Meta-theory of law:
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
London, UK
ISTE Ltd
2022
Hoboken, NJ John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2022 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Sociology, Ethics and Epistemology of Sciences : epistemology of Normative Sciences
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xviii, 363 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781789450743 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048556908 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20230109 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 221111s2022 a||| b||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781789450743 |c hardback |9 978-1-78945-074-3 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1353781769 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV048556908 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Meta-theory of law |c coordinated by Mathieu Carpentier |
| 264 | 1 | |a London, UK |b ISTE Ltd |c 2022 | |
| 264 | 1 | |a Hoboken, NJ |b John Wiley & Sons, Inc. |c 2022 | |
| 300 | |a xviii, 363 Seiten |b Illustrationen |c 24 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Sociology, Ethics and Epistemology of Sciences : epistemology of Normative Sciences | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Rechtstheorie |0 (DE-588)4126505-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Rechtsphilosophie |0 (DE-588)4048821-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Metatheorie |0 (DE-588)4299409-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Recht |0 (DE-588)4048737-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | 0 | |a Jurisprudence / Philosophy | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Rechtstheorie |0 (DE-588)4126505-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Rechtsphilosophie |0 (DE-588)4048821-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Recht |0 (DE-588)4048737-4 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Metatheorie |0 (DE-588)4299409-3 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Carpentier, Mathieu |d 1974- |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)1074539761 |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |z 978-1-394-16368-7 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033933174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033933174 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804184567799611392 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents Introduction................................................................................................... xiii Mathieu Carpentier Part 1. Legal Theory Methods................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. Methodology in Legal Philosophy....................................... 3 Julie Dickson 1.1. Introduction: methodology in legal philosophy....................................... 1.2. The nature of law?...................................................................................... 1.3. Changing questions: diversity and development.................................... 1.4. Directly evaluative legal philosophy versus indirectly evaluative legal philosophy............................................................................. 1.5. Conclusion................................................................................................. 19 28 Chapter 2. The Methodology of Analytic Jurisprudence.................. 31 3 5 13 Pierluigi Chiassoni 2.1. Foreword.................................................................................................... 2.2. The principles of an analytic approach to jurisprudence...................... 2.3. The statute of analytic jurisprudence....................................................... 2.4. Two sets of analytic tools........................................................................ 2.4.1. Tools for the analysis of legal discourses....................................... 31 32 38 41 42
vi Meta-theory of Law 2.4.2. Tools for the refinement of extant juridical terminological and conceptual apparatuses........................................................................ 2.4.3. The tools of analytic jurisprudence and conceptual analysis. ... 2.5. Vindicating a modest and reconstructive variety of conceptual analysis........................................................................................... 2.6. Vindicating the analytic approach (and the principle of simplicity) against “essentialist” jurisprudence............................................ 2.7. References................................................................................................ 48 52 53 58 68 Chapter 3. Methodology for Theorizing About the Nature of Law and About Doctrinal Areas of Law.............................................. Brian H. BlX 75 3.1. Introduction................................................................................................ 3.2. Theories of the natureof law................................................................... 3.2.1. Increasing philosophical sophistication......................................... 3.2.2. Hans Keisen..................................................................................... 3.2.3. H.L.A. Hart..................................................................................... 3.2.4. Ronald Dworkin................................................................................ 3.2.5. Joseph Raz........................................................................................ 3.2.6. John
