October 2017. 4 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border’, Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2022, Rochan Consulting, ‘Tracking Russian Deployments near Ukraine Autumn-Winter 2021-22’, 15 November 2021. For details on Operation Danube, see Francois, Operation Danube, Europe@War. 5 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border’, Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2022, Rochan Consulting, ‘Tracking Russian Deployments near Ukraine Autumn-Winter 2021-22’, 15 November 2021; Dan Sabbagh, ‘Putin involved in War “at level of Colonel or Brigadier”, say Western Sources’, The Guardian, 16 May 2022. 6 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border’, Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2022, Rochan Consulting, ‘Tracking Russian Deployments near Ukraine Autumn-Winter 2021-22’, 15 November 2021. 7 Garamon. 8 Slava (veteran NCO of the ZSU), interview, 20 February 2022; Dan Rice, ‘The Untold Story of the Battle for Kyiv’, Small Wars Journal (online), 31 May 2022; Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan,
Serhiy Morgunov, Kostiantyn Khudov, ‘Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders combined to save the Capital’, WP, 24 August 2022. 1
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022 Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Robert Person, Michael McFaul, ‘What Putin fears most’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 33/Issue 2, April 2022; Samuel Ramani, ‘Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership’, Middle East Policy, 25 April 2020; Maria Tsvetkova, ‘How Russia allowed homegrown Radicals to go and fight in Syria’, Reuters, 13 May 2016; Stuart Ramsay, ‘IS Files reveal Assad’s Deal with Militants’, Sky News, 2 May 2016; Sabra Ayres, ‘Thousands of Russians joined Islamic State and brought their Children. Now Relatives are trying to bring them Home’, Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2017; Hassan Hassan, ‘Insurgents Again: the Islamic State’s calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria-Iraq Border Region and beyond’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Volume 10, Issue 11, December 2017; for a detailed reconstruction of the Iranian and then the Russian military interventions in Syria, see Cooper, Syrian Conflagration Cooper, Moscow’s Game ofPoker (details in Bibliography). ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion, RUSI, Special Report, 22 April 2022, p. 2. Joe Tidy, ‘Ukrainian power grid “lucky” to withstand Russian cyber-attack’, BBC, 12 April 2022. ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion) RUSI, Special Report, 22 April 2022, p. 2. Unless stated otherwise, the following reconstruction of the fighting north-west of Kyiv between 24 and 28 February is based on cross-examination of dozens of reports in the mainstream and social media, including - for example - Dan Rice, ‘The untold
Story of the Battle for Kyiv’, Small Wars Journal (online), 31 May 2022 - and a review of videos released on YouTube, including ‘The Hostomel Landing Analysis’, 26 May 2022; ‘Russian Ka-52 Emergency Landing during Combat Sortie at Hostomel Airport’, 19 March 2022; ‘Helmet Cam captured Russian Air Assault Troops First Capture of Hostomel Airport’, 12 March 2022; Russian ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine, 25 March 2022 and ‘Survivor: Russian VDV Airborne Soldier talks about their initial Invasion of Hostomel Airport’, 21 April 2022. Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Serhiy Morgunov, Kostiantyn Khudov, ‘Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders combined to save the Capital’, The Washington Post (WP), 24 August 2022. Notably, members of the 4th Rapid Intervention Brigade, NG, reported the arrival of 34 Russian helicopters at Antonov LAP, and to have shot down three of these (see ‘Video shows Helicopters flying towards Gostomel Airfield in Ukraine’, WP, 24 February 2022). If the Russian formation originally included a total of 40 helicopters, this might be a cross-confirmation of the loss of up to six, and heavy damage of at least three Ka-52s, Mi-8s and Mi-24s to PSU interceptors and ZSU MANPADs. Sonne et al, ‘Battle for Kyiv.”, WP, 24 August 2022. Zolkin, ‘Survivor.’, YouTube՛, 21 April 2022; Ukrainian Military TV, ‘Zeus: A Man who beat Russians hard in Hostomel’, YooTube, 15 August 2022; James Marson, ‘The Ragtag Army that won the Battle of Kyiv and saved Ukraine’, WSJ, 20 September 2022. Julian Duplain, ’Russians twice targeted Zelensky compound with