Finnis........................................................................................ 3.2.7. Frederick Schauer............................................................................. 3.2.8. Brian Leiter..................................................................................... 3.2.9. Mark Greenberg................................................................................ 3.3. Theories of doctrinalareas......................................................................... 3.3.1. Descriptive, prescriptive and neutral............................................... 3.3.2. Purposes........................................................................................... 3.3.3. Universal versus parochial................................................................ 3.3.4. The subject of explanation (the data)............................................ 3.3.5. Justice and autonomy or efficiency............................................... 3.4. Conclusion................................................................................................. 3.5. References................................................................................................. 75 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 81 82 83 83 84 85 85 86 86 87 87 Chapter 4. Empirical Complexity as a Conceptual Claim: Reappraising Hart’s Account of Law as a Complex Social Practice........................................................................ Gregory Bligh 4.1. Introduction................................................................................................. 4.1.1. No
place for empirical science in Haitian jurisprudence.............. 93 93 94
Contents 4.1.2. Hart’s object: “characterizing” the “complexity” of the legal system................................................................................................. 4.1.3. Two key sources of influence: J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. . . 4.1.4. Do the (linguistic) twist................................................................... 4.2. Hart’s Austinian account of the quotidian empirical statement........... 4.2.1. A critique of reductive sense-data empiricism............................... 4.2.2. Accounting for the complexity of experience............................... 4.3. Rejecting the descriptive fallacy............................................................. 4.3.1. A critique of Russell’s theory of meaning.................................... 4.3.2. A rejection of the descriptive fallacy carried over into Hart’s jurisprudence................................................................................... 4.4. The empirical relevance of the conceptual scheme in The Concept ofLaw........................................................................................ 4.4.1. “Descriptive metaphysics” and “linguistic phenomenology” ... 4.4.2. Empirical complexity and presupposition in The Concept ofLaw................................................................................... 4.5. Conclusion................................................................................................. 4.6. References................................................................................................. vii 96 99 101 106 106 112 115 116 122 126
127 135 140 142 Chapter 5. Authoritative Disagreement: Meta-Legal Theory and the Semantics of Adjudication....................................................... Andrej Kristan and Giulia Travato 149 5.1. Introduction................................................................................................. 5.2. Explananda................................................................................................. 5.2.1. Authoritative disagreement in fact-oriented interpretation........... 5.2.2. Authoritative disagreement in text-oriented interpretation........... 5.3. Meta-theoretic demarcation..................................................................... 5.3.1. Rule-skeptical legal positivism........................................................ 5.3.2. Conventionalist legal positivism..................................................... 5.3.3. Interpretivist legal antipositivism..................................................... 5.4. Semantic explanations.............................................................................. 5.4.1. Semantic invariantism..................................................................... 5.4.2. Expressivism...................................................................................... 5.4.3. Indexical contextualism ................................................................... 5.4.4. Non-indexical contextualism.......................................................... 5.4.5. Dialetheism...................................................................................... 5.4.6. Content
relativism........................................................................... 5.4.7. Assessment relativism...................................................................... 5.4.8. Truth-value indeterminism............................................................. 149 150 150 151 154 155 155 156 157 158 159 161 164 164 165 166 168
viii Meta-theory of Law 5.5. Conclusion................................................................................................ 5.6. References................................................................................................ 169 170 Chapter 6. Jeremy Waldron, the Legitimacy of Judicial Review and Political Political Theory.................................................... 179 Charles-Maxime Panaccio 6.1. Introduction................................................................................................ 6.2. The first Waldron..................................................................................... 6.2.1. The circumstances of politics.......................................................... 6.2.2. Political political theory.................................................................. 6.2.3. Rights................................................................................................ 6.2.4. CRJR................................................................................................ 6.3. Reviews of the first Waldron.................................................................. 6.3.1. The nature of disagreement............................................................. 6.3.2. Substance and results versus process and procedure.................... 6.3.3. CRJR................................................................................................ 6.4. The second Waldron................................................................................ 6.5.
Conclusion................................................................................................ 6.6. References................................................................................................ 179 180 180 181 182 182 184 184 185 187 187 191 192 Part 2. Legal Science Theories................................................................. 195 Chapter 7. Metatheory of an (Empirical) Legal Science..................... 197 Eric Millard 7.1. General framework: theory, metatheory and metascience.................... 7.1.1. Theory and metatheory..................................................................... 7.1.2. A theory of legal science as a metascience.................................... 7.1.3. A theory of (empirical) legal science............................................ 7.1.4. A theory of (empirical legal) science as applied metatheory. . . . 7.2. (Meta)theoretical theses of an (empirical) legal science......................... 7.2.1. Epistemological thesis..................................................................... 7.2.2. Meta-ethical thesis........................................................................... 7.2.3. Methodological thesis..................................................................... 197 197 200 201 205 206 208 209 212 Chapter 8. Legal and Social Sciences: What are the Links?............. 215 Véronique Champeil-Desplats 8.1. Social sciences, a factor in redefining legal sciences............................ 218
Contents 8.1.1. Epistemological movements: the positioning of legal sciences between exact, physical and natural sciences and social sciences .... 8.1.2. Heuristic movements: the reinvigoration of legal sciences by the social sciences................................................................................ 8.2. The modalities of disciplinary articulations............................................ 8.2.1. Difficulties and pitfalls..................................................................... 8.2.2. Interdisciplinary experiences and the pragmatism of interweaving knowledge............................................................................. 8.3. References.......................................................................... Chapter 9. A Hermeneutic Reading of Law and Lega) Theory: Regarding Paul Ricœur.............................................................................. ix 218 221 225 225 228 231 235 Xavier ВЮҮ and Thomas Escach-Dubourg 9.1. The outcome of a long journey, from the interpretive method to a general epistemology................................................................................ 9.1.1. A philosophy of interpretation........................................................ 9.1.2. A hermeneutic of symbols as a propaedeutic of a grand philosophy: the symbol suggests................................................................ 9.2. Hermeneutic and textual disciplines....................................................... 9.2.1. The conceptual break brought about by textual hermeneutics: the paradigm of
textuality.................................................. 9.2.2. The methodological break brought about by textual hermeneutics: reading and textual interpretation.................................... 9.3. Law as a hermeneutical discipline.......................................................... 9.3.1. Interpretation of the law: quoting the law and understanding it are one and the same thing............................................ 9.3.2. Interpretation by law and interpretation in law............................... Chapter 10. Legal Science According to the Pure Theory of Law. . 237 237 243 247 248 253 257 257 260 265 Thomas Hochmann 10.1. The negation of legal science (Sander).................................................. 10.2. The defense of legal science (Merki)..................................................... 10.3. Legal science pushed into the background (Keisen)............................ 10.3.1. Absence of denial of legal science............................................... 10.3.2. A theory of law, not of legal science............................................ 10.3.3. An interest in decision, not knowledge....................................... 10.3.4. A regression: the theory of the tacit alternative clause.............. 267 270 276 277 278 279 281
x Meta-theory of Law Chapter 11. Axiological Neutrality, Oppositional Thinking and Knowledge.............................................................................................. 285 Jean-Baptiste PoiNTEL 11.1. The three aspects of a theory................................................................... 11.1.1. Pascal’s wager, a textbook case..................................................... 11.1.2. A scientific theory of law............................................................. 11.1.3. A factual analysis of “ought to be”................................................ 11.2. “Hume’s Guillotine”, a false foundation for axiological neutrality . . 11.2.1. The definition of “Hume’s Guillotine”, an error of interpretation............................................................................................ 11.2.2. The meaning of “Hume’s Guillotine”, explaining its motivations............................................................................................... 11.2.3. The consequence of “Hume’s Guillotine”, a return to argument................................................................................................. 11.2.4. Purity or axiological neutrality, a return to Max Weber.............. 11.2.5. Language acts in John L. Austin, the inevitable fusion between descriptive and prescriptive........................................................ 11.2.6. Platonic reductionism, a problematological repression.............. 11.2.7. The importance of the implicit, a more scientific approach . . . 11.3. Oppositional commitment to the
theory............................................... 11.3.1. The critical eye, connecting analysis to policy............................ 11.3.2. Scientific purity, a political program............................................ 11.3.3. Methodological anarchism, a basis for research......................... 11.3.4. The archaeology of knowledge, a critical method...................... 11.3.5. Example: the concept of state tyranny......................................... 11.3.6. Oppositional knowledge in law, a program to be defined........... 11.4. A new disciplinary ethics, but for which academic field?................... 11.5. References................................................................................................. Chapter 12. Legal Science and Its Roles in Legal Reasoning.......... 285 286 288 289 290 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 298 298 299 300 302 303 304 305 306 311 Fábio Perin Shecaira 12.1. The concept of a source of law................................................................ 12.1.1. Explicit reference in legal practice............................................... 12.1.2. Prescriptions that serve as content-independent reasons........... 12.2. Arguments from authority..................................................................... 12.3. Types of scholarly authority.................................................................. 12.3.1. Describing and prescribing............................................................. 12.3.2. Can legal science really serve as practical authority?................. 12.3.3. A note on legitimate and