attacks, Ukraine says’, Washington Post, 29 April 2022; Sonne et al, ‘Battle for Kyiv.”, WP, 24 August 2022. ‘The Destruction of a Convoy of Chechen Special Forces near Hostomel on Feb. 26 officially confirmed by the President’s Office’, Kyiv Independent, 27 February 2022 Slava (veteran NCO of the ZSU), interview, 10 March 2022. James Marson, ‘The Ragtag Army.’, WSJ, 20 September 2022. 13 Zolkin, ‘Survivor.’, YouTube, 21 April 2022. 14 ‘How this War began: Interview with General Krivonos by Mark Solonin (in Ukrainian), YouTube.com, 29 July 2022. 15 Based on media reports (for example; Kyiv Independent, Washington Examiner, CNN etc.) by mayor of Vasylkiv, Natalya Balasinovich, and Kryvonos’s interview with Mark Solonin. Zaluzhny claimed an 11-76 shot down over Vasylkiv via his Telegram account early on 26 February, and this claim was repeated by the Associated Press. The Pentagon ‘confirmed’ the downing of two Il-76s. That said, as of summer 2022, the Ukrainians have not provided any kind of evidence for any of these intercepts or at least for a major engagement with the VDV on the ground. Chapter б 1 2 3 4 5 Andrew Milburn, ‘They own the long Clock: How the Russian military is starting to adapt in Ukraine’, Taskandpurpose.com, 21 March 2022; Andrew Milburn, ‘Russia’s War in Ukraine is far from over’, Taskandpurpose.com, 21 March 2022; Andrew Milburn, Interview, Taskandpurpose.com, 25 March 2022; ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion, RUSI, Special Report, 22 April 2022, p. 4. Isobel Koshiw, ‘How Sumy’s Residents kept Russian Forces out of their City’,
The Guardian, 2 January 2023. Awaiting an Order: Battalion Commander on Kharkiv Counteroffensive, Possibility of War in Russia (in Ukrainian), Hromadske, 23 May 2022. Cross-examination of reports by Stariy Butusov, 25 Russian Military Vehicles destroyed near Stariy Saltiv, 9 May 2022. Awaiting an
Order: Battalion Commander on Kharkiv Counteroffensive, Possibility of War in Russia’ (in Ukrainian), Hromadske, 23 May 2022. Chapter 7 1 2 3 4 5 В “ДНР” и “ЛНР” объявлена всеобщая мобилизация, DW, 19 February2022; ‘Глава ЛНР Пасечник подписал указ о всеобщей мобилизации в республике’, RT, 19
February 2022, ‘В ДНР и ЛНР военные силой забирают жителей на войну’, URA.ua, 21 February 2022, ‘Росія почала військову окупацію частини Донбасу: з’явилось відео входження колони техніки’, TSN, 21 February 2022. ‘В ЛНР заявили, что у республики не будет легкой операции в Донбассе’, Ria Novosti, 24
February 2022. ‘Оккупанты “ЛНР” объявили о начале штурма прифронтового Счастья (видео)’, Focus.ua, 24 February 2022; ‘«Счастье не дадим потерять стране». Как жители города в Луганской области выживают во время обострения на фронте, Hromadske.ua, 24 February 2022. ‘ВСУ отбили атаку на прифронтовое
Счастье, город остается под контролем Украины’, Focus.ua, 24 February 2022, ‘Плацдарменное положение: Луганская республика начала решающие бои’, Izvestia, 28 February 2022. In early March 2022, the government of Ukraine opened a case for treason against the head of the Stanytssia Luhanska civil-
military administration and his two deputies, allegedly for switching sides and providing intelligence and support
to the LPR and Russian forces (see: ‘Держзрада керівників селищної військово-цивільної адміністрації на Луганщині ֊ розпочато розслідування’, Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office website, 2 March 2022). Ukrainian Military TV, ‘AFU destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 1 IFV near Triokhizbenka’, YouTube, 25 February 2022; ‘Город Счастье и семь поселков освобождены в ЛНР’, Don24.ru, 28 February 2022. 73
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28 6 7 8 9 ‘Кольцевая линия: войска республик Донбасса и России блокировали Мариуполь’, Izvestia, 2 March 2022; Теперь работаем вместе, ‘Войска ЛНР и армия России вышли навстречу друг другу в Донбассе’, YouTube, 4 March 2022. This is a common community name in Donbas, for reference
this is the Petrivske listed in the Ukrainian gazetteer as being located at 37.83651 47.63066. ‘Басурин заявил, что силы ДНР будут освобождать территорию области’, RIA Novosti, 24 February 2022; ‘Луганское Счастье: как в ЛНР налаживают жизнь под залпы артиллерии’, Izvestia, 5 March 2022. ‘Українські
військові поблизу Волновахи збили російський винищувач-бомбардувальник, Slovo І Dilo, 3 March 2022; ‘Освобождение Мариуполя: морпехи Новороссии против морпехов Украинского Государства’, 9111.ru, 24 March 2022; ‘В Волновахе уничтожен командир батальона “Спарта” из ДНР’, Dnepr Express, 6 March 2022.