de facto authority................................. 311 312 313 314 316 316 319 323
Contents xi 12.4. Implications for jurisprudence ................................................................ 12.5. Conclusion.............................................................................................. 12.6. References................................................................................................. 324 327 327 Chapter 13. Inference to the Best Explanation in Legal Science; on Balancing Contrastive Hypotheses.................................. 329 David Duarte 13.1. Normative propositions in legal science............................................... 13.2. Inference to the best explanation.......................................................... 13.3. Speculative (hypothetical) normative propositions and inference to the best explanation ..................................................................... 13.4. Contrastive hypotheses in balancing..................................................... 13.5. References................................................................................................. 329 337 List of Authors.............................................................................................. 359 Index................................................................................................................ 361 343 346 353
|
| adam_txt |
Contents Introduction. xiii Mathieu Carpentier Part 1. Legal Theory Methods. 1 Chapter 1. Methodology in Legal Philosophy. 3 Julie Dickson 1.1. Introduction: methodology in legal philosophy. 1.2. The nature of law?. 1.3. Changing questions: diversity and development. 1.4. Directly evaluative legal philosophy versus indirectly evaluative legal philosophy. 1.5. Conclusion. 19 28 Chapter 2. The Methodology of Analytic Jurisprudence. 31 3 5 13 Pierluigi Chiassoni 2.1. Foreword. 2.2. The principles of an analytic approach to jurisprudence. 2.3. The statute of analytic jurisprudence. 2.4. Two sets of analytic tools. 2.4.1. Tools for the analysis of legal discourses. 31 32 38 41 42
vi Meta-theory of Law 2.4.2. Tools for the refinement of extant juridical terminological and conceptual apparatuses. 2.4.3. The tools of analytic jurisprudence and conceptual analysis. . 2.5. Vindicating a modest and reconstructive variety of conceptual analysis. 2.6. Vindicating the analytic approach (and the principle of simplicity) against “essentialist” jurisprudence. 2.7. References. 48 52 53 58 68 Chapter 3. Methodology for Theorizing About the Nature of Law and About Doctrinal Areas of Law. Brian H. BlX 75 3.1. Introduction. 3.2. Theories of the natureof law. 3.2.1. Increasing philosophical sophistication. 3.2.2. Hans Keisen. 3.2.3. H.L.A. Hart. 3.2.4. Ronald Dworkin. 3.2.5. Joseph Raz. 3.2.6. John
Finnis. 3.2.7. Frederick Schauer. 3.2.8. Brian Leiter. 3.2.9. Mark Greenberg. 3.3. Theories of doctrinalareas. 3.3.1. Descriptive, prescriptive and neutral. 3.3.2. Purposes. 3.3.3. Universal versus parochial. 3.3.4. The subject of explanation (the data). 3.3.5. Justice and autonomy or efficiency. 3.4. Conclusion. 3.5. References. 75 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 81 82 83 83 84 85 85 86 86 87 87 Chapter 4. Empirical Complexity as a Conceptual Claim: Reappraising Hart’s Account of Law as a Complex Social Practice. Gregory Bligh 4.1. Introduction. 4.1.1. No
place for empirical science in Haitian jurisprudence. 93 93 94
Contents 4.1.2. Hart’s object: “characterizing” the “complexity” of the legal system. 4.1.3. Two key sources of influence: J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. . . 4.1.4. Do the (linguistic) twist. 4.2. Hart’s Austinian account of the quotidian empirical statement. 4.2.1. A critique of reductive sense-data empiricism. 4.2.2. Accounting for the complexity of experience. 4.3. Rejecting the descriptive fallacy. 4.3.1. A critique of Russell’s theory of meaning. 4.3.2. A rejection of the descriptive fallacy carried over into Hart’s jurisprudence. 4.4. The empirical relevance of the conceptual scheme in The Concept ofLaw. 4.4.1. “Descriptive metaphysics” and “linguistic phenomenology” . 4.4.2. Empirical complexity and presupposition in The Concept ofLaw. 4.5. Conclusion. 4.6. References. vii 96 99 101 106 106 112 115 116 122 126
127 135 140 142 Chapter 5. Authoritative Disagreement: Meta-Legal Theory and the Semantics of Adjudication. Andrej Kristan and Giulia Travato 149 5.1. Introduction. 5.2. Explananda. 5.2.1. Authoritative disagreement in fact-oriented interpretation. 5.2.2. Authoritative disagreement in text-oriented interpretation. 5.3. Meta-theoretic demarcation. 5.3.1. Rule-skeptical legal positivism. 5.3.2. Conventionalist legal positivism. 5.3.3. Interpretivist legal antipositivism. 5.4. Semantic explanations. 5.4.1. Semantic invariantism. 5.4.2. Expressivism. 5.4.3. Indexical contextualism . 5.4.4. Non-indexical contextualism. 5.4.5. Dialetheism. 5.4.6. Content
relativism. 5.4.7. Assessment relativism. 5.4.8. Truth-value indeterminism. 149 150 150 151 154 155 155 156 157 158 159 161 164 164 165 166 168
viii Meta-theory of Law 5.5. Conclusion. 5.6. References. 169 170 Chapter 6. Jeremy Waldron, the Legitimacy of Judicial Review and Political Political Theory. 179 Charles-Maxime Panaccio 6.1. Introduction. 6.2. The first Waldron. 6.2.1. The circumstances of politics. 6.2.2. Political political theory. 6.2.3. Rights. 6.2.4. CRJR. 6.3. Reviews of the first Waldron. 6.3.1. The nature of disagreement. 6.3.2. Substance and results versus process and procedure. 6.3.3. CRJR. 6.4. The second Waldron. 6.5.
Conclusion. 6.6. References. 179 180 180 181 182 182 184 184 185 187 187 191 192 Part 2. Legal Science Theories. 195 Chapter 7. Metatheory of an (Empirical) Legal Science. 197 Eric Millard 7.1. General framework: theory, metatheory and metascience. 7.1.1. Theory and metatheory. 7.1.2. A theory of legal science as a metascience. 7.1.3. A theory of (empirical) legal science. 7.1.4. A theory of (empirical legal) science as applied metatheory. . . . 7.2. (Meta)theoretical theses of an (empirical) legal science. 7.2.1. Epistemological thesis. 7.2.2. Meta-ethical thesis. 7.2.3. Methodological thesis. 197 197 200 201 205 206 208 209 212 Chapter 8. Legal and Social Sciences: What are the Links?. 215 Véronique Champeil-Desplats 8.1. Social sciences, a factor in redefining legal sciences. 218
Contents 8.1.1. Epistemological movements: the positioning of legal sciences between exact, physical and natural sciences and social sciences . 8.1.2. Heuristic movements: the reinvigoration of legal sciences by the social sciences. 8.2. The modalities of disciplinary articulations. 8.2.1. Difficulties and pitfalls. 8.2.2. Interdisciplinary experiences and the pragmatism of interweaving knowledge. 8.3. References. Chapter 9. A Hermeneutic Reading of Law and Lega) Theory: Regarding Paul Ricœur. ix 218 221 225 225 228 231 235 Xavier ВЮҮ and Thomas Escach-Dubourg 9.1. The outcome of a long journey, from the interpretive method to a general epistemology. 9.1.1. A philosophy of interpretation. 9.1.2. A hermeneutic of symbols as a propaedeutic of a grand philosophy: the symbol suggests. 9.2. Hermeneutic and textual disciplines. 9.2.1. The conceptual break brought about by textual hermeneutics: the paradigm of
textuality. 9.2.2. The methodological break brought about by textual hermeneutics: reading and textual interpretation. 9.3. Law as a hermeneutical discipline. 9.3.1. Interpretation of the law: quoting the law and understanding it are one and the same thing. 9.3.2. Interpretation by law and interpretation in law. Chapter 10. Legal Science According to the Pure Theory of Law. . 237 237 243 247 248 253 257 257 260 265 Thomas Hochmann 10.1. The negation of legal science (Sander). 10.2. The defense of legal science (Merki). 10.3. Legal science pushed into the background (Keisen). 10.3.1. Absence of denial of legal science. 10.3.2. A theory of law, not of legal science. 10.3.3. An interest in decision, not knowledge. 10.3.4. A regression: the theory of the tacit alternative clause. 267 270 276 277 278 279 281
x Meta-theory of Law Chapter 11. Axiological Neutrality, Oppositional Thinking and Knowledge. 285 Jean-Baptiste PoiNTEL 11.1. The three aspects of a theory. 11.1.1. Pascal’s wager, a textbook case. 11.1.2. A scientific theory of law. 11.1.3. A factual analysis of “ought to be”. 11.2. “Hume’s Guillotine”, a false foundation for axiological neutrality . . 11.2.1. The definition of “Hume’s Guillotine”, an error of interpretation. 11.2.2. The meaning of “Hume’s Guillotine”, explaining its motivations. 11.2.3. The consequence of “Hume’s Guillotine”, a return to argument. 11.2.4. Purity or axiological neutrality, a return to Max Weber. 11.2.5. Language acts in John L. Austin, the inevitable fusion between descriptive and prescriptive. 11.2.6. Platonic reductionism, a problematological repression. 11.2.7. The importance of the implicit, a more scientific approach . . . 11.3. Oppositional commitment to the
theory. 11.3.1. The critical eye, connecting analysis to policy. 11.3.2. Scientific purity, a political program. 11.3.3. Methodological anarchism, a basis for research. 11.3.4. The archaeology of knowledge, a critical method. 11.3.5. Example: the concept of state tyranny. 11.3.6. Oppositional knowledge in law, a program to be defined. 11.4. A new disciplinary ethics, but for which academic field?. 11.5. References. Chapter 12. Legal Science and Its Roles in Legal Reasoning. 285 286 288 289 290 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 298 298 299 300 302 303 304 305 306 311 Fábio Perin Shecaira 12.1. The concept of a source of law. 12.1.1. Explicit reference in legal practice. 12.1.2. Prescriptions that serve as content-independent reasons. 12.2. Arguments from authority. 12.3. Types of scholarly authority. 12.3.1. Describing and prescribing. 12.3.2. Can legal science really serve as practical authority?. 12.3.3. A note on legitimate and
de facto authority. 311 312 313 314 316 316 319 323