‘Бронеавтомобили “Варта” на вооружении народной милиции ДНР’, ѴК website, 12 March 2022 Chapter 8 1 2 3 ‘The Heroes of the Moment in Time: Blew up Bridge together with Himself’, GenStab-U, 25 February 2022. Ukrainian Military TV, Thor Skybiuk, about the first Days of War and Defending Voznesensk’,
16 July 2022; ‘Поранені майже не виживають: у розвідці назвали кількість втрат серед мобілізованих на Донбасі’, Kanal 24,19 May 2022; UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine ֊ 22 June 2022’ Ά Ukrainian Town deals Russia one of the War’s most decisive
Routs’. WSJ, 16 March 2022; Sravasti Dasgupta, ‘Ukrainian Soldiers and Volunteers defeated larger
Russian force in strategically important Town’, The Independent, 17 March 2022; ‘Paratroopers from the Lviv Region repulsed the enemy attack on in the Battle for Voznesensk’, 26 March 2022; ‘Film shows Battle for Voznesensk, which kept Russians from reaching Odesa’, 15 April 2022; Ukrainian Military TV, Thor Skybiuk, about the first Days of War and Defending Vozunesenks’, 16 July 2022. Appendix III 1 74 Unless stated otherwise, based on Butowski. |
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| series | Europe@war series |
| series2 | Europe@war series |
| spelling | Cooper, Tom 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)1081464763 aut War in Ukraine Volume 2 Russian invasion, February 2022 Edward Crowther [und weitere] Warwick Helion & Company Limited 2023 76 Seiten, xii Seiten Tafeln Karten (teilweise farbig) txt rdacontent sti rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Europe@war series no. 28 Europe@war series "On 24 February 2022, eight years after invading the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine and organising an illegal referendum in support of a subsequent Russian annexation, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both Western and Russian intelligence services expected the invasion to quickly topple the democratically elected government in Kyiv and, with the help of collaborators, to overrun the Ukrainian armed forces in a matter of between 3 and 14 days. Early on 24 February, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) launched a series of missile and artillery strikes on the main air bases and dozens of other military facilities in Ukraine. Immediately afterwards, the VSRF launched a ground invasion, with its forces advancing on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Melitopol, and Kherson. Although following a build-up that had begun in April 2021, and expected by many, the onslaught still came as a major surprise for the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian armed forces, and the majority of its allies in the West, and also for the mass of officers and other ranks of the VSRF, many of whom believed that they were only to participate in exercises. However, the deeper the Russians rolled into Ukraine, the more resistance they encountered: while some Russian units performed as expected, elsewhere whole armies began falling apart when ordered to advance at maximum possible speed without the necessary firepower and logistic support. After suffering catastrophic losses while failing to reach downtown Kyiv, and failing to reach and enter Chernihiv and Kharkiv, the war in northern and north-eastern Ukraine quickly settled down into a bloody stalemate. In the south, the Russians initially advanced at an astonishing rate, securing Melitopol during the second day of their invasion, and Kherson only a few days later [...]." (DE-588)4145395-5 Bildband gnd-content Crowther, Edward Verfasser (DE-588)1296072789 aut Fontanellaz, Adrien Verfasser (DE-588)1162458046 aut Sipos, Milos Verfasser (DE-588)1190671581 aut (DE-604)BV048590863 2 Europe@war series no. 28 (DE-604)BV046733782 28 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033966577&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033966577&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register |
| spellingShingle | Cooper, Tom 1970- Crowther, Edward Fontanellaz, Adrien Sipos, Milos War in Ukraine Europe@war series |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4145395-5 |
| title | War in Ukraine |
| title_auth | War in Ukraine |
| title_exact_search | War in Ukraine |
| title_exact_search_txtP | War in Ukraine |
| title_full | War in Ukraine Volume 2 Russian invasion, February 2022 Edward Crowther [und weitere] |
| title_fullStr | War in Ukraine Volume 2 Russian invasion, February 2022 Edward Crowther [und weitere] |
| title_full_unstemmed | War in Ukraine Volume 2 Russian invasion, February 2022 Edward Crowther [und weitere] |
| title_short | War in Ukraine |
| title_sort | war in ukraine russian invasion february 2022 |
| topic_facet | Bildband |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033966577&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033966577&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV048590863 (DE-604)BV046733782 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT coopertom warinukrainevolume2 AT crowtheredward warinukrainevolume2 AT fontanellazadrien warinukrainevolume2 AT siposmilos warinukrainevolume2 |