Contents xi 12.4. Implications for jurisprudence . 12.5. Conclusion. 12.6. References. 324 327 327 Chapter 13. Inference to the Best Explanation in Legal Science; on Balancing Contrastive Hypotheses. 329 David Duarte 13.1. Normative propositions in legal science. 13.2. Inference to the best explanation. 13.3. Speculative (hypothetical) normative propositions and inference to the best explanation . 13.4. Contrastive hypotheses in balancing. 13.5. References. 329 337 List of Authors. 359 Index. 361 343 346 353 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1074539761 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048556908 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1353781769 (DE-599)BVBBV048556908 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01817nam a2200433 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048556908</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230109 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">221111s2022 a||| b||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781789450743</subfield><subfield code="c">hardback</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-78945-074-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1353781769</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV048556908</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Meta-theory of law</subfield><subfield code="c">coordinated by Mathieu Carpentier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">London, UK</subfield><subfield code="b">ISTE Ltd</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Hoboken, NJ</subfield><subfield code="b">John Wiley & Sons, Inc.</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xviii, 363 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sociology, Ethics and Epistemology of Sciences : epistemology of Normative Sciences</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4126505-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtsphilosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4048821-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Metatheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4299409-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Recht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4048737-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Jurisprudence / Philosophy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rechtstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4126505-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Rechtsphilosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4048821-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Recht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4048737-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Metatheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4299409-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Carpentier, Mathieu</subfield><subfield code="d">1974-</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1074539761</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-1-394-16368-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033933174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033933174</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048556908 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:58:51Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:41:24Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781789450743 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033933174 |
| oclc_num | 1353781769 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xviii, 363 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | ISTE Ltd John Wiley & Sons, Inc. |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Sociology, Ethics and Epistemology of Sciences : epistemology of Normative Sciences |
| spelling | Meta-theory of law coordinated by Mathieu Carpentier London, UK ISTE Ltd 2022 Hoboken, NJ John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2022 xviii, 363 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Sociology, Ethics and Epistemology of Sciences : epistemology of Normative Sciences Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd rswk-swf Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd rswk-swf Metatheorie (DE-588)4299409-3 gnd rswk-swf Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd rswk-swf Jurisprudence / Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 s Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 s DE-604 Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 s Metatheorie (DE-588)4299409-3 s Carpentier, Mathieu 1974- Sonstige (DE-588)1074539761 oth Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-394-16368-7 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033933174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Meta-theory of law Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd Metatheorie (DE-588)4299409-3 gnd Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4126505-1 (DE-588)4048821-4 (DE-588)4299409-3 (DE-588)4048737-4 |
| title | Meta-theory of law |
| title_auth | Meta-theory of law |
| title_exact_search | Meta-theory of law |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Meta-theory of law |
| title_full | Meta-theory of law coordinated by Mathieu Carpentier |
| title_fullStr | Meta-theory of law coordinated by Mathieu Carpentier |
| title_full_unstemmed | Meta-theory of law coordinated by Mathieu Carpentier |
| title_short | Meta-theory of law |
| title_sort | meta theory of law |
| topic | Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd Metatheorie (DE-588)4299409-3 gnd Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Rechtstheorie Rechtsphilosophie Metatheorie Recht |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033933174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT carpentiermathieu metatheoryoflaw